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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
WADS WORTH REESE, PLLC, an Idaho 
professional corporation; CLARK A. REESE Supreme Court Case No. 46126 
CPA, P.C., an Idaho professional corporation; 
and WADS WORTH ACCOUNTING CPA, an 
Idaho professional corporation, 
Plaintiffs-Counterdefendants- Respondents, 
vs. 
SIDDOWAY & COMPANY, PC, an Idaho 
professional corporation; RANDY 
SIDDOWAY, an individual, 
Defendants-Counterclaimants- Appellants. 
SIDDOWAY & COMPANY, PC, an Idaho 
professional corporation; RANDY 
SIDDOWAY, an individual, 
Counterclaimants-Appellants, 
vs. 
FREDERICK WADSWORTH, an individual; 
and CLARK A. REESE, an individual, 
Counterdefendants-Respondents. 
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, in and for the County of Ada. 
GLENN W. GODFREY, JR. 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
EAGLE, IDAHO 
HONORABLE JASON D. SCOTT 
VAUGHN FISHER 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
Wadsworth Reese PLLC, Clark A Reese, Wadsworth
Accounting CPA 
╘vs.







Location: Ada County District Court
Judicial Officer: Scott, Jason D.
Filed on: 12/14/2015
Case Number History:
Appellate Case Number: 46126-2018
CASE INFORMATION
Case Type: AA- All Initial District Court 
Filings (Not E, F, and H1)
Case
Status:





Court Ada County District Court
Date Assigned 01/08/2016
Judicial Officer Scott, Jason D.
PARTY INFORMATION
Lead Attorneys
Plaintiff Reese, Clark A Fisher, Vaughn
Retained
208-345-7000(W)
Wadsworth Accounting CPA Fisher, Vaughn
Retained
208-345-7000(W)
Wadsworth Reese PLLC Fisher, Vaughn
Retained
208-345-7000(W)
Defendant Barkan, Jeanine Mahoney, Jennifer Reid
Retained
208-342-4591(W)
Siddoway & Company PC
Unknown from Source Data
Retained




Unknown from Source Data
Retained
Counter Claimant Siddoway & Company PC
Unknown from Source Data
Retained
Siddoway, Randy
Unknown from Source Data
Retained
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DATE EVENTS & ORDERS OF THE COURT INDEX
12/14/2015 New Case Filed Other Claims





12/17/2015 Affidavit of Service
Affidavit Of Service (12.16.2015)
12/21/2015 Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Order to Show Cause 02/03/2016 02:30 PM)
12/21/2015 Order
Order to Show Cause (2/3/16 @ 2:30 pm)
12/22/2015 Affidavit of Service
(3) Affidavit Of Service (12.16.2015)
12/24/2015 Answer
Answer (Jeanine Barkan Pro Se)
12/24/2015 Affidavit of Service
(2) Affidavit Of Service (12/23/15)
12/30/2015 Affidavit of Service
(2) Affidavit Of Service (12/28/15)
01/04/2016 Motion
Defendant Randy Siddoway's Motion For Disqualification without Cause
01/06/2016 Hearing Vacated




01/08/2016 Certificate of Mailing
Certificate Of Mailing
01/08/2016 Change Assigned Judge: Self Disqualification
Change Assigned Judge: Self Disqualification
01/08/2016 Transcript Filed
Notice Of Reassignment - Judge Scott
01/19/2016 Answer
Answer and Counterclaim (Hastings for Randy Siddoway and Siddoway & Company PC)
01/19/2016 Motion
Motion for Pro Hac Vice Admission
01/19/2016 Motion
Motion to Compel Arbitration
01/27/2016 Order
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Order Granting Pro Hac Vice Admission
01/27/2016 Amended
Amended Motion For Order To Show Cause Hearing
01/28/2016 Order
Procedural Order Regarding Motion for Order to Show Cause
01/28/2016 Notice of Appearance
Notice Of Appearance (Angstman Johnson for Dustin Siddoway)
02/02/2016 Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 02/23/2016 03:00 PM) Preliminary Injunction
02/03/2016 CANCELED Order to Show Cause Hearing (2:30 PM)  (Judicial Officer: Bail, Deborah A.)
Vacated
02/04/2016 Motion
Motion to Reschedule Preliminary Injuction Hearing
02/08/2016 Notice of Service
(3) Notice Of Service
02/09/2016 Notice
Notice Vacaing Show Cause Hearing
02/09/2016 Hearing Vacated
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 02/23/2016 03:00 PM: Hearing Vacated Preliminary
Injunction
02/12/2016 Motion
Motion To Compel Arbitration
02/12/2016 Request
Request To Submit Decision
02/12/2016 Motion
Motion Denying Validity of the Arbitration Agreement 
02/16/2016 Notice of Service
2- Notice Of Service
02/17/2016 Order
Order Establishing Briefing Schedule
02/17/2016 Amended
(2) Amended Notice of Deposition
02/18/2016 Affidavit of Service
Affidavit Of Service 2.15.16
02/18/2016 Affidavit of Service
Affidavit Of Service 2.16.16
02/18/2016 Notice of Service
Notice Of Service
02/23/2016 CANCELED Motion Hearing (3:00 PM)  (Judicial Officer: Scott, Jason D.)
Vacated
Preliminary Injunction Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 02/23/2016 03:00 PM: 
Hearing Vacated
ADA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT
CASE SUMMARY
CASE NO. CV-OC-2015-21225
PAGE 3 OF 30 Printed on 09/26/2018 at 2:59 PM000 04
03/02/2016 Opposition to
Clark A. Reese CPA, P.C.'s Opposition to Motion to Compel Arbitration
03/02/2016 Affidavit
Affidavit of Clark A. Reese in Opposition to Motion to Compel Arbitration
03/02/2016 Affidavit
Affidavit of Vaughn Fisher in Opposition to Motion to Compel Arbitration
03/02/2016 Motion
Motion to Request Hearing on Plaintiff's Opposition to Motion to Compel Arbitration
03/04/2016 Answer
Answer of Dustin Siddoway (Johnson for Dustin Siddoway)
03/07/2016 Reply
Reply Of Clark A. Reese CPA, P.C. And Wadsworth Accounting CPA, PLLC To Randy 
Siddoway And Siddoway And Compay P.C.'s Counterclaims
03/09/2016 Affidavit
Affidavit Of Randy Siddoway in Support Of Motion To Compel Arbitration
03/09/2016 Reply
Reply to Plaintiff Reese's Opposition to Motion to Compel Arbitration
03/18/2016 Motion
Motion for Leave to Withdraw as Counsel of Record for Defendant Dustin Siddoway
03/18/2016 Affidavit in Support of Motion
Affidavit of Counsel In Support Of Motion to Withdraw as Counsel of Record for Defendant 
Dustin Siddoway
03/18/2016 Notice of Hearing
Notice Of Hearing on Motion for Leave to Withdraw as Counsel of Record for Defendant 
Dustin Siddoway
03/21/2016 Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 04/05/2016 03:00 PM) Motion for Leave to Withdraw as Counsel 
of Record
03/23/2016 Motion
Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint
03/23/2016 Memorandum
Memorandum In Support of Motion To Amend Complaint
03/24/2016 Response
Response In Opposition To Plaintiff's Motion To Amend Complaint
04/04/2016 Motion
Motion for Telephonic Participation
04/05/2016 Order
Order on Motion for Telephonic Participation
04/05/2016 DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter: # of Pages:
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 04/05/2016 03:00 PM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Cromwell
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: (<50) Motion for Leave to Withdraw 
as Counsel of Record 
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04/05/2016 Motion Hearing (3:00 PM)  (Judicial Officer: Scott, Jason D.)
Motion for Leave to Withdraw as Counsel of Record Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 
04/05/2016 03:00 PM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Cromwell
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: (<50)
04/06/2016 Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 04/26/2016 03:30 PM) to Compel Arbitration
04/06/2016 Notice of Hearing
Notice Of Hearing (4.26.16 at 3:30 PM)
04/06/2016 Amended
Amended Notice of Hearing (4.26.16 at 3:30PM)
04/20/2016 Proof of Service
Proof Of Service Of Order
04/21/2016 Notice of Appearance
Notice Of Appearance for Defendant Dustin Siddoway (Siddoway Pro Se)
04/26/2016 DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter: # of Pages:
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 04/26/2016 03:30 PM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Olesek
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: (<50) to Compel Arbitration
04/26/2016 Affidavit of Service
Affidavit Of Service (4.24.2016)
04/26/2016 Motion Hearing (3:30 PM)  (Judicial Officer: Scott, Jason D.)
to Compel Arbitration Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 04/26/2016 03:30 PM: District 
Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Olesek
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: (<50)
05/04/2016 Affidavit of Service
Affidavit Of Service (5.3.2016)
05/06/2016 Affidavit of Service
Affidavit Of Service (5/4/16)
05/10/2016 Memorandum
Memorandum Decision and Order
05/10/2016 Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Status / Scheduling / Settlement Conf 05/31/2016 01:30 PM)
05/12/2016 Motion
Defendant Randy Siddoways Motion For Partial Summary Judgment
05/12/2016 Memorandum
Memorandum In Support Of Randy Siddoways Motion For Partial Summary Judgment
05/16/2016 Motion
Plaintiffs Motion To Compel Discovery
05/16/2016 Affidavit
Affidavit Of Vaughn Fisher In Support Of Motion To Compel Discovery
05/16/2016 Memorandum
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Plaintiffs Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Compel Discovery
05/16/2016 Memorandum of Costs
Defendant Randy Siddoway's Memorandum of Costs
05/16/2016 Affidavit
Affidavit of Attorney Brett W Hastings of Basis And Computation of Attorney's Fees
05/16/2016 Notice of Hearing
Notice Of Hearing
05/16/2016 Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Compel 06/08/2016 03:30 PM) Motion To Compel Discovery
05/24/2016 Amended
Amended Complaint For Dissociation, Damages And Declaratory Relief
05/24/2016 Miscellaneous
Defendant's Dustin Siddoway's Opposition To Motion To Compel 
05/24/2016 Declaration
Declaration Of Defendant Dustin Siddoway In Opposition To Motion To Compel
05/27/2016 Stipulation
Stipulation for Scheduling and Planning
05/31/2016 Hearing Vacated
Hearing result for Status / Scheduling / Settlement Conf scheduled on 05/31/2016 01:30 PM: 
Hearing Vacated
05/31/2016 Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference 04/19/2017 03:30 PM)
05/31/2016 Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 05/08/2017 09:00 AM) 5
05/31/2016 Motion
Motion to Disallow Randy Siddoway's Request for Attorney Fees





Hearing result for Motion to Compel scheduled on 06/08/2016 03:30 PM: Hearing Vacated 
Motion To Compel Discovery 




06/08/2016 CANCELED Motion to Compel (3:30 PM)  (Judicial Officer: Scott, Jason D.)
Vacated
Motion To Compel Discovery Hearing result for Motion to Compel scheduled on 06/08/2016 
03:30 PM: Hearing Vacated
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06/20/2016 Answer
Answer and Counterclaim of Defendants Randy Siddoway and Siddoway & Company in 
Response to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint
06/20/2016 Motion
Motion to Stay Arbitration
06/20/2016 Memorandum
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Stay Arbitration
06/20/2016 Notice of Hearing
Notice Of Hearing
06/20/2016 Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 07/06/2016 03:00 PM) Plaintiffs' Motion to Stay Arbitration
06/22/2016 Notice of Appearance
Notice Of Appearance (Fisher For Clark A Reese)
06/22/2016 Notice




Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 07/06/2016 03:00 PM: Hearing Vacated Plaintiffs' 
Motion to Stay Arbitration 
06/24/2016 Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 08/11/2016 09:00 AM) Memo of 
Costs and Fees, Motion to Stay Arbitration
06/27/2016 Motion
Motion for Preliminary Injuction
06/27/2016 Affidavit in Support of Motion
Affidavit of Vaughn Fisher In Support Of Motion for Preliminary Injuction
06/27/2016 Memorandum
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injuction
06/27/2016 Notice of Hearing
Notice Of Hearing
06/27/2016 Motion
Motion to Shorten Time
06/27/2016 Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 06/29/2016 02:00 PM) Motn. for Preliminary Injunction
06/28/2016 Response
Siddoway's Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Shorten Time
06/28/2016 Hearing Vacated
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 06/29/2016 02:00 PM: Hearing Vacated Motn. for 
Preliminary Injunction
06/28/2016 Order
Order Denying Motion to Shorten Time
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06/28/2016 Amended
Amended Notice of Hearing (Motion for PReliminary Injunction) 7.19.16@2:30pm
06/28/2016 Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 07/19/2016 02:30 PM) Motion for Preliminary Injunction
06/29/2016 CANCELED Motion Hearing (2:00 PM)  (Judicial Officer: Scott, Jason D.)
Vacated
Motn. for Preliminary Injunction Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 06/29/2016 02:00 
PM: Hearing Vacated
07/06/2016 CANCELED Motion Hearing (3:00 PM)  (Judicial Officer: Scott, Jason D.)
Vacated
Plaintiffs' Motion to Stay Arbitration Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 07/06/2016 
03:00 PM: Hearing Vacated
07/12/2016 Response
Response in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction
07/14/2016 Motion for Summary Judgment
Motion For Partial Summary Judgment
07/14/2016 Affidavit in Support of Motion
Affidavit Of Jennifer Hanway In Support Of Motion For Partial Summary Judgment
07/14/2016 Memorandum
Memorandum In Support of Motion For Partial Summary Judgment
07/14/2016 Notice of Hearing
Notice Of Hearing (8.11.16 at 9:00 AM) Motion For Partial Summary Judgment
07/15/2016 Motion
Motion to Shorten Time
07/15/2016 Affidavit
Supplemental Affidavit of Jennifer Hanway in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction
07/19/2016 DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter: # of Pages:
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 07/19/2016 02:30 PM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Cromwell
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: (<50) Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction
07/19/2016 Order
Order Granting Motion to Shorten Time
07/19/2016 Motion Hearing (2:30 PM)  (Judicial Officer: Scott, Jason D.)
Motion for Preliminary Injunction Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 07/19/2016 02:30 
PM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Cromwell




Memorandum in Support of Siddoway's Motion to Reconsider
07/21/2016 Motion
Motion to Shorten Time
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07/22/2016 Order




Memorandum in Support of Siddoway's Motion to Reconsider
07/25/2016 Affidavit in Support of Motion
Affidavit of Randy Siddoway In Support Of Motion
07/26/2016 Order
Procedural Order on Second Motion to Reconsider
07/28/2016 Stipulation
Stipulation To Extend The Deadline To File Responses To Motions For Partial Summary
Judgment
07/29/2016 Response
Response in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment
07/29/2016 Affidavit
Affidavit in Support of Response to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
07/29/2016 Memorandum
Memorandum in Response to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
08/01/2016 Response
Response in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment
08/01/2016 Memorandum
Memorandum in Opposition to Second Motion to Reconsider 
08/01/2016 Notice
Notice Of Errata To Affidavit Of Vaughn Fisher In Support Of Plaintiffs Response To 
Defendant Randy Siddoways Motion For Partial Summary Judgment
08/03/2016 Reply
to Plaintiff's Response to Randy Siddoway's Second Motion to Reconsider
08/03/2016 Response
and Affidavit in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Objection
08/03/2016 Reply
to Plaintiffs' Response to Randy Siddoway's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
08/03/2016 Reply
to Plaintiffs' Response to Randy Siddoway's Second Motion to Reconsider
08/04/2016 Objection
Objection To Reply To Plaintiffs Response To Randy Siddoways Second Motion To Reconsider
08/09/2016 Order
Order on Siddoway's Second Motion to Reconsider and on Reese's Motion to Stay Arbitration
08/09/2016 Notice of Service
08/11/2016 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (9:00 AM)  (Judicial Officer: Scott, Jason D.)
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Order Granting Motion to Disallow Siddoway's Request for Costs and Attorney Fees
08/11/2016 Order
Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
08/18/2016 Memorandum
Decision and Order on Siddoway's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
08/22/2016 Answer
of Defendant Jeanine Barkan to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint
08/23/2016 Memorandum of Costs
08/23/2016 Affidavit
of Attorney B. Hastings of Basis and Computation of Attorney's Fees
08/23/2016 Memorandum
in Support of Award of Attorney Fees to Siddoway
08/29/2016 Motion
for Permission to Appeal
08/29/2016 Memorandum In Support of Motion
for Permission to Appeal
08/31/2016 Notice of Hearing
09/06/2016 Motion




Notice of Deposition Of Leslie Shuter
09/09/2016 Notice of Taking Deposition
-Mike Shuter
09/09/2016 Notice of Taking Deposition
-Barry Van Buren
09/09/2016 Notice of Taking Deposition
-Don Cook
09/09/2016 Notice of Taking Deposition
-Joe Southworth
09/09/2016 Notice of Taking Deposition
-John Harry
09/09/2016 Notice of Taking Deposition
-Joseph Cestero
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09/09/2016 Notice of Taking Deposition
-Justin Simmons
09/09/2016 Notice of Taking Deposition
-Kelly Bartlett
09/09/2016 Notice of Taking Deposition
-Mark Rogers
09/09/2016 Notice of Taking Deposition
-Phil King
09/09/2016 Notice of Taking Deposition
-Shawna Bartlett
09/09/2016 Notice of Taking Deposition
-Shawna Bartlett









on Stipulation for Protection
09/14/2016 Notice of Taking Deposition
09/15/2016 Affidavit of Service
Affidavit of Service (09/15/16)
09/15/2016 Affidavit of Service
Affidavit of Service
09/15/2016 Affidavit of Service
Affidavit of Service (09/14/16)
09/15/2016 Affidavit of Service
Affidavit of Service (09/14/16)
09/15/2016 Affidavit of Service
Affidavit of Service (09/14/16)
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09/15/2016 Affidavit of Service
Affidavit of Service (09/14/16)
09/15/2016 Affidavit of Service
Affidavit of Service (09/14/16)
09/16/2016 Notice
of Deposition of Dustin Siddoway
09/16/2016 Notice
of Deposition of Randy Siddoway
09/16/2016 Notice
of Deposition of Jeanine Barkan
09/19/2016 Notice of Appeal
09/19/2016 Appeal Filed in Supreme Court
09/19/2016 Notice of Taking Deposition
of Brett Hastings
09/19/2016 Notice of Taking Deposition
of Stacey Simmons
09/19/2016 Amended
Notice of Deposition of Mark Rogers









Order Denying Motion to Shorten
10/31/2016 Notice of Hearing
11/15/2016 Memorandum
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Vacate Defendants Preliminary Injunction
Hearing
11/15/2016 Motion
Motion to Shorten Time
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Plaintiff's Motion to Vacate Defendants Preliminary Injunction Hearing
11/15/2016 Affidavit
Affidavit of Vaughn Fisher in Opposition to Siddoway's Motion for Preliminary Injunction
11/15/2016 Affidavit
Affidavit of Clark Reese in Opposition to Siddoway's Motion for Preliminary Injunction
11/15/2016 Memorandum
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Siddoway's Motion for Preliminary Injunction
11/17/2016 Response
in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Vacate
11/22/2016 Preliminary Injunction (2:00 PM)  (Judicial Officer: Scott, Jason D.)
11/22/2016 Court Minutes
12/14/2016 Notice of Hearing
12/15/2016 Order




to Confirm Aribitration Award and Enter Judgment
12/19/2016 Memorandum In Support of Motion
to Confirm Arbitration Award and Enter Judgment
12/19/2016 Motion
Motion to Confirm Arbitration Award
12/19/2016 Affidavit




Of Deposition Of Glenda Nelson
12/21/2016 Notice
Of Deposition Of Debbie Mason
12/21/2016 Notice
Of Deposition Of Rebecca Bishop
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12/22/2016 Status Conference (2:30 PM)  (Judicial Officer: Scott, Jason D.)
12/22/2016 Motion
for Leave to Amend
12/22/2016 Memorandum In Support of Motion
of Motion for Leave to Amend
12/22/2016 Affidavit of Service
of Vaughn Fisher in support of Motion for Leave to Amend
12/22/2016 Affidavit of Service
of Service-Mountain West Bank
12/22/2016 Affidavit of Service
of Service-Rebecca Bishop
12/22/2016 Affidavit of Service
of Service-Debbie Mason
12/22/2016 Affidavit
Affidavit of Service-Glenda Nelson




Plaintiff's Brief re: Procedure to Confirm Arbitration Award
12/28/2016 Memorandum
Memorandum Regarding Procedure for Judgment on Arbitration Award
12/30/2016 Memorandum
Memorandum Decision and Order on Siddoways Motion for Preliminary Injunction
01/03/2017 Order
Procedural Order Regarding Motions to Confirm Arbitration Award
01/03/2017 Amended
Notice of Deposition Duces Tecum Of Glenda Nelson
01/03/2017 Amended
Notice of Deposition Decus Tecum Of Rebecca Bishop
01/05/2017 Status Conference (3:00 PM)  (Judicial Officer: Scott, Jason D.)
01/10/2017 Order
Order Confirming Arbitration Award
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- Supreme Court No. 44492
01/11/2017 Civil Notice of Hearing
2/15/17 @ 3:30pm
01/13/2017 Notice
Notice of Deposition of Jeanine Barkan
01/13/2017 Notice
Notice of Deposition of Randy Siddoway
01/13/2017 Notice
Notice of Deposition of Dustin Siddoway
01/13/2017 Amended
Amended Notice of Deposition Duces Tecum of Debbie Mason
01/16/2017 Motion
Randy Siddoway's Motion to Quash Subpoena to Mountain West Bank
01/16/2017 Memorandum
Randy Siddoway's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Quash Subpoena to Mountain West
Bank
01/16/2017 Affidavit




for Motion to Quash Subpoena
01/17/2017 Declaration
in Support of Motion
01/18/2017 Notice
Notice of Hearing 2/5/17 @3:30pm
01/18/2017 Notice of Hearing
Second Notice of Hearing (02.15.2017 @ 3:30 PM)
01/23/2017 Motion
Motion for Leave to Amend Counterclaims
01/23/2017 Memorandum In Support of Motion
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Leave to Amend Counterclaims
01/24/2017 Affidavit of Service
1.23.17
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01/25/2017 Notice of Appearance
(Jennifer R. Mahoney/Jeanine Barkan & Dustin Siddoway)
01/25/2017 Notice of Appearance
Mahoney for Dustin and Jeanine
01/27/2017 Notice
Notice of Service
01/27/2017 Notice of Service
01/31/2017 Amended
Notice of Deposition - Debbie Mason
01/31/2017 Amended
Notice of Deposition - Randy Siddoway
01/31/2017 Amended
Notice of Deposition - Jeanine Barkan
01/31/2017 Amended
Notice of Deposition - Dustin Siddoway
01/31/2017 Amended
Notice of Hearing (2/28/17@3:30pm)
02/01/2017 Memorandum
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Compel Discovery
02/01/2017 Motion
Motion to Compel Discovery
02/01/2017 Affidavit
Affidavit of Jennifer Hanway
02/02/2017 Notice of Service
02/06/2017 Notice of Hearing
(02/28/2017 03:30 pm)
02/07/2017 Motion
Defendant Jeanine Barkan's Motion for Summary Judgment
02/07/2017 Memorandum
Defendant Jeanine Barkan's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
02/07/2017 Affidavit
of Counsel in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
02/07/2017 Declaration
of Randy Siddoway in Support of Barkan's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend
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of Jeanine Barkan in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
02/07/2017 Notice
Notice of Hearing 3/7/17 @ 3:15pm
02/07/2017 Motion
Defendant Dustin Siddoway's Motion for Summary Judgment
02/07/2017 Memorandum
Defendant Dustin Siddoway's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
02/07/2017 Affidavit







02/07/2017 Notice of Service
02/07/2017 Notice of Service
02/07/2017 Notice of Service
02/07/2017 Motion
Defendants Siddoway & Company PC's and Randy Siddoway's Motion for Summary Judgment
02/07/2017 Memorandum
in Support of Siddoway & Company, PC's and Randy Siddoway's Motion for Summary
Judgment
02/07/2017 Declaration
Declaration of His Motion for Summary Judgment
02/07/2017 Declaration
of Attorney Brett Hastings in Support of Randy Siddoway's Motion for Summary Judgment
02/07/2017 Miscellaneous
Deposition of Emily Harris
02/07/2017 Miscellaneous
Deposition of Kalyn Harding
02/07/2017 Miscellaneous
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Deposition of Shawna Bartlett
02/07/2017 Miscellaneous
Deposition of Barry Van Buren
02/07/2017 Miscellaneous
Deposition of Stacey Simmons
02/07/2017 Miscellaneous
Deposition of Frederick Wadsworth
02/07/2017 Miscellaneous
Deposition of Clark Reese
02/07/2017 Miscellaneous
Deposition of Glenda Nelson
02/07/2017 Miscellaneous
Deposition of Rebecca Bishop
02/08/2017 Affidavit
Affidavit of Service - Debbie Mason 2/8/17
02/13/2017 Notice
Notice of Service




02/14/2017 Notice of Hearing
02/14/2017 Motion
Joint Motion to Alter the Scheduling Order
02/15/2017 CANCELED Motion to Amend (3:30 PM)  (Judicial Officer: Scott, Jason D.)
Vacated
02/16/2017 Notice of Service
-Clark
02/16/2017 Notice of Service
-Wadsworth
02/21/2017 Memorandum
in Opposition to Defendants Motion for Leave to Amend Counterclaims
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Defendant Dustin Siddoway's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend re: 
Punitive Damages
02/21/2017 Objection
Defendant Jeanine Barkan and Dustin Siddoway's Objection to Motion to Vacate Trial
02/21/2017 Memorandum
Defendant Jeanine Barkan's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend
02/21/2017 Affidavit
Of Vaughn Fisher in Support of Plaintiffs Opposition to Dustin Siddoways Motion to Quash
Subpoena
02/21/2017 Memorandum
in Opposition to Dustin Siddoways Motion to Quash Subpoena
02/21/2017 Memorandum
in Opposition to Randy Siddoways Motion to Quash Subpoena
02/21/2017 Response
of Siddoway & Company, PC and Randy Siddoway in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Leave to Amend
02/24/2017 Order
re Joint Motion to Alter Scheduling Order
02/24/2017 Response
Reply to Plaintiffs' Opposition to Siddoway's Motion to Amend Counterclaims
02/24/2017 Notice of Service
02/24/2017 Notice of Service
02/27/2017 Notice of Service
Def Barkan's Discovery Response
02/28/2017 Motion Hearing - Civil (3:30 PM)  (Judicial Officer: Scott, Jason D.)
To Quash Subpoena To Mountain West Bank & Plaintiff's Motion For Leave To Amend & for 





Notice of Vacating and Resetting Hearing on Motions for Summary Judgment
03/06/2017 Notice of Hearing
4/18/17 at 3:00 pm
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03/07/2017 CANCELED Motion for Summary Judgment (3:15 PM)  (Judicial Officer: Scott, Jason D.)
Vacated
03/09/2017 Order
Denying Motion to Quash Subpoenas
03/09/2017 Order
on Plaintiff's Motion to Compel
03/09/2017 Notice of Service
03/09/2017 Notice of Hearing




Granting Leave to Amend Counterclaims
03/15/2017 Affidavit
of Costs
03/15/2017 Notice of Service
03/15/2017 Notice of Service




Defendants Dustin Siddoway and Jeanine Barkan's Supplemental Memorandum in Support of 
Motion for Summary Judgment








in opposition to Randy Siddoway's Motion for Summary Judgment
04/05/2017 Memorandum
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To Verrified Amended Counterclaim Of Randy Siddoway & Siddoway Company, Pc
04/11/2017 Reply
in Support of Randy's Motion for Summary Judgment
04/11/2017 Reply
Defendant Jeanine Barkan's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
04/11/2017 Affidavit
of Counsel re: Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
04/11/2017 Reply
Defendant Dustin Siddoway's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment
04/12/2017 Notice of Service
04/12/2017 Notice of Service
04/18/2017 Motion for Summary Judgment (3:00 PM)  (Judicial Officer: Scott, Jason D.)
04/18/2017 Court Minutes
05/05/2017 Notice of Service
05/10/2017 Order
ORDER AWARDING EXPENSES IN CONNECTION WITH PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO 
COMPEL
05/15/2017 Motion
Siddoway's Motion to Compel and for Finding of Contempt
05/15/2017 Memorandum
Siddoway's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Compel
05/15/2017 Affidavit
Affidavit of Attorney Brett W. Hastings in Support of Siddoway's Motion to Compel
05/18/2017 Memorandum
Decision and Order on Defendant's Motions for Summary Judgment and on Plaintiff's Motion 
to Amend
05/23/2017 Notice of Hearing
6/6/17 @ 3pm
ADA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT
CASE SUMMARY
CASE NO. CV-OC-2015-21225



















Second Amended Complaint For Dissociation, Damages, And Declaratory Relief
05/30/2017 Memorandum
in Opposition to Motion to Compel and for Finding of Contempt
05/30/2017 Affidavit
of Vaughn Fischer in Opposition to Motion to Compel and for Finding of Contempt
06/01/2017 Notice of Service
06/02/2017 Motion
Defendants Jeanine Barkan and Dustin Siddoway's Motion for Attorney Fees
06/02/2017 Memorandum of Costs & Attorney Fees
Defendants Jeanine Barkan and Dustin Siddoway's Memorandum of Costs and Fees
06/02/2017 Affidavit
of Wyatt B. Johnson
06/04/2017 Reply
in Support of Siddoway's Motion to Compel
06/06/2017 Motion to Compel (3:00 PM)  (Judicial Officer: Scott, Jason D.)
06/06/2017 Notice of Service
06/06/2017 Court Minutes
06/07/2017 Objection
Defendants Jeanine Barkan and Dustin Siddoway's Objection to Plaintiffs' Second Amended
Complaint
06/07/2017 Objection
Joinder to Objection to Second Amended Complaint
06/14/2017 Order
on Motion to Compel and Motion for Contempt
06/15/2017 Motion for Reconsideration
06/15/2017 Memorandum In Support of Motion
for Reconsideration
06/15/2017 Motion to Amend Complaint
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to Disallow Defendants Jeanine Barkan and Dustin Siddoway's Motion for Attorney Fees
06/16/2017 Memorandum
in Support of Motion to Disallow Defendants Jeanine Barkan and Dustin Siddoway's Motion 
for Attorney Fees
06/16/2017 Notice of Hearing
8/9/17 @ 3:00pm
06/22/2017 Notice of Service
06/27/2017 Notice of Service
06/27/2017 Motion for Summary Judgment
06/27/2017 Memorandum In Support of Motion
07/06/2017 Order
Denying Motion to Reconsider
07/07/2017 Notice of Service
07/07/2017 Notice of Service
07/11/2017 Affidavit
of Clark A. Reese in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment
07/26/2017 Amended
Amended Memorandum in Support of Motion to Amend Complaint and Add Party
07/31/2017 Memorandum
07/31/2017 Motion to Compel
07/31/2017 Affidavit
07/31/2017 Notice of Hearing
8/15/2017 @ 3:00pm
08/02/2017 Memorandum
Defendant Dustin Siddoway's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend 
Complaint and Add New Party
08/02/2017 Response
in Opposition to Plaintiffs Third Motion to Amend
08/04/2017 Response
to Motion for Continuance
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for Continuance and to Shorten Time
08/04/2017 Memorandum In Support of Motion
08/07/2017 Motion
Motion for Telephonic Participation
08/08/2017 Notice
Notice to Withdraw Motion for Leave to Amend
08/09/2017 Motion to Amend (3:00 PM)  (Judicial Officer: Scott, Jason D.)
Complaint
08/09/2017 Order
on Motion for Telephonic Participation
08/09/2017 Court Minutes
08/09/2017 Response
Response in Opposition to Motion to Compel
08/10/2017 Motion for Summary Judgment








08/14/2017 Notice of Service
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Decision and Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend Complaint and Add Party
08/24/2017 Response
08/24/2017 Notice of Hearing
10/3/2017 @ 3:00 pm
08/25/2017 Motion
for Leave for Over Length Brief
08/25/2017 Memorandum In Support of Motion
Memo in Support of Motion for Over Length Brief
08/25/2017 Notice of Hearing
9/7/2017 @ 3:00 pm
08/29/2017 Order
Granting Motion to Shorten Time
08/29/2017 Order
Granting Leave to File Over Length Brief
08/29/2017 Opposition to
Plaintiff's Oppostion To Motion for Leave To File Over Length Memorandum
08/31/2017 Reply
Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
09/04/2017 Memorandum In Support of Motion
Memorandum in Support of Siddoways Motion Summary Judgment (Amended)
09/05/2017 Notice of Service
09/06/2017 Stipulation
for Dismissal with Prejudice and for Entry of Judgment re: Defendants Jeanine Barkan and 
Dustin Siddoway
09/06/2017 Notice of Service
09/07/2017 Motion for Summary Judgment (3:00 PM)  (Judicial Officer: Scott, Jason D.)
09/07/2017 Judgment
re: Defendants Jeanine Barkan and Dustin Siddoway
09/07/2017 Order of Dismissal
with Prejudice
09/07/2017 Certificate of Mailing
09/07/2017
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Dismissed With Prejudice (Judicial Officer: Scott, Jason D.)
Party (Siddoway, Dustin; Barkan, Jeanine)
09/07/2017 Court Minutes
09/08/2017 Notice
09/13/2017 Notice of Service
09/18/2017 Memorandum
Decision and Order on Plaintiffs' Motion fo Summary Judgment
09/19/2017 Memorandum
In Opposition to Siddoway's Second Motion for Summary Judgment
09/19/2017 Declaration
of Frederick Wadsworh In Opposition to Siddoway's Second Motion for Summary Judgment
09/19/2017 Declaration
of Clark Reese In Opposition to Siddoway's Second Motion for Summary Judgment
09/19/2017 Motion
to Limit the Use of Exhibit Gto the Memorandum In Opposition to Siddoway's Second Motion 
for Summary Judgment
09/19/2017 Notice




in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to Limit Use of Exhibit G
09/26/2017 Reply
Siddoway's Reply Supporting Motion Summary Judgment
09/27/2017 Reply
In Support of Motion to Limit Use of Exhibit G
10/03/2017 Motion for Summary Judgment (3:00 PM)  (Judicial Officer: Scott, Jason D.)
10/03/2017 Court Minutes
10/10/2017 Order
Denying The Siddoway Defendant's 2nd Motion for Summary Judgment & To Limit Use of 
Exhibit G
10/10/2017 Motion
Plaintiff's Motion In limine
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10/10/2017 Memorandum In Support of Motion
In Limine
10/10/2017 Affidavit
Of Vaughn Fisher In Support Of Plaintiff's Motion In Limine
10/12/2017 Notice
Siddoway's Notice of Non-Opposition






Siddoway's Witness List for Trial
10/23/2017 Exhibit List/Log
Siddoway's Exhibit List for Trial
10/24/2017 Pre-trial Conference (3:00 PM)  (Judicial Officer: Scott, Jason D.)
04/19/2017 Continued to 10/24/2017 - Cont - Other - Wadsworth Accounting CPA
10/24/2017 Notice of Service
10/24/2017 Court Minutes
10/27/2017 Acceptance of Service
Re: Subpoena to Appear in Trial
10/27/2017 Affidavit of Service
10/30/2017 Affidavit of Service
10/27/17 - John Harry
10/31/2017 Affidavit of Service
Subpoena to Appear at Trial-Lyle Cook
11/03/2017 Subpoena Issued
and Filed - to Kalyn Harding
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Plaintiffs Second Exhibit List
11/07/2017 Jury Trial (9:00 AM)  (Judicial Officer: Scott, Jason D.)
7
05/08/2017 Continued to 11/07/2017 - Cont - Other - Wadsworth Accounting CPA
11/07/2017 Order
Granting Planitiffs' Motion in Limine
11/07/2017 Memorandum
re Oral Motion in Limine to Preclude the Testimony of Dylan Evans
11/07/2017 Affidavit in Support of Motion
of Jennifer Hanway
11/07/2017 Court Minutes
11/08/2017 Court Trial - Civil (9:00 AM)  (Judicial Officer: Scott, Jason D.)
11/08/2017 Court Minutes
11/09/2017 Court Trial - Civil (9:00 AM)  (Judicial Officer: Scott, Jason D.)
11/09/2017 Court Minutes
11/13/2017 Court Trial - Civil (9:00 AM)  (Judicial Officer: Scott, Jason D.)
11/13/2017 Court Minutes




to Extend Deadline to Submit Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
01/16/2018 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
01/16/2018 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Siddoway's Proposed Findings and Conclusions
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03/16/2018 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
03/16/2018 Judgment
03/16/2018 Certificate of Mailing
03/30/2018 Request
to Resubmit for Decision-Arbitration Legal Fees
03/30/2018 Motion
Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment
03/30/2018 Memorandum In Support of Motion




Granting Motion for Extension of Time
04/16/2018 Order
Denying Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment and Request for Attorney Fees
05/29/2018 Notice of Appeal
05/30/2018 Appeal Filed in Supreme Court
09/26/2018 Reporter's Notice of Transcript(s) Lodged
- Supreme Court No. 46126
DATE FINANCIAL INFORMATION
Defendant  Siddoway & Company PC
Total Charges 397.00
Total Payments and Credits 397.00
Balance Due as of  9/26/2018 0.00
Defendant  Siddoway, Randy
Total Charges 0.00
Total Payments and Credits 0.00
Balance Due as of  9/26/2018 0.00
Defendant  Barkan, Jeanine
Total Charges 136.00
Total Payments and Credits 136.00
Balance Due as of  9/26/2018 0.00
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Total Payments and Credits 136.00
Balance Due as of  9/26/2018 0.00
Plaintiff  Reese, Clark A
Total Charges 136.00
Total Payments and Credits 136.00
Balance Due as of  9/26/2018 0.00
Plaintiff  Wadsworth Reese PLLC
Total Charges 221.00
Total Payments and Credits 221.00
Balance Due as of  9/26/2018 0.00
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Vaughn Fisher, ISB No. 7624 
Allison M. Blackman, ISB No. 8686 
Fisher Rainey Hudson 
950 West Bannock Street, Ste. 630 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 345-7000 
Facsimile: (208) 514-1900 
vaughn@frhtriallawyers.com 
naw@frhtriallawyers.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
• No FILED L ~ 45 A.M. ____ P ..M . ..:..:.-.:---
DEC 14 2015 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By SANTIAGO BARRIOS 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
WADSWORTH REESE, PLLC, an Idaho 
Professional Corporation; CLARK A. REESE 
CPA, P.C., an Idaho Professional Corporation; 
and WADSWORTH ACCOUNTING CPA, an 
Idaho Professional Corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SIDDOWAY & COMPANY, PC, an Idaho 
professional corporation; RANDY 
SIDDOWAY, an individual; DUSTIN 
SIDDOWAY, an individual and JEANINE 
BARKAN, an individual; 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV O C 15 2 1 2 2 5 
VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR 
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF, PRELIMINARY 
INJUNCTION, DISSOCIATION, 
RECISSION AND DAMAGES 
PARTIES, JURISDICTION, VENUE 
1. Plaintiff Wadsworth Reese PLLC ("WR PLLC") is an Idaho professional 
corporation in good standing with the Idaho Secretary of State and is formerly known as Siddoway, 
Wadsworth & Reese, PLLC. 
VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF, 




2. Plaintiff Clark A. Reese CPA, P .C. ("Reese PC") is an Idaho professional 
corporation in good standing with the Idaho Secretary of State and is a member of WR PLLC. 
I I 
3. Plaintiff Wadsworth Accounting CPA, PLLC ("Wadsworth PLLC") is an Idaho 
professional corporation in good standing with the Idaho Secretary of State and is a member of 
WRPLLC. 
4. Defendant Siddoway & Company, P.C. ("Siddoway Co.") is an Idaho 
professional corporation in good standing with the Idaho Secretary of State and is a member of 
WRPLLC. 
5. Defendant Randy Siddoway ("Randy") is an individual resident of the State of 
Idaho, residing in Ada County and, upon information and belief, the sole member of Siddoway 
Co. 
6. Defendant Dustin Siddoway ("Dustin") is an individual resident of the State of 
Idaho and a former employee of WR PLLC. 
7. Defendant Jeanine Barkan ("Barkan") is an individual resident of the State of 
Idaho and a former employee of WR PLLC. 
8. Plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to the WR PLLC Operating Agreement, the 
Idaho Uniform Limited Liability Company Act and other applicable law. 
9. Plaintiffs, including WR PLLC, are proper parties pursuant to LC. §§30-6-902, 
30-6-903 and by the vote of Reese PC and Wadsworth PLLC. 
10. Siddoway Co. has renounced its duties to WR PLLC, has utilized WR PLLC 
property to its detriment, has solicited employees from WR PLLC and has helped Dustin acquire 
more than 283 former WR PLLC clients for his new accounting practice, for which reasons a 
demand under I. C. §30-6-902(1) would be futile. 
l 
VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF, PRELIMINARY 





The amount in controversy is greater than the sum of $10,000.00. 
Based upon the above allegations and pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-404, this claim 
satisfies the jurisdictional prerequisites of the District Court and venue is proper in this action. 
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 
13. On December 20, 2013, Clark Reese ("Clark") and Randy filed a Certificate of 
Organization with the Idaho Secretary of State organizing WR PLLC (then known as CRS 
Services, PLLC) as a professional limited liability company. 
14. The Certificate of Organization listed Clark and Randy as either members or 
I 
managers of WR PLLC. 
15. On January 1, 2014 WR PLLC entered into a Purchase Agreement with Non-
Competition Agreement with Harding & Co. P.A. ("Harding Agreement"). 
16. Pursuant to the Harding Agreement, WR PLLC purchased the following assets 
from Harding & Co., P.A.: 
a. All of the equipment, computers, computer programs/software, client lists, 
furniture, marketing materials, signs, tools, client files, inventory, and fixtures, 
plus all other property used in conducting the Harding & Co., P.A. business. 
b. All leasehold improvements and leasehold rights of Harding & Co., P.A. at 
I 
I 
the premises of 357 East Watertower Lane, Meridian, ID, 83642. 
c. All of Harding & Co., P.A.'s goodwill. 
d. The right to Harding & Co., P.A.'s telephone number(s) and listing in the 
telephone books. 
e. All clients, client lists, client files and information. 
I 
VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR JNJUlCTIVE RELIEF, 
INJUCTION, DISSOCIATION, RECISSION AND DAMAGES - 3 
PRELIMINARY 
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17. In return for the assets, WR PLLC agreed to pay to Harding Co., P.A. 60% of the 
average annual collections for services performed in 2014 and 2015, including amounts collected 
through April 30, 2016. 
18. The purchase price was to be paid pursuant to a promissory note over a five year 
period with interest accruing at 6%. 
19. Harding Co., PA and its owner, Kalyn Harding ("Kalyn") agreed not to compete 
with WR PLLC and Kalyn and other former Harding Co., PA employees accepted positions with 
WRPLLC. 
20. On or about January 6, 2014 Reese PC, Wadsworth PLLC, and Siddoway Co. 
executed an Operating Agreement for WR PLLC: 
a. The January 6, 2014 Operating Agreement was the first governing document 
for WR PLLC other than the Certificate of Organization filed on December 
20, 2013. 
b. The January 6, 2014 Operating Agreement listed Reese PC, Wadsworth PLLC 
and Siddoway Co. as the members of WR PLLC. 
c. The January 6, 2014 Operating Agreement changed the name of WR PLLC 
from CRS Services, PLLC to Siddoway, Wadsworth & Reese, PLLC. 
d. The January 6, 2014 Operating Agreement listed each of the three members' 
capital contribution to WR PLLC.as $100. 
21. On January 14, 2014 WR PLLC filed an Amendment to Certificate of 
Organization with the Idaho Secretary of State changing the name of WR PLLC from CRS 
Services, PLLC to Siddoway, Wadsworth & Reese, PLLC. 
VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF, PRELIMINARY 
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22. On or about January 20, 2014, WR PLLC hired Dustin to work for it as a certified 
professional accountant. 
23. Dustin's terms of employment were negotiated by Randy. 
24. Randy is Dustin's uncle. 
25. The offer to employ Dustin with WR PLLC was made by Randy. 
26. Randy has never produced a signed, written contract between WR PLLC and 
Dustin covering the substance of Dustin's employment with WR PLLC. 
27. Upon information and belief, Randy permitted Dustin to work for WR PLLC 
without having Dustin execute a written contract. 
28. Randy has never produced a signed, written contract restricting Dustin's ability to 
compete with WR PLLC or otherwise exploit his exposure to WR PLLC clients, including those 
purchased from Harding & Co, P.A. 
29. Upon information and belief, Randy permitted Dustin to work for WR PLLC 
without having Dustin execute a written contract restricting Dustin's ability to compete with WR 
PLLC for clients with whom he established a relationship while an employee of WR PLLC. 
30. On or about January 28, 2015, Reese PC and Siddoway Co entered into an Asset 
Sale Agreement ("Reese Agreement"). 
31. Pursuant ,to the Reese Agreement, Reese PC purportedly purchased from 
Siddoway & Co. the right to receive a one third interest and membership in WR PLLC (then 
known as Siddoway, Wadsworth & Reese, PLLC). 
32. The Reese Agreement purports to value the one third interest and membership at 
"one half the value of certain assets to be contributed." 
VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF, PRELIMINARY 
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33. At the time Reese P.C. entered into the Reese Agreement, Reese PC was already a 
member of WR PLLC. 
34. The Reese Agreement fails to list the "certain assets" to be contributed. 
35. The Reese Agreement fails to specify to where those certain assets will "be 
contributed." 
36. The Reese Agreement contained a Non-Compete prov1s1on which prohibits 
Siddoway Co. and Randy from competing with WR PLLC in certain specified business activities 
within a 25 mile radius of Boise, ID for a period of two years after they cease to be associated 
with WR PLLC. 
37. The Reese Agreement Non-Compete provision also prohibits Siddoway Co. and 
Randy from directly or indirectly soliciting or servicing on behalf of himself or on behalf or in 
conjunction with others, any client or customer, or prospective client or customer who has been 
solicited or served by WR PLLC prior to the closing date (January 1, 2014). 
38. The Reese Agreement Non-Compete provision provides that if Siddoway Co. or 
Randy violate the Non-Compete restrictions that Siddoway Co. and-or Randy will pay back to 
Reese P.C. any amounts paid under the Reese Agreement plus interest of 6%. 
39. As of the filing of this action, Reese PC has paid $28,000 to Siddoway Co. 
pursuant to the Reese Agreement. 
40. In July of 2015, Randy informed Clark and Frederick Wadsworth ("Frederick") 
that he was done with public accounting in general and that he desired to leave WR PLLC. 
41. In July 2015 WR PLLC used a consultant to negotiate a buy-out for Siddoway 
Co.'s interest in WR PLLC. 
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42. Subsequently the members of WR PLLC failed to reach an agreement on the 
value of Siddoway Co.'s interest in WR PLLC. 
43. On August 21, 2015 Randy informed Clark and Frederick that effective August 
21, 2015 he was resigning from his management duties with WR PLLC. 
44. On August 21, 2015 Randy informed Clark and Frederick that on August 24, 
2015 he would start taking clients from WR PLLC and servicing them in a new entity. 
45. Randy also informed Clark and Frederick that he was going to offer employment 
in his new entity to certain WR PLLC employees, including Dustin and Barkan. 
46. On August 21, 2015 Dustin gave notice of termination of his employment. 
4 7. After Dustin terminated his employment he was asked not to return to the 
premises. 
48. On or around the evening of August 26, 2015 Randy facilitated Dustin's re-entry 
to the premises and Clark Reese and Jennifer Reese observed Randy sharing information from 
his computer with Dustin. 
49. On August 24, 2015 Barkan gave notice of termination of her employment 
effective immediately. 
50. On August 24, 2015 Dustin approached Kalyn Harding, Debbie Mason and 
Glenda Nelson, all of whom are former Harding employees, and offered them employment with 
his new tax accounting entity. 
51. On August 24, 2015, Barkan filed a Certificate of Organization with the Idaho 
Secretary of State organizing a limited liability company called AnchorPoint, LLC. 
52. Upon information and belief, Randy and-or Siddoway Co. was the principal 
owner of AnchorPoint, LLC. 
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53. On August 24, 2015, Randy emailed a spreadsheet containing a WR PLLC client 
list to both Dustin and Barkan. 
54. Barkan along with Randy used the spreadsheet containing the WR PLLC client 
list as a guide for trying to get WR PLLC clients to leave WR PLLC for Dustin's new accounting 
firm. 
55. Barkan along with Randy encoded the spreadsheet with information regarding 
which person (including Randy and the former Harding & Co. employees) would be best suited 
to solicit each WR PLLC client to transfer from WR PLLC to Dustin's new accounting firm. 
56. Barkan forwarded the spreadsheet containing the WR PLLC clients to Dustin on 
August 28, 2015 for his use in soliciting WR PLLC clients. 
57. On August 26, 2015, Dustin filed Certificate of Organization with the Idaho 
Secretary of State organizing a professional limited liability company called AnchorPoint 
Accounting, PLLC. 
58. Also on August 26, 2015, Barkan filed a Certificate of Organization with the 
Idaho Secretary of State organizing a limited liability company called AnchorPoint Advisory, 
LLC. 
59. On September 17, 2015 Randy and Barkan filed an Amendment to Certificate of 
Organization with the Idaho Secretary of State changing the name of AnchorPoint, LLC to 
Siddoway Advisory Services, LLC. 
60. From August 21, 2015, forward, Randy assisted Dustin and AnchorPoint 
Accounting, PLLC in taking clients away from WR PLLC even though Siddoway Co. continues 
to be a member of WR PLLC. 
VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF, PRELIMINARY 
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61. For example, Randy had a meeting scheduled with former WR PLLC client Don 
Cook on September 3, 2015. 
62. Upon information and belief, Randy, Don Cook, and Don Cook's associate 
attended the September 3, 2015 Don Cook meeting which took place at WR PLLC's offices and 
was witnessed by a member of WR PLLC. 
63. Later on September 3, 2015, after Randy's meeting with Don Cook and his 
associate, Don Cook caused a written notice to be delivered to WR PLLC by AnchorPoint 
Accounting, PLLC indicating that he needed his papers and electronic documents released to 
Dustin's new accounting firm, AnchorPoint Accounting, PLLC. 
64. As another example, Randy had a meeting with former WR PLLC client Barry 
Van Beuren of Meridian Steel Erectors, Inc. on September 9, 2015. 
65. Upon information and belief, Dustin attended the September 9, 2015 Barry Van 
Beuren meeting. 
66. Later on September 9, 2015, after his meeting with Randy, Barry Van Beuren 
caused a written notice to be delivered to WR PLLC by AnchorPoint Accounting, PLLC 
indicating that he needed his papers and electronic documents, along with those of Meridian 
Steel Erectors, Inc., released to Dustin's new accounting firm, AnchorPoint Accounting, PLLC. 
67. As another example, on or near October 19, 2015, Randy was contacted by Pro 
Tech Roofing, Inc. to address their end of the year accounting. 
68. Upon information and belief, Randy then had a discussion or meeting with Scott 
Lottman, Mark Rogers and-or Office Manager Denise Clark. 
69. On October 20, 2015, after speaking with Randy, Scott Lottman signed a written 
notice indicating that he needed his papers and electronic documents, along with those of Rogers 
VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF, PRELIMINARY 
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& Lottman, LLC and Pro Tech Roofing, Inc., released to Dustin's new accounting firm, 
AnchorPoint Accounting, PLLC. The notice was delivered by AnchorPoint Accounting, PLLC. 
70. On October 20, 2015, after speaking with Randy, Mark Rogers signed a written 
notice indicating that he needed his papers and electronic documents, released to Dustin's new 
accounting firm, AnchorPoint Accounting, PLLC. The notice was delivered by AnchorPoint 
Accounting, PLLC. 
71. As of the filing of this lawsuit more than 283 individuals and companies have 
transitioned from WR PLLC to AnchorPoint Accounting, PLLC. 
72. Upon information and belief, Randy participated in transitioning a significant 
I 
amount of the more than 283 transferees. 
73. Upon information and belief, Randy has been continuously contacting WR PLLC 
clients and asking them to transfer from WR PLLC to AnchorPoint Accounting, PLLC. 
74. For example, on October 1, 2015, Randy called Mike Teeter of MJT Construction 
in an effort to discuss tax accounting. 
75. Randy made this call despite his pronouncements that he is no longer in the 
business of tax accounting. 
76. From August 21, 2015 forward Randy has assisted Dustin in convincing 
employees to leave WR PLLC even though Siddoway Co. continues to be a member of WR 
PLLC. 
77. For example, on August 25, 2015 Kalyn Harding, Debbie Mason and Glenda 
Nelson, all former WR PLLC employees, resigned their positions with WR PLLC and took jobs 
with AnchorPoint Accounting, PLLC. 
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78. Upon information and belief, Randy helped Dustin to recruit WR PLLC 
employees for his new company even though Siddoway Co. continued to be a member of WR 
PLLC. 
79. At the time Kalyn Harding accepted a position with AnchorPoint Accounting, 
PLLC, she was the subject of a non-compete clause in favor of WR PLLC which was contained 
in the Harding Agreement. 
80. A short time after accepting employment in violation of the non-compete 
agreement, Kalyn Harding renounced her employment with AnchorPoint Accounting, PLLC. 
81. Nonetheless, Debbie Mason and Glenda Nelson were former employees of 
Harding & Co., P.A. with significant relationships with the clients that joined WR PLLC as a 
result of the Harding Agreement. 
82. Although WR PLLC continues to be liable to Kalyn Harding under the Harding 
Agreement, Randy and Dustin have utilized Debbie Mason and Glenda Nelson to encourage 
former Harding clients to leave WR PLLC for AnchorPoint Accounting, LLC. 
COUNTI 
Injunctive Relief for Violation of the Idaho Trade Secrets Act-
1.C. §§ 48-801 & 48-802 
(Randy, Siddoway Co., Dustin, & Barkan) 
I 
83. The Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re-allege all previous paragraphs of this 
Complaint. 
84. Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief against Randy, Siddoway Co., Dustin, and Barkan 
for their actual misappropriation of WR PLLC's client list which constitutes a trade secret. 
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85. The August 24, 2015 spreadsheet containing the WR PLLC client list, along with 
sensitive and proprietary information regarding hours billed and fees charged to the customers by 
WR PLLC is a trade secret as defined by LC. §48-801(5). 
86. Randy's mailing of the spreadsheet to Dustin and Barkan was a misappropriation 
of trade secrets as defined by LC. §48-801(2). 
87. As of the filing of this complaint more than 283 individuals and businesses have 
left WR PLLC for AnchorPoint Accounting, PLLC. 
88. Plaintiffs have suffered and contin~e to suffer immediate and irreparable injury, 
loss and damage as a result of the use of the spreadsheet by Randy, Siddoway Co., Dustin and 
Barkan. 
89. Plaintiffs are entitled to an order granting injunctive relief pursuant to LC. §48-
802 preventing Randy, Siddoway Co., Dustin and Barkan from utilizing the spreadsheet and the 
information contained therein. The Court should grant preliminary injunctive relief prohibiting 
the Defendants from: 
a. Contacting any current or former clients of WR PLLC that are on the 
spreadsheet; 
b. Sharing with AnchorPoint Accbunting, PLLC any information about the 
I 
former and current WR PLLC clients that are on the spreadsheet; 
c. Receiving any remuneration from providing services to former WR PLLC 
clients that are on the spreadsheet. · 
COUNT II 
Preliminary Injunction Pu~suant to 1.R.C.P. 65 
(Randy & Siddoway Co.) 
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90. The Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re-allege all previous paragraphs of this 
Complaint. 
91. Randy and Siddoway Co. owe a fiduciary duty to Plaintiffs, including those duties 
specifically set forth in I.C. §30-6-409. 
92. By their actions as set forth above, Randy and Siddoway Co. have breached and 
continue to breach their fiduciary duties causing Plaintiffs irreparable harm. 
93. Plaintiffs are entitled to restrain Randy and Siddoway Co. from dealing with WR 
PLLC and its past and present clients on behalf of Dustin and AnchorPoint Accounting PLLC, 
which have interest which are adverse to WR PLLC. 
94. The continuing acts of Randy and Siddoway Co. have caused and will cause 
irreparable injury to WR PLLC. 
95. Plaintiffs are entitled to an order granting injunctive relief pursuant to I.R.C.P. 65 
preventing Randy and Siddoway Co. from breaching their fiduciary duty to WR PLLC. The 
Court should grant preliminary injunctive relief prohibiting the Defendants from: 
a. Contacting any current or former clients of WR PLLC on behalf of Dustin, 
AnchorPoint Accounting, PLLC ~r any other business; 
b. Sharing with AnchorPoint Accounting, PLLC or any entity or individual any 
information about former and current WR PLLC clients; 
c. Receiving any remuneration from providing services to former WR PLLC 
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96. The Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re-allege all previous paragraphs of this 
Complaint. 
97. Plaintiffs seek a judicial order dissociating Siddoway Co. from WR PLLC. 
98. Siddoway Co. engaged, or is engaging, in wrongful conduct that has adversely 
and materially affected, or will adversely and materially affect WR PLLC's business activities. 
99. Siddoway Co. has willfully or persistently committed, or is willfully and 
persistently committing, a material breach of WR PLLC's operating agreement and its duties or 
obligations under LC. § 30-6-409. 
100. Siddoway Co. has engaged in, or is engaging in, conduct relating to the WR 
PLLC's business activities which makes it not reasonably practicable to carry on business 
activities with Siddoway Co. 
101. WR PLLC has suffered damages as a result of the actions taken by Siddoway Co. 
and its principal, Randy, for which Siddoway Co. should dissociated from its membership 
interest in WR PLLC. 
102. In the event that Siddoway Co. is found to be entitled to the value of Membership 
Interest in WR PLLC, as defined in the Operating Agreement, that value should be diminished 
by all damages suffered by WR PLLC as a result of the actions taken by Siddoway Co. and its 
principal, Randy. 
COUNTIV 
Breach of Fiduciary Duty 
(Siddoway Co. & Randy) 
103. The Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re-allege all previous paragraphs of this 
Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 
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104. WR PLLC is an Idaho professional limited liability company organized pursuant 
to the Idaho professional limited liability company Act. 
105. At all times alleged herein, Siddoway Co. was a member and one-third owner of 
WRPLLC. 
106. As a member and one-third owner of WR PLLC, Siddoway Co. owed a fiduciary 
duty to WR PLLCC and to the other two members and one-third owners: (1) Reese PC, and (2) 
Wadsworth PLLC. 
107. As set forth above, Siddoway Co. breached its fiduciary duty to (1) WR PLLC, 
(2) Reese PC, and (3) Wadsworth PLLC by the acts of misfeasance and malfeasance described 
herein. 
108. Randy is an officer and owner of Siddoway Co. 
109. Randy participated in and orchestrated Siddoway's breach of fiduciary duty as set 
forth herein. 
110. As a proximate result of Siddoway Co.'s breach of fiduciary duty, (1) WR PLLC, 
(2) Reese PC, and (3) Wadsworth PLLC, have suffered damages for which they are entitled to 
recover in an amount to be proven at trial. 
111. The aforementioned acts of Siddoway 1Co. and Randy, were and continue to be 
willful, oppressive, fraudulent, and malicious, for which Plaintiffs reserve the right to seek leave 
to amend this Complaint pursuant to LC. §6-1604. 
COUNT'.V 
Civil Conspiracy to Commit Breach of Fiduciary Duty 
(Siddoway Co., Randy, Dustin & Barkan) 
112. The Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re-allege all previous paragraphs of this 
Complaint. 
I 
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113. By engaging in the foregoing conduct, including but not limited to Siddoway 
Co.'s, Randy, Dustin and Barkan's secret play to steal WR PLLC's client information list, 
selectively solicit key employees and provide other confidential information to a competing 
business while still associated with WR PLLC, and doing so with full knowledge of each other's 
actions, Siddoway Co., Randy, Dustin and Barkan entered into an agreement to accomplish an 
unlawful purpose or to accomplish a lawful purpose by unlawful means. 
114. Siddoway Co., Randy, Dustin and Barkan have conspired to act in concert to 
facilitate a breach of fiduciary duty by Siddoway Co. and Randy. 
115. As a proximate result of Defendants' civil conspiracy and the actual breach of 
fiduciary duty, (1) WR PLLC, (2) Reese PC, and (3) Wadsworth PLLC, have suffered damages 
for which they are entitled to recover in an amount to be proven at trial. 
116. The aforementioned acts of Siddoway Co., Randy, Dustin and Barkan were and 
continue to be willful, oppressive, fraudulent, and malicious, for which Plaintiffs reserve the 
right to seek leave to amend this Complaint pursuant to LC. §6-1604. 
COUNT VI 
Violation of the Idaho Trade Secret Act-
1.C. §§ 48-801, 48-802, & 48-803 
(All Defendants) 
117. The Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re-allege all previous paragraphs of this 
Complaint. 
118. The August 24, 2015 spreadsheet containing the WR PLLC client list, along with 
sensitive and proprietary information regarding hours billed and fees charged to the customers by 
WR PLLC is a trade secret as defined by LC. §48-801(5). 
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119. Randy's mailing of the spreadsheet to Dustin and Barkan was a misappropriation 
of trade secrets as defined by I.C. §48-801(2). 
120. As of the filing of this complaint more than 283 individuals and businesses have 
left WR PLLC for AnchorPoint Accounting, PLLC. 
121. Plaintiffs have suffered and continue to suffer damages as a result of the 
Defendants' misappropriation of trade secrets for which they are entitled to recover in an amount 
to be proven at trial. 
COUNT VII 
Interference with Prospective Business Advantage 
(All Defendants) 
122. The Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re-allege all previous paragraphs of this 
Complaint. 
123. WR PLLC enjoys an economic relationship and a valid economic expectancy 
with many customers with whom it has provided services to, and with whom it expects to 
contract in the future. 
124. All Defendants have knowledge of this relationship and economic expectancy, 
and of the economic benefit it brings to WR PLLC. 
125. Defendants have and continue to, intentionally interfere with WR PLLC's 
economic relationship with its clients by soliciting them to end their relationship with WR 
PLLC. 
126. Defendants' acts of intentional interference are wrongful pursuant to the Idaho 
Trade Secrets Act I.C. §§ 48-801 et al., I.C. §30-6-409 and common law. 
I 
\ 
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127. In utilizing the spreadsheet and other proprietary information the Defendants used 
a wrongful means to cause injury to the Plaintiffs' prospective business relationship with its 
clients. 
128. The actions of Randy and Siddoway Co. were wrongful and improper in that 
Siddoway Co. is still a member of WR PLLC. 
129. As a result of Defendants' intentional interference with the Plaintiffs' prospective 
business relationships, Plaintiffs have suffered damages for which they are entitled to recover in 
an amount to be proven at trial. 
130. Defendants aforementioned acts were and continue to be willful, oppressive, 
fraudulent, and malicious, for which Plaintiffs r~serve the right to seek leave to amend this 
Complaint pursuant to LC. §6-1604. 
COUNT VIII 
Civil Conspiracy to Interfere with Prospective Economic Advantage 
(All Defen~ants) 
131. The Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re-allege all previous paragraphs of this 
Complaint. 
132. By engaging in the foregoing conduct, including but not limited to Siddoway 
Co.'s, Randy, Dustin and Barkan's secret play to steal WR PLLC's client information list, 
selectively solicit key employees and provide other confidential information to a competing 
business while still associated with WR PLLC, and doing so with full knowledge of each other's 
actions, Siddoway Co., Randy, Dustin and Barkan entered into an agreement to accomplish an 
unlawful purpose or to accomplish a lawful purpose by unlawful means. 
133. The Defendants have conspired to act in concert thereby facilitating an intentional 
interference with prospective economic advantage. 
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134. As a proximate result of Defendants' civil conspiracy and the actual intentional 
interference with prospective economic advantage, (1) WR PLLC, (2) Reese PC, and (3) 
Wadsworth PLLC, have suffered damages for which they are entitled to recover in an amount to 
be proven at trial. 
135. The aforementioned acts of Defendants were and continue to be willful, 
oppressive, fraudulent, and malicious, for which Plaintiffs reserve the right to seek leave to 
amend this Complaint pursuant to I.C. §6-1604. 
COUNTIX 
Breach of Confidence 
(All Defendants) 
136. The Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re-allege all previous paragraphs of this 
Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 
13 7. When WR PLLC disclosed its non-trnde secret proprietary information, including 
but not limited to its client lists to Defendants, it did so in confidence in the course of its 
membership and/or an employee-employer relationship, and therefore Defendants owed WR 
PLLC a legal duty of confidence to maintain the information in a confidential and proprietary 
' 
manner, and not to use the information for Defendants' own purposes. 
138. Defendants accepted the non-trade secret proprietary information as alleged 
herein voluntarily and for the purpose of their association and/or employment with WR PLLC, 
thereby owing WR PLLC a duty of confidence wit4 respect to the WR PLLC's non-trade secret 
proprietary information. 
1 
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139. Defendants have willfully and in conscious disregard for the duty of confidence 
owed to WR PLLC, used for Defendants' own purposes and disclosed to others WR PLLC's 
non-trade secret proprietary information. 
140. As a proximate result of Defendants' Breach of Confidence, (1) WR PLLC, (2) 
Reese PC, and (3) Wadsworth PLLC, have suffered damages for which they are entitled to 
recover in an amount to be proven at trial. 
141. The aforementioned acts of Defendants, were and continue to be willful, 
oppressive, fraudulent, and malicious, for which Plaintiffs reserve the right to seek leave to 
amend this Complaint pursuant to I.C. §6-1604. 
COUNTX 
Civil Conspiracy to Commit Breach of Confidence 
(All Defendants) 
142. The Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re-allege all previous paragraphs of this 
Complaint. 
143. By engaging in the foregoing conduct, including but not limited to Defendants' 
secret play to steal WR PLLC's client information list, selectively solicit key employees and 
provide other confidential information to a competing business while still associated with WR 
PLLC, and doing so with full knowledge of each other's actions, Defendants entered into an 
agreement to accomplish an unlawful purpose or to accomplish a lawful purpose by unlawful 
means. 
144. The Defendants have conspired to act in concert thereby facilitating a breach of 
confidence. 
I 
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145. As a proximate result of Defendants' civil conspiracy and the actual breach of 
confidence, (1) WR PLLC, (2) Reese PC, and (3) Wadsworth PLLC, have suffered damages for 
which they are entitled to recover in an amount to be proven at trial. 
146. The aforementioned acts of Defendants were and continue to be willful, 
oppressive, fraudulent, and malicious, for which Plaintiffs reserve the right to seek leave to 
amend this Complaint pursuant to LC. §6-1604. 
COUNT XI 
Breach of the Reese Agreement - Rescission 
(Siddoway Co.) 
14 7. The Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re-allege all previous paragraphs of this 
Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 
148. The acts of Siddoway Co. and Randy were and are a material breach of the Reese 
Agreement which destroys the purpose for entering into the contract. 
149. The Reese Agreement is vague and unclear regarding what consideration, if any, 
Reese P.C. was to receive in return for its payment of $200,000. 
150. Reese PC has no adequate remedy at law. 
151. The acts of Siddoway Co. and Randy have caused a failure of consideration 
entitling Reese P.C. to rescission of the Reese Agreement. 
COUNT XII 
Breach of the Reese Agreement - Damages 
(Siddoway Co. & Randy) 
152. The Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re-allege all previous paragraphs of this 
Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 
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154. Siddoway Co. and Randy breached the Reese Agreement by inducing the clients 
of WR PLLC to hire AnchorPoint Accounting, PLLC and Siddoway Advisory Services, LLC 
(formerly known as AnchorPoint, LLC). 
155. Plaintiff Reese P .C. has been damaged as a result of the actions of Siddoway Co. 
and Randy for which it is entitled to recover in an amount of at least $28,000 plus interest to be 
proven at trial 
COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES 
Therefore, pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(3), Plaintiffs are entitled to recover their 
attorney fees and costs of suit in an amount deemed reasonable by this Court. 
from: 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendants as follows: 
1. That a preliminary injunction be issued restraining the Defendants from: 
a. Contacting any current or former clients of WR PLLC that are on the 
spreadsheet referenced in paragraph 53 of this complaint; 
b. Sharing with AnchorPoint Accounting, PLLC any information about the 
former and current WR PLLC clients that are on the spreadsheet 
referenced in paragraph 53 of this complaint; 
c. Receiving any remuneration from providing services to former WR PLLC 
clients that are on the spreadsheet referenced in paragraph 53 or this 
complaint. 
2. That a preliminary injunction be i~sued restraining Siddoway Co. and Randy 
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I 
INJUCTION, DISSOCIATION, RECISSION AND DAMAGES - 22 
000054
• 
a. Contacting any current or former clients of WR PLLC on behalf of Dustin, 
l 
AnchorPoint Accounting, PLLC or any other business; 
b. Sharing with AnchorPoint Accounting, PLLC or any entity or individual 
any information about form~r and current WR PLLC clients; 
c. Receiving any remuneration from providing services to former WR PLLC 
clients or for assisting others in providing services to former WR PLLC 
clients. 
3. For a Court Order dissociating Siddoway Co. from WR PLLC; 
4. For a Court Order rescinding the Reese Agreement; 
5. An award of damages in an amount to be proven at trial; 
6. An award of Plaintiffs' attorney fees and costs of suit incurred herein; 
7. An award of pre-judgment and post-judgment interest; and 
8. For such other and further relief as this Court deems just, equitable and proper. 
v.fl..._ 
DATED this_/_,_ day of December, 2015. 
FISHER RAINEY HUDSON 
I 
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I, Sf-e-Ffar11e, {,o 'f , a notary public do hereby certify that on this flf~ day of 
December, 2015, personally appeared before me Clark A. Reese, who, being by me first duly 
sworn, declare that the statements herein contained are true. 
. +l 
DATED this IL( - day of December, 2015. 
Clark A. Reese, on behalf of Plaintiffs 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this J.!i!:._ day of December, 2015. 
STEFFANIE COY 
Notary Public 
State of l~aho 
I 
Residing at: --'f2D~l=Je'------~~ 
My Commission Expires: f\,,{aV?k. 7 ~ 2 O 2..-o 
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Jeanine Barkan, In Pro Per 
922 W. Colchester Drive 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
208.938.5459 
In Pro Per for Defendant JEANINE BARKAN 
:~-. -d .........  --~-~-1 ,M-.::::::: 
DEC 2 4 2015 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By HALEY MYERS 
OE.PUTV 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
WADSWORTH REESE, PLLC, an Idaho 
Professional Corporation; CLARK A REESE 
CPA, P.C., an Idaho Professional 
Corporation; and WADSWORTH 




SIDDOWAY & COMPANY, PC, an Idaho 
Professional corporation; RANDY 
SIDDOWAY, an individual; DUSTIN 
SIDDOWAY, an individual and JEANINE 
BARKAN, an individual; 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 1521225 
ANSWER OF DEFENDANT 
JEANINE BARKAN 
Fee Category: __ _ 
Filing Fee: $ ___ _ 
Defendant, JEANINE BARKAN (hereinafter referred to as "defendant"), and for no 
other defendant, answer, admit, deny, affirmatively defend, and otherwise allege in response to 
the plaintiffs verified complaint for INJUNCTIVE RELIEF, PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION, 
DISSOCIATION, RECISSION AND DAMAGES (hereinafter referred to as "complaint") filed 
on December 14, 2015 herein as follows: 
ANSWER-1 
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1. Defendant denies, unless specifically admitted, generally and specifically each 
and every allegation set forth in the verified complaint of plaintiffs, and without waiving the 
generality of such denial, specifically deny that plaintiffs are or have been owed any contractual, 
fiduciary, confidential or tort duties, or any amounts of money, including but not limited to 
I 
anything of value to account for to plaintiff, as alleged or otherwise, from this answering 
defendant. 
2. Defendant answers and so generally and specifically deny each and every material 
allegation of the within complaint unless otherwise specifically admitted. 
3. Defendant admits the allegations contained in paragraph 7, 49, 51, 58, 59. 
4. Defendant denies the following paragraphs because I do not have personal 
knowledge or enough information to admit or den~ them: 53, 87, 120, 128. 
5. With respect to those allegations or causes of action in the complaint mentioning 
or directed to Defendant, Defendant denies paragraphs 54, 55, 56, 84, 85, 86, 88, 89, 113, 114, 
115, 116, 118, 119, 121, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 129, 130, 132, 133, 134, 135, 137, 138, 139, 
140,141,143,144,145,146 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
6. The complaint, and each cause of action thereof, does not state facts sufficient to 
constitute a cause of action against this answering defendant. 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
ANSWER-2 
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7. Plaintiff by its conduct has waived any and all claims or remedies, if any, against 
this answering defendant. 
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
8. Plaintiff by its conduct is barred from asserting any and all claims for money, or 
otherwise, or remedies, if any, against these answering defendant as a result of accord and 
satisfaction. 
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
9. Plaintiff by its conduct is barred from asserting any and all claims for money, or 
otherwise, or remedies, if any, against these answering defendants as a result of a novation, 
express or implied. 
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
10. Plaintiff failed to exercise reasonable care for its own protection, rights, and 
interest, if any, at all relevant times, and in connection with the alleged transactions, and as a 
result of such negligence, caused, contributed to, or brought about its own damages, if any, and 
knew or should have known that no duty, fiduciary or otherwise, was owed to plaintiff at all 
relevant times. Accordingly, in the event any answering defendant is found to owe plaintiff any 
duty, sum of money, or any thing of value, each defendant's liability, if any, must be reduced as 
a result of such comparative negligence of plaintiff. 
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
11. Plaintiff by its conduct is barred from asserting any and all claims or remedies, if 
ANSWER-3 
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any, against this answering defendant as a result of failure to mitigate damages. 
SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
12. Plaintiff by its conduct is barred from asserting any and all claims for money, or 
otherwise, or remedies, if any, against this answering defendant as a result of laches, causing 
prejudice to defendant by plaintiffs unreasonable delay in asserting the claims as set forth in the 
complaint herein. 
EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
13. Plaintiff by its conduct is barred from asserting any and all claims or remedies, if 
any, against this answering defendant as a result of applicable statutes of limitations. 
NINTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
14. Plaintiff lacks standing or capacity to sue generally, and to bring the instant 
action, by its failure to comply with applicable statutes, laws, or rules, respecting the alleged 
corporate status or interests, if any, of plaintiff. 
TENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
15. Plaintiff by its conduct is barred from asserting or enforcing any and all claims for 
money, or otherwise, or remedies, if any, against this answering defendant as a result of the 




ELEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
16. Plaintiff by its conduct, expressly, impliedly, or by ratification, is barred from 
asserting, enforcing any and all claims for money, or otherwise, or remedies, if any, against this 
answering defendant as a result of prior or subsequent modifications of material provisions of 
such writings or oral agreements, if any, in connection with the underlying transactions. 
TWELFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
I 
1 7. Plaintiff is barred from asserting, collecting, or enforcing any and all claims for 
I 
money, or otherwise, or remedies, if any, against ~s answering defendant in connection with the 
I 
purported transactions, as alleged in the instant complaint, as a result of plaintiffs unclean 
hands, including, but not limited to, sexual discrimination. 
THIRTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
18. Plaintiff is barred from asserting, collecting, or enforcing any and all claims for 
money, or otherwise, or remedies, if any, against this answering defendant in connection with the 
purported transactions, as alleged in the instant complaint, as a result of plaintiffs having acted 
in pari delicto with other defendants, assigns, agents, or other third parties to bring about all of 
the loss or injury, if any, complained of by plaintiff in its complaint on file herein. 
FOURTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
I 
19. In the event that any answering defendant is found, in any manner, degree, or 
extent, to have owed plaintiff any duties, whether statutory, generally, or in equity, for which 
such defendant is further found liable, each answering defendant alleges that other persons 
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and/or entities are primarily liable for any and all such claims, sums of monies, or duties, and 
that such other persons, entities, or parties should be made to pay any judgment rendered any 
answering defendant, in full, or in substantial part, under the principles of equitable 
indemnification. 
FIFTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
20. Each answering defendant alleges that each is entitled to a setoff and/or offset 
against any amounts established to be owed to plaintiff in connection with the transactions 
alleged in plaintiff's complaint. 
SIXTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
21. Defendant is and was privileged and justified in any conduct alleged by and 
against Defendant in the complaint. 
WHEREFORE, these answering defendants pray for judgment as follows: 
1. That plaintiffs take nothing by the instant complaint and that the complaint be 
dismissed; 
2. For costs of suit incurred hereby; 
3. For reasonable attorney fees; 
4. For such other and further relief the Court may deem just and proper. 
Date: December 24, 2015 
ANSWER-6 
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- I ./ 
Glenn W. Godfrey, Jr. 
GODFREY LAW, PLLC 
842 E. Winding Creek Drive 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: (208) 392-1551 
Email: GodfreyLawPLLC@gmail.com 
Idaho Bar No. 1662 
Local Counsel 
Brett W. Hastings 
HASTINGS LAW GROUP, LLC 
Wells Fargo Center, 13th Floor 
299 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Email: Brett@HastingsLaw.us 
Telephone: (801) 721-8066 
Utah Bar No. 15442 
Applying Counsel 
JAN 1 B 2016 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF THE ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
WADSWORTH REESE, PLLC, an Idaho 
professional corporation; CLARK A. REESE 
CPA, P.C., an Idaho professional corporation; 
and WADSWORTH ACCOUNTING CPA, 
and Idaho professional corporation, 
Plaintiffs 
V. 
SIDDOWAY & COMPANY, PC, an Idaho 
professional corporation; RANDY · 
SIDDOWAY, an individual; DUSTIN 
SIDDOWAY; an individual; and JEANINE 
BARKAN, an individual, 
Defendants 
ANSWER AND COUNTERLAIM OF 
DEFENDANTS RANDY SIDDOWAY 
AND SIDDOWAY & COMPANY, PC 




Defendant RANDY SIDDOWAY ("Mr. Siddoway"), through legal counsel, answers 
and responds to the specific paragraphs of the Complaint filed against Defendants in this matter 
as follows: 
1. Mr. Siddoway lacks sufficient knowledge to admit or deny the allegations in paragraph 1. 
2. Mr. Siddoway lacks sufficient knowledge to admit or deny the allegations in paragraph 2. 





8. The allegations in paragraph 8 are legal conclusions that require no response. To the 
extent a response is required, Mr. Siddoway denies the same. 
9. The allegations in paragraph 8 are legal conclusions that require no response. To the 
extent a response is required, Mr. Siddoway denies the same. 
10. Denied. 
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d. Mr. Siddoway admits that Exhibit A of the Operating Agreement listed each 
Member's initial cash contribution t<;> WR, PLLC as $ 100. Mr. Siddoway denies 






26. Mr. Siddoway admits that WR, PLLC, inclu~iing Plaintiffs, did not require a written 
cont~act as a condition of Dustin's employmlnt. Mr. Siddoway denies all other 
allegations in paragraph 26. 
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27. Mr. Siddoway admits that WR, PLLC, including Plaintiffs, did not require a written 
contract as a condition of Dustin's employment. Mr. Siddoway denies all other 
allegations in paragraph 27. 
28. Mr. Siddoway admits that WR, PLLC, including Plaintiffs, did not require a written 
contract as a condition of Dustin's employment. Mr. Siddoway denies all other 
allegations in paragraph 28. 
29. Mr. Siddoway admits that WR, PLLC, including Plaintiffs, did not require a written 
contract as a condition of Dustin's employment. Mr. Siddoway denies all other 
allegations in paragraph 29. 
30. Mr. Siddoway admits that on January 28, 2015, Reese PC and Siddoway Co. executed the 
written Reese Agreement which included an effective date of January 1, 2014. 
31. Mr. Siddoway admits that the written Reese Agreement provided for the sale of certain 
Siddoway Co. assets to Reese PC and for the simultaneous contribution by Reese PC of 
the same certain assets to WR, PLLC in exchange for a 1/3 interest in WR, PLLC. Mr. 
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37. Mr. Siddoway admits that the written Reese Agreement contains a provision, effective 
I 
upon Siddoway Co.'s dissociation from WR, PLLC, prohibiting Siddoway Co. from 
soliciting or servicing WR, PLLC clients, as they existed prior to January 1, 2014, for 
I 
I 
purposes of providing tax preparation, bookkeeping, or auditing services. Mr. Siddoway 
denies all other allegations in paragraph 37. 
I 
38. Mr. Siddoway admits that the written Reese Agreement provides that if paragraph 9 of 
I 
I 
the written Reese Agreement is violated, Siddoway Co. or Mr. Siddoway will repay to 
I 
Reese PC all payments made under the written Reese Agreement plus interest of 6%. 
Mr. Siddoway denies all other allegations in paragraph 38. 
39. Admitted. 
I 
40. Mr. Siddoway admits that in July of 2015, artd on previous occasions, he informed 
I 
I 
Plaintiffs that he desired to exit traditional p~blic accounting and pursue a business 
advisory practice, so long as a reasonable buyout of Siddoway Co. 's membership interest 
in WR, PLLC could be agreed upon. Mr. Siddoway denies all other allegations in 
paragraph 40. 
4 I . Admitted. 
42. Denied. Only July 17, 2015 Plaintiffs agreed, in writing, to buy Siddoway Co.' s 
I 
membership interest in WR, PLLC for $150,000. Plaintiffs then breached the July 17, 
2015 agreement by refusing to close the transLtion. 
43. Denied. 
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44. Mr. Siddoway admits that on or about August 21, 2015, he informed Plaintiffs that 
Siddoway Co. was planning to offer business advisory services to customers and clients, 
specifically not to include tax preparation, Jookkeeping, or audit services. Mr. Siddoway 
denies all other allegations in paragraph 44.\ · 
I 
45. Denied. 
46. Admitted. \ 
4 7. Mr. Siddoway lacks sufficient knowledge to admit or deny the allegations in paragraph 
4 7 and, therefore, denies the same. 
48. Mr. Siddoway admits that, with Plaintiffs filll knowledge, Dustin Siddoway was present 
I 
at the WR, PLLC offices for a brief period of time on August 26, 2015. Mr. Siddoway 
lacks sufficient knowledge to admit or deny ~II other allegations in paragraph 48 and, 
therefore, denies the same. 
49. Admitted. 
50. Upon information and belief, Mr. Siddoway believes that on or about August 24, 2015, 
j 
Dustin Siddoway offered employment to some WR, PLLC employees. 
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56. Mr. Siddoway lacks sufficient knowledge to admit or deny the allegations in paragraph 
56 and, therefore, denies the same. 
57. Upon information and belief, Mr. Siddoway believes that on August 26, 2015, Dustin 
Siddoway filed a Certificate of Organization with the Idaho Secretary of State organizing 




61. Mr. Siddoway admits that on or about September 3, 2015, at Don Cook's request, he met 
with Don Cook. Mr. Siddoway denies all other allegations in paragraph 61. 
62. Mr. Siddoway admits that on or about September 3, 2015, at Don Cook's request, he met 
with Don Cook and another person, at the WR, PLLC's offices. Mr. Siddoway lacks 
sufficient knowledge to admit or deny all other allegations in paragraph 62 and, therefore, 
I 
denies the same. 
63. Upon information and belief, Mr. Siddoway admits that at some point on or about 
September 3, 2015 Don Cook requested that his accounting records be released to 
AnchorPoint Accounting, LLC. Mr. Siddoway denies all other allegations in paragraph 
63. 
64. Mr. Siddoway admits that on or about September 9, 2015, at Barry Van Beuren's request, 
I 
he met with Mr. Van Beuren. Mr. Siddoway denies all other allegations in paragraph 64. 
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65. Mr. Siddoway admits that on or about Sept6mber 9, 2015, at Barry Van Beuren's request, 
Dustin attended a meeting with Mr. Van Be~ren. Mr. Siddoway denies all other 
allegations in paragraph 65. 
66. Upon information and belief, Mr. Siddoway admits that at some point on or about 
September 9, 2015 Mr. Van Beuren requested that WR, PLLC release his accounting 
records and the accounting records of Meridian Steel Erectors, Inc. to Anchor Point 
Accounting, LLC. Mr. Siddoway denies all jother allegations in paragraph 66. 
! 
I 
67. Mr. Siddoway admits that on or about October 19, 2015 he was contacted by Pro Tech 
I 
Roofing, Inc .. Mr. Siddoway denies all othet allegations in paragraph 67. 
68. Mr. Siddoway admits that on or about Octob~r 2015 he spoke with Scott Lottman, Mark 
Rogers and/or Denise Clark. Mr. Siddoway denies all other allegations in paragraph 68. 
I 
69. Upon information and belief, Mr. Siddoway admits that at some point on or about 
I 
I 
October 20, 2015, Scott Lottman requested that WR, PLLC release his accounting 
records and the accounting records of Rogers & Lottman, LLC and Pro Tech Roofing, 
Inc., to AnchorPoint Accounting, LLC. Mr. Siddoway denies all other allegations in 
paragraph 69. 
70. Upon information and belief, Mr. Siddoway admits that at some point on or about 
I 
October 20, 2015, Mark Rogers requested that WR, PLLC release his accounting records 
to AnchorPoint Accounting, LLC. Mr. SiddoLay denies all other allegations in 
paragraph 70. 
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71. Mr. Siddoway lacks sufficient knowledge to admit or deny the allegations in paragraph 






77. Mr. Siddoway admits that on or about Augbst 25, 2015, certain WR, PLLC employees 
were approached by Dustin and accepted employment with Dustin's company 
I. 




79. Mr. Siddoway lacks sufficient knowledge to admit or deny that Kalyn Harding accepted a 
I 
position with AnchorPoint Accounting, PLLC and, therefore, denies the allegation. 
l 
80. Mr. Siddoway lacks sufficient knowledge to admit or deny the allegations in paragraph 
80 and, therefore, denies the same. 
81. Admitted. 
82. Denied insofar as the allegations in paragraph 82 alleged actions by Mr. Siddoway. Mr. 
Siddoway lacks sufficient knowledge to ad!it or deny the other allegations of paragraph 
82 and, therefore, denies the same. 
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83. With respect to paragraph 83, Mr. Siddoway incorporates by reference all preceding 
answers and responses as though fully set forth in this section. 
84. Mr. Siddoway denies that the purported WR, PLLC client list constitutes a trade secret 
and denies all other allegations in paragraph 84. 
85. Denied. 
86. Denied. 
87. Mr. Siddoway lacks sufficient knowledge to admit or deny the allegations in paragraph 
87 and, therefore, denies the same. 
88. Denied. 
89. The allegations in paragraph 89 are legal conclusions that require no response. To the 
I 
extent a response is required, Mr. Siddoway denies the same. 
I 
COUNT II 
90. With respect to paragraph 90, Mr. Siddoway incorporates by reference all preceding 





93. The allegations in paragraph 93 are legal co,nclusions that require no response. To the 
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95. The allegations in paragraph 95 are legal conclusions that require no response. To the 
extent a response is required, Mr. SiddowaJ denies the same. 
I 
COUNT,111 
96. With respect to paragraph 96, Mr. Siddowat incorporates by reference all preceding 
answers and responses as though fully set fdrth in this section. 
97. The allegation in paragraph 97 is a request ~y Plaintiff's for relief and, therefore, requires 






101. The allegation in paragraph 101 is a conclusion of law and, therefore, requires no 
response. To the extent a response is required, Mr. Siddoway denies the same. 
102. The allegations in paragraph 102 are requejsts by Plaintiff for relief and, therefore, 
l 
reqmre no response. To the extent a response is required, Mr. Siddoway denies the same. 
COUNTIV 
I 
I 03. With respect to paragraph 103, Mr. Siddoway incorporates by reference all preceding 
answers and responses as though fully set forth in this section. 
I 
104. Admitted. 
I 05. Admitted. 
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I 06. Mr. Siddoway admits that, as a member of WR, PLLC, Siddoway Co. owes certain 
duties to WR, PLLC as reasonably modified by the WR, PLLC Operating Agreement. 
Mr. Siddoway denies all other allegations it) paragraph I 06. 
I 07. Denied. 
I 08. Admitted. 
1 09. Denied. 
110. Denied. 




112. With respect to paragraph 112, Mr. Siddolay incorporates by reference all preceding 
answers and responses as though fully set fJrth in this section. 





117. With respect to paragraph 117, Mr. Siddoway incorporates by reference all preceding 
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120. Mr. Siddoway lacks sufficient knowledge to admit or deny the allegations in paragraph 
120 and, therefore, denies the same. 
12 I . Denied. 
COUNT VII 
122. With respect to paragraph 122, Mr. Siddoway incorporates by reference all preceding 
answers and responses as though fully set forth in this section. 
123. Mr. Siddoway admits that WR, PLLC has economic relationships with its customers. 
Mr. Siddoway denies all other allegations in paragraph 123. 
124. Mr. Siddoway admits that WR, PLLC has economic relationships with its customers. 








131. With respect to paragraph 131, Mr. Siddoway incorporates by reference all preceding 
answers and responses as though fully set forth in this section. 
132. Denied. 
13 
Wadsworth v. Siddoway 







136. With respect to paragraph 136, Mr. Siddoway incorporates by reference all preceding 







142. With respect to paragraph 142, Mr. Siddoway incorporates by reference all preceding 






Wadsworth v. Siddoway 




14 7. With respect to paragraph 14 7, Mr. Siddoway incorporates by reference all preceding 






152. With respect to paragraph 152, Mr. Siddoway incorporates by reference all preceding 
answers and responses as though fully set forth in this section. 
153. The allegation in paragraph 153 is a conclusion oflaw and, therefore, requires no 
response. To the extent a response is required, Mr. Siddoway denies the same. 
154. Denied. 
155. Denied. 
COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES 
Denied. 
FIRST SEPARATE DEFENSE 
Mr. Siddoway denies generally and specifically each and every allegation set forth in the 
" 
Complaint except to the extent such allegation has been expressly admitted herein. 
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SECOND SEP ARA TE DEFENSE 
The Complaint fails to state any claim against Mr. Siddoway upon which relief can be 
granted. 
THIRD SEPARATE DEFENSE 
Some or all of Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the doctrine of unclean hands. 
FOURTH SEPARATE DEFENSE 
Some or all of Plaintiffs' claims are barred by its failure to mitigate any alleged damages. 
FIFTH SEP ARA TE DEFENSE 
Some or all of Plaintiffs' claims are barred because Plaintiffs' own acts or omissions 
were the sole proximate cause, or substantial proximate cause of its alleged damage. 
SIXTH SEPARATE DEFENSE 
I 
Some or all of Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the doctrines of waiver and estoppel. 
SEVENTH SEP ARA TE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs' claims are barred because of Plaintiff's own bad faith and unlawful acts. 
EIGHT SEPARATE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs' claims are barred because of Plaintiff's own breach of contract and failure to 
perform. 
NINTH SEP ARA TE DEFENSE 
Some or all of Plaintiffs' claims are barred Jy the doctrine of consent. 
16 
Wadsworth v. Siddoway 
Answer and Counterclaim of Defendants Randy Siddoway and Siddoway Co. 
000078
• • 
TENTH SE PARA TE DEFENSE 
Some or all of Plaintiffs' claims are barred because of Plaintiffs' lack standing. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
Having fully answered the Complaint, Mr.-Siddoway and Siddoway Co. pray for relief as 
follows: 
l. That the Complaint against him and it be immediately dismissed on its merits and with 
prejudice. 
2. That Plaintiffs receive nothing from Mr. Siddoway or Siddoway Co. in this matter. 
3. That Mr. Siddoway and/or Siddoway Co. be awarded reasonable attorney fees and costs, 
as allowed by Idaho Code§§ 12-120 and 12-121 and any other applicable statue. 
4. For such other relief as the court deems just under the circumstances. 
I 
COUNTER CLAIM 
Counterclaimants Randy Siddoway ("Mr. Siddoway") and Siddoway & Company, PC 
("Siddoway Co.") complains of counterclaim defendants Frederick Wadsworth ("Mr. 
Wadsworth"), Wadsworth Accounting CPA, PLLC ("Wadsworth PLLC"), Clark A. Reese 
("Mr. Reese"), and Clark A Reese CPA, P.C. ("Reese PC" and collectively "Counterclaim 
Defendants"), as follows: 
I 
PARTIES, JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
1. Mr. Siddoway is a resident of Ada Count), Idaho and the sole shareholder of 
Siddoway Co .. 
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2. Siddoway Co. is an Idaho professional corporation in good standing with the Idaho 
Secretary of State and a member of Wadsworth Reese, PLLC ("WR, PLLC"). 
3. Mr. Wadsworth is a resident of Canyon County Idaho and the sole member of 
Wadsworth PLLC. 
4. Wadsworth PLLC is an Idaho professional limited liability company in good standing 
with the Idaho Secretary of State and a member of WR, PLLC. 
5. Mr. Reese is a resident of Ada County, Idaho and the sole shareholder of Reese PC. 
6. Reese PC is an Idaho professional corporation in good standing with the Idaho 
I 
Secretary of State and a member of WR, P LLC. 
I 
7. This court has jurisdiction over this case under IDAHO CONST. art. V, § 20 and IDAHO 
CODE ANN.§ 7-705. 
8. Venue is proper in this court under IDAH6 CODE ANN.§ 5-404 because some or all 
I 
Counterclaim Defendants reside in Ada County, Idaho. 
I 
BACKGROUND 
9. On or about December 2013 Mr. Siddoway, Mr. Reese, and Mr. Wadsworth agreed to 
form a new business entity and enter into business together for the purpose of providing public 
accounting services in the Boise area 
10. To this end, on December 20, 2013 Mr. Reese and Mr. Siddoway filed a Certificate of 
Organization with the Idaho Secretary of State foJing WR, PLLC. 
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11. At that time Mr. Siddoway had developed a substantial accounting practice having 
engaged in public accounting in the Boise area for nearly 20 years, the accounting practice being 
held in Siddoway Co. 
12. Mr. Wadsworth had also practiced as a public accountant in the Boise area for a 
number of years. 
13. Mr. Siddoway, Mr. Wadsworth, and Mr. Reese agreed that Mr. Wadsworth had 
goodwill that he could contributed to the new venture in an amount approximately ½ as valuable 
as the goodwill that could contributed by Siddoway Co. 
14. Mr. Reese desired to be an equal partner in the new venture. 
15. At that time Mr. Reese had not developed a public accounting practice and had no 
goodwill to contribute to the new venture to justify equal ownership. 
16. On or about December 2013 Mr. Siddo~ay and Mr. Reese, through their respective 
entities Siddoway Co. and Reese PC, entered into an oral agreement in which Reese PC agreed 
to purchase ½ of the goodwill of Siddoway Co. and simultaneously contribute the purchased 
goodwill to WR, PLLC in exchange for a 1/3 membership interest in WR, PLLC (the "Oral 
Agreement"). 
17. Under the terms of the Oral Agreement Reese PC would pay to Siddoway Co. 
approximately $200,000 over a period of time with interest accruing at 6% per annum. 
I 
18. Mr. Siddoway contributed the remaining goodwill of Siddoway Co. to WR, PLLC for 
a 1/3 membership interest in WR, PLLC. 
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19. Mr. Wadsworth contributed the goodwill owned by him to WR, PLLC for a 1/3 
membership interest in WR, PLLC. 
20. On January 22, 2014 Reese PC paid $5,'500 to Siddoway Co. as the first installment 
on the $200,000 debt established by the Oral Agreement. 
21. On January 6, 2014, Siddoway Co., Wadsworth PLLC, and Reese PC each executed 
the Operating Agreement of Siddoway Wadsworth & Reese, PLLC (the "Operating 
Agreement" attached as Exhibit A), with the intent that the agreement act as the sole source of 
agreement between the parties regarding WR, PLLC. 
22. Prior to formation of WR, PLLC, Mr. Siddoway informed Mr. Reese and Mr. 
Wadsworth that it was his strong desire to phase out of compliance based public accounting and 
develop a business advisory practice of his own that would not offer tax preparation, 
bookkeeping, or audit services. 
23. Nevertheless, Mr. Siddoway was willing to work in WR, PLLC for a year or two 
before he began phasing out of compliance public accounting. 
24. Shortly after commencing business together significant disagreements arose between 
the parties regarding how to manage and grow WR, PLLC. 
25. On January 29, 2015 Reese PC and Siddoway Co. executed an Asset Sales 
I 
Agreement with an accompanying Specific Guarantee and Promissory Note memorializing, in 
' 
I 
writing, the Oral Agreement they had entered into on or about December 2013 (the "Reese 
I 
Contract" attached as Exhibit B). 
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26. The Reese Contract contains a mandatory arbitration clause requiring settlement by 
arbitration of any controversies or claims arising out of the Reese Contract. 
27. On January 29, 2015 Reese PC made a payment of $5,000 to Siddoway Co. pursuant 
to the terms of the Reese Contract. 
28. Pursuant to the Reese Contract, starting on March 1, 2015, Reese PC began to make 
$2,500 monthly payments to Siddoway Co. on the first day of each month. 
29. On October 1, 2015, Reese PC failed to make the $2,500 payment to Siddoway Co. 
and has failed to make any payment since September 1, 2015. 
30. In an effort to resolve their differences regarding management and growth of WR, 
PLLC, Mr. Siddoway, Mr. Reese, and Mr. Wadsworth hired a practice management consultant. 
31. The resulting negotiations yielded no significant relief of the disagreements between 
the members of WR, PLLC leading Mr. Siddoway to suggest that Mr. Reese and Mr. Wadsworth 
buy-out his membership interest in WR, PLLC. 
32. Following significant negotiation, on or about July 31, 2015, Mr. Siddoway, Mr. 
Reese, and Mr. Wadsworth each agreed to a buy-out arrangement that required, among other 
things, payment to Siddoway Co. of $150,000 (the "July Agreement" attached as Exhibit C). 
33. The proposed buy-out arrangement was reduced to writing and was signed by each 
party on July 31, 2015. 
34. Because the July Agreement was hand written, Mr. Siddoway was tasked with having 
the hand written and executed agreement reduced to a more professional, typewritten document. 
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35. Mr. Siddoway retained an attorney to produce a typewritten version of the July 
Agreement. However, before the typewritten document could be produced Mr. Wadsworth and 
Mr. Reese announced that they would not sign it nor would they honor the terms of the July 
Agreement. 
36. On August 21, 2015, Mr. Siddoway met with Mr. Wadsworth and Mr. Reese in and 
effort, once again, to negotiate a mutually agreeable buy-out of Siddoway Co. 's membership 
interest in WR, PLLC. 
37. During the August 21, 2015 meeting Mr. Siddoway proposed a number of terms for 
the buy-out, including a phase out of his WR, PLLC duties, proposed sharing of receivables, 
payment of liabilities, and separation of office assets. 
38. Neither Mr. Wadsworth nor Mr. Reese accepted the buy-out/separation terms offered 
by Mr. Siddoway in the August 21, 2015 meeting. 
39. Instead, in an email dated August 24, 2015, Mr. Wadsworth claimed that Mr. 
Siddoway had resigned from his WR, PLLC duties. 
40. On or about August 24, 2015, without Mr. Siddoway's or Siddoway Co. 's consent, 
Mr. Wadsworth and Mr. Reese took steps that effectively froze Mr. Siddoway and Siddoway Co. 
out of WR, PLLC, as described below. 
I 
41. On or about August 24, 2015, Mr. Wadsworth and Mr. Reese changed computer 
passwords, thus denying Mr. Siddoway and SiddowaJ Co. access to client accounting files and 
I 
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other company information making it very difficult or impossible to perform services for WR, 
PLLC clients. 
42. On or about August 21, 2015, Mr. Wadsworth and Mr. Reese, without Mr. 
Siddoway's knowledge or consent, met with Dustin Siddoway, the lead accounting associate of 
WR, PLLC, and demanded that he sign a non-compete agreement or leave his employment with 
WR,PLLC. 
I 
43. On or about August 24, 2015, Mr. Wadsworth and Mr. Reese placed a lock on the 
I 
I 
computer server room door, denying Mr. Siddoway and Siddoway Co. access to the server. 
44. Upon information and belief, on or about August 24, 2015, Mr. Wadsworth and Mr. 
Reese decided to withhold WR, PLLC distributions from Siddoway Co., and have withheld such 
distributions from Siddoway Co. from September 1, 2015 to the present. 
45. Prior to September 1, 2015, in accordance with the Operating Agreement and Idaho 
law, all members of WR, PLLC had received equal monthly distributions of company funds by 
automatic transfer or check from the WR, PLLC bank account. 
46. On or about August 31, 2015, Mr. Wadsworth and Mr. Reese, without Mr. 
Siddoway's or Siddoway Co. 's knowledge or consent, removed all cash from the WR, PLLC 
bank account one result being that Siddoway Co. did not receive its September 1, 2015 monthly 
distribution via electronic transfer. 
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47. Upon information and belief, Mr. Wadsworth and Mr. Reese have diverted the WR, 
PLLC funds into another bank account which is unknown to Mr. Siddoway and to which neither 
Mr. Siddoway nor Siddoway Co. has access. 
48. From September 2015 to the present, Wadsworth PLLC and Reese PC have 
authorized and taken WR, PLLC distributions, while at the same time refusing to make like 
distributions to Siddoway Co. 
49. On or about August 24, 2015, Mr. Wadsworth and Mr. Reese demanded that 
Siddoway Co. abandon the office used by Mr. Siddoway, or pay rent to WR, PLLC. 
50. From August 24, 2015 forward, Mr. Wadsworth and Mr. Reese have excluded Mr. 
Siddoway and Siddoway Co. from virtually all meetings of members of WR, PLLC, refused to 
share information regarding the company and its operation, and denied Siddoway Co. its right to 
vote on or otherwise consent or dissent to actions proposed by them. 
51. On August 28, 2015, through legal counsel, Mr. Siddoway and Siddoway Co. 
demanded, in writing, that Mr. Reese and Mr. Wadsworth immediately cease their oppressive 
treatment of Mr. Siddoway and Siddoway Co., including a demand that Siddoway Co. be 
afforded its full and equal rights as a member and manager of WR, PLLC. 
52. On or about September 5, 2015, Mr. Siddoway initiated a final attempt to negotiate a 
separation of Siddoway Co. from WR, PLLC. 
53. During the September 5, 2015 negotiation, both parties were represented by legal 
counsel. 
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54. After several hours the parties had agreed to the major terms of a buy-out agreement 
and agreed to have Mr. Siddoway's counsel reduce the agreement to writing (the "September 
Agreement"). I 
55. Two days later, on or about September 7\ 2015, Mr. Wadsworth and Mr. Reese 
renounced the September Agreement and stated thJ they would not sign any document 
containing the previously agreed upon terms. 
56. Due to the complete loss of trust in Mr. \1/adsworth and Mr. Reese and their actions 
making it impossible for Mr. Siddoway to effectivelt work in the WR, PLLC offices, Mr. 
Siddoway began working from a separate office. 
57. Siddoway Co. has not dissociated from WR, PLLC and remains a member and 
manager of WR, PLLC with full rights to equal treatment, decision making authority, and 
distributions. 
FIRST COUNTERCLAIM 
Breach of Contract - Operating Agreement 
(all Counterclaim Defendants) 
I 
58. Mr. Siddoway and Siddoway Co. incorporate herein all preceding paragraphs of this 
I 
Counter Claim. 
59. Counterclaim Defendants have breached the terms of the Operating Agreement by 
their actions, including but not limited to the following: 
a. Denying Siddoway Co. access to comJany information. 
b. Denying Siddoway Co. access to comp~ny assets. 
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c. Denying Siddoway Co. the right to consent to or approve actions of the company. 
d. Denying Siddoway Co. the right to equal distributions of the company. 
e. Denying Siddoway Co. the right to v,ote on company matters and to otherwise 
participate in the management of the company. 
60. Counterclaim Defendant's actions have 4amaged Mr. Siddoway and Siddoway Co., 
in an amount to be established at trial, plus interest, costs and attorneys' fees as allowed by law 
or equity. 
SECOND COUNTERCLAIM 
Breach of the Implied Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
(all Counterclaim Defendants) 
61. Mr. Siddoway and Siddoway Co. incorporate herein all preceding paragraphs of this 
Counter Claim. 
62. Without limitation, the following actions of Counterclaim Defendants have breached 
the terms of the Operating Agreement and have nullified or significantly impaired Siddoway 
Co. 's rights and benefits under the Operating Agree~ent: 
a. Denying Siddoway Co. access to company information. 
b. Denying Siddoway Co. access to company assets. 
I 
c. Denying Siddoway Co. the right to consent to or approve actions of the company. 
d. Denying Siddoway Co. the right to equal distributions of the company. 
I 
I 
e. Denying Siddoway Co. the right to vote on company matters and to otherwise 
. ' . h f h l part1c1pate mt e management o t e company. 
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63. Counterclaim Defendants' actions have damaged Mr. Siddoway and Siddoway Co., 
in an amount to be established at trial, plus interest, costs and attorneys' fees as allowed by law 
or equity. 
THIRD COUNTERCLAIM 
Violation of Idaho Code Ann. § 30-6-404 
(all Counterclaim Defendants) 
64. Mr. Siddoway and Siddoway Co. incorporate herein all preceding paragraphs of this 
Counterclaim. 
65. Counterclaim Defendants' have breached Idaho Code Ann. § 30-6-404 by failing to 
make distributions in equal shares among members and instead distributing WR, PLLC funds to 
themselves and refusing to make an equal distribution to Siddoway Co. 
66. Counterclaim Defendants' actions have damaged Mr. Siddoway and Siddoway Co. in 




(all Counterclaim Defendants) 
67. Mr. Siddoway and Siddoway Co. incorporate herein all preceding paragraphs of this 
Counter Claim. 
68. Under the terms of the Operating Agreement, all members of WR, PLLC are to 
receive distributions in proportion to their membership interest. 
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69. From January 2014 until August 2015, all distributions were distributed to each 
member in proportion to their respective membership interest. 
70. On or about August 24, 2015, Counterclaim Defendants decided to deny Siddoway 
Co. of its right to a proportionate distribution of company funds. 
71. From Septemberl, 2015 to the present Counterclaim Defendants have surreptitiously 
and illegally caused WR, PLLC to distribute company funds in a manner inconsistent with the 
Operating Agreement, Idaho law, and the established course of dealing. In so doing, 
. I 
Counterclaim Defendants have unlawfully distributdd to themselves, for their own use and 
I 
enjoyment, company funds to which Siddoway Co. is legally entitled. 
I 
I 
72. Counterclaim Defendants are liable to Siddoway Co. for actual damages for their 
I 
conversion of WR, PLLC funds that should have been distributed to Siddoway Co. 
73. Counterclaim Defendant's actions have damaged Mr. Siddoway and Siddoway Co., 




(all Counterclaim Defendants) 
74. Mr. Siddoway and Siddoway Co. incorporate herein all preceding paragraphs of this 
Counterclaim. 
I 
75. Counterclaim Defendants, in breach of the: Operating Agreement, have 
I 
misappropriated funds of WR, PLLC for their own behefit and use. 
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76. Neither Mr. Siddoway nor Siddoway Co. is in control of the financial affairs of WR, 
PLLC and Counterclaim Defendants have blocked access to the financial records of the 
l 
company, therefore, Mr. Siddoway and Siddoway ~o. cannot ascertain where and to whom 
I 
money is flowing from revenue generated by WR, PLLC. 
77. Mr. Siddoway and Siddoway Co., therefore, is entitled to a full accounting, from 
Counterclaim Defendants, of all WR, PLLC activities including, without limitation, a detailed 
accounting of all money paid by WR, PLLC, directly or indirectly, to its members. 
SIXTH COUNTERCLAIM 
Judicial Dissolution 
(all Counterclaim Defendants) 
78. Mr. Siddoway and Siddoway Co. incorporate herein all preceding paragraphs of this 
Counterclaim. 
79. By breaching the Operating Agreement, converting for their own use WR, PLLC 
funds rightfully belonging to Siddoway Co., and other actions, Counterclaim Defendants are 
I 
acting in a manner that is illegal, fraudulent, and oppressive to Siddoway Co .. 
I 
80. Counterclaim Defendants' illegal, fraudulent, and oppressive acts have been, and will 
continue to be, harmful to Siddoway Co .. 
81. Due to Counterclaim Defendants' illegal, fraudulent, and oppressive acts, WR, PLLC 
should be judicially dissolved pursuant to IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-6-701 ( l )( e ). 
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t SEVENTH COUNTERCLAIM 
Breach of Contract - Reese Contract 
(Mr. Reese and Reese PC) 
82. Mr. Siddoway and Siddoway Co. incorporate herein all preceding paragraphs of this 
Counterclaim. 
83. Reese PC has breached the Reese Contract and the associated Promissory Note by 
failing to make the required payments to Siddoway Co .. 
84. Mr. Reese has breached the terms of the Specific Guaranty by failing to make prompt 
and full payment under the terms of the Promissory Note once Reese PC failed to make such 
payments. 
85. Mr. Reese and Reese PC have breached the terms of the Reese Contract by failing to 
I 
adhere to the mandatory arbitration clause of the Reise Contract and have, instead, instigated 
I 
litigation in this court alleging certain controversies ~nd claims arising out of the Reese 
Agreement. 
I 
86. Mr. Siddoway and Siddoway Co. will seek, and this court should issue an order, 
compelling arbitration of all controversies and claims arising out of the Reese Contract and 
ordering Counterclaim Defendants to remove all such claims from their Complaint. 
87. Mr. Reese's and Reese PC's actions have damaged Mr. Siddoway and Siddoway Co., 
in an amount to be established at arbitration, or if arbilation is not compelled, at trial, plus 
interest, costs and attorneys' fees as allowed by law J equity. 
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(all Counterclaim Defendants) 
' 
• 
88. Mr. Siddoway and Siddoway Co. incorpbrate herein all preceding paragraph of this 
I 
Counterclaim. 1 
89. Pursuant to the Operating Agreement, thb Reese Contract, Idaho Code Ann. § 12-120, 
I 
and Idaho Code Ann. § 12-121, Mr. Siddoway and Siddoway Co. are entitled to recover their 
attorney fees and costs of suit in an amount deemed ~easonable by this court. 
I 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Mr. Siddoway and Siddoway Co. prays for relief as follows: 
I 
I 
1. Under the First Counterclaim, a judgment in favor of Mr. Siddoway or Siddoway Co. 
and against Counterclaim Defendants for breach of tAe Operating Agreement in an amount to be 
established at trial, plus interest, costs, and attomeys1 fees as allowed by law or equity. 
2. Under the Second Counterclaim, a judgment in favor of Mr. Siddoway or Siddoway 
Co. and against Counterclaim Defendants for breach bf the implied duty of good faith and fair 
I 
I 
dealing in an amount to be established at trial, plus interest, costs, and attorneys' fees as allowed 
by law or equity. 
3. Under the Third Counterclaim, a judgment in favor of Mr. Siddoway or Siddoway Co. 
\ 
and against Counterclaim Defendants for violation of IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-6-404 in an 
amount to be established at trial, plus interest, costs, abd attorneys' fees as allowed by law or 
equity. 
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4. Under the Fourth Counterclaim, a judgment in favor of Mr. Siddoway or Siddoway 
Co. and against Counterclaim Defendants for conversion in an amount to be established a trial, 
I 
plus interest, costs, and attorneys' fees as allowed by law or equity. 
I 
I 
5. Under the Fifth Counterclaim, a full accounting, from Counterclaim Defendants, of all 
WR, PLLC activities including, without limitation, ~ detailed accounting of all money paid by 
WR, PLLC, directly or indirectly, to its members. 
6. Under the Sixth Counterclaim, judicial dissolution of WR, PLLC pursuant to IDAHO 
CODE ANN.§ 30-6-70l(l)(e). 
7. Under the Seventh Counterclaim, an order compelling arbitration of all controversies 
and claims arising out of the Reese Contract, or if arbitration is not compelled, a judgment in 
favor of Mr. Siddoway or Siddoway Co. and against jf ounterclaim Defendants for breach of the 
Reese Contract in an amount to be established at trial,, plus interest, costs, and attorneys' fees as 
allowed by law or equity. 
I 
8. Under the Eight Counterclaim, a judgment in favor of Mr. Siddoway or Siddoway Co. 
and against Counterclaim Defendants in an amount to be established at trial, for Mr. Siddoway 
and Siddoway Co.'s reasonable attorneys' fees and costs, plus interest, associated with this 
matter. 
I 
9. Any other legal or equitable relief that this court deems just. 
I 
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Dated this 18th day of January, 2016. 
~ ~/@ HASTINGS LAW G:t: 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Pro Hae Vice 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on the .1i_ day of January, 2016, I served a true and correct copy of the 
forgoing Answers and Counterclaim of Defendant Randy Siddoway and Siddoway & Company, 
PC to the following by the means indicated: 
via email transmission 
Vaughn Fisher 
FISHER RAINEY HUDSON 
vaughn@frhtriallawyers.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
~ 
HASTINGS LAW GROUP, LLC 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Pro Hae Vice 
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SIDDOWAY WADSWORTH & REESE, PLLC 
This Operating Agreement of SIDDOWAY WADSWORTH & REESE, PLLC, an 
Idaho professional limited liability company organized pursuant to the Idaho 
professional limited liability company Act is entered into and shall be effective as of the 
Effective Date, by and among the Company anc;J. the persons executing this Agreement 
as Members. i 
ARTICLE I - DEFINITIONS 
For purposes of this Operating Agreemlt (as defined below), unless the context 
clearly indicates otherwise, the following terms!shall have the following meanings: 
I 
1.1 Act-The Idaho professional limit~d liability company Act and all 
amendments to the Act. j 
1.2 Additional Member - A Member other than an Initial Member or a 
Substitute Member who has acqufred a Membership Interest from the 
Company. I 
1.3 Articles - The Articles of Organization of the Company as properly 
adopted and amended from time to time by the Members and filed with 
I 
the Secretary of State. I 
1.4 Assignee - A transferee of a Memoership Interest who has not been 
admitted as a Substitute Member. j 
1.5 Bankrupt Member - A Member w~o: (1) has become the subject of an 
Order for Relief under the United States Bankruptcy Code; or (2) has 
I 
initiated, either in an original Proceeding or by way of answer, in any state 
insolvency or receivership Proceeding, an action for liquidation 
arrangement, composition, readjustment, dissolution or similar relief. 
1.6 Business Day - Any day other than Saturday, Sunday or any legal holiday 
observed in the state. I 
1.7 Capital Account-The account maintained for a Member or Assignee 
determined in accordance with Arb.de VIII herein. 
1.8 Capital Contribution - Any contri8ution of Property or services or the 
obligation to contribute Property dr services made by or on behalf of a 
Member or Assignee. \ 
1.9 Code - The Internal Revenue Code of 1986 as amended from time to time. 
I 
I 




1 .10 Commitment - The Capital Contributions that a Member or Assignee is 
obligated to make under this Operating Agreement. 
1.11 Company - Advantage Auto Sales and Sports Rentals, LLC, a limited 
liability company formed under the laws of Idaho and any successor 
limited liability company. 
1.12 Company Liability - Any enforceable debt or obligation for which the 
Company is liable or which is secured by any Company Property. 
1.13 Company Minimum Gain - An amount determined by first computing for 
each Company Nonrecourse Liability any gain the Company would 
realize if it disposed of the Company Property subject to that liability for 
no consideration other than full satisfaction of the liability, and then 
aggregating the separately comptited gains. The amount of Company 
Minimum Gain includes such miriimum gain arising from a conversion, 
refinancing or other change to a debt instrument, only to the extent a 
Member is allocated a share of that minimum gain. For any Taxable 
Year, the net increase or decrease in Company Minimum Gain is 
determined by comparing the Co:r;npany Minimum Gain on the last day of 
the immediately preceding Taxable Year with the minimum gain on the 
last day of the current Taxable Year. Notwithstanding any provision to 
the contrary contained herein, Company Minimum Gain and increases 
and decreases in Company Minimum Gain are intended to be computed 
in accordance with Section 704 of the Code ~d the Regulations issued 
thereunder, as the same may be issued and interpreted from time to time. 
A Member's share of Company Minimum Gain at the end of any Taxable 
Year equals: the sum of nonrecourse deductions allocated to that Member 
(and to that Member1s predecessors in interest) up to that time and the 
Distributions made to that Member (and to that Member1s predecessors in 
interest) up to that time of proceeds of a nonrecourse liability allocable to 
an increase in Company Minimum Gains minus the sum of that Member's 
(and that Member's predecessors in interest) aggregate share of the net 
decreases in Company Minimum Gain plus their aggregate share of 
decreases resulting from revaluations of Company Property subject to one 
or more Company Nonrecourse Liabilities. 
1.14 Company Nonrecourse Liability - A Company Liability to the extent that 
no Member or related person bears the economic risk of loss (as defined in 
Section 1:752-2 of the Regulations) with respect to the liability. 
1.15 Company Property - Any Property owned by the Company. 
1.16 Contributing Members - Those Mett1.bers making contributions as a result 
of the failure of a Delinquent Member to make the contributions required 
by the Commitment as described i7:1 Article VIII herein. 
1.17 Default Interest Rate -The higher of the legal rate or the then-current 
prime rate quoted by the largest commercial bank in the jurisdiction of the 
principal office, plus three percent (3 % ). 
















Delinquent Member - A Member or Assignee who has failed to meet the 
Commitment of that Member or Assignee. 
Distribution. A transfer of Property to a Member on account of a 
Membership Interest as described in Article IX herein. 
Disposition (Dispose) -Any sale, assignment, transfer, exchange, 
mortgage, pledge, grant, hypothecation or other transfer, absolute or as 
security or encumbrance (including Dispositions by operation of law). 
Dissociation - Any action which causes a person to cease to be a Member 
as described in Article XII hereof. 
Dissolution Event - An event, the occurrence of which will result in the 
dissolution of the Company under Article XIV herein unless the Members 
agree to the contrary. 
Effective Date - March 4, 2004. 
Im.mediate Family - A Member's Immediate Family includes the Member's 
spouse, children (including natural, adopted and stepchildren), 
grandchildren and parents. · 
Initial Capital Contribution - The Capital Contribution agreed to be made 
by the Initial Members as described in Article VIII herein. 
Initial Members - Those persons identified on Exhibit" A" attached hereto 
and made a part hereof by this reference who have executed the 
Operating Agreement. 
1 
Majority - The affirmative vote or consent of more than one-half (1/2) of 
the Membership Interest of all Members described as a "Majority" in 
Article VI hereof. 
(Managem~nt Right - the. right of~ Member to participate in the, 
(m~g:t;men_t of the to~pany, i?c,uci4tg the rights to ~o_nnati~-an-d~-to ..... J 
~onsent to or appLove actions of t11e Company.} 
Member - Initial Member, Substituted Member or Additional Member 
and, unless the context expressly indicates to the contrary, includes 
Assignees. 
Member Minimum Gain - An amount determined by first computing for 
each Member Nonrecourse Liability any gain the Company would realize 
if it disposed of the Company Property subject to that liability for no 
consideration other than full satisfaction of the liability and then 
aggregating the separately computed gains. The amount of Member 
Minimum Gain includes such minimum gain arising from a conversion, 
refinancing or other change to a debt instrument, only to the extent a 
Member is allocated a share of that minimum gain. For any Taxable 
Year, the net increase or decrease in Member Minimum Gain is 
determined by comparing the Me~ber Minimum Gain on the last day of 
the immediately preceding Taxable Year with the minimum gain on the 
last day of the current Taxable YeJ.. Notwithstanding any provision to 
the contrary contained herein, Member Minimum Gain and increases and 











decreases in Member Minimum Gain are intended to be computed in 
accordance with Section 704 of th~ Code and the Regulations issued 
thereunder, as the same may be is~ued and interpreted from time to time. 
Member Nonrecourse Liability - &y Company Liability to the extent the 
liability is nonrecourse under statJ law and on which a Member or 
Related Person bears the economici risk of loss under Section 1.752-2 of the 
Code because, for example, the MJmber or Related Person is the creditor 
or a guarantor. 1 
(Membership Interest-The rights of a Member or, in the case of an) 
tAssignee, tj:le rights of t:he_assJgajng Memb.er in Distributions (liqu--i_d-.. c!-tin-g) 
G)r other~ise).~d allocajig!)1> of the P.r~fits, losses,_g~, deductlons_and} 
(credits o_f_the_C::q~:eanyJ 
1 
Money - Cash or other legal tender of the United States or any obligation 
that is immediately reducible to legal tender without delay or discount. 
Money shall be considered to have a fair market value equal to its face 
amount. I 
Net Losses - The losses and deductions of the Company determined in 
accordance with accounting principles consistently applied from year to 
year, employed under the method bf accounting adopted by the Company 
and as reported separately or in th~ aggregate, as appropriate, on the tax 
return of the Company filed for federal income tax purposes. 
Net Profits - The income and gains:of the Company determined in 
accordance with accounting principles consistently applied from year to 
year, employed under the method of accounting adopted by the Company 
and as reported separately or in th~ aggregate, as appropriate, on the tax 
returp. of the Company filed for feqeral income tax purposes. 
Nonrecourse Liabilities- Nonreco1¥"se Liabilities include Company 
Nonrecourse Liabilities and Member Nonrecourse Liabilities. 
Notice-Notice shall be in writing. Notice to a Member shall be 
considered given when mailed by first class mail, postage prepaid and 
addressed to the Member at the address reflected in the Operating 
Agreement, unless the Member has given the Company a Notice of a 
different address. 
Offsettable Decrease - Any allocation that unexpectedly causes or 
increases a deficit in the Member's ~pita! Account as of the end of the 
Taxable Year to which the allocation relates attributable to depletion 
allowances under Section 1.704(b)(2)(iv)(k) of the Regulations, allocations 
of loss and deductions under Sections 704(e)(2) or 706 of the Code or 
under Section 1.751-1 of the Regula-µons, or distributions that, as of the 
end of the year, are reasonably expected to be made to the extent they 
exceed the offsetting increases to such Member's Capital Account that 
reasonably are expected to occur dtlring or prior to the Taxable Years in 
which such Distributions are expected to be made ( other than increases 
pursuant to a minimum gain chargJback). 
I 
I 


















Operating Agreement - This Opetating Agreement, including all 
Subscription Agreements, if any, and amendments adopted in accordance 
with the Operating Agreement a~d the Act. 
Organization - A Person other than a natural person. Organization 
includes, without limitation, corporations (both non-profit and other 
corporations), partnerships (both limited and general), joint ventures, 
limited liability companies and unincorporated associations, but the term 
does not include joint tenancies and tenancies by the entirety. 
Organization Expenses - Those expenses incurred in the organization of 
the Company, including the costs :of preparation of the Operating 
Agreement and Articles. I 
Proceeding-Any judicial or administrative trial, hearing or other activity, 
civil, criminal or investigative, th~ result of which may be that a court, 
arbitrator or governmental agencYi may enter a judgment, order, decree or 
other determination which, if not appealed and reversed, would be 
binding upon the Company, a Metnber or other Person subject to the 
jurisdiction of such court, arbitratbr or governmental agency. 
Property- Any Property, real or p~sonal, tangible or intangible, including 
money and any legal or equitable interest in such Property, but excluding 
services and promises to perform ~ervices in the future. 
Permitted Transferee - Any memb
1
er of the Member's Immediate Family or 
any Organization controlled by subh Member or by members of the 
Member's Immediate Family. \ 
Person - An individual, trust, estate or any incorporated or 
unincorporated Organization perril.itted to be a member of a limited 
liability company under the laws 6£ the state. 
Proceeding - Any administrative, i1udicial or other adversary proceeding,. 
including, without limitation, litigation, arbitration, administrative 
adjudication, mediation and appeal or review of any of the foregoing. 
Regulations - Except where the cotttext indicates otherwise, the 
permanent, temporary, proposed or proposed and temporary Regulations 
of the Department of the Treasury :under the Code as such Regulations 
may be lawfully changed from tirrie to time. 
Related Person - A person having ~ relationship to a Member that is 
described in Section 1.751-4(b) of the Regulations. 
Resignation - The act by which a Member ceases to be a Member. 
Sharing Ratio - With respect to ani Member, the percentage of ownership 
in the Company as specified on Exhibit "Au to this Operating Agreement. 
Subscription Agreement - Agreem~nt between a Member and the 
Company to fulfill the Commitmettt as defined in Section 1.10 of this 
Article. I 
Substitute Member - An Assignee who has been admitted to all of the 
rights of membership pursuant to fhe Operating Agreement. 
I 
' 




1.53 Taxable Year - The taxable year of the Company as determined pursuant 
to Section 706 of the Code. 1 
1.54 Taxing Jurisdiction - Any state, lo'7al or foreign government that collects 
tax, interest or penalties, howeverjdesignated, on any Member's share of 








ARTICLE II -FORMATION 
I 
Organization - The Members hereby organize the Company as an Idaho 
professional limited liability company pursuant to the provisions of the 
Act. I 
Agreement - For and in considera#on of the mutual covenants herein 
contained and for other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and 
sufficiency of which is hereby ackri.owledged, the Members executing the 
Operating Agreement hereby agree to the terms and conditions of the 
Operating Agreement, as it may fr6m time to time be amended according 
to its terms. (ITis)he express interf tion of the Meml?,ers_fuat the Qp~ratiQg} 
(~~eem~z,.t_sh~liJ:ie t!te sole_sp_"f!.!'~~ITT_e~me_l}!fo°f the parties and, except 
to the extent a provision of the Operating Agreement expressly 
incorporates federal income tax rules by reference to sections of the Code 
or Regulations or is expressly prohibited or ineffective under the Act, the 
Operating Agreement shall goverri, even when inconsistent with or 
different than, the provisions of th~ Act or any other law or rule. To the 
extent any provision of the Operating Agreement is prohibited or 
ineffective under the Act, the Operkting Agreement shall be considered 
amended to the smallest degree p~ssible in order to make the Agreement 
effective under the Act. In the ev~t the Act is subsequently amended or 
interpreted in such a way to make ~y provision of the Operating 
Agreement that was formerly invalid valid, such provision shall be 
considered to be valid from the eff~ve date of such interpretation or 
amendment. 
Name - The name of the Company.is SIDDOWAY WADSWORTH & 
REESE, PLLC, and all business of the Company shall be conducted under 
that name or under any other name, but in any case, only to the extent 
permitted by applicable law. \ 
Effective Date - The Operating Agreement shall become effective upon the 
earlier of the filing and acceptance of the same with the Secretary of State 
of Idaho or the date of execution of the Operating Agreement. 
Registered Agent and Office - The registered agent for the service of 
process and the registered office shall be that Person and location reflected 
in the Articles as filed in the office of the Secretary of State. The Members 
may, from time to time, change the registered agent or office through 
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appropriate filings with the Secretary of State. If the Members shall fail 
to designate a replacement registe~ed agent or change of address of the 
registered office, any Member may designate a replacement registered 
agent or file a notice of change of c!,ddress through appropriate filings with 
the Secretary ofStata - - - - -- --~ . 
2.6 Principal Office - The principal offtce of the Company shall be located at )-·-. 
\,, 4747 Mustang Creek Lane, Boise, Hlaho 83709. ~ 
-----~~TICLE III - NA~ OF BUSINESS ..--
j 
The Company may engage in any lawful business permitted by the Act or the 
laws of any jurisdiction in which the Company lhay do business. The Company shall 
have the authority to do all things necessary or Jonvenient to accomplish its purpose 
and operate its business as described in this Arti~le III. 
I 
4.1 
ARTICLE IV - ACCOUNTING AND RECORDS 
Records to be Maintained - The eoLpany shall maintain the following 
records and information at the priricipal office: 
A. A current and past list setting£~ the full name and last known majling 
address of each Member and Manager; 
B. A copy of the Articles of Organization and all amendments thereto, 
together with executed copies of ariy powers of attorney pursuant to 
which any Articles have been exectited; 
C. Copies of the Company's federal, £9reign, state and local income tax 
returns and reports, if any, for the ~ee (3) most recent years; 
D. Copies of the Operating Agreement, including all amendments thereto 
I 
and copies of any written Operating Agreement no longer in effect; 
E. Any financial statements of the Company for the three (3) most recent 
years; and 
F. A writing or other data compilation from which information can be 
obtained through retrieval devices into reasonably usable form setting 
forth the following: · 
(i) the amount of cash and a description and statement of the agreed 
value of the other Property or services contributed by each Member and 
which each Member has agreed to <lontribute; 
(ii) the times at which or events ppon the happening of which any 
additional Commitments agreed to ,be made by each Member are to be 
made; \ 
(iii) any right of a Member to receive, or of the Company to make, 
Distributions to a Member which inblude a return of all or any part of the 
l 





Member's Capital Contributions; and 
(iv) any events upon the hap~g of which the Company is to be 
dissolved and its affairs wound ul 
Reports to Members: 
A. The Members shall provide reports at least annually to the Members, 
other than Assignees, at such time knd in such manner as the Members 
may determine reasonable. \ 
B. The Members shall provide all Members with those information returns 
required by the Code and the laws 1\of any state in which the Company 
operates. 
Accounts - The Members shall maintain a record of Capital Account for 
each Member in accordance with Article VIII hereof. 
ARTICLE V - NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF MEMBERS 
The names and addresses of the Initial MJmbers are as reflected on Exhibit # A" 
I 
attached hereto and by this reference made a part hereof as if set forth fully herein. 
I 
ARTICLE VI - RIGHTS AND IDUTIES OF MEMBERS 
6.1 l~~ent Ri&,:!tslJ- All Memb~ ( othe,, than Assignees) who have nol] 
(Dissociated shall be entitled to vot~,on any matter submitt_ed to a vote_()f) 
(Th_e):fembers and_ ShalJJ>.<eJhe ¥,gers of the ComRanyJ 
The following actions require the consent of all of the Members: 
A. Any amendment to this Operating kgreen,.ent; 
B. The admission of Assignees to Mankgement Rights; 
I 
C. The continuation of the Company after a Dissolution Event; and 
D. The authorization of a Member to do any act on behalf of the Company 
that contravenes the Operating Agreement which shall require unanimous 
consent of the Members. 
6.2 Majority - Whenever any matter is required or allowed to be approved by 
a Majority of the Members or a Majority of the remaining Members under 
I 
the Act or the Operating Agreement, such matter shall be considered 
approved or consented to upon the ~eceipt of the affirmative approval or 
consent, either in writing or at a me~g of the Members, of Members 
having Sharing Ratios in excess of ohe-half (1/2) of the Sharing Ratios of 
all the Members entitled to vote on~ particular matter. Assignees and, in 
the case of approvals to withdrawal!where consent of the remaining 







Members is required, dissociatinglMembers shall not be considered 
Members entitled to vote for the pµrpose of determining a Majority. In 
the case of a Member who has Disposed of that Member's entire 
Membership Interest to an Assignee, but has not been removed as 
provided below, the Sharing Rati~ of such Assignee shall be considered in, 
determining a Majority, and such Member's vote or consent shall be 
determined by such Sharing Ratio! 
Liability of Members - No person Joiely by virtue of his/her/its Member 
status shall be liable as such for th~ liabilities of the Company. The 
failure of a limited liability compa:h.y to observe any formalities or 
I 
requirements relating to the exercise of its powers or management of its 
business or affairs under this Agrebent or the Act shall not be grounds 
for imposing personal liability on the Members or Managers for liabilities 
of the limited liability company. I 
Indemnifications - The Company shall indemnify the Members,_and 
agents for all costs, losses, liabiliti~ and damages paid or accrued by such 
Member, Manager or agent in connection with the business of the 
Company to the fullest extent pro.Ji\· ded or allowed by the laws of the 
state. 
Representations and Warranties i Each Member, and in the case of an 
Organization, the Person(s) executing the Operating Agreement on behalf 
of the Organization, hereby repres~ts and warrants to the Company and 
each other Member that: (a) if that Member is an Organization, that it is 
duly organized, validly existing arid in good standing under the law of its 
State of organization, and that it ha'.s full organizational power to execute 
and agree to the Operating Agreerri.ent to perform its obligations 
hereunder; (b) that the Member is Acquiring its interest in the Company 
for the Member's own account as ah investment and without an intent to 
distribute the interest; and (c) the Member acknowledges that the interests 
have not been registered under thelSecurities Act of 1933 or any state 
securities laws and may not be resold or transferred by the Member 
without appropriate registration oi the availability of an exemption from 
such requirements. I 
Conflicts of Interest: 1 
A. A Member, shall be entitled to enter into transactions that may be 
considered to be competitive with, or a business opportunity that may be 
beneficial to, the Company; it being expressly understood that some of the 
Members may enter into transactions that are similar to the transactions 
into which the Company may entez:. Notwithstanding the foregoing, 
Members shall account to the Company, and hold as trustee for it, any 
Property, profit or benefit derived 1:>y the Member, without the consent of 
the other Members, in the conduct ~d winding up of Company business 
or from a use or appropriation by the Member of Company Property, 
including information developed e{clusively for the Company and 
OPERA TING AGREEMENT for SIDDOWAY WADSWORTI:l & REESE, PLLC- Page 9 
000108
• • 
opportunities expressly offered to the Company. 
I 
B. A Member does not viola~ a duty or obligation to the Company 
merely because the Member1s conduct furthers the Member's own interest. 
A Member may lend money to and transact other business with the 
Company. The rights and obligations of a Member who lends money to 
or transacts business with the Company are the same as those of a person 
who is not a Member, subject to other applicable law. No transaction 
with the Company shall be voidable solely because a Member has a direct 
or indirect interest in the transaction if either the transaction is fair to the 
Company or the disinterested Members, in either case, knowing the 
material facts of the transaction and the Member1s interest, authorize, 
approve or ratify the transaction. 1 
ARTICLE VII - CONTRIBUTIONS iAND CAPITAL ACCOUNTS 
I 
7.1 Initial Contributions-Each Initial Member shall make the Capital 
Contribution described for that M~mber on Exhibit "A" at the time and on 
the terms specified on Exhibit" A"
1 
and shall perform that Member's 
Commitment. If no time for contribution is specified, the Capital 
Contributions shall be made upon the filing of the Articles of 
Organization with the Secretary of State. The value of the Capital 
Contributions shall be as set forth on Exhibit" A". No interest shall 
accrue on any Capital Contribution, and no Member shall have the right 
to withdraw or be repaid any Capital Contribution except as provided in 
this Operating Agreement. Each Additional Member shall make the 
Initial Capital Contribution as described in the Admission Agreement. 
The value of the Additional Member's Initial Capital Contribution, and the 
time for making such contribution shall be set forth on Exhibit "A" to this 
Operating Agreement. 
7.2 Additional Contributions -In addition to the Initial Capital Contributions 
and Commitments, the Members may determine, from time to time, that 
additional contributions are needed to enable the Company to conduct its 
business. Upon making such a determination, the Members shall give 
Notice to all Members, in writing, at least ten (10) Business Days prior to 
the date on which such contribution is due. Such Notice shall set forth 
the amount of additional contribution needed, the purpose for which the 
contribution is needed and the datJ by which the Members should 
contribute. Each Member shall belentitled to contribute a proportionate 
share of such additional contributiqn. Except to the extent of a Member's 
unpaid Commitment, no Member shall be obligated to make any such 
additional contributions. In the etnt any one or more Members do not 
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make their additional contributions, the other Members shall be given the 
opportunity to make the contributions. Each Additional Member shall 
make the Capital Contribution to which such Member has agreed, at the 
time or times and upon the terms to which the Members and the 
Additional Member agree. 
7.3 Enforcement of Commitments - Ip. the event any Member (a Delinquent 
Member) fails to perform the Delinquent Member's Commitment, the_ 
Members shall give the Delinquent Member a Notice of the failure to meet 
the Commitment. If the Delinquent Member fails to perform the 
Commitment (including any cos~ associated with the Notice of failure 
I 
and demand of compliance with ~e Commitment and interest on such 
obligation at the Default Interest Rate) within ten (10) Business Days of the 
giving of Notice, the Members rrJi.y take such action, including, but not 
limited to, enforcing the Comminpent in the court of appropriate 
jurisdiction in the state in which the Principal Office is located or the state 
of the Delinquent Member's addrbs as reflected in the Operating 
Agreement. Each Member exprJssly agrees to the jurisdiction of such 
courts but only for the enforcemept of Commitments. The Members may 
elect to allow the other Members to contribute the amount of the 
I 
Commitment in proportion to su~h Members' Sharing Ratios, with those 
Members who contribute (Contri1fmting Members) to contribute additional 
amounts equal to any amount of the Commitment not contributed. The 
Contributing Members shall be erititled to treat the amounts contributed 
I 
pursuant to this Section as a loan from the Contributing Members bearing 
interest at the Default Interest Rafe and secured by the Delinquent · 
Member's interest in the Company. Until they are fully repaid, the 
Contributing Members shall be entitled to all Distributions to which the 
Delinquent Member would have been entitled. Notwithstanding the 
foregoing, no Commitment or oilier obligation to make an additional 
contribution may be enforced by ~ creditor of the Company unless the 
I • 
Member expressly consents to su~h enforcement or to the assignment of 
the obligation to such creditor. 
7.4 Maintenance of Capital Accounts • The Company shall establish and 
maintain Capital Accounts for each Member and Assignee. Each 
Member's Capital Account shall be increased by: (1) the amount of any 
Money actually contributed by th~ Member to the capital of the Company; 
(2) the fair market value of any Property contributed, as determined by 
the Company and the Contributing Member at arm's length at the time of 
contribution (net of liabilities assumed by the Company or net of liabilities 
which the Company takes such Property subject to, within the meaning of 
Section 752 of the Code); and (3) the Member's share of Net Profits and of 
any separately allocated items of income or gain except adjustments of the 
Code (including any gain and income from unrealized income with 
respect to accounts receivable allocated to the Member to reflect the 
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difference between the book value and tax basis of assets contributed by 
the Member). Each Member's Capital Account shall be decreased by: (1) 
the amount of any Money actually distributed to the Member; (2) the fair 
market value of any Property distributed to the Member, as determined 
by the Company and the receiving Member at arm's length at the time of 
distribution (net of liabilities of the Company assumed by the Member or 
net of liabilities which the Member takes such Property subject to within 
the meaning of Section 752 of the Code); and (3) the Member's share of 
Net Losses and of any separately allocated items of deduction or loss 
(including any loss or deduction allocated to the Member to reflect the 
difference between the book value and tax basis of assets contributed by 
the Member). 
7.5 Distribution of Assets - If the Company at any time distributes any of its 
assets in-kind to any Member, the ~apital Account of each Member shall 
be adjusted to account for that Member's allocable share (as determined 
under Article IX below) of the Net Profits or Net Losses that would have 
been realized by the Company ha~ it sold the assets that were distributed 
at their respective fair market values immediately prior to their 
distribution. 1 
7.6 Sale or Exchange of Interest - In the event of a sale or exchange of some or 
all of a Member's Interest in the Company, the Capital Account of the 
transferring Member shall become the Capital Account of the Assignee, to 
the extent it relates to the portion of the interest transferred. 
7.7 Compliance with Section 704(b) of the Code - The provisions of this 
Article VIII, as they relate to the maintenance of Capital Accounts, are 
intended and shall be construed and, if necessary, modified to cause the 
allocations of profits, losses, income, gain and credit pursuant to Article IX 
to have substantial economic effect under the Regulations promulgated 
under Section 704(b) of the Code in light of the Distributions made 
pursuant to Articles IX and XN and the Capital Contributions made 
pursuant to this Article VIII. Notwithstanding anything herein to the 
contrary, this Operating Agreement shall not be construed as creating a 
deficit restoration obligation or otherwise personally obligate any Member 
to make a Capital Contribution in excess of the Initial Contribution. 
ARTICLE VIII - ALLOCATIONS AND DISTRIBUTIONS 
8.1 Allocations of Net Profits and Net Losses from Operations - Except as may 
be required by Section 704(c) of the Code and Sections 9.2, 9.3 and 9.4 of 
this Article IX, Net Profits, Net Losses and other items of income, gain, 
loss, deduction and credit shall be apportioned among the Members in 
proportion to their Sharing Ratios. 
8.2 Company Minimum Gain Chargeback • If there is a net decrease in 
Company Minimum Gain for a Tax~ble Year, each Member must be 






allocated items of income and gai;n for that Taxable Year equal to that 
Member's share of the net decreak in Company Minimum Gain. A 
Member's share of the net decrea$e in Company Minimum Gain is the 
amount of the total net decrease multiplied by the Member's percentage 
share of the Company Minimum pain at the end of the immediately 
preceding Taxable Year. A Member's share of any decrease in Company 
Mini.mum Gain resulting from a r~valuation of Company Property equals 
the increase in the Member's Capital Account attributable to the 
revaluation to the extent the reduction in minim.um gain is caused by the 
revaluation. A Member is not su~ject to the Company Minimum Gain 
chargeback requirement to the extent the Member's share of the net 
decrease in Company Minimum Gain is caused by a guarantee, 
refinancing or other change in the debt instrument causing it to become 
partially or wholly a recourse liability or a Member Nonrecourse Liability, 
and the Member bears the economic risk of loss (within the meaning of 
Section 1.752-2 of the Regulations) for the newly guaranteed, refinanced or 
otherwise changed liability. \ 
Member Minimum Gain Otargeback - ff during a Taxable Year there is a 
net decrease in Member Minimu.rri Gain, any Member with a share of that 
Member Minimum Gain (as deterq:lined under Section 1.704-2(i)(5) of the 
Regulations) as of the beginning o~ that Taxable Year must be allocated 
items of income and gain for that raxable Year (and, if necessary, for 
succeeding Taxable Years) equal to that Member's share of the net 
decrease in the Company Minimum Gain. A Member's share of the net 
decrease in Member Minimum Gain is determined in a manner consistent 
with the provisions of Section 1.704-2(g)2 of Regulations. A Member is 
not subject to this Member Minimum Gain chargeback, however, to the 
extent the net decrease in Member Minimum Gain arises because the 
liability ceases to be a Member Nonrecourse Liability due to a conversion, 
refinancing or other change in the debt instrument that causes it to 
become partially or wholly a Company Nonrecourse Liability. The 
amount that would otherwise be sqbject to the Member Minimum Gain 
chargeback is added to the Member's share of Company Minimum Gain. 
In addition, rules consistent with ttjose applicable to Company Minimum 
Gain shall be applied to determine the shares of Member Minimum Gain 
and Member Minim.um Gain charg+back to the extent provided under the 
Regulations issued pursuant to Section 704(b) of the Code. 
Qualified Income Offset - In the ev~t any Member, in such capacity, 
unexpectedly receives an Offsettabl~ Decrease, such Member will be 
allocated items of income and gain (consisting of a pro rata portion of each 
item of the Company's income and gain for such year) in an amount and 
manner sufficient to offset such Offsettable Decrease as quickly as 
poo~hle. \ 
Interim Distributions - From time to\ time, the Members shall determine, in 
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their reasonable judgment, to w~t extent, if any, the Company's cash on 
hand exceeds the current and anti~ipated needs, including, without 
limitation, needs for operating expenses, debt service, acquisitions, 
reserves and mandatory distributions, if any. To the extent such excess 
exists, the Members may make Distributions to the Members in 
accordance with their Shaxing Ra~os. Such Distributions shall be in cash 
or Property (which need not be distrusted proportionately) or partly in 
both, as determined by the Memb~rs. 
I 
ARTICLE IX-TAXES 
9.1 Elections - The Members may make any tax elections for the Company 
allowed under the Code or the tax laws of any state or other jurisdiction 
having taxing jurisdiction over the Company. 
9.2 Taxes of Taxing Jurisdiction-To the extent that the laws of any Taxing 
Jurisdiction require, each Member requested to do so by the Members will 
submit an agreement indicating that the Member will make timely income 
tax payments to the Taxing Jurisdittion and that the Member accepts 
personal jurisdiction of the Taxing)urisdiction with regard to the 
collection of income taxes attributable to the Member's income, interest 
and penalties assessed on such income. If the Member fails to provide 
I 
such agreement, the Company may withhold and pay over to such Taxing 
Jurisdiction the amount of tax, penalty and interest determined under the 
laws of the Taxing Jurisdiction with respect to such income. Any such 
payments with respect to the incon\e of a Member shall be treated as a 
Distribution for purposes of ArticIJ IX herein. The_Members may, where 
permitted by the rules of any Taxirig Jurisdiction, file a composite, 
combined or aggregate tax return rF1ecting the income of the Company 
and pay the tax, interest and penal~es of some or all of the Members on 
such income to the Trucing Jurisdiction, in which case the Company shall 
inform the Members of the amount1\of such tax, interest and penalties so 
paid. 
9.3 Tax Matters Partner -The Members shall designate one of their number 
or, if there are no Members eligible 
1
to act as tax matters partner, any other 
Member, as the tax matters partner 10£ the Company pursuant to Section 
6231(a)(7) of the Code. Any MemBer designated as tax matters partner 
shall take such action as may be necessary to cause each other Member to 
become a notice partner within the meaning of Section 6223 of the Code. 
Any Member who is designated tax\matter partner may not take any 
action contemplated by Sections 6222 through 6232 of the Code without 
the consent of the_Members. \ 
9.4 Cash Method of Accounting- The records of the Company shall be 
maintained on a cash receipt and ciiJbursement method of accounting. 
I 
I 





ARTICLE X - DISPOSITION OF MEMBERSHIP INTERESTS 
10.1 Disposition - Any Member or Assignee may dispose of all or a portion of 
the Member's or Assignee's Membership Interest upon compliance with 
I 
this Article XI. No Membership Interest shall be disposed of: 
A. If such Disposition, alone or when combined with other 
transactions, would result in a termination of the Company within 
the meaning of Section 708 6£ the Code; 
B. If the Members request an ~pinion of counsel, such opinion of 
counsel must be satisfactory to the Members and opine that such 
assignment is subject to an effective registration under the 
applicable state and federa1 1securities laws or exempt from such 
registration requirements; cir 
C. Unless and until the Comp~y receives from the Assignee the 
information and agreemen~ that the Members may reasonably 
require, including, but not limited to, any taxpayer identification 
number and any agreement
1
that may be required by any Taxing 
Jurisdiction. I 
10.2 Dispositions Not in Compliance with this Article Void - Any attempted 
Disposition of a Membership Interest, or any part thereof, not in 
compliance with this Article is null and void. 
ARTICLE XI - DISSOCIATION OF A MEMBER 
11.1 Dissociation - A Person shall cease to be a Member upon the happening of 
any of the following events: 
A. The Member withdraws by ~oluntary act from the Company by 
giving thirty (30) days Notice to the Members. 
B. The Member ceases to be a Member of the Company due to the 
assignment of all of such Member's interest in the Company, and 
the Assignee has become a Substitute Member. 
C. The Member is removed as a Member by an affirmative vote of a 
Majority of the Members who have not assigned their interest when 
the Member assigns all of his/her/its interest in the Company. 
D. Except were the Member obtains the written consent of all 
Members at the time, the Member: (i) makes an assignment for the 
benefit of creditors; (ii) files a voluntary petition in bankruptcy; (iii) 
is adjudicated bankrupt or insolvent; (iv) files a petition or answer 
I 
seeking for the Member any reorganization, arrangement, 
composition, readjustment, l~quidation, dissolution or similar relief 
under any statute, law or regulation; (v) files an answer or other 
pleading admitting or failing! to contest the material allegations of a 
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petition filed against the Member in any Proceeding of this nature; 
or (vi) seeks, consents to or acquiesces to the appointment of a 
trustee, receiver or liquidator of the Member or of all or any 
substantial part of the Member's properties. 
E. Except where the Member obtains the written consent of all 
Members at the time, if within one hundred twenty (120) days after 
the commencement of any Proceeding against the Member seeking 
reorganization, arrangement, composition, readjustment, 
liquidation, dissolution or similar relief under any statute, law or 
regulation, the Proceeding has not been dismissed; or if within one 
hundred twenty (120) days after the appointment, without 
his/her/its consent or acquiescence, of a trustee, receiver or 
liquidator of the Member or of all or any substantial part of 
his/her/its properties, the appointment is not vacated or stayed; or 
if within one hundred twenty (120) days after the expiration of any 
stay, the appointment is not vacated. 
F. Except where the Member obtains the written consent of all 
Members at the time, in the case of a Member who is an individual: 
(i) the Member's death; or 
(ii) the entry of an order by a court of competent jurisdiction 
adjudicating the Member incompetent to manage his/her person or 
estate. 
G. Except where the Member obtains the written consent of all 
Members at the time, in the case of a Member who is a trust or is 
acting as a Member by virtue of being a trustee of a trust, the 
termination of the trust, but' not merely the substitution of a new 
trustee. j 
H. Except where the Member optains the written consent of all 
Members at the time, in the case of a Member that is a separate 
limited liability company, the dissolution and commencement of 
winding up of the separate limited liability company. 
I. Except where the Member obtains the "Written consent of all 
Members at the time, in the case of a Member that is a corporation, 
the filing of Articles of Dissolution or forfeiture of its corporate 
powers or right to do business. 
J. Except where the Member obtains the "Written consent of all 
Members at the time, in the case of an estate, the distribution by the 
fiduciary of the estate's entire interest in the Company. 
K. In the case of a professional services limited liability company, 
restrictions or limitations ar~ placed upon a Member's ability to 
continue to render professional services as described in Section 
53-614(5), Idaho Code. 
11.2 Rights of Dissociating Member- In the event any Member dissociates 
I 
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prior to the expiration of the Term: 
A. If the Dissociation causes a dissolution and winding up of the 
Company under Article XIV herein, the Member shall be entitled to 
participate in the winding u'p of the Company to the same extent as 
any other Member, except that any Distributions to which the 
Member would have bee~ entitled shall be reduced by the dam.ages 
sustained by the Company c;i.s a result of the Dissolution caused by 
the Dissociation and winding up; or 
B. If the Dissociation does not ~ause a dissolution and winding up of 
the Company under Article ;XIV herein and the event of dissolution 
is either Section 12.1.C. or 12.1.F. above, the Member shall be 
entitled to an amount equal to the value of the Member's 
Membership Interest in the <Company, to be paid within six (6) 
months of the date of DissoJiation. As to all other events of 
dissolution defined in Articl~ XII, Section 12.1, which do not cause 
a dissolution, the dissociated Member shall be entitled to receive an 
amount equal to the Member's Membership Interest in the 
Company, to be paid when tp.e Company is dissolved and wound 
up in accordance with Article XIV herein. The value of the 
Member's Membership Inter~t shall include the amount of any 
Distributions to which the Member is entitled under the Operating 
Agreement and the fair valu~ of the Member's Membership Interest 
as of the date of Dissociatio~ based upon the Member's right to 
share in Distributions from the Company reduced by any damages 
sustained by the Company J a result of the Member's Dissociation. 






Rights of Assignees - The Assignee 1 a Membership Interest has no right 
to participate in the management of\the business and affairs of the 
Company or to become a Member. The Assignee is only entitled to 
receive the Distributions and return of capital and to be allocated the Net 
Profits and Net Losses attributable to the Membership Interest. 
Admission of Substitute Members - An Assignee of a Membership Interest 
shall be admitted as a Substitute Meinber and admitted to all the rights of 
the Member who initially assigned the Membership Interest only with the 
I 
approval of all the Members. H so admitted, the Substitute Member has 
all the rights and powers and is subjkct to all the restrictions and liabilities 
of the Member originally assigning t~e Membership Interest. The 
admission of a Substitute Member, without more, shall not release the 
Member originally assigning the Metnbership Interest from any liability to 
I 








the Company that may have existed prior to the approval. 
Admission of Additional Membeis - The Members may permit the 
admission of Additional MemberJ and determine the Capital 
Contributions of such Members o:hly upon the approval of a Majority of 
the Members. 
ARTICLE XIII - DISSOLUTION AND WINDING UP 
Dissolution - The Company shall L dissolved and its affairs wound up 
upon the first to occur of the follo+mg events (which, unless the Members 
agree to continue the business, shall constitute Dissolution Events): 
A. The expiration of the Term imless the business of the Company is 
continued with the consent 1of all of the Members; 
B. The unanimous written conkent of all of the Member; 
C. The Dissociation of any Meinber, unless the business of the 
Company is continued with, the consent of all of the remaining 
Members within ninety (90)
1 
days after such Dissociation; or 
D. The entry of a decree of judicial dissolution. 
Effect of Dissolution - Upon dissolution, the Company shall cease carrying 
on as distinguished from the winding up of the Company business, but 
the Company is not terminated but continues until the winding up of the 
affairs of the Company is completed and the Certificate 9£ Dissolution has 
been issued by the Secretary of State. 
Distribution of Assets on Dissolution - Upon the winding up of the 
Company, the Company Property shall be distributed: 
A. To creditors, including Members who are creditors, to the extent 
permitted by law, in satisfaction of Company Liabilities; and 
B. To Members in accordance with positive Capital Account balances 
taking into account all Capit~ Account adjustment for the 
Company's Taxable Year in which the liquidation occurs. 
Liquidation proceeds shall be paid within sixty (60) days of the end 
of the Company's Taxable Year or, if later, within ninety (90) days 
after the date of liquidation. Such Distributions shall be in cash or 
Property (which need not be distributed proportionately) or partly 
in both, as determined by the_Members. 
Winding Up and Certificate of Dissolution - The winding up of a limited 
liability company shall be completed when all debts, liabilities and 
I 
obligations of the limited liability company shall have been paid and 
discharged or reasonably adequate provision therefor have been made 
and all of the remaining Property ru:'.td assets of the limited liability 
company have been distributed to tl1e Members. Upon the completion of 
winding up of the Company, a Certfficate of Dissolution shall be delivered 
to the Secretary of State for filing. The Certificate of Dissolution shall set 





forth the information required by\ the Act. 
ARTICLE XIV - AMENDMENT 
Operating Agreement May Be Jdified - The Operating Agreement may 
be modified as provided in this Afticle XV (as the same may, from time to 
time, be amended). \ 
Amendment or Modification of Operating Agreement - The Operating 
Agreement may be amended or modified from time to time only by a 
written instrument adopted and executed by all of the Members. 
ARTICLE XV - MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
15.1 Entire Agreement - The Operating Agreement represents the entire 
agreement among all the Members and between the Members and the 
Company. \ 
15.2 No Partnership Intended for NoniTax Purposes - The Members have 
formed the Company under the Act and expressly do not intend hereby to 
form a partnership under either ilie State Uniform Partnership Act nor the 
State Uniform Limited Partnership Act. The Members do not intend to 
be partners one to another, or partners as to any third party. To the 
extent any Member, by work or action, represents to another person that 
any other Member is a partner or that the Company is a partnership, the 
Member making such wrongful representation shall be liable to any other 
Member who incurs personal liability by reason of such wrongful 
representation. 
15.3 Rights of Creditors and Third Parties Under Operating Agreement - The 
Operating Agreement is entered into among the Company and the 
Members for the exclusive benefit of the Company, its Members and their 
successors and assigns. The Operating Agreement is expressly not 
intended for the benefit of any creditor of the Company or any other 
person. Except and only to the extent provided by applicable statute, no 
such creditor or third party shall have any rights under the Operating 
Agreement or any agreement between the Company and any Member 
with respect to any Capital Contribution or otherwise. 
15.4 Additional Documents - All of the parties hereto agree to sign any and all 
additional papers, documents, agreements, titles, deeds or any similar 
such items that may be required to comply with the intent of this 
Agreement. '. 
15.5 Taxes - All of the parties hereto specifically understand that they will seek 
their own independent tax counsel !regarding the tax consequences of this 
transaction or any of the transactio~s that relate hereto. 
15.6 Successors and Assigns-This Agreement, except as otherwise herein 
provided, shall bind and inure to ~e benefit of the heirs, successors, 






assigns and personal representatives of the parties hereto. 
Waiver - The waiver of any.of th~ parties hereto of a breach of any 
provision of this Agreement shall neither operate as nor be construed as a 
waiver of any subsequent breach by any of the parties hereto. 
Attorney's - In the event any partr to this Agreement is compelled to file 
an action against any other partYi to enforce any provision of this 
Agreement, then and in such ev~nt the unsuccessful party in the litigation 
hereby agrees to pay the successful party in the litigation all costs 
associated with such litigation, iriduding reasonable attorney's fees and 
reasonable expert witness fees, a~d upon application and good cause 
shown, the court having jurisdicf;ion over the matter shall render 
judgment in favor of the success.ryil party and against the unsuccessful 
party for said fees and costs in addition to any other remedy provided by 
~w. 1 
Governing Law - This Agreement shall be governed by in all respects, 
whether as to validity, constructit>n, capacity, performance or otherwise, 
by the laws of the State of Idaho. \ 
15.10 Severability-The provisions of t~is Agreement are severable. If any one 
or more of the provisions are helq to be invalid by any court of competent 
jurisdiction or are voided or nullified for any reason, the remaining 
provisions and paragraphs shall ~ontinue in full force and effect and shall 
I 
be binding upon the parties so as to carry out the intent and purpose of 
the parties as nearly as possible. \ 
15.11 Headings -The section headings contained in this Agreement are 
furnished merely for convenience:and shall not be construed as limiting or 
expanding the contents hereof in any way whatsoever. 
15.12 Pronouns -All pronouns and any\variations thereof shall be deemed to 
refer to the masculine, feminine, neuter, singular and plural as the identity 
of the person or persons shall reqti.ire. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties ~ executed this Agreement in multiple 
counterparts on the day and years set forth beside their names below. 
MEMBERS: 
'I
r '~.1_1,i\ ;, . , ~Cf I (,,.t_; :,,..,J.. 
f--1,, .. ,,,,-,,-------------




DATE Oark A Reese CPA PC 









Siddoway & Company PA 
ClarkA. Reese CPA PC 
EXHIBIT.r II A" 
Initial Capital Contribution 
and Value \ 












• • il~ ______ A_s_sE_T_s_A_LE_s_A_GR_E_E_M_EN_T _____ ~!I 
THIS AGREEMENT, effective this 1s1 day of Jmmary, 2014, by and between 
SIDDOWAY & COMPANY, PC, an Idaho Professional Corporation, hereinafter referred to 
as "Seller" and CLARK A. REESE CPA, P.C., an Idaho Professional Corporation, hereinafter 
ref erred to as "Buyer". 
RECITALS 
WHEREAS, the Seller is the owner of an accounting practice, and related assets. 
WHEREAS, the Seller is desirous to sell certain assets used in Seller's accounting 
practice to the Buyer, and simultaneously Seller and Buyer will contribute the certain 
I 
assets to Siddoway, Wadsworth & Reese, PLLC, in exchange for respective one third (1/3) 
interests and membership in Siddoway, Wadsworth & Reese, PL.LC, and 
WHEREAS, the parties wish to put their agreement with regard to this sale in 
writing, 
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the covenants and 
agreemc~nts contained herein the parties agree as follows: 
I. SALE. The Seller hereby sells to the Buyer the• right to receive a one third 
( l/3) interest and membership in Siddoway, w'adsworth & Reese, PLLC, the vaJue of this 
right is equal to ½ of the value of the certain assets to be contributed. Orher than the 
afore-mentioned right, the buyer is not acquiring any assets from the seller nor assuming 
any of the sellers debts. 
L. PURCHASE PRICE. In consideration for the transfer of the above described 
assets from Seller to Buyer, Buyer shall pay to the Seller the sum of Two Hundred 
Thousand and No/ 100 Dollars {$200,000.00), which Seller shall accept from Buyer in full 
payment therefore, subject to the terms and conditions herein contained. 
3. PAYMENT OF PURCHASE PRICE. The above referenced purchase price shall 
,1SSI':T S.1\/.I':S AGREEMENT Paye I 
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be paid as specified in the Promissory Note entered between the parties on or before 
dosing. A copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and an amortization schedule 
of these payments is attached hereto as Exhibit "B". 
4. CLOSING. The Closing in this matter will take place contemporaneously 
with the e,'(ecution of this Agreement. At such time, the Buyer will t•xecute tlw 
Promissory Note specified herein. 
S. SELLERS' REPRESENTATION. Seller represents to Buyer that the following 
I 
I 
facts are true and correct, With the knowledge that Buyer is purchasing Seller's assets in 
I 
full reliance thereon: \ 
a. That the assets being sold are owned by the Seller, and Seller has full 
authority to execute this Agreement and to consummate all transactions called for herein. 
b. That Seller has good, deal· and marketable title to the assets being 
sold to Buyer herein, and will convey the same to the Buyer free and dear of all 
encumbrances. 
c. Seller has complied with and is not in violation of any applicable 
governmental statutes, laws, regulations or rules relating to the assets being transferred. 
I 
' 
c.l. The consummation of the Agreement will not constitut(• or result in 
any default, breach, or violation of any agreement, contract, instrument, or arrangement 
to which the Seller or Seller's property is bound. 
e. Al] the assets are accepted "AS IS." 
I 
G. SECURITY AGREErvIENT. Buyer hereby grants the Seller a security interest 
in the assets sold hereunder until the full purc~ase price is paid. The Guarantor pledges 
his interest" in Siddoway, Wadsworth and ReJse, Pl.LC to secure the payment of this 
obligation. The Seller will prepare a UCC-1 Finjncial Statement in favor of the Seller and 
I 
the Buyer will cooperate with its execution and rccorrung. 
7. TAXES AND ASSESSMENTS. Sellct shall pay all taxes and assessments of 
I 




<•very kind and nature, accnting on the assets prior to and through the date• of dosing, 
and the Buyer will pay the taxes and assessments thereafter. 
8. RELATIONSHIP OF THE PARTIES. Relationship between the parties is that 
of Sellers and Buyer. The parties are not partners or joint ventures, nor is there any other 
type of relationship. This agreement is intended to create such a rl'lationship since the 
~wller and buyer will both become owners and members of Siddoway, Wadsworth & Reese, 
PLLC. 
9. NON-COMPETE. It is understoocl and agreed that for a period of two (2) 
years from the date that it or he ceases association with Siddoway, Wadsworth and 
Reese, PLLC, within a 25-mile radius of thr Boise, Idaho city limits, the Seller and 
its principal, Randy Siddoway shall not engage in the business of providing tax 
preparation, bookkeeping or auditing services whether as a proprietor, partner, 
e1nployce, stock.holder, principal, agent, consultant, director, officer, or in any 
other capacity or manner whatsoever, in any enterprise that shall so engage. 
Seller shall not directly or indirectly solicit or service on behalf of hims<•lf or 
on behalf or in conjunction with others, any client or customer, or prospective 
client or customer who has been solicited or served by the business prior to the 
dosing date with regard to the business specified above. 
If any court shall determine that the duration or any other term or any 
rrstriction contained in this section is unenforceable, it is the intention of tlw 
partiPs that the restrictive covenant set forth herein shall not thereby be 
terminated, but shall be deemed amended to the extent required to render it valid 
and enforceable. 
1\SSE/' SAU~\' .t\.GREEMENT 
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If the Seller or its principal violate this provision, he or it will repay to the Buyer 
all payments made pursuant to this Agreement plus simple interest calculated at six 
percent ! 6%]. 
Io. DEFAULT. Should there be a default on tlw terms of the Promissory Nol(' 
(E.'<.hibit "A") by the Buyer under this Agreement, and the Seller gets a judgment as a 
result of this default, the Seller will not attempt to collert said judgment by executing on 
the Guarantor's personal residence at the time. 
j 
J 1. NOTICES. Notices shall be effective upon the mailing of same Lo rhe 
n.•spectivc party at the following addresses: 1 
Seller: 
Siddoway & Company, PA 
G206 N. Discovery Way 
Boise, Idaho 83 713 
Buyer: 
Clark A. Reese CPA, P.C. 
G206 N. Discovery Way 
Boise, Idaho 83 713 
L2. MODIFICATION. This Agreemen_t may not be modified except in writing 
signed by the parties. This Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to tlw benefit of 
the agents and/or personal representatives of each party. 
I 3. (AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE. lJnle~ther_-wise provided in_{his AgreemcntJ 
f~!.!!Y~cont~g~~y_or_dc_1ims arising out of qr:~~!~W!}g_t~_Ql~gr,c._~~._o~tch_~e_Qf,\ 
(s,!:@.ll_b,e_sg!!!g_dJ~y_argitration il}_~ccordance with ttie rules of th~ne~_f.\rbitratipn) 
l~ss~cicltJQTI,~.d .aJ1,1._dg!:!!_filt_up.Q!!_the aw~rd rery_g_e1:~d by th~ arbitrat<~S.§)]11~lY..!Je cnt~I".edl 
(JI]_any_cQ_urt hayingjuJ::isdi_ction there_pJ) 
1-!. ATTORNEY'S FEES. Should either party b(' r('quired to commence legal 
action to enforce any of the terms of this Agreement, the prevailing party in such 
litigation shall be entitled to an award of reasonable attorneys fees and costs from the 
other party. 
15. REPRESENTATION. The partic~ hereto have asked Bradley B. Poole, 
Chartered, an Idaho Professional Corporation, attorney for Siddoway, Wadsworth and 
.-\.\:<.,'J:'T .\~·\IE\' A.GRHEMI:'NT Page -l 
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Reece, PUC to draft this Agreement and other docwnents relating to corporation matters 
and each hereby consents to such representation after being adVised to seek their own 
independent counsel and after full disclosure of the possible effects such multiple client 
representation shall have on the independent, professional judgment of the lawyer as to 
each party. 
16. SURVIVAL OF AGREEMENT. The terms of this Agreement shall survive the 
closing of this transaction. 
DATED this ¢" f day of Jo r .. ,, 1 , 
I 
SEll.ER: SIDDOWAY & COMPANY, PC 
By: /I) .. •, IL <I-, 





FOR GOOD AND VALUABLE CONSIDERATION, and as an inducement for Siddoway 
& Company, PC, an Idaho Professional Corporation (Lender) to extend credit to 
Clark A. Reese CPA, P.C. an Idaho Professional Corporation, (Borrower), the 
undersigned unconditionally guarantees to Lender the prompt and full payment 
of this Promissory Note. Paragraph 10 above regarding not attempting to pursue 
collection against the undersigned's residence in the event of default applies to 
this Specific Guaranty. 1 
The undersigned agrees to remain bound on this guaranty notwithstanding any 
extension, forbearance of waiver, or release, discharge or substitution of any 
collateral or security for the debt. In the event of default, the Creditors may seek 
payment directly from the undersigned without need to proceed frrst against 
Borrower. ; 
j 
This Guaranty shall be binding upon and iriure to the benefit of the parties, their 
successors, assigns and personal represent~tives. 
Signed under seal this 'l. ~ day of 'J1~Nv~1 , ~.1-[' 
Clark A. Reese 





BC >ISE, II ).:\I IC> 
• 
January I, ~o 1-l 
FOR V /\1.lfl: RECI·:JVED, Clark. A. R('('S(' ('f>_.\, P.C., an Idaho ProfrssiOll<ll 
Corporation l"Horrowc•r"I, h('r<•by promis<•s to pay to th<• ord<•r of Siddoway & 
Company, PA, an Idaho Prof<•ssional Assodation l"l.l•nd<-r"I, th<• sum of Two llundrc•d 
Thousand and No/I oo Dollars ($200,000.00),,l'og<'lh<•r with intPrc•st tlwrc•on at th<• rntP 
of C;.(}0% 1)('r annum. Said sum shalJ lw paid i11 I h<· mannl'r following: 
I 
Paymc•nts of $2,500.00 per month pay~tbh• on thP I st day of Pach month. 
Tht•s<• payml'nts will IJ<'gin January II. 20 I:>, anc.l th<> full halanc<• of 
prin('ipal and intc•rc•st shall lw due• on dr lwf'or<• January I, ~~o I!). 
All paynwnts shall lJ<' first appli<•d to i1tc•n•st and 1.lw halanc·<· to principal. 
This note· shall at the• option of any, holder h<'n·of Iw inmwc.liatl'ly du<• and 
payabl<• upon th<' oc·c·urrc•nn· of any of the· fol,owing: 
I 
I. 1:auurc• to make• any paym<•nt dm• ht>rc•undt'r on its dm• datc•. TtwrP 
shall lw a right to c·un• •within thirty (:H>) clays of thP dm• date• of a paynwm. Suc-h a 
payment will lw suhjc•c·t lO the• lall• paym<'f1t pc•naJty hc•rc•in. 
2. Br<.'ach of any condition e>f any Sc•curity Agrt>c•mc•nt or (;uarant<'<' 
grant c•d as coll at c•ral S(•(·urity for this not(•. \ 
J. lipon the• death, disso~ution or liquidation of any of tlw 
unc.i<'rsigm•d, or any c•mlorsc•r, guarantor or surPty hc•rc•t o. 
I 
-J. 1 lpon the• filing by any of the• urn.lc•rsigm•d or th(' ~uarantor of an 
assigmnc•nt for thc• hc.•nefit of <T<•ditors, bankruptcy, or for rc>lil'f undt>r any provisions 
of t·hc• Bankruptcy Cod(•; or hy suffrring an involuntary P<'tition in bankruptcy or 
n•cc•iv<'rship not vacatc•d within thirty tluys. \ 
In th<· c•v<•nt this note• shall he• in dc.•fault, and placed with an attornc•v for 
coll('(tion, th('n the• unc.lc~rsigncd agr<~<• to pay all rc•asomlblc• attornc•y fN•s and costs of 
coll<·ction. Paym<'nt not ma<h• within f'h:<' C:i) days of dm• date- shall h<• suh.it'<'t to a lat<' 
charge• of :i% of said paynwnt. /\11 paym<•nts h<•n•umlc•r shall h<• mad<• Io such addn•ss 
us may f'rom tinw to tinw IJ<' dcsignat<"d by any holder ht•rpof. This Promissory Nol<' is 
stth,ic>rt to llw wrms and conditions of t'h<· :\ssc•t Salc•s .. '\gn•<·mc•nt of <•vc•n datC' 
lwrc•with lwtwc•c•n th<• partic•s, including, hut not Jimitc>d lo, th<• provisions thar lh<• 
guarantor's pc•rs<mal rc•sidenc·C' will not hC' suhjPct to c•xc•mtion or sal<• in th<• t'V<'nl of H 
br<'ach and a suhsc•qul•nt Judgm<~nt in favbr of the• I.c•ndPr of this Nol<'. This 
Promissory Note• is s<•<·tir<'d hy th<• Gm.trantor'.s intC'r('st in Siddoway, Wadsworth and 
R<'<'S<', Pl.LC, an l<l,1110 Profrssional l.imit('(l 1.iahilily Company. 
Th<' und(•rsigned and all oth<'r parti<•s to this noh•, whc•tlwr us <'ndors<·rs. 
guarantors or sur<•tic•s, agr<'<' to r<'main fully bound hc•n•1mdc•r until this noH· shall Iw 
fully paid and waive• ckmanc.l, prc•spnt mc•nt and prot<•st and all not icc•s I h<'r<'t o and 
furtlwr agrc•<> to rc•main hound, notwithstanding any <>xt<•nsion, modifkation, wavi<'r, or 
oth<·r inc.lulgen('(' by any holder or upon i-lw diseharg<• or n•l<><.tS<' of any ohligor 
hc•rc•tmd<•r or to this now, or upon the• c•xchang<•, suhstitution, or n•l<•asc• of anv 
collaH>ral grant<•d as sc•c·urity for this note•. No modifiC'alion or indulg(•nc·c• for an)' 
/. ... 1. I I f, 
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hold<'r her<>of shall be• hmding unless in writing; and any indulg<'nC'<' on any on 
oC"casion shall not h(• an indulgPnn• for any othc•r of futur<• oceasion. Any modifieation 
of' <·hang<• of tl•rms, h<•rc•undPr grantc•d hy uny holdt•r undPrsigm•d, notwithstanding th<• 
acknowlc•dgmt•nt of' any of th(\ undc•rsignc•d, and c•,.l<'h of lhc• und<•rsign<'c.l doPs hPn•by 
irn•voc·ably grant to e•ach of the• oth<'rs a pow<'r of attornc•y to c•nt<•r inl o any such 
moclifkation on t'h<•ir behalf. The• rights of any hokh.•r h<'r<•of shall lw cumulative• and 
nC>t nc•n•ssarily sucTc•ssiv<•. This not<• shall take• effrct as a sc•alc•d instnmwnt and shall 
lw constnwd, govc•rn('d and c•nforcc•d in ac·t·ordancl' with lhP laws or the• Stall· of Idaho. 
This Promissory Not<' is not transfc•rahl<• by tlw l.t>nc.l<•r. 
Borrower: 
Clark A. R<'PSC' CPA, P.C. 
By: _____ ~~~---- ··-··' ~ 2 .r- e.o ,_?. __ 
Date• 
SPECIFIC GUARAN'IY 
FOi{ GOOD AND VALUABLE CONSIDEH.-'\TION, and as an imluc-Pmc•nt for Sidc.lowav & 
Company, PA, an Idaho Prof(•ssionaJ Assodation ("l.<'n<l<'r") i-o t>Xt<1ncl <T<•dit to Clark A. 
R<'<'Sl' CPA, P.C. an Idaho Professional Corporation, (Brn-row<'r), th,· unc.l<•rsigm•d 
un<'onditionally guarant<'<'S to I.<.•nc.lPr th<• prompt and full paynwnt of this Promissory 
Not<•. 
Th<' und<•rsignNI agr('(~S to rc•main bound on this guaranty notwiths1anding any 
<'Xt<'nsion, forhcanm<"<' of waiv<•r, or n•l<•as<•, disehargl' or suhs1 itution of any <'<>llat<•ral 
or sPcurity for tlw d<•ht. In the• PVPnt of <l<•fault, !h<• C'r<•c.litors may sc•<>k paym<•nt 
din•ctly from tlw undc•rsignNI withoul m•c•cl lo pron•c•d first against Borrow<•r. 
This c;uaranry shall lw binding upon and inure• ro th<' hen<'f'it of tlw p .. 1rt iPs, t·hpir 
suc<'c•ssors, assigns and personal n•presPnl at iv<>s. 
Should t hc•n• he• a dc•fault hy th<• Buy<•r m1cJN this Prmiussory No1<-, and th<' lloldPr gt•ts 
a judgm<•nt as a rc•suJt of this default, tlw I lolc.lc•r hc•r<•of will not attc•mpt to coJl(•ct said 
juclgnwnt hy <'X<'Cllling on th<> <~uarantor's pPrscmal r(•sidc•nn· at th<• time•. 
Sigm•d und(1r sc•al !'his .2.g- _ tlay of Pl~"'~: .. ) .... , ~~!S-
( 'lark A R<•c•sc• 
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Clark Purchase 
Compound Period ......... Monthly 
Nominal Annual Rate .... 6.000 % 
CASH FLOW DATA 
Event Date Amount Number Period End Date 
1 Loan 01/01/2014 200,000.00 1 
2 Payment 01/22/2014 5,500.00 1 
3 Payment 01/01/2015 2,500.00 48 Monthly 12/01/2018 
4 Payment 01/01/2019 126,482.59 1 
AMORTIZATION SCHEDULE - NormalAmortization 
Date Payment Interest Principal .. Balance ... 
Loan 01/01/2014 200,000.00 
1 01/22/2014 5,500.00 690.41 4,809.59 195,190.41 
2014 Totals 5,500.00 690.41 4,809.59 
2 01/01/2015 2,500.00 11,346.88 8,846.88- 204,037.29 
3 02/01/2015 2,500.00 1,020.19 1,479.81 202,557.48 
4 03/01/2015 2,500.00 1,012.79 1,487.21 201,070.27 
5 04/01/2015 2,500.00 1,005.35 1,494.65 199,575.62 
6 05/01/2015 2,500.00 997.88 1,502.12 198,073.50 
7 06/01/2015 2,500.00 990.'37 1,509.63 196,563.87 
8 07/01/2015 2,500.00 982.82 1,517.18 195,046.69 
9 08/01/2015 2,500.00 975.23 1,524.77 193,521.92 
10 09/01/2015 2,500.00 967.61 1,532.39 191,989.53 
11 10/01/2015 2,500.00 959.95 1,540.05 190,449.48 
12 11/01/2015 2,500.00 952.25 1,547.75 188,901.73 
13 12/01/2015 2,500.00 944.51 1,555.49 187,346.24 
2015 Totals 30,000.00 22,155.83 7,844.17 
14 01/01/2016 2,500.00 936.73 1,563.27 185,782.97 
15 02/01/2016 2,500.00 928.91 1,571.09 184,211.88 
16 03/01/2016 2,500.00 921.06 1,578.94 182,632.94 
17 04/01/2016 2,500.00 913.16 1,586.84 181,046.10 
18 05/01/2016 2,500.00 905.23 1,594.77 179,451.33 
19 06/01/2016 2,500.00 897.26 1,602.74 177,848.59 
20 07/01/2016 2,500.00 889.24 1,610.76 176,237.83 
21 08/01/2016 2,500.00 881.19 1,618.81 174,619.02 
22 09/01/2016 2,500.00 873.10 1,626.90 172,992.12 
23 10/01/2016 2,500.00 864.96 1,635.04 171,357.08 
24 11/01/2016 2,500.00 856.79 1,643.21 169,713.87 
25 12/01/2016 2,500.00 848.57 1,651.43 168,062.44 
2016 Totals 30,000.00 10,716.20 19,283.80 
26 01/01/2017 2,500.00 840.31 1,659.69 166,402.75 
27 02/01/2017 2,500.00 832.01 1,667.99 164,734.76 
< , J I I< / I . I 
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Clark Purchase 
Date Payment Interest Principal Balance 
28 03/01/2017 2,500.00 823.67 1,676.33 163,058.43 
29 04/01/2017 2,500.00 815.29 1,684.71 161,373.72 
30 05/01/2017 2,500.00 806.87 1,693.13 159,680.59 
31 06/01/2017 2,500.00 798.40 1,701.60 157,978.99 
32 07/01/2017 2,500.00 789.89 1,710.11 156,268.88 
33 08/01/2017 2,500.00 781.34 1,718.66 154,550.22 
34 09/01/2017 2,500.00 772.75 1,727.25 152,822.97 
35 10/01/2017 2,500.00 764.11 1,735.89 151,087.08 
36 11/01/2017 2,500.00 755.44 1,744.56 149,342.52 
37 12/01/2017 2,500.00 746.71 1,753.29 147,589.23 
2017 Totals 30,000.00 9,526.79 20,473.21 
38 01/01/2018 2,500.00 737.95 1,762.05 145,827.18 
39 02/01/2018 2,500.00 729.14 1,770.86 144,056.32 
40 03/01/2018 2,500.00 720.28 1,779.72 142,276.60 
41 04/01/2018 2,500.00 711.38 1,788.62 140,487.98 
42 05/01/2018 2,500.00 702.44 1,797.56 138,690.42 
43 06/01/2018 2,500.00 693.45 1,806.55 136,883.87 
44 07/01/2018 2,500.00 684;42 1,815.58 135,068.29 
45 08/01/2018 2,500.00 675:34 1,824.66 133,243.63 
46 09/01/2018 2,500.00 666:22 1,833.78 131,409.85 
47 10/01/2018 2,500.00 657l05 1,842.95 129,566.90 
48 11/01/2018 2,500.00 647:83 1,852.17 127,714.73 
49 12/01/2018 2,500.00 638.57 1,861.43 125,853.30 
2018 Totals 30,000.00 8,264.07 21,735.93 
50 01/01/2019 126,482.59 629.29 125,853.30 0.00 
2019 Totals 126,482.59 629.,29 125,853.30 
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4 Wyatt Johnson 
5 ANGSTMAN JOHNSON 
3649 Lakeharbor Lane 
e Boise, Idaho 83 703 
Telephone: (208) 384-8588 
1 Facsimile: (208) 853-0117 
Johnson ISB: 5858 
8 




IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH RJDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR mE COUNTY OF ADA 
13 WADSWORTH REESE, PLLC, an Idaho 
14 Professional Corporation; CLARK A. REESE Case No. CVOC1521225 
CPA, P.C., an Idaho Professional Corporation; 
1s and WADSWORTH ACCOUNTING CPA, an 
16 




19 SIDDOWAY & COMP ANY, PC, an Idaho 
20 professional corporation; RANDY 
SIDDOWAY, an individual; DUSTIN 
21 SIDDOWAY, an individual and JEANINE 




The Defendant, Dustin Siddoway, by anjthrough his counsel of record, ANGSTMAN 
26 JOHNSON, answers the Complaint in the above- atter as follows: 
1. Except as expressly admitted, Dusl Siddoway denies each and every allegation 
26 
27 
28 of the Complaint. 
29 
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2. Dustin Siddoway admits Paras. 1-3, 5-7, 11-16, 18, 21, 22, 24, 26, 28-32, 34, 35, 
2 50-53, 57-59, 71, 81, 87 and 120 of the Complaint. 
3 
3. Dustin Siddoway denies Paras. 10, 23, 25, 46, 47. 54-56, 60, 76, 78, 80, 82, 84-
4 
5 86, 88, 89, 113-116, 118, 119, 121, 123-130, 132-135, 137-141,143-146 and the demand for 




4. The paragraphs contained in the following Counts of the complaint are not 
directed toward Dustin Siddoway, so no response is required, but are denied to the extent a 
10 
response is required: Count II, Count III, and Count N. 
11 5. The following paragraphs merely incorporate others by reference, and all 




117, 122, 131, 136 and 142. 
6. Dustin Siddoway is without sufficient information or belief to admit or deny the 
18 truth or falsity of the allegations of the following paragraphs, and therefore denies the same: 8, 9, 
17 20, 33, 39-45, 49, 61-70, and 72-75. 
18 
19 
7. In response to Paragraph 4, Dustin Siddoway denies the allegations for the reason 
that it appear that Siddoway & Company is a "P.A.,11 rather than a "P .C." 
20 
21 8. In response to Paragraph 17, Dustin Siddoway denies the allegations for the 
22 reason that the purchase price was allocated to specific assets, rather than the assets collectively. 
23 9. In response to Paragraph 77, Dustin Siddoway denies that Kalyn Harding ever 
24 
took a job with AnchorPoint Accounting, PLLC, btit admits the remainder of that allegation. 
25 1 I 
26 
10. In response to Paragraphs 19 and 7~, these allegations are denied for the reason 
28 
27 that the obligations of Harding Cot P.A. and Kalyii Harding are only those set forth in the actual 
I 
29 
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1 agreement and not as phrased in the Complaint. Paragraph 79 is further denied for the reason that 
2 
Kalyn Harding never took a position with AnchorPoint Accounting, PLLC. 
3 
4 
11. In response to Paragraph 27, Dustin Siddoway affinnatively alleges that WR 
5 PLLC did not require a written contract as a condition of Dustin Siddoway' s employment, and, 




12. In response to Paragraphs 36, 37, and 38 they are denied because they allege 
obligations upon Randy Siddoway, personally, despite the fact that he is not an obligor on the 
10 
agreement that is the subject of those paragraphs. 
11 13. In response to Paragraph 48, Dustin Siddoway admits only that he entered the 
12 premises on one or two occasions, but denies that he and Randy Siddoway were looking at any 
13 
14 
client information on any of those occasions. Dustin Siddoway is without information to admit 











Plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief may be grant00t I.R.C.P. 
Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the equitable doctrines of Laches Waiver or 
21 Estoppel. 








Dustin Siddoway makes a demand pursuant to I.R.C.P. 38 for a trial by jury of not less 
than 12 persons and all issues so triable. 
ANSWER OF DUSTIN SIDDOWAY - PAGE 3 







The Defendants have been required to obtain cowisel to defend these allegations and 
request attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-120(3), I.R.C.P. 54, and any other applicable 
5 
provision of law. 




Based upon the foregoing, Dustin Siddoway request that the Court (1) dismiss the 
Complaint of the Plaintiffs, Defendant and Pro Se, that they take nothing thereby; (2) award 
10 
Defendant their reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in defending this action; and (3) 
11 award such other relief as the Court deems just and equitable. 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this !::I!± . y ~f March, 2016, I caused to be served a true copy of 
3 the foregoing ANSWER OF DUSTIN SIDDOWAY by the method indicated below, and addressed to 











































Fisher, Rainey Hudson 
950 W. Bannock Street, Ste 630 
Boise, ID 83702 
(208) 297-2689 
Brett Hastings 
Hastings Law Group, LLC 
299 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
(Pro hac vice) 
Glenn Godfrey, Jr. 
Godfrey Law, PLLC 
842 E. Winding Creek Drive 
Eagle, ID 83616 
(Local Counsel) 
Jeanine Barkan 
922 W. Colchester Dr. 
Eagle, ID 83616 
ANSWER OF DUSTIN SIDDOWAY -P 
A•J: Matter: 1 IS32-00I 
Means of Seryjce 
0 U.S. Mail, Postage Paid 
D Hand Delivered 
D Fax Transmittal 
~:11ugh11ra~liitlriallawy1:r:;.com 
1111 i SMfi!•fi'lll.rialliU:P''i::i,CWJl 
0 U.S. Mail, Postage Paid 
D Hand Delivered 
D Fax Transmittal 
~reU,'tilhQSJill2§111w,m; 
D U.S. Mail, Postage Paid 
D Hand Delivered 
D Fax Transmittal 
~ fiod l(gv(.1prPLl,C(<tgl1111il.com 
0 U.S. Mail, Postage Paid 
D Hand Delivered 
D Fax Transmittal 
~1 jbarkan 18•ti~gmail.i:om 
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Vaughn Fisher, ISB No. 7624 
Allison M. Blackman, ISB No. 8686 
Fisher Rainey Hudson 
950 West Bannock Street, Ste. 630 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 345-7000 
Facsimile: (208) 514-1900 
vaughn@frhtrialiawyers.com 
naw@frhtriallawyers.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
t~O-----=-----
FILEu $"• A.M. ____ .M • Qo 
MAR - 7 2016 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, C!3rk 
By SANTIAGO BAR~'.lOS 
Di!f-JTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE ST A TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
WADSWORTH REESE, PLLC, an Idaho 
Professional Corporation; CLARK A. REESE 
CPA, P.C., an Idaho Professional Corporation; 
and WADSWORTH ACCOUNTING CPA, 
PLLC , an Idaho Professional Corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SIDDOWAY & COMPANY, PC, an Idaho 
professional corporation; RANDY 
SIDDOWAY, an individual; DUSTIN 
SIDDOWAY, an individual and JEANINE 
BARKAN, an individual; 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 1521225 
REPL V OF CLARK A. REESE CPA, 
P.C. AND WADSWORTH 
ACCOUNTING CPA, PLLC TO RANDY 
SIDDOWAY AND SIDDOWAY & 
COMPANY P.C.'s COUNTERCLAIMS 
PLAINTIFFS CLARK A. REESE CPA, P.C. & WADSWORTH ACCOUNTING CPA, 
PLLC ("counter-defendants") file this Reply to Randy Siddoway ("Randy") and Siddoway & 
Company, P.C. {"Siddoway Co.") Counterclaims: 
REPLY OF CLARK A. REESE CPA, P.C. AND WADSWORTH ACCOUNTING CPA 
TO RANDY SIDDOWAY AND SIDDOWAY & COMPANY P.C. 'S 






I • Page: 3 
First Affirmative Defense - The Reese Contract alleged in the counterclaims is void on its face 
by agreement of the parties. 
Second Affirmative Defense - The counterclaimants' claims are barred in full or in part by 
estoppel. 
Third Affirmative Defense - The counterclaimants' claims are barred in full or in part by 
failure of consideration. 
Fourth Affirmative Defense- The counterclaimants' claims are barred in full or in part by 
fraud. 
Fifth Affirmative Defense - The counterclaimants' claims are barred in· full or in part by the 
statute of frauds. 
Sixth Affirmative Defense- The counterclaimants' claims are barred in full or in part by 
waiver. 
Seventh Affirmative Defense - The counterclaimants' claims are barred in full or in part by the 
failure of a condition subsequent. 
The Counter defendants respond to the numbered allegations on the counterclaims as 
follows: 






REPLY OF CLARK A. REESE CPA, P.C. AND WADSWORTH ACCOUNTING CPA 
TO RANDY SIDDOWAY AND SIDDOWAY & COMPANY P.C.'S 






7. It is admitted the Court has jurisdiction over this case. 




10. It is admitted the Certificate of Organization was filed as alleged. The remaining 
allegations are denied 
11. It is admitted that Siddoway developed an accounting practice in the Boise area and 
that he operated some or all of it through Siddoway Co. The remaining allegations are denied. 
12. Admitted. 
' 
13. Admitted the three individuals projected the annual revenue from Mr. Wadsworth's 
existing clients would be about one half of the anrtual revenue from Mr. Siddoway's existing 
clients. The remaining allegations, are denied. 
14. Denied. Mr. Reese WAS an equal partner in the entity. 
15. Denied. Mr. Reese had some clients and some goodwill. No goodwill was ever 
fonnally contributed by any of the members. 
16. Admitted the two individuals discussed Mr. Reese purchasing one-half of Mr. 
Siddoway's practice and that both halves would be contributed to WR PLLC. However, it is 
denied the essential tenns of any agreement were con~lusively reached as they did not define what 
it meant to purchase one half of Mr. Siddoway's practice or finalize a price or purchase terms. The 
two did discuss the historic revenue generated by Mr. Siddowafs practice and agreed that, if 
REPLY OF CLARK A. REESE CPA, P.C. AND WADSWORTH ACCOUNTING CPA 
TO RANDY SIDDOWAY AND SIDDOWAY & COMPANY P.C.'S 












20. Denied. The payment was a loan so that Siddoway Co. could meet its payroll 
obligations. 
21. It is admitted that the Operating Agreement was executed on January 6, 2014. 
Regarding the additional allegation. the document speaks for itself. 
22. Admitted. 




_:,, Denied. The version of the Reese Contract attached to the Counterclaim is 
incomplete and there was no prior oral agreement. 
26. Denied. The Reese Contract is void per the agreement of the parties. 
27. Admitted that two payments totaling $5,000 were made in January 2015. The 
remaining allegations are denied. 
I 
28. Admitted that payments were made as alleged in anticipation of the Reese Contract 
being validated. It was not. 
29. Admitted. 
I 
REPLY OF CLARK A. REESE CPA, P.C. AND WADSWORTH ACCOUNTING CPA 
TO RANDY SIDDOWAY AND SIDDOWAY & COMPANY P.C.'S 







Page: 6 • 
30. Denied as incomplete. The primary purpose of the consultant was to improve the 
performance of the firm. 
31. It is admitted that Randy asked the other two members to buy out his membership 
interest in July 2015. The remaining allegations are denied. 
32. Denied. 
33. Denied. A non-binding letter of intent was signed by the parties. 
34. Admitted. 
35. Denied. Randy told the other two members that he was adding terms to the contract 
which were not in the letter of intent. When they said they would not agree, Randy stopped the 
drafting process. 
36. Denied. On August 21, 2015 Randy met with the other two members to announce 
that he was leaving the firm and taking employees and clients with him. 
37. Denied. 
38. Denied. None were offered at that time. 
39. Admitted that in an August 24, 2015 email Mr. Wadsworth confirmed that Randy 
had resigned from his day to day management duties to the finn. The remaining allegations of this 
paragraph are denied. 
40. Denied. 
41. Denied. 
42. Denied. Randy encouraged the meeting with Dustin Siddoway to invite him to buy 
I 
out Randy's interest in the limited liability company. 
I 
I 
43. Denied. The lock had already been in place prior to August 24, 2015. 
REPLY OF CLARK A. REESE CPA, P.C. AND WADSWORTH ACCOUNTING CPA 
TO RANDY SIDDOWAY AND SIDDOWAY & COMPANY P.C. ~s 






44. Denied. No distributions have ever been recognized by Wadsworth Reese PLLC 
but for an even $225 per member for the year 2014. 
45. Denied. No distributions have ever been recognize.d by Wadsworth Reese PLLC 
but for an even $225 per member for the year 20 I 4. The only money received prior to September 




49. Admitted that on or about August 24, 2015 Mr. Siddoway stopped generating any 
revenue or producing any work for WR PLLC and that in response he was asked to pay rent to 
WR PLLC or vacate his office. The remaining allegations, including that he was asked to vacate 
on August 24, 2015 are denied. 
50. Denied. 
51. Denied. TI1e letter sent at that time speaks for itself. 
52. Admitted this was the prior attempt prior to the petition being filed to dissociate 




56. Counter-defendants are without infonnation as to the totality of Mr. Siddoway's 
unspoken motivations. This allegation is denied. 
REPLY OF CLARK A. REESE CPA, P.C. AND WADSWORTH ACCOUNTING CPA 
TO RANDY SIDDOWAY AND SIDDOWAY & COMPANY P.C.'S 
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57. Admitted that Siddoway Co. has not been legally dissociated from Wadsworth 
Reese, PLLC. The remaining allegations of this paragraph are denied. 
FIRST COUNTER CLAIM 















67. Counter-defendants likewise incorporate their responses to the preceding 
paragraphs. 
68. Denied. 
REPLY OF CLARK A. REESE CPA, P.C. AND WADSWORTH ACCOUNTING CPA 
TO RANDY SIDDOWAY AND SIDDOWAY & COMPANY P.C.'S 




TO:12082876919 FROM:2082922815 - -
Page: 9 
69. Admitted to the extent this allegation references that recognized $225 distribution. 




















REPLY OF CLARK A. REESE CPA, P.C. AND WADSWORTH ACCOUNTING CPA 
TO RANDY SIDDOWAY AND SIDDOWAY & COMPANY P.C.'S 
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82. Counter-defendants likewise incorporate their responses to the preceding 
paragraphs. 
83. Denied. The referenced contract is void on its face by agreement of the parties. 
84. Denied. The referenced contract is void on its face by agreement of the parties. 
85. Denied. The referenced contract is void on its face by agreement of the parties. 
86. Denied. The referenced contract is void on its face by agreement of the parties. 
87. Denied. The referenced contract is vdid on its face by agreement of the parties. 
EIGHTH COUNTERCLAIM 




WHEREFORE, Counter-defendants pray: 
I 
a. That the counterclaims be dismissed in the entirety; 
b. That counter-defendants take nothing pursuant to their counterclaims; 
c. That Siddoway Co. be dissociated.from Wadsworth Reese PLLC; 
I 
d. That attorney fees and costs be awarded against Siddoway Co. and Randy; 
e. That this Court award all relief which is proper and appropriate. 
DATED this _I_ day of March, 2016. 
Fisher 
A omey for Plaintiffs 
REPLY OF CLARK A. REESE CPA, P.C. AND WADSWORTH ACCOUNTING CPA 
TO RANDY SIDDOWAY AND SIDDOWAY & COMPANY P.C.'S 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the .. J- day ofMarch,2016, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
REPLY OF CLARK A. REESE CPA, P.C. AND WADSWORTH ACCOUNTING CPA TO RANDY 
SIDDOWAY AND SIDDOWAY & COMPANY P.C.'S COUNTERCLAIMS to be served upon the 
following individuals in the manner indicated below: 
Jeanine Barkan 
922 W Colchester Drive 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Dusty Siddoway 
12592 W. Explorer Dr., Ste 125 
Boise, ID 83713 
Randy Siddoway 
12592 W. Explorer Dr., Ste 125 
Boise, ID 83713 
Siddoway & Company, PC 
12592 W. Explorer Dr., Ste 125 
Boise. ID 83 713 
( ) Via U.S. Mail 
( ) Via Facsimile 
( ) Via Overnight Mail 
( ) Via Hand Delivery 
(~a Email -jbarkanl8@gmail.com 
( ) Via U.S. Mail 
( ) Via Facsimile 
( ) Via Overnight Mail 
( ) Via Hand Delivery 
('-(\Tia Email -wyatt@angstman.com 
( ) Via U.S. Mail 
( ) Via Facsimile 
( ) Via Overnight Mail 
( ) Via Hand Delivery 
(\..(Via Email - Brett@hastingslaw.us 
( ) Via U.S. Mail 
( ) Via Facsimile 
( ) Via Overnight Mail 
( ) Via Hand Delivery 
( '(via Email - Brett@hastingslaw.us 
REPLY OF CLARK A. REESE CPA, P.C. AND WADSWORTH ACCOUNTING CPA 
TO RANDY SIDDOWAY AND SIDDOWAY & COMPANY P.C.'S 
COUNTERCLAIMS - 10 
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MAY 1 o 2016 
CHRISTOPHER 0. RICH, Clerk 
By KRISTI DUMON 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
WADSWORTH REESE, PLLC, an Idaho 
Professional Corporation; CLARK A. REESE Case No. CV-OC-2015-21225 
CPA, P .C., an Idaho Professional Corporation; 
and WADSWORTH ACCOUNTING CPA, an MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
Idaho Professional Corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SIDDOWAY & COMPANY, PC, an Idaho 
professional corporation; RANDY 
SIDDOWAY, an individual; DUSTIN 
SIDDOWAY, an individual; and JEANINE 
BARKAN, an individual, 
Defendants. 
This case arises from an accounting firm's breakup. Defendants Siddoway & Company, 
PC ("Siddoway PC") and Randy Siddoway-which the Court together will call "Siddoway"-
contend that some of the parties' disputes are subject to an arbitration clause. Siddoway 
therefore moves to compel arbitration. Plaintiff Clark A. Reese CPA, P.C. ("Reese PC") 
opposes the motion, contending the agreement that contains the arbitration clause is void. 
Additionally, the three plaintiffs, Reese PC along with Plaintiffs Wadsworth Reese, PLLC and 
Wadsworth Accounting CPA ("Wadsworth PC"), move to amend their complaint to assert a 
claim for a declaratory judgment that the agreement that contains the arbitration clause is void. 
Both motions were argued and taken under advisement on April 26, 2016. For the reasons that 
follow, both are granted. 





The accounting firm that is now called Wadsworth Reese, PLLC was formed by 
accountants Clark Reese and Randy Siddoway in December 2013. (Verif. Compl., 13; Answer 
, 13;
1 
Fisher Aff., 3 & Ex. A.) It first was called CRS Services, PLLC. (Verif. Compl., 13; 
Answer, 13 & Ex. A.) About a month later, however, its name was changed to Siddoway, 
Wadsworth & Reese, PLLC, reflecting the addition of a third accountant, Frederick Wadsworth, 
to the venture. (Verif. Compl. , 21; Answer, 21; Fisher Aff. , 4 & Ex. B.) Its three members at 
that time were not the three accountants individually, but instead the professional corporations 
through which they had respectively been doing business as accountants. Those professional 
corporations-Siddoway PC, Reese PC, and Wadsworth PC---entered into an operating 
agreement for Wadsworth Reese dated January 6, 2014. (Verif. Compl., 20(a), (b); Answer 
, 20(a), (b).) The January 2014 operating agreement was intended to be temporary because the 
three accountants had not yet reached a final agreement as to all of the terms on which they were 
joining forces, such as the values to assign to their respective client bases. (Reese Aff., 5.) But, 
as discussed below, the hoped-for final agreement was never reached. (Reese Aff. ,, 7, 11-21.) 
The firm finally took on the Wadsworth Reese name in November 2015, nearly two years 
after the "temporary" operating agreement was signed. (Fisher Aff., 5 & Ex. C.) It did so in the 
wake of Randy Siddoway' s August 2015 decision to cut ties and begin a new venture of his own. 
(Reese Aff., 23.) This lawsuit arises from the parties' inability to reach an agreement as to the 
terms of Randy Siddoway' s departure, as well as their disagreement as to whether his new 
venture violated duties to Wadsworth Reese. 
1 
Citations to the "Answer" mean Siddoway's answer. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 2 
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One bone of contention is the Asset Sales Agreement entered into by Reese PC and 
Siddoway PC on January 28, 2015, but effective January 1, 2014. (Reese Aff. ,r 12 & Ex. A.) 
The Court will call that agreement the "Reese Agreement," borrowing the label Plaintiffs give it. 
The Reese Agreement was an effort to resolve some of the issues the three accountants had 
hoped, and were then still hoping, to resolve in a final agreement. (Reese Aff. ,r 12.) Under the 
Reese Agreement, Siddoway PC agreed to sell Reese PC "the right to receive a one third (1/3) 
interest and membership in [Wadsworth Reese]"-a right with a nebulous agreed value "equal to 
½ of the value of the certain assets to be contributed." (Reese Aff. Ex. A§ 1.) In return, Reese 
PC agreed to pay Siddoway PC $200,000 in monthly installments. (Reese Aff. Ex. A§§ 2-3.) 
Importantly, the Reese Agreement included an arbitration clause: 
13. AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE. Unless otherwise provided in this 
Agreement, any controversy or claims arising out of or relating to this Agreement, 
or breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the rules of the 
American Arbitration Association, and a judgment upon the award rendered by 
the arbitrator(s) may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof. 
(Reese Aff. Ex. A§ 13.) 
The same day the Reese Agreement was signed, Frederick Wadsworth sent an e-mail to 
Randy Siddoway and Clark Reese memorializing terms of an earlier discussion between the 
three accountants about the Reese Agreement. (Reese Aff. ,r,r 13-14 & Ex. A.) The e-mail 
repeatedly mentions the "Clark buy-in document." (Reese Aff. Ex. A.) It is perfectly clear that 
the "Clark buy-in document" meant the Reese Agreement. In the e-mail, Frederick Wadsworth 
wrote that "I believe the three ofus have agreed to the following terms: We will use the Clark 
buy-in document with MINIMAL adjustments .... Those adjustments are: The Clark buy-in 
document will be void if fewer than two partners agree to sign the operating/member's 
agreement by Feb 15, 2015." (Reese Aff. Ex. A (underscoring added).) The e-mail was printed, 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 3 
000149
itled "Modification #1," and signed by all three accountants. (Reese Aff. Ex. A.) Reece PC 
then began making monthly payments to Siddoway PC in accordance with the Reese Agreement, 
and the accountants negotiated toward a new operating agreement. (Reese Aff. ,r,r 16-18.) 
But no new operating agreement was reached-not by February 15, 2015, and not ever. 
(Reese Aff. ,r,r 18-20.) Rather than assert that the Reese Agreement had become void because no 
new operating agreement was reached by the February 15 deadline, Reese PC continued making 
payments to Siddoway PC after February 15. (Reese Aff. ,r 20; Siddoway Aff. ,r 5.) Those 
payments continued until October 2015. (Siddoway Aff. ,r,r 10-11.) 
In the meantime, during July 2015, Randy Siddoway asked to be bought out of 
Wadsworth Reece. (Reese Aff. ,r 21.) At that point, the negotiations shifted; negotiations 
toward final terms on which the three accountants could co-exist under the Wadsworth Reese 
umbrella transitioned to negotiations toward terms on which Siddoway PC would exit 
Wadsworth Reese. (Reese Aff. ,r,r 22-23.) But those negotiations also faltered, and in August 
2015 Randy Siddoway left Wadsworth Reese, taking some employees (including Defendants 
Dustin Siddoway and Jeanine Barkan) and some clients with him. (Reese Aff. ,r,r 23-27.) 
Wadsworth Reese, Reese PC, and Wadsworth PC filed this action against Siddoway PC, 
Randy Siddoway, Dustin Siddoway, and Jeanine Barkan on December 14, 2015, asserting a 
variety of "business tort" claims, as well as a claim for Siddoway PC's dissociation from 
Wadsworth Reese and two claims for breach of the Reese Agreement. Their complaint's twelve 
counts are as follows: (1) a request for injunctive relief under the Idaho Trade Secrets Act, 
LC. §§ 48-801 to -807; (2) a request for injunctive relief under I.R.C.P. 65; (3) a request for a 
judicial order for Siddoway PC's dissociation from Wadsworth Reese; (4) a claim breach of 
fiduciary duty; (5) a claim for civil conspiracy to commit breach of fiduciary duty; (6) a claim 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 4 
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violation of the Idaho Trade Secret Act; (7) a claim for tortious interference with prospective 
business advantage; (8) a claim for civil conspiracy to commit tortious interference with 
prospective economic advantage; (9) a claim for breach of confidence; (10) a claim for civil 
conspiracy to commit breach of confidence; ( 11) a claim seeking rescission of the Reese 
Agreement as a remedy for its breach; and (12) a claim seeking damages as a remedy for breach 
of the Reese Agreement. (Verif. Compl. ,i,i 83-155.) 
On January 19, 2016, Siddoway filed an answer to Plaintiffs' complaint and a 
counterclaim against Reese PC and Wadsworth PC.
2 
The counterclaim's eight counts are as 
follows: (1) a claim for breach of Wadsworth Reese's operating agreement; (2) a claim for 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing owed in connection with the 
operating agreement; (3) a claim that Wadsworth Reese's distributions have been unequal, in 
violation of LC.§ 30-6-404; (4) a claim for conversion; (5) a claim for an accounting of 
Wadsworth Reese's activities; (6) a claim for Wadsworth Reese's judicial dissolution; (7) a 
claim against Reese PC ( as well as non-plaintiff Clark Reese) for breach of the Reese 
Agreement; and (8) a request for legal fees. 
On February 12, 2016, Siddoway filed a motion to compel arbitration with respect to 
Counts XI and XII of the Complaint, contending they are subject to the Reese Agreement's 
arbitration clause. Those two claims are brought only by Reese PC (Verif. Compl. ,i,i 151, 155), 
as the other two plaintiffs are not parties to the Reese Agreement. In opposition to the motion, 
Reese PC contends (i) the Reese Agreement-and therefore its arbitration clause-is void 
because of the non-occurrence of the "condition subsequent" stated in Modification #1 that at 
2 
Unconventionally, the counterclaim defendants also include non-plaintiffs Clark Reese and 
Frederick Wadsworth, who have not appeared in this action. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 5 
000151
-
st two of Wadsworth Reese's members would agree to a new operating agreement by 
February 15, 2015, (ii) the Reese Agreement is too indefinite to be enforced, and (iii) the Reese 
Agreement fails for lack of consideration. 
Reese PC's arguments for the Reese Agreement's invalidity, of course, are inconsistent 
with its seeking relief in Counts XI and XII for the Reese Agreement's breach. Having taken 
note of the inconsistency, Plaintiffs filed a motion to amend their complaint to assert an 
alternative claim seeking a declaratory judgment that the Reese Agreement is void because of the 
non-occurrence of the condition subsequent stated in Modification #1. In opposition to that 
motion, Siddoway contends the proposed new claim is futile for the following reasons: (i) 
Modification # 1 is an invalid agreement to agree, so its condition subsequent is ineffectual; (ii) 
the non-occurrence of the condition subsequent was excused; (iii) Modification #1 was implicitly 
modified to remove the condition subsequent; and (iv) Reese PC waived the right to insist on the 
occurrence of the condition subsequent. 
As already noted, Siddoway's motion to compel arbitration and Plaintiffs' motion to 
amend their complaint were argued and taken under advisement on April 26, 2016. During the 
hearing, the Court observed that the motion to compel arbitration is governed by LC. § 7-902(a), 
which is part of the Uniform Arbitration Act as adopted in Idaho (LC.§§ 7-901 to -922). The 
Court·asked the parties what procedure section 7-902(a) requires, noting that an evidentiary 
hearing was the approach taken by the district court, and deemed sufficient on appeal, in Loomis, 
Inc. v. Cudahy, 104 Idaho 106,656 P.2d 1359 (1982). The Court made clear its willingness to 
take that approach here. Neither side professed to know what procedure section 7-902(a) 
requires·, and neither side asked for an evidentiary hearing. Instead, each side agreed to waive 
the right to an evidentiary hearing in favor of allowing the Court to decide the matter on the 
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3 
In light of both sides' mutual preference for that 
approach, the Court agreed to it. 
II. 
LEGAL STANDARDS 
A. Siddoway's motion to compel arbitration 
Under the Uniform Arbitration Act, when one party moves to compel arbitration but 
another denies the existence of an agreement to arbitrate, "the court shall proceed summarily to 
the determination of the issue so raised." I.C. § 7-902(a) (emphasis added). The inquiry for 
which section 7-902(a) provides "must be limited in scope-is there an agreement to arbitrate or 
is there not. It would be inappropriate to review the merits of the dispute as such would in many 
instances emasculate the benefits of arbitration." Loomis, 104 Idaho at 109, 656 P.2d at 1362. In 
Loomis, the district court conducted an evidentiary hearing and then determined that the parties' 
dispute was subject to an agreement to arbitrate. Id. at 107, 656 P.2d at 1360. The Idaho 
Supreme Court affirmed that decision. Id. at 110,656 P.2d at 1363. This suggests that an 
evidentiary hearing is a suitable means of "proceed[ing] summarily" under section 7-902(a) to 
determine whether the claims at issue are subject to an agreement to arbitrate. In a later case, 
however, the Idaho Supreme Court held that "[w]hen ruling on a motion to compel arbitration, 
the district court applies the same standard as if ruling on a motion for summary judgment." 
Wattenbarger v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 150 Idaho 308,317,246 P.3d 961, 970 (2010). 
4 
3 
In terms ~f evidence, the paper record contains only the complaint (which was verified by Clark 
Reese) and affidavits by Clark Reese, Plaintiffs' counsel, and Randy Siddoway. 
4 
Wattenbarger was governed by the Federal Arbitration Act. No party contends that to be true 
of this case. Instead, the parties assume the Uniform Arbitration Act applies. The Court 
proceeds on that same assumption but notes that its approach to deciding Siddoway's motion to 
compel arbitration would be no different had it made the opposite assumption. 
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attenbarger might seem at first blush seem inconsistent with Loomis. But the two cases are 
readily reconcilable, and the proper approach for the Court to follow here becomes clear in the 
process of reconciling them. 
In Wattengbarger, the movant met the summary-judgment standard; it ended the inquiry 
into the propriety of arbitration by proving as a matter oflaw that the claims at issue were subject 
to an agreement to arbitrate. But the movant will not always satisfy the summary-judgment 
standard; sometimes the movant will fail to prove as a matter of law that the claims at issue are 
subject to an agreement to arbitrate. The Wattenbarger court had no need to consider what 
happens then. In that event, the inquiry is not at its end. Failing to prove a proposition as a 
matter of law is, after all, not the same thing as losing the proposition entirely. When a 
proposition isn't proved as a matter of law under the summary-judgment standard because there 
is a genuine factual dispute, the proposition is submitted to the factfinder. That is no less true in 
the context of a motion to compel arbitration. In this context, t~e summary-judgment standard is 
applied in the first instance (consistent with Wattenbarger), and if it is unsatisfied because there 
is a genuine factual dispute about whether the claims at issue are subject to an agreement to 
arbitrate, then fact-finding is needed to resolve the dispute. See, e.g., Guidotti v. Legal Helpers 
Debt Resolution, L.L.C., 716 F.3d 764, 776 (3d Cir. 2013) (decided under the Federal Arbitration 
Act); Marcus & Millichap Real Estate Inv. Servs. of Seattle, Inc. v. Yates, Wood & MacDonald, 
Inc., 192 Wash. App. 465, _ (2016) (decided under the Uniform Arbitration Act). Under the 
Uniform Arbitration Act, the fact-finding takes the form of an expedited evidentiary hearing. 
Marcus & Millchap, 192 Wash. App. at_. That is consistent with both Loomis and section 
7-902(a)'s directive to "proceed summarily" to decide the motion to compel arbitration. 
In keeping with these authorities, then, a two-step process is in order. 
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First, the Court will apply the familiar summary-judgment standard. Under that standard, 
summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with 
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw." I.R.C.P. 56(c). The movant's burden 
is to prove that there is no genuine factual dispute and that, in the absence of a genuine factual 
dispute, it is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw. E.g., Boise Mode, LLC v. Donahoe Pace & 
Partners Ltd., 154 Idaho 99, 103-04, 294 P.3d 1111, 1115-16 (2013). If the movant carries its 
burden, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to prove that a genuine factual dispute must be 
resolved before judgment can be awarded to the movant. Boise Mode, 154 Idaho at 104, 294 
P.3d at 1116. To carry that ultimate burden, the nonmovant "may not rest upon mere allegations 
in the pleadings, but must set forth by affidavit specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for 
trial." Id. (quotation marks omitted). In determining whether the nonmovant has carried its 
burden, the Court must construe the record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, drawing 
all reasonable inferences in the nonmovant's favor. Id. That said, as the trier of fact in this 
context under section 7-902(a), the Court "'is entitled to arrive at the most probable inferences 
based upon the undisputed evidence properly before it and grant the summary judgment despite 
the possibility of conflicting inferences."' JR. Simplot Co. v. Bosen, 144 Idaho 611, 615, 167 
P.3d 748, 752 (2006) (quoting Shawver v. Huckleberry Estates, L.L.C., 140 Idaho 354, 360-61, 
93 P.3d 685, 691-92 (2004)). 
If Siddoway proves as a matter of law under this standard that the claims at issue, if 
potentially viable, are subject to an agreement to arbitrate, then the inquiry will be at its end and 
the Court will issue an order compelling arbitration. 
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Second, but only if the Court concludes that Siddoway failed to prove as a matter of law 
that the claims at issue, if potentially viable, are subject to an agreement to arbitrate, the Court 
takes on a fact-finding role. The normal nature of that role, in the context of a motion to compel 
arbitration, would be to preside at an evidentiary hearing and make the factual findings necessary 
to decide, on a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, whether the movant proved that the 
claims at issue are subject to an agreement to arbitrate. Here, however, when the Court offered 
to schedule an evidentiary hearing, each side waived the right to one so that the Court could 
decide the issue on the paper record. Thus, in the event it concludes the summary-judgment 
standard is unsatisfied, the Court will proceed to determine, based on the paper record, whether 
the claims at issue are subject to an arbitration agreement, applying a preponderance-of-the-
evidence standard, just as it would have done had live testimony been presented during an 
evidentiary hearing. In other words, for purposes of this second step, the Court would treat 
written testimony the same as live testimony and resolve factual disputes as best it can on the 
limited record before it. 
B. Plaintiffs' motion to amend 
Permission to amend a pleading must be "freely given," so long as 'justice so requires." 
I.R.C.P. 15(a). Whether that standard is met in a given case is a matter of discretion. E.g., 
Maroun v. Wyreless Sys., Inc., 141 Idaho 604,612, 114 P.3d 974, 982 (2005), abrogated_ on 
other grounds, Wandering Trails, LLC v. Big Bite Excavation, Inc., 156 Idaho 586, 591, 329 
P.3d 368,373 (2014). Permission should be granted, however, unless (i) there is undue delay, 
bad faith, or a dilatory motive on the movant' s part, (ii) the movant has repeatedly failed to cure 
deficiencies in its pleadings, (iii) the amendment would unduly prejudice the nonmovant, or (iv) 
the amendment would be futile. E.g., id. A proposed new claim is futile if the supporting factual 
allegations are insufficient to state a claim for relief. E.g., id. 





A. Siddoway's motion to compel arbitration 
As discussed above, the Court will first evaluate Siddoway' s motion to compel 
arbitration according to the summary-judgment standard. The necessary analysis is deceptively 
simple. The two claims at issue are Counts XI and XII of Plaintiffs' complaint.
5 
Both claims are 
asserted only by Reese PC, and both are for breach of the Reese Agreement. Count XI seeks 
rescission as a remedy, while Count XII seeks damages as an alternative remedy. As breach 
claims, these claims depend on the notion that the Reese Agreement either has or had enough 
vitality to create to duties owed-and breached-by Siddoway. 
Under the Reese Agreement's arbitration clause, "any controversy or claims arising out 
of or relating to this Agreement, or breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration in accordance 
with the rules of the American Arbitration Association." (Reese Aff. Ex. A§ 13.) Counts XI 
and XII, as breach claims, are subject to the Reese Agreement's arbitration clause. Siddoway 
wants these claims submitted to arbitration, consistent with the arbitration clause. Reese PC 
wants to avoid arbitration, contending the arbitration clause does not furnish a proper basis for an 
order compelling arbitration because the Reese Agreement as a whole is unenforceable. That 
position, of course, is inconsistent with Reese PC's implicit position, in connection with Counts 
XI and XII, that the Reese Agreement is or was alive enough to be susceptible of breach. 
5 
Neither Siddoway's motion to compel arbitration nor any of the supporting or opposing briefing· 
addresses Count VII of Siddoway's counterclaim, which accuses Clark Reese and Reese PC of 
breaching the Reese Agreement. (Counterclaim ,r,r 82-87.) Thus, this decision pertains only to 
Counts XI and XII of Plaintiffs' complaint, not also to Count VII of Siddoway's counterclaim, 
even though all of those claims are for breach of the Reese Agreement. Since Siddoway favors 
arbitration, it appears to the Court that Siddoway can, if it wishes, simply initiate an arbitration 
proceeding to press the breach claim embodied by Count VII of its counterclaim, without need 
for advance judicial permission. 
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Reese PC has the right to plead claims in the alternative, but it has no right to shield from 
arbitration breach claims that are potentially viable only if the Reese Agreement has or had 
enough vitality to create duties susceptible of breach. In that event, its arbitration clause would 
be enforceable along with the rest of its provisions. Reese PC does not argue to the contrary. 
Since Siddoway has invoked the arbitration clause, in keeping with that clause, only an arbiter-
not the Court-can award Reese PC any remedies for the Reese Agreement's breach. In other 
words, if the Reese Agreement is invalid, then Counts XI and XII fail and no relief can be 
awarded to Reese PC by either the Court or an arbiter, but if instead the Reese Agreement is 
valid, then Counts XI and XII are potentially viable but subject to the Reese Agreement's 
arbitration clause, so any available relief would have to be awarded by an arbiter. Either way, no 
relief is available in court. 
Consequently, the Court concludes as a matter oflaw that Counts XI and XII are not 
viable in this litigation, irrespective of whether they have enough merit to succeed in arbitration. 
Under the summary-judgment standard, then, Siddoway's motion to compel arbitration must be 
granted. If Reese PC wishes to arbitrate these claims rather than simply abandon them,
6 
then 
Reese PC shall initiate arbitration. If any party to the arbitration proceeding wishes to contend 
that the Reese Agreement is unenforceable ( as Reese PC is contending here) and therefore could 
not give rise to remedies for breach, then the arbiter may decide that issue for purposes of the 
arbitration proceeding. The Court will not deprive the arbiter of the authority to reach that key 
6 
In this decision's next section, the Court grants Plaintiffs' motion to amend their complaint and 
sets a deadline for them to do so. Though they are not ordered to do so, Plaintiffs may wish to 
consider omitting Counts XI and XII from their amended complaint. As already explained, 
because Siddoway has invoked the Reese Agreement's arbitration clause, there are no 
circumstances in which Counts XI and XII-claims for breach of the Reese Agreement-could 
result in an award of relief in court, even assuming they can succeed in arbitration. 
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estion going to the merits of the claims embodied by Counts XI and XII under the guise of 
determining whether those claims are subject to an agreement to arbitrate. As already noted, in 
deciding a motion to compel arbitration, "[i]t would be inappropriate to review the merits of the 
dispute as such would in many instances emasculate the benefits of arbitration." Loomis, 104 
Idaho at 109,656 P.2d at 1362. 
B. Plaintiffs' motion to amend 
Plaintiffs seek permission to amend their complaint to add a new claim: Count XIII, 
through which they would seek a declaratory judgment that the Reese Agreement is void under 
the terms of Modification #1 because at least of Wadsworth Reese's members did not agree to a 
new operating agreement within the timeframe Modification #1 allowed. Siddoway opposes the 
motion, contending proposed Count XIII is futile for the same basic reason Siddoway contends 
its motion to compel arbitration should be granted: that the Reese Agreement is enforceable, 
despite the absence of agreement to a new operating agreement for Wadsworth Reese. The 
Court has, however, resolved Siddoway's motion to compel arbitration without determining 
whether the Reese Agreement is enforceable. The Court ought not and will not reach beyond the 
pleadings to decide the Reese Agreement's enforceability in the context of a motion to amend 
the pleadings. See Carl H Christensen Family Trust v. Christensen, 133 Idaho 866, 872, 993 
P.2d 1197, 1203 (1999) (holding that in the context of a motion to amend the pleadings, "[a]s 
long as the proposed amendment states a valid claim, a court may not consider the sufficiency of 
the evidence supporting the proposed claim"). Consequently, proposed Count XIII has not been 
shown to be futile. Plaintiffs' motion to amend is granted. 
i\.ccordingl y, 
IT IS ORDERED that Siddoway's motion to compel arbitration is granted. If Reese PC 
wishes to continue pursuing the claims asserted in Counts XI and XII of its complaint, Reese PC 
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all, within thirty days of the date of this order, initiate arbitration with respect to them and file 
with the Court a notice that it has done so. In accordance with LC.§ 7-902(d), this action is 
stayed as to Counts XI and XII of Reese PC's complaint pending the outcome of the arbitration 
proceeding. If arbitration is not initiated or notice is not filed as directed in this order, the stay 
will be lifted and those counts will be dismissed without prejudice (unless they are not reasserted 
in Plaintiffs' to-be-filed amended complaint, obviating the need for dismissal). 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' motion to amend their complaint is granted. 
Plaintiffs shall file their proposed amended complaint within 14 days from the date of this order. 
The foregoing order for arbitration of Counts XI and XII shall apply to those claims, if reasserted 
in Plaintiffs' amended complaint. 
H., 
Dated this J_Q_ day of May, 2016. 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
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By TYLER ATKINSON 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
WADSWORTH REESE, PLLC, an Idaho 
Professional Corporation; CLARK A. REESE 
CPA, P.C., an Idaho Professional Corporation; 
and WADSWORTH ACCOUNTING CPA, 
PLLC, an Idaho Professional Corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SIDDOWAY & COMPANY, PC, an Idaho 
professional corporation; RANDY 
SIDDOWAY, an individual; DUSTIN 
SIDDOWAY, an individual and JEANINE 
BARKAN, an individual; 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 1521225 
AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR 
DISSOCIATION, DAMAGES and 
DECLARATORY RELIEF 
PARTIES, JURISDICTION, VENUE 
1. Plaintiff Wadsworth Reese, PLLC ("WR PLLC") is an Idaho Professional 
Corporation in good standing with the Idaho Secretary of State and is formerly known as 
Siddoway, Wadsworth & Reese, PLLC. 
2. Plaintiff Clark A. Reese CPA, P .C. ("Reese PC") is an Idaho Professional 
Corporation in good standing with the Idaho Secretary of State and is a member of WR PLLC. 




3. Plaintiff Wadsworth Accounting CPA, PLLC ("Wadsworth PLLC") is an Idaho 
Professional Corporation in good standing with the Idaho Secretary of State and is a member of 
WRPLLC. 
4. Defendant Siddoway & Company, P.C. ("Siddoway Co.") is an Idaho Professional 
Corporation in good standing with the Idaho Secretary of State and is a member of WR PLLC. 
5. Defendant Randy Siddoway ("Randy") is an individual resident of the State of 
Idaho, residing in Ada County and, upon information and belief, the sole member of Siddoway 
Co. 
6. Defendant Dustin Siddoway ("Dustin") is an individual resident of the State of 
Idaho and a former employee of WR PLLC. 
7. Defendant Jeanine Barkan ("Barkan") is an individual resident of the State ofldaho 
and a former employee of WR PLLC. 
8. Plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to the WR PLLC Operating Agreement, the 
Idaho Uniform Limited Liability Company Act and other applicable law. 
9. Plaintiffs, including WR PLLC, are proper parties pursuant to I.C. §§30-6-902, 30-
6-903 and by the vote of Reese PC and Wadsworth PLLC. 
10. Siddoway Co. has renounced its duties to WR PLLC, has utilized WR PLLC 
property to its detriment, has solicited employees from WR PLLC and has helped Dustin acquire 
more than 283 former WR PLLC clients for his new accounting practice, for which reasons a 
demand under I. C. §30-6-902(1) would be futile. 
11. The amount in controversy is greater than the sum of $10,000.00. 
12. Based upon the above allegations and pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-404, this claim 
satisfies the jurisdictional prerequisites of the District Court and venue is proper in this action. 





13. On December 20, 2013, Clark Reese ("Clark") and Randy filed a Certificate of 
Organization with the Idaho Secretary of State organizing WR PLLC (then known as CRS 
Services, PLLC) as a professional limited liability company. 
14. The Certificate of Organization listed Clark and Randy as either members or 
managers of WR PLLC. 
15. On January 1, 2014, WR PLLC entered into a Purchase Agreement with Non-
Competition Agreement with Harding & Co. P.A. ("Harding Agreement"). 
16. Pursuant to the Harding Agreement, WR PLLC purchased the following assets 
from Harding & Co., P.A.: 
a. All of the equipment, computers, computer programs/software, client lists, 
furniture, marketing materials, signs, tools, client files, inventory, and fixtures, 
plus all other property used in conducting the Harding & Co., P.A. business. 
b. All leasehold improvements and leasehold rights of Harding & Co., P.A. at 
the premises of 357 East Watertower Lane, Meridian, ID, 83642. 
c. All of Harding & Co., P.A.'s goodwill. 
d. The right to Harding & Co., P.A.'s telephone number(s) and listing in the 
telephone books. 
e. All clients, client lists, client files and information. 
17. In return for the assets, WR PLLC agreed to pay to Harding Co., P.A. 60% of the 
average annual collections for services performed in 2014 and 2015, including amounts collected 
through April 30, 2016. 
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18. The purchase price was to be paid pursuant to a promissory note over a five year 
period with interest accruing at 6%. 
19. Harding Co., PA and its owner, Kalyn Harding ("Kalyn") agreed not to compete 
with WR PLLC and Kalyn and other former Harding Co., PA employees accepted positions with 
WRPLLC. 
20. On or about January 6, 2014, Reese PC, Wadsworth PLLC, and Siddoway Co. 
executed an Operating Agreement for WR PLLC: 
a. The January 6, 2014 Operating Agreement was the first governing document 
for WR PLLC other than the Certificate of Organization filed on December 20, 
2013. 
b. The January 6, 2014, Operating Agreement listed Reese PC, Wadsworth PLLC 
and Siddoway Co. as the members of WR PLLC. 
c. The January 6, 2014, Operating Agreement changed the name of WR PLLC 
from CRS Services, PLLC to Siddoway, Wadsworth & Reese, PLLC. 
d. The January 6, 2014, Operating Agreement listed each of the three members' 
capital contribution to WR PLLC as $ 100. 
21. On January 14, 2014, WR PLLC filed an Amendment to Certificate of Organization 
with the Idaho Secretary of State changing the name of WR PLLC from CRS Services, PLLC to 
Siddoway, Wadsworth & Reese, PLLC. 
22. On or about January 20, 2014, WR PLLC hired Dustin to work for it as a certified 
professional accountant. 
23. Dustin's terms of employment were negotiated by Randy. 
24. Randy is Dustin's uncle. 




25. The offer to employ Dustin with WR PLLC was made by Randy. 
26. Randy has never produced a signed, written contract between WR PLLC and Dustin 
covering the substance of Dustin's employment with WR PLLC. 
27. Upon information and belief, Randy permitted Dustin to work for WR PLLC 
without having Dustin execute a written contract. 
28. Randy has never produced a signed, written contract restricting Dustin's ability to 
compete with WR PLLC or otherwise exploit his exposure to WR PLLC clients, including those 
purchased from Harding & Co, P.A. 
29. Upon information and belief, Randy permitted Dustin to work for WR PLLC 
without having Dustin execute a written contract restricting Dustin's ability to compete with WR 
PLLC for clients with whom he established a relationship while an employee of WR PLLC. 
30. On or about January 28, 2015, Reese PC and Siddoway Co. signed an Asset Sale 
Agreement ("Reese Agreement"). 
31. Pursuant to the Reese Agreement, Reese PC purportedly purchased from Siddoway 
& Co. the right to receive a one third interest and membership in WR PLLC (then known as 
Siddoway, Wadsworth & Reese, PLLC). 
32. The Reese Agreement purports to value the one third interest and membership at 
"one half the value of certain assets to be contributed." 
33. At the time Reese PC executed the Reese Agreement, Reese PC was already a 
member of WR PLLC. 
34. The Reese Agreement fails to list the "certain assets" to be contributed. 
35. The Reese Agreement fails to specify to where those certain assets will "be 
contributed." 




36. As part of the execution of the Reese Agreement, it was decided amongst the 
members of Wadsworth Reese, PLLC and the parties to the Reese Agreement that the Reese 
Agreement would only be valid if the members of Wadsworth Reese reached an agreement by 
February 15, 2015, on the issues of partner compensation and contribution that would be 
incorporated into a new Operating Agreement. 
37. After the meeting on January 28, 2015, Frederick Wadsworth reduced the above 
agreement (reflected in paragraph 39) regarding the validity of the Reese Agreement to an email, 
which was titled Modification #1 that Clark Reese, Randy Siddoway, and Frederick Wadsworth 
signed. Modification # 1 is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
38. Modification #1 to the Reese Agreement specifically states that, "The Clark buy-in 
document (Reese Agreement) will be void if fewer than two partners agree to sign the 
operating/member's agreement by February 15, 2015." Modification #1 also contemplated various 
terms that still needed to be agreed to, including but not limited to a "non-transferrable clause" and 
a non-compete to protect Randy Siddoway. 
39. Around the time the Reese Agreement was executed, Clark Reese and Randy 
Siddoway agreed that Clark's previous $5,500 loan to Randy could be used as credit for the 
$200,000 due under the Reese Agreement. 
40. Through Reese PC, Clark Reese made two payments in January 2015, totaling 
$5,000 and began to make monthly payments of $2,500 in anticipation that the parties would reach 
a new Operating Agreement pursuant to Modification #1. 
41. From approximately January 2015, through the summer of 2015, and well beyond 
the February 15, 2015, deadlines, the members of Wadsworth Reese and the parties to the Reese 
Agreement negotiated in an attempt to reach a new Operating Agreement. 




42. However the parties were unsuccessful in reaching a new Operating Agreement. 
43. Nonetheless, in good faith Clark Reese, through Reese PC, continued to make 
payments to Siddoway Co. 
44. As of the filing of this action, Reese PC has paid $28,000 to Siddoway Co. pursuant 
to the Reese Agreement 
45. In July of 2015, Randy informed Clark and Frederick Wadsworth ("Frederick") that 
he was done with public accounting in general and that he desired to leave WR PLLC. 
46. In July 2015, WR PLLC used a consultant to negotiate a buy-out for Siddoway 
Co.' s interest in WR PLLC. 
47. Subsequently the members of WR PLLC failed to reach an agreement on the value 
of Siddoway Co.'s interest in WR PLLC. 
48. On August 21, 2015, Randy informed Clark and Frederick that effective August 21, 
2015, he was resigning from his management duties with WR PLLC. 
49. On August 21, 2015, Randy informed Clark and Frederick that on August 24, 2015, 
he would start taking clients from WR PLLC and servicing them in a new entity. 
50. Randy also informed Clark and Frederick that he was going to offer employment 
in his new entity to certain WR PLLC employees, including Dustin and Barkan. 
51. On August 21, 2015, Dustin gave notice of termination of his employment. 
52. On August 24, 2015, Barkan gave notice of termination of her employment 
effective immediately. 
53. After Dustin terminated his employment he was asked not to return to the premises. 
54. At some point between August 21 and August 24, Randy facilitated Dustin's re-
entry to the premises and was seen sharing information from his computer with Dustin. 




55. On August 24, 2015, Dustin approached Kalyn Harding, Debbie Mason and Glenda 
Nelson, all of whom are former Harding employees, and offered them employment with his new 
tax accounting entity. 
56. On August 24, 2015, Barkan filed a Certificate of Organization with the Idaho 
Secretary of State organizing a limited liability company called AnchorPoint, LLC. 
57. Upon information and belief, Randy and-or Siddoway Co. was the principal owner 
of AnchorPoint, LLC. 
58. On August 24, 2015, Randy emailed a spreadsheet containing a WR PLLC client 
list to both Dustin and Barkan. 
59. Barkan, along with Randy, used the spreadsheet containing the WR PLLC client 
list as a guide for trying to get WR PLLC clients to leave WR PLLC for Dustin's new accounting 
firm. 
60. Barkan, along with Randy, encoded the spreadsheet with information regarding 
which person (including Randy and the former Harding & Co. employees) would be best suited to 
solicit each WR PLLC client to transfer from WR PLLC to Dustin's new accounting firm. 
61. Barkan forwarded the spreadsheet containing the WR PLLC clients to Dustin on 
August 28, 2015, for his use in soliciting WR PLLC clients. 
62. On August 26, 2015, Dustin filed Certificate of Organization with the Idaho 
Secretary of State organizing a professional limited liability company called AnchorPoint 
Accounting, PLLC. 
63. On August 26, 2015, Barkan filed a Certificate of Organization with the Idaho 
Secretary of State organizing a limited liability company called AnchorPoint Advisory, LLC. 




64. On September 17, 2015, Randy and Barkan filed an Amendment to Certificate of 
Organization with the Idaho Secretary of State changing the name of AnchorPoint, LLC to 
Siddoway Advisory Services, LLC. 
65. From August 21, 2015, forward, Randy assisted Dustin and AnchorPoint 
Accounting, PLLC in taking clients away from WR PLLC even though Siddoway Co. continues 
to be a member of WR PLLC. 
66. For example, Randy had a meeting scheduled with former WR PLLC client Don 
Cook on September 3, 2015. 
67. Upon information and belief, Randy and Don Cook's associate attended the 
September 3, 2015, Don Cook meeting which took place at WRPLLC's offices and was witnessed 
by a member of WR PLLC. 
68. Later on September 3, 2015, after Randy's meeting with Don Cook's associate, 
Don Cook caused a written notice to be delivered to WR PLLC by AnchorPoint Accounting, 
PLLC, indicating that he needed his papers and electronic documents released to Dustin's new 
accounting firm, AnchorPoint Accounting, PLLC. 
69. As another example, Randy had a meeting with former WR PLLC client Barry Van 
Beuren of Meridian Steel Erectors, Inc. on September 9, 2015. 
70. Upon information and belief, Dustin attended the September 9, 2015, Barry Van 
Beuren meeting. 
71. Later on September 9, 2015, after his meeting with Randy, Barry Van Beuren 
caused a written notice to be delivered to WR PLLC by AnchorPoint Accounting, PLLC indicating 
that he needed his papers and electronic documents, along with those of Meridian Steel Erectors, 
Inc., released to Dustin's new accounting firm, AnchorPoint Accounting, PLLC. 
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72. As another example, on or near October 19, 2015, Randy was contacted by Pro 
Tech Roofing, Inc. to address their end of the year accounting. 
73. Upon information and belief, Randy then had a discussion or meeting with Scott 
Lottman, Mark Rogers and-or Office Manager Denise Clark. 
74. On October 20, 2015, after speaking with Randy, Scott Lottman signed a written 
notice indicating that he needed his papers and electronic documents, along with those of Rogers 
& Lottman, LLC and Pro Tech Roofing, Inc., released to Dustin's new accounting firm, 
AnchorPoint Accounting, PLLC. The notice was delivered by AnchorPoint Accounting, PLLC. 
75. On October 20, 2015, after speaking with Randy, Mark Rogers signed a written 
notice indicating that he needed his papers and electronic documents, released to Dustin's new 
accounting firm, AnchorPoint Accounting, PLLC. The notice was delivered by AnchorPoint 
Accounting, PLLC. 
76. As of the filing of this lawsuit, 283 individuals and companies have transitioned 
from WR PLLC to AnchorPoint Accounting, PLLC. 
77. Upon information and belief, Randy participated in transitioning a significant 
amount of the 283 transferees. 
78. Upon information and belief, Randy has been continuously contacting WR PLLC 
clients and asking them to transfer from WR PLLC to AnchorPoint Accounting, PLLC. 
79. For example, on October 1, 2015, Randy called Mike Teeter of MJT Construction 
in an effort to discuss tax accounting. 
80. Randy made this call despite his pronouncements that he is no longer in the business 
of tax accounting. 
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81. From August 21, 2015, forward, Randy has assisted Dustin in convmcmg 
employees to leave WR PLLC even though Siddoway Co. continues to be a member of WR PLLC. 
82. For example, on August 25, 2015, Kalyn Harding, Debbie Mason and Glenda 
Nelson, all former WR PLLC employees, resigned their positions with WR PLLC and took jobs 
with AnchorPoint Accounting, PLLC. 
83. Upon information and belief, Randy helped Dustin to recruit WR PLLC employees 
for his new company even though Siddoway Co. continued to be a member of WR PLLC. 
84. At the time Kalyn Harding accepted a position with AnchorPoint Accounting, 
PLLC, she was the subject of a non-compete clause in favor of WR PLLC which was contained in 
the Harding Agreement. 
85. A short time after accepting employment in violation of the non-compete 
agreement, Kalyn Harding renounced her employment with AnchorPoint Accounting, PLLC. 
86. Nonetheless, Debbie Mason and Glenda Nelson were former employees of Harding 
& Co., P.A. with significant relationships with the clients that joined WR PLLC as a result of the 
Harding Agreement. 
87. Although WR PLLC continues to be liable to Kalyn Harding under the Harding 
Agreement, Randy and Dustin have utilized Debbie Mason and Glenda Nelson to encourage 
former Harding clients to leave WR PLLC for AnchorPoint Accounting, LLC. 
COUNT III 
Application for Judicial Order for Siddoway Co.'s Dissociation from WR PLLC 
88. The Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re-allege all previous paragraphs of this 
Complaint. 
89. Plaintiffs seek a judicial order dissociating Siddoway Co. from WR PLLC. 




90. Siddoway Co. engaged, or is engaging, in wrongful conduct that has adversely and 
materially affected, or will adversely and materially affect WR PLLC's business activities. 
91. Siddoway Co. has willfully or persistently committed, or is willfully and 
persistently committing, a material breach of WR PLLC's operating agreement and its duties or 
obligations under LC. § 30-6-409. 
92. Siddoway Co. has engaged in, or is engaging in, conduct relating to the WR PLLC' s 
business activities which makes it not reasonably practicable to carry on business activities with 
Siddoway Co. 
93. WR PLLC has suffered damages as a result of the actions taken by Siddoway Co. 
and its principal, Randy, for which Siddoway Co. should dissociated from its membership interest 
in WRPLLC. 
94. In the event that Siddoway Co. is found to be entitled to the value of Membership 
Interest in WR PLLC, as defined in the Operating Agreement, that value should be diminished by 
all damages suffered by WR PLLC as a result of the actions taken by Siddoway Co. and its 
principal, Randy. 
COUNTIV 
Breach of Fiduciary Duty 
(Siddoway Co. & Randy) 
95. The Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re-allege all previous paragraphs of this 
Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 
96. WR PLLC is an Idaho professional limited liability company organized pursuant to 
the Idaho Professional Limited Liability Company Act. 
97. At all times alleged herein, Siddoway Co. was a member and one-third owner of 
WRPLLC. 




98. As a member and one-third owner of WR PLLC, Siddoway Co. owed a fiduciary 
duty to WR PLLC and to the other two members and one-third owners: (1) Reese PC, and (2) 
Wadsworth PLLC. 
99. As set forth above, Siddoway Co. breached its fiduciary duty to (1) WR PLLC, (2) 
Reese PC, and (3) Wadsworth PLLC by the acts of misfeasance and malfeasance described herein. 
100. Randy is an officer and owner of Siddoway Co. 
101. Randy participated in and orchestrated Siddoway's breach of fiduciary duty as set 
forth herein. 
102. As a proximate result of Siddoway Co.'s breach of fiduciary duty, (1) WR PLLC, 
(2) Reese PC, and (3) Wadsworth PLLC, have suffered damages for which they are entitled to 
recover in an amount to be proven at trial. 
103. The aforementioned acts of Siddoway Co. and Randy, were and continue to be 
willful, oppressive, fraudulent, and malicious, for which Plaintiffs reserve the right to seek leave 
to amend this Complaint pursuant to I.C. §6-1604. 
COUNTV 
Civil Conspiracy to Commit Breach of Fiduciary Duty 
(Siddoway Co., Randy, Dustin & Barkan) 
104. The Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re-allege all previous paragraphs of this 
Complaint. 
105. By engaging in the foregoing conduct, including but not limited to Siddoway Co.' s, 
Randy, Dustin and Barkan's secret play to steal WR PLLC's client information list, selectively 
solicit key employees and provide other confidential information to a competing business while 
still associated with WR PLLC, and doing so with full knowledge of each other's actions, 
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Siddoway Co., Randy, Dustin and Barkan entered into an agreement to accomplish an unlawful 
purpose or to accomplish a lawful purpose by unlawful means. 
106. Siddoway Co., Randy, Dustin and Barkan have conspired to act in concert to 
facilitate a breach of fiduciary duty by Siddoway Co. and Randy. 
107. As a proximate result of Defendants' civil conspiracy and the actual breach of 
fiduciary duty, (1) WR PLLC, (2) Reese PC, and (3) Wadsworth PLLC, have suffered damages 
for which they are entitled to recover in an amount to be proven at trial. 
108. The aforementioned acts of Siddoway Co., Randy, Dustin and Barkan were and 
continue to be willful, oppressive, fraudulent, and malicious, for which Plaintiffs reserve the right 
to seek leave to amend this Complaint pursuant to I.C. §6-1604. 
COUNT VI 
Violation of the Idaho Trade Secret Act-
1.C. §§ 48-801, 48-802, & 48-803 
(All Defendants) 
109. The Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re-allege all previous paragraphs of this 
Complaint. 
110. The August 24, 2015, spreadsheet containing the WR PLLC client list, along with 
sensitive and proprietary information regarding hours billed and fees charged to the customers by 
WR PLLC is a trade secret as defined by I.C. §48-801(5). 
111. Randy's mailing of the spreadsheet to Dustin and Barkan was a misappropriation 
of trade secrets as defined by I.C. §48-801(2). 
112. As of the filing of this complaint, 283 individuals and businesses have left WR 
PLLC for AnchorPoint Accounting, PLLC. 
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113. Plaintiffs have suffered and continue to suffer damages as a result of the 
Defendants' misappropriation of trade secrets for which they are entitled to recover in an amount 
to be proven at trial. 
COUNT VII 
Interference with Prospective Business Advantage 
(All Defendants) 
114. The Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re-allege all previous paragraphs of this 
Complaint. 
115. WR PLLC enjoys an economic relationship and a valid economic expectancy with 
many customers with whom it has provided services to, and with whom it expects to contract in 
the future. 
116. All Defendants have knowledge of this relationship and economic expectancy, and 
of the economic benefit it brings to WR PLLC. 
117. Defendants have and continue to intentionally interfere with WR PLLC's economic 
relationship with its clients by soliciting them to end their relationship with WR PLLC. 
118. Defendants' acts of intentional interference are wrongful pursuant to the Idaho 
Trade Secrets Act I.C. §§ 48-801 et al., I.C. §30-6-409 and common law. 
119. In utilizing the spreadsheet and other proprietary information the Defendants used 
a wrongful means to cause injury to the Plaintiffs' prospective business relationship with its clients. 
120. The actions of Randy and Siddoway Co. were wrongful and improper in that 
Siddoway Co. is still a member of WR PLLC. 
121. As a result of Defendants' intentional interference with the Plaintiffs' prospective 
business relationships, Plaintiffs have suffered damages for which they are entitled to recover in 
an amount to be proven at trial. 




122. Defendants' aforementioned acts were and continue to be willful, oppressive, 
fraudulent, and malicious, for which Plaintiffs reserve the right to seek leave to amend this 
Complaint pursuant to LC. §6-1604. 
COUNT VIII 
Civil Conspiracy to Interfere with Prospective Economic Advantage 
(All Defendants) 
123. The Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re-allege all previous paragraphs of this 
Complaint. 
124. By engaging in the foregoing conduct, including but not limited to Siddoway Co.' s, 
Randy, Dustin and Barkan's secret play to steal WR PLLC's client information list, selectively 
solicit key employees and provide other confidential information to a competing business while 
still associated with WR PLLC, and doing so with full knowledge of each other's actions, 
Siddoway Co., Randy, Dustin and Barkan entered into an agreement to accomplish an unlawful 
purpose or to accomplish a lawful purpose by unlawful means. 
125. The Defendants have conspired to act in concert thereby facilitating an intentional 
interference with prospective economic advantage. 
126. As a proximate result of Defendants' civil conspiracy and the actual intentional 
interference with prospective economic advantage, (1) WR PLLC, (2) Reese PC, and (3) 
Wadsworth PLLC, have suffered damages for which they are entitled to recover in an amount to 
be proven at trial. 
127. The aforementioned acts of Defendants were and continue to be willful, 
oppressive, fraudulent, and malicious, for which Plaintiffs reserve the right to seek leave to amend 
this Complaint pursuant to LC. §6-1604. 




Breach of Confidence 
(All Defendants) 
128. The Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re-allege all previous paragraphs of this 
Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 
129. When WR PLLC disclosed its non-trade secret proprietary information, including 
but not limited to its client lists to Defendants, it did so in confidence in the course of its 
membership and/or an employee-employer relationship, and therefore Defendants owed WR 
PLLC a legal duty of confidence to maintain the information in a confidential and proprietary 
manner, and not to use the information for Defendants' own purposes. 
130. Defendants accepted the non-trade secret proprietary information as alleged herein 
voluntarily and for the purpose of their association and/or employment with WR PLLC, thereby 
owing WR PLLC a duty of confidence with respect to the WR PLLC' s non-trade secret proprietary 
information. 
131. Defendants have willfully and in conscious disregard for the duty of confidence 
owed to WR PLLC, used for Defendants' own purposes and disclosed to others WR PLLC's non-
trade secret proprietary information. 
132. As a proximate result of Defendants' Breach of Confidence, (1) WR PLLC, (2) 
Reese PC, and (3) Wadsworth PLLC, have suffered damages for which they are entitled to recover 
in an amount to be proven at trial. 
133. The aforementioned acts of Defendants, were and continue to be willful, 
oppressive, fraudulent, and malicious, for which Plaintiffs reserve the right to seek leave to amend 
this Complaint pursuant to LC. §6-1604. 





Civil Conspiracy to Commit Breach of Confidence 
(All Defendants) 
134. The Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re-allege all previous paragraphs of this 
Complaint. 
135. By engaging in the foregoing conduct, including but not limited to Defendants' 
secret play to steal WR PLLC's client information list, selectively solicit key employees and 
provide other confidential information to a competing business while still associated with WR 
PLLC, and doing so with full knowledge of each other's actions, Defendants entered into an 
agreement to accomplish an unlawful purpose or to accomplish a lawful purpose by unlawful 
means. 
136. The Defendants have conspired to act in concert thereby facilitating a breach of 
confidence. 
137. As a proximate result of Defendants' civil conspiracy and the actual breach of 
confidence, (1) WR PLLC, (2) Reese PC, and (3) Wadsworth PLLC, have suffered damages for 
which they are entitled to recover in an amount to be proven at trial. 
138. The aforementioned acts of Defendants were and continue to be willful, 
oppressive, fraudulent, and malicious, for which Plaintiffs reserve the right to seek leave to amend 
this Complaint pursuant to I.C. §6-1604. 
COUNT XIII 
Declaratory Judgment Finding the Reese Agreement Void 
139: The Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re-allege all previous paragraphs of this 
Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 




140. That portion of the Reese Agreement called Modification #1 includes a provision 
which required the members of Wadsworth Reese and the parties to the Reese Agreement to enter 
into a new Operating Agreement by February 15, 2015, or the Reese Agreement would be void. 
141. The failure of the members of Wadsworth Reese and the parties to the Reese 
Agreement to enter into a new Operating Agreement by February 15, 2015, renders the Reese 
Agreement void. 
142. To date, and well beyond the February 15, 2015, deadline, the members of 
Wadsworth Reese and the parties to the Reese agreement have failed to enter into a new Operating 
Agreement. 
143. As a result, the Plaintiffs are entitled to a declaratory judgment finding the Reese 
Agreement void. 
COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES 
Therefore, pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(3), Plaintiffs are entitled to recover their 
attorney fees and costs of suit in an amount deemed reasonable by this Court. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendants as follows: 
1. For a Court Order dissociating Siddoway Co. from WR PLLC; 
2. An award of damages against the Defendants in an amount to be proven at trial; 
3. A declaratory judgment finding the Reese Agreement void; 
4. An award of Plaintiffs attorney fees and costs of suit incurred herein; 
5. An award of pre-judgment and post-judgment interest; and 
6. For such other and further relief as this Court deems just, equitable and proper. 




DATED this -3..:!__ day of I'\"' 1 
• 
, 2016 . 
FISHER RAINEY HUDSON 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the~ day of May, 2016, I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DISSOCIATION, DAMAGES and 
DECLARATORY RELIEF to be served upon the following individuals in the manner indicated 
below: 
Jeanine Barkan 
922 W Colchester Drive 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Dustin Siddoway 
10994 West Hiddenbrook 
Star, ID 83665 
Brett Hastings 
299 South Main Street, 13th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110 
Glenn Godfrey, Jr. 
842 E. Winding Creek Drive 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Attorneys for Defendants Randy 
Siddoway and Siddoway & Company, 
P.C. 
( ) Via U.S. Mail 
( ) Via Facsimile 
( ) Via Hand Delivery 
( .{via Email - jbarkanl 8@gmail.com 
( ) Via U.S. Mail 
( ) Via Facsimile 
( ) Via Hand Delivery 
( ,1 Via Email - dustin@teamanchorpoint.com 
( ) Via U.S. Mail 
( ) Via Facsimile 
( ) Via Hand Delivery 
(,{Via Email - Brett@hastingslaw.us 
( /Via Email - GodfreyLawPLLC@gmail.com 




6206 N Discon·rv Wav. Boise. ID 83713 
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From: Frederick Wadsworth 
Sent: Wednesday, January 28, 2015 1:12 PM 
To: Clark Reese; Randy Siddoway 
Subject: follow up 
Randy I Clark, 
Thank you for allowing me to visit with you after our meeting this morning. In those discussions it was clear to me that 
all three of us want to continue to work together as partners with signed agreements {with the signing happening in the 
very near future). The expected outcome from all parties is that an agreement will be reached and signed in the next 
two weeks. But before we can move forward with the membership agreement we need to have the Clark buy in 
document signed today. In order to accomplish these common desires; l believe that the three of us have agreed to the 
following items: 
We will use the Clark buy-in document with MINIMAL adjustments (we are not trying to make a brand new 
agreement from scratch) 
o Those adjustments are: 
• The Clark buy-in document will be void if fewer than two partners agree to sign the 
operating/member's agreement by Feb 15, 2015 
• If Clark signs the membership agreement then the buy in document is in full effect (200k purchase 
price) 
• If two partners agree to the member's agreement (but not Clark) then he will only be liable for 20k 
instead of 200k 
• Clark will agree to a non-compete (i.e. he cannot service Harding or Randy Siddoway clients 
outside of SWR) to protect Randy 
• The current buy-in document is missing the non-transferrab!e clause which I believe was an 
inadvertent omission 
Regarding the membership agreement: 
• Each of us promises to use our best efforts in good faith to reach such an agreement (i.e. no 
partner will intentionally sabotage the efforts of reaching an agreement) by that date 
• on Feb 15 the choice will be to sign the document we have mutually created or not to sign (it is in 
the best interest of the firm to have a signed agreement and we must set a firm deadline to 
avoid continual! delays} 
A°i~: 
Please double check this list and let me know if I have omitted something or misrepresented any item. My goal/ intent 
is to faithfully reproduce the minimum items that are needed to accomplish o goal of a signed buy in document today 
and a signed membership agreement by 2/15/15. 
Frederick Wadsworth, CPA 
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Glenn W. Godfrey, Jr. 
GODFREY LAW, PLLC 
842 E. Winding Creek Drive 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: (208) 392-1551 
Email: GodfrevLawPLLC(algmail.com 
Idaho Bar No. 1662 
Local Counsel 
Brett W. Hastings 
HASTINGS LAW GROUP, LLC 
Wells Fargo Center, 13 th Floor 
299 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Email: Brett(d;HastingsLaw. us 
Telephone: (801) 721-8066 
Utah Bar No. 15442 
Applying Counsel 
!======-=-=-:;::F_.IL!O'«ip,M:;---,,3~.:-, ~~-~,-
JUN 2 0 2016 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By SABRINA STOKES 
DEPUTY 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
WADSWORTH REESE, PLLC, an Idaho 
professional corporation; CLARK A. REESE 
CPA, P.C., an Idaho professional corporation; 
and WADSWORTH ACCOUNTING CPA, 
and Idaho professional corporation, 
Plaintiffs 
V. 
SIDDOWAY & COMPANY, PC, an Idaho 
pro(essional corporation; RANDY 
SID DO WAY, an individual; DUSTIN 
SIDDOWAY; an individual; and JEANINE 
BARKAN, an individual, 
Defendants 
ANSWER AND COUNTERLAIM OF 
DEFENDANTS RANDY SIDDOWAY 
AND SIDDOWAY & COMPANY, PC IN 
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S 
AMENDED COMPLAINT 




Defendant Randy Siddoway and Siddoway & Company, PC ("Mr. Siddoway"), through 
legal counsel, answers and responds to the specific paragraphs of the Complaint filed against 
Defendants in this matter as follows: 
1. Mr. Siddoway lacks sufficient knowledge to admit or deny the allegations in paragraph 1. 
2. Mr. Siddoway lacks sufficient knowledge to admit or deny the allegations in paragraph 2. 





8. The allegations in paragraph 8 are legal conclusions that require no response. To the 
extent a response is required, Mr. Siddoway denies the same. 
9. The allegations in paragraph 9 are legal conclusions that require no response. To the 
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d. Mr. Siddoway admits that Exhibit A of the Operating Agreement listed each 
Member's initial cash contribution to WR, PLLC as $100. Mr. Siddoway denies 






26. Mr. Siddoway admits that WR, PLLC, including Plaintiffs, did not require a written 
contract as a condition of Dustin's employment. Mr. Siddoway denies all other 
allegations in paragraph 26. 
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27. Mr. Siddoway admits that WR, PLLC, including Plaintiffs, did not require a written 
contract as a condition of Dustin's employment. Mr. Siddoway denie.s all other 
allegations in paragraph 27. 
28. Mr. Siddoway admits that WR, PLLC, including Plaintiffs, did not require a written 
contract as a condition of Dustin's employment. Mr. Siddoway denies all other 
allegations in paragraph 28. 
29. Mr. Siddoway admits that WR, PLLC, including Plaintiffs, did not require a written 
contract as a condition of Dustin's employment. Mr. Siddoway denies all other 
allegations in paragraph 29. 
30. Mr. Siddoway admits that on January 28, 2015, Reese PC and Siddoway Co. executed the 
written Reese Agreement which includes an express effective date of January 1, 2014. 
Mr. Siddoway denies all other allegations in paragraph 30. 
31. Mr. Siddoway admits that the written Reese Agreement provided for the sale of certain 
Siddoway Co. assets to Reese PC and for the simultaneous contribution by Reese PC of 
the same certain assets to WR, PLLC in exchange for a 1/3 interest in WR, PLLC. Mr. 
Siddoway denies all other allegations in paragraph 31. 
32. Admitted. 
33. Denied. 
34. Mr. Siddoway admits that the Reese Agreement does not include an itemized list of the 
"certain assets" sold to Reese PC. Mr. Siddoway denies all other allegations in paragraph 
4 
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37. Mr. Siddoway admits that Clark Reese, Randy Siddoway, and Frederick Wadsworth 
signed Modification #1, which was drafted by Frederick Wadsworth. Mr. Siddoway 
denies all other allegations in paragraph 37. 
38. Paragraph 38 refers to a document that speaks for itself and, therefore, no answer is 
required. To the extent an answer may be required to the allegations in paragraph 38, Mr. 
Siddoway denies the same. 
39. Mr. Siddoway admits that the $5,500 paid by Reese PC to Siddoway Co. in January 2014 
was credited against the $200,000 plus accrued interest due to Siddoway Co. under the 
Reese Agreement. Mr. Siddoway denies all other allegations in paragraph 38. 
40. Mr. Siddoway admits that in January 2015 Reese PC made two payments to Siddoway 
Co. totaling $5,000 and continued to make monthly payments of$2,500, as required by 
the Reese Agreement, until October 1, 2015. Mr. Siddoway denies all other allegations 
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51. Upon information and belief, Mr. Siddoway admits that Dustin gave notice of 
termination of his employment from WR PLLC on August 21, 2015 in response to the 
demand made by Mr. Reese and Mr. Wadsworth that Dustin sign a non-compete 
agreement in favor of WR PLLC. Mr. Siddoway had no knowledge of and did not 
participate in the meeting in which the demand was made. 
52. Mr. Siddoway admits that Barkan gave notice of termination of her employment at WR 
PLLC sometime in late August 2015. Mr. Siddoway denies all other allegations in 
paragraph 52. 
53. Mr. Siddoway lacks sufficient knowledge to admit or deny the allegations in paragraph 
53 and, therefore, denies the same. 
54. Denied. 
55. Mr. Siddoway admits that Dustin hired some employees of WR PLLC after Dustin left 
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61. Mr. Siddoway lacks sufficient knowledge to admit or deny the allegations in paragraph 
56 and, therefore, denies the same. 
62. Upon information and belief, Mr. Siddoway believes that on August 26, 2015, Dustin 
Siddoway filed a Certificate of Organization with the Idaho Secretary of State organizing 




66. Mr. Siddoway admits that on or about September 3, 2015, at Don Cook's request, he met 
with Don Cook. Mr. Siddoway denies all other allegations in paragraph 66. 
67. Mr. Siddoway admits that on or about September 3, 2015, at Don Cook's request, he met 
with Don Cook and another person, at the WR, PLLC's offices. Mr. Siddoway lacks 
sufficient knowledge to admit or deny all other allegations in paragraph 67 and, therefore, 
denies the same. 
68. Upon information and belief, Mr. Siddoway admits that at some point on or about 
September 3, 2015 Don Cook requested that his accounting records be released to 
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AnchorPoint Accounting, LLC. Mr. Siddoway denies all other allegations in paragraph 
68. 
69. Mr. Siddoway admits that on or about September 9, 2015, at Barry Van Beuren's request, 
he met with Mr. Van Beuren. Mr. Siddoway denies all other allegations in paragraph 69. 
I 
70. Mr. Siddoway admits that on or about September 9, 2015, at Barry Van Beuren's request, 
I 
Dustin attended a meeting with Mr. Van Beuren. Mr. Siddoway denies all other 
allegations in paragraph 70. 
71. Upon information and belief, Mr. Siddoway admits that at some point on or about 
September 9, 2015 Mr. Van Beuren requested that WR, PLLC release his accounting 
records and the accounting records of Meridian Steel Erectors, Inc. to AnchorPoint 
Accounting, LLC. Mr. Siddoway denies all other allegations in paragraph 71. 
72. Mr. Siddoway admits that on or about October 19, 2015 he was contacted by Pro Tech 
Roofing, Inc. Mr. Siddoway denies all other allegations in paragraph 72. 
73. Mr. Siddoway admits that on or about October 2015 he spoke with Scott Lottman, Mark 
Rogers and/or Denise Clark. Mr. Siddoway denies all other allegations in paragraph 73. 
74. Upon information and belief, Mr. Siddoway admits that at some point on or about 
October 20, 2015, Scott Lottman requested that WR, PLLC release his accounting 
records and the accounting records of Rogers & Lottman, LLC and Pro Tech Roofing, 
Inc., to AnchorPoint Accounting, LLC. Mr. Siddoway denies all other allegations in 
paragraph 74. 
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75. Upon information and belief, Mr. Siddoway admits that at some point on or about 
October 20, 2015, Mark Rogers requested that WR, PLLC release his accounting records 
to AnchorPoint Accounting, LLC. Mr. Siddoway denies all other allegations in 
paragraph 7 5. 
76. Mr. Siddoway lacks sufficient knowledge to admit or deny the allegations in paragraph 






82. Upon information and belief, Mr. Siddoway admits that on or about August 25, 2015, 
certain WR, PLLC employees were approached by Dustin and accepted employment with 
Dustin's new accounting company AnchorPoint Accounting, PLLC. Mr. Siddoway 
denies all other allegation in paragraph 82. 
83. Denied. 
84. Mr. Siddoway lacks sufficient knowledge to admit or deny the allegations in paragraph 
84 and therefore, denies the same. 
85. Mr. Siddoway lacks sufficient knowledge to admit or deny the allegations in paragraph 
85 and, therefore, denies the same. 
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86. Admitted. 
87. Denied insofar as the allegations in paragraph 87 allege actions by Mr. Siddoway. Mr. 
Siddoway lacks sufficient knowledge to admit or deny the other allegations of paragraph 
87 and, therefore, denies the same. 
COUNT III 
88. With respect to paragraph 88, Mr. Siddoway incorporates by reference all preceding 
answers and responses as though fully set forth in this section. 
89. The allegation in paragraph 89 is a request by Plaintiffs for relief and, therefore, requires 







95. With respect to paragraph 95, Mr. Siddoway incorporates by reference all preceding 
answers and responses as though fully set forth in this section. 
96. Admitted. 
97. Mr. Siddoway admits the allegations in paragraph 97 and affirmatively states that he 
remains a member and one-third owner of WR PLLC. 
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98. Mr. Siddoway admits that, as a member of WR, PLLC, Siddoway Co. owes certain duties 
to WR, PLLC as reasonably modified by the WR, PLLC Operating Agreement. Mr. 







104. With respect to paragraph 104, Mr. Siddoway incorporates by reference all preceding 






109. With respect to paragraph 109, Mr. Siddoway incorporates by reference all preceding 
answers and responses as though fully set forth in this section. 
110. Denied. 
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112. Mr. Siddoway lacks sufficient knowledge to admit or deny the allegations in paragraph 
112 and, therefore, denies the same. 
113. Denied. 
COUNT VII 
114. With respect to paragraph 114, Mr. Siddoway incorporates by reference all preceding 
answers and responses as though fully set forth in this section. 
115. Mr. Siddoway admits that WR, PLLC has economic relationships with its customers. 
Mr. Siddoway denies all other allegations in paragraph 123. 
116. Mr. Siddoway admits that WR, PLLC has economic relationships with its customers. 
Mr. Siddoway denies all other allegations in paragraph 124. 
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123. With respect to paragraph 123, Mr. Siddoway incorporates by reference all preceding 






128. With respect to paragraph 128, Mr. Siddoway incorporates by reference all preceding 







134. With respect to paragraph 134, Mr. Siddoway incorporates by reference all preceding 
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13 7. Denied. 
138. Denied. 
COUNT XIII 
139. With respect to paragraph 139, Mr. Siddoway incorporates by reference all preceding 





COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES 
Denied. 
FIRST SEPARATE DEFENSE 
Mr. Siddoway denies generally and specifically each and every allegation set forth in the 
Complaint except to the extent such allegation has been expressly admitted herein. 
SECOND SEP ARA TE DEFENSE 
The Complaint fails to state any claim against Mr. Siddoway upon which relief can be 
granted. 
THIRD SEPARATE DEFENSE 
Some or all of Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the doctrine of unclean hands. 
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FOURTH SEPARATE DEFENSE 
Some or all of Plaintiffs' claims are barred by its failure to mitigate any alleged damages. 
FIFTH SEP ARA TE DEFENSE 
Some or all of Plaintiffs' claims are barred because Plaintiffs' own acts or omissions 
were the sole proximate cause, or substantial proximate cause of its alleged damage. 
SIXTH SEPARATE DEFENSE 
Some or all of Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the doctrines of waiver and estoppel. 
SEVENTH SEP ARA TE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs' claims are barred because of Plaintiffs own bad faith and unlawful acts. 
EIGHT SEPARATE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs' claims are barred because of Plaintiffs own breach of contract and failure to 
perform. 
NINTH SEPARATE DEFENSE 
Some or all of Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the doctrine of consent. 
TENTH SEPARATE DEFENSE 
Some or all of Plaintiffs' claims are barred because of Plaintiffs' lack standing. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
Having fully answered the Complaint, Mr. Siddoway and Siddoway Co. pray for relief as 
follows: 
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1. That the Complaint against him and it be immediately dismissed on its merits and with 
prejudice. 
2. That Plaintiffs receive nothing from Mr. Siddoway or Siddoway Co. in this matter. 
3. That Mr. Siddoway and/or Siddoway Co. be awarded reasonable attorney fees and costs, 
as allowed by Idaho Code§§ 12-120 and 12-121 and any other applicable statue. 
4. For such other relief as the court deems just under the circumstances. 
COUNTER CLAIM 
Counterclaimants Randy Siddoway ("Mr. Siddoway") and Siddoway & Company, PC 
("Siddoway Co.") complains of counterclaim defendants Frederick Wadsworth ("Mr. 
Wadsworth"), Wadsworth Accounting CPA, PLLC ("Wadsworth PLLC"), Clark A. Reese 
("Mr. Reese"), and Clark A Reese CPA, P.C. ("Reese PC" and collectively "Counterclaim 
Defendants"), as follows: 
PARTIES, JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
1. Mr. Siddoway is a resident of Ada County, Idaho and the sole shareholder of 
Siddoway Co .. 
2. Siddoway Co. is an Idaho professional corporation in good standing with the Idaho 
Secretary of State and a member of Wadsworth Reese, PLLC ("WR, PLLC"). 
3. Mr. Wadsworth is a resident of Canyon County Idaho and the sole member of 
Wadsworth PLLC. 
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4. Wadsworth PLLC is an Idaho professional limited liability company in good standing 
with the Idaho Secretary of State and a member of WR, PLLC. 
5. Mr. Reese is a resident of Ada County, Idaho and the sole shareholder of Reese PC. 
6. Reese PC is an Idaho professional corporation in good standing with the Idaho 
Secretary of State and a member of WR, PLLC. 
7. This court has jurisdiction over this case under IDAHO CONST. art. V, § 20 and IDAHO 
CODE ANN. § 7-705. 
8. Venue is proper in this court under IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 5-404 because some or all 
Counterclaim Defendants reside in Ada County, Idaho. 
BACKGROUND 
9. On or about December 2013 Mr. Siddoway, Mr. Reese, and Mr. Wadsworth agreed to 
form a new business entity and enter into business together for the purpose of providing public 
accounting services in the Boise area 
10. To this end, on December 20, 2013 Mr. Reese and Mr. Siddoway filed a Certificate of 
Organization with the Idaho Secretary of State forming WR, PLLC. 
11. At that time Mr. Siddoway had developed a substantial accounting practice having 
engaged in public accounting in the Boise area for nearly 20 years, the accounting practice being 
held in Siddoway Co. 
12. Mr. Wadsworth had also practiced as a public accountant in the Boise area for a 
number of years. 
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13. Mr. Siddoway, Mr. Wadsworth, and Mr. Reese agreed that Mr. Wadsworth had 
goodwill that he could contributed to the new venture in an amount approximately ½ as valuable 
as the goodwill that could contributed by Siddoway Co. 
14. Mr. Reese, through his entity Reese PC, desired to be an equal partner in the new 
venture. 
15. At that time Mr. Reese had not developed a public accounting practice and had no 
goodwill to contribute to the new venture to justify equal ownership. 
16. On or about December 2013 Mr. Siddoway and Mr. Reese, through their respective 
entities Siddoway Co. and Reese PC, entered into an oral agreement in which Reese PC agreed 
to purchase ½ of the goodwill of Siddoway Co. and simultaneously contribute the purchased 
goodwill to WR, PLLC in exchange for a 1/3 membership interest in WR, PLLC ( the "Oral 
Agreement"). 
17. Under the terms of the Oral Agreement Reese PC would pay to Siddoway Co. 
approximately $200,000 over a period of time with interest accruing at 6% per annum. 
18. Mr. Siddoway contributed the remaining goodwill of Siddoway Co. to WR, PLLC for 
a 1/3 membership interest in WR, PLLC. 
19. Mr. Wadsworth contributed the goodwill owned by him to WR, PLLC for a 1/3 
membership interest in WR, PLLC. 
20. On January 22, 2014 Reese PC paid $5,500 to Siddoway Co. as the first installment 
on the $200,000 debt established by the Oral Agreement. 
18 
Wadsworth v. Siddoway 
Answer and Counterclaim of Defendants Randy Siddoway and Siddoway Co. in Response to 
Plaintiffs Amended Complaint. 
000200
• • 
21. On January 6, 2014, Siddoway Co., Wadsworth PLLC, and Reese PC each executed 
the Operating Agreement of Siddoway Wadsworth & Reese, PLLC (the "Operating 
Agreement" attached as Exhibit A), with the intent that the agreement act as the sole source of 
agreement between the parties regarding WR, PLLC. 
22. Prior to formation of WR, PLLC, Mr. Siddoway informed Mr. Reese and Mr. 
Wadsworth that it was his strong desire to phase out of compliance based public accounting and 
develop a business advisory practice of his own that would not offer tax preparation, 
bookkeeping, or audit services. 
23. Nevertheless, Mr. Siddoway was willing to work in WR, PLLC for a year or two 
before he began phasing out of compliance public accounting. 
24. Shortly after commencing business together significant disagreements arose between 
the parties regarding how to manage and grow WR, PLLC. 
25. On January 28, 2015 Reese PC and Siddoway Co. executed an Asset Sales 
Agreement with an accompanying Specific Guarantee and Promissory Note memorializing, in 
writing, the Oral Agreement they had entered into on or about December 2013 (the "Reese 
Contract" attached as Exhibit B). 
26. The Reese Contract contains a mandatory arbitration clause requiring settlement by 
arbitration of any controversies or claims arising out of the Reese Contract. 
27. On January 29, 2015 Reese PC made a payment of $5,000 to Siddoway Co. pursuant 
to the terms of the Reese Contract. 
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28. Pursuant to the Reese Contract, starting on March 1, 2015, Reese PC began to make 
$2,500 monthly payments to Siddoway Co. on the first day of each month. 
29. On October 1, 2015, Reese PC failed to make the $2,500 payment to Siddoway Co., 
as required by the Reese Contract, and has failed to make any payment since September 1, 2015. 
30. In an effort to resolve their differences regarding management and growth of WR, 
PLLC, Mr. Siddoway, Mr. Reese, and Mr. Wadsworth hired a practice management consultant. 
31. The resulting negotiations yielded no significant relief of the disagreements between 
the members of WR, PLLC leading Mr. Siddoway to suggest that Mr. Reese and Mr. Wadsworth 
buy-out his membership interest in WR, PLLC. 
32. Following significant negotiation, on or about July 31, 2015, Mr. Siddoway, Mr. 
Reese, and Mr. Wadsworth each agreed to a buy-out arrangement that required, among other 
things, payment to Siddoway Co. of $150,000 (the "July Agreement" attached as Exhibit C). 
33. The proposed buy-out arrangement was reduced to writing and was signed by each 
party on July 31, 2015. 
34. Because the July Agreement was hand written, Mr. Siddoway was tasked with having 
the hand written and executed agreement reduced to a more professional, typewritten document. 
35. Mr. Siddoway retained an attorney to produce a typewritten version of the July 
Agreement. However, before the typewritten document could be produced Mr. Wadsworth and 
Mr. Reese announced that they would not sign it nor would they honor the terms of the July 
Agreement. 
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36. On August 21, 2015, Mr. Siddoway met with Mr. Wadsworth and Mr. Reese in and 
effort, once again, to negotiate a mutually agreeable buy-out of Siddoway Co.' s membership 
interest in WR, PLLC. 
37. During the August 21, 2015 meeting Mr. Siddoway proposed a number of terms for 
the buy-out, including a phase out of his WR, PLLC duties, proposed sharing of receivables, 
payment of liabilities, and separation of office assets. 
38. Neither Mr. Wadsworth nor Mr. Reese accepted the buy-out/separation terms offered 
by Mr. Siddoway in the August 21, 2015 meeting. 
39. Instead, in an email dated August 24, 2015, Mr. Wadsworth claimed that Mr. 
Siddoway had resigned from his WR, PLLC duties. 
40. On or about August 24, 2015, without Mr. Siddoway's or Siddoway Co.'s consent, 
Mr. Wadsworth and Mr. Reese took steps that effectively froze Mr. Siddoway and Siddoway Co. 
out of WR, PLLC, as described below. 
41. On or about August 24, 2015, Mr. Wadsworth and Mr. Reese changed computer , 
passwords, thus denying Mr. Siddoway and Siddoway Co. access to client accounting files and 
other company information making it very difficult or impossible to perform services for WR, 
PLLC clients. 
42. On or about August 21, 2015, Mr. Wadsworth and Mr. Reese, without Mr. 
Siddoway's knowledge or consent, met with Dustin Siddoway, the lead accounting associate of 
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WR, PLLC, and demanded that he sign a non-compete agreement or leave his employment with 
WR,PLLC. 
43. On or about August 24, 2015, Mr. Wadsworth and Mr. Reese placed a lock on the 
computer server room door, denying Mr. Siddoway and Siddoway Co. access to the server. 
44. Upon information and belief, on or about August 24, 2015, Mr. Wadsworth and Mr. 
Reese decided to withhold WR, PLLC distributions from Siddoway Co., and have withheld such 
distributions from Siddoway Co. from September 1, 2015 to the present. 
45. Prior to September 1, 2015, in accordance with the Operating Agreement and Idaho 
law, all members of WR, PLLC had received equal monthly distributions of company funds by 
automatic transfer or check from the WR, PLLC bank account. 
46. On or about August 31, 2015, Mr. Wadsworth and Mr. Reese, without Mr. 
Siddoway's or Siddoway Co.'s knowledge or consent, removed all cash from the WR, PLLC 
bank account one result being that Siddoway Co. did not receive its September 1, 2015 monthly 
distribution via electronic transfer. 
47. Upon information and belief, Mr. Wadsworth and Mr. Reese have diverted the WR, 
PLLC funds into another bank account which is unknown to Mr. Siddoway and to which neither 
Mr. Siddoway nor Siddoway Co. has access. 
48. From September 2015 to the present, Wadsworth PLLC and Reese PC have 
authorized and taken WR, PLLC distributions, while at the same time refusing to make like 
distributions to Siddoway Co. 
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49. On or about August 24, 2015, Mr. Wadsworth and Mr. Reese demanded that 
Siddoway Co. abandon the office used by Mr. Siddoway, or pay rent to WR, PLLC. 
50. From August 24, 2015 forward, Mr. Wadsworth and Mr. Reese have excluded Mr. 
Siddoway and Siddoway Co. from virtually all meetings of members of WR, PLLC, refused to 
share information regarding the company and its operation, and denied Siddoway Co. its right to 
vote on or otherwise consent or dissent to actions proposed by them. 
51. On August 28, 2015, through legal counsel, Mr. Siddoway and Siddoway Co. 
demanded, in writing, that Mr. Reese and Mr. Wadsworth immediately cease their oppressive 
treatment of Mr. Siddoway and Siddoway Co., including a demand that Siddoway Co. be 
afforded its full and equal rights as a member and manager of WR, PLLC. 
52. On or about September 5, 2015, Mr. Siddoway initiated a final attempt to negotiate a 
separation of Siddoway Co. from WR, PLLC. 
53. During the September 5, 2015 negotiation, both parties were represented by legal 
counsel. 
54. After several hours the parties had agreed to the major terms of a buy-out agreement 
and agreed to have Mr. Siddoway's counsel reduce the agreement to writing (the "September 
Agreement"). 
55. Two days later, on or about September 7, 2015, Mr. Wadsworth and Mr. Reese 
renounced the September Agreement and stated that they would not sign any document 
containing the previously agreed upon terms. 
23 
Wadsworth v. Siddoway 
Answer and Counterclaim of Defendants Randy Siddoway and Siddoway Co. in Response to 
Plaintiffs Amended Complaint. 
000205
- • 
56. Due to the complete loss of trust in Mr. Wadsworth and Mr. Reese and their actions 
making it impossible for Mr. Siddoway to effectively work in the WR, PLLC offices, Mr. 
Siddoway began working from a separate office. 
57. Siddoway Co. has not dissociated from WR, PLLC and remains a member and 
manager of WR, PLLC with full rights to equal treatment, decision making authority, and 
distributions. 
FIRST COUNTERCLAIM 
Breach of Contract - Operating Agreement 
(all Counterclaim Defendants) 
58. Mr. Siddoway and Siddoway Co. incorporate herein all preceding paragraphs of this 
Counter Claim. 
59. Counterclaim Defendants have breached the terms of the Operating Agreement by 
their actions, including but not limited to the following: 
a. Denying Siddoway Co. access to company information. 
b. Denying Siddoway Co. access to company assets. 
c. Denying Siddoway Co. the right to consent to or approve actions of the company. 
d. Denying Siddoway Co. the right to equal distributions of the company. 
e. Denying Siddoway Co. the right to vote on company matters and to otherwise 
participate in the management of the company. 
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60. Counterclaim Defendant's actions have damaged Mr. Siddoway and Siddoway Co., 
in an amount to be established at trial, plus interest, costs and attorneys' fees as allowed by law 
or equity. 
SECOND COUNTERCLAIM 
Breach of the Implied Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
(all Counterclaim Defendants) 
61. Mr. Siddoway and Siddoway Co. incorporate herein all preceding paragraphs of this 
Counter Claim. 
62. Without limitation, the following actions of Counterclaim Defendants have breached 
the terms of the Operating Agreement and have nullified or significantly impaired Siddoway 
Co. 's rights and benefits under the Operating Agreement: 
a. Denying Siddoway Co. access to company information. 
b. Denying Siddoway Co. access to company assets. 
c. Denying Siddoway Co. the right to consent to or approve actions of the company. 
d. Denying Siddoway Co. the right to equal distributions of the company. 
e. Denying Siddoway Co. the right to vote on company matters and to otherwise 
participate in the management of the company. 
63. Counterclaim Defendants' actions have damaged Mr. Siddoway and Siddoway Co., 
in an amount to be established at trial, plus interest, costs and attorneys' fees.as allowed by law 
or equity. 
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THIRD COUNTERCLAIM 
Violation of Idaho Code Ann. § 30-6-404 
(all Counterclaim Defendants) 
64. Mr. Siddoway and Siddoway Co. incorporate herein all preceding paragraphs of this 
Counterclaim. 
65. Counterclaim Defendants' have breached Idaho Code Ann.§ 30-6-404 by failing to 
make distributions in equal shares among members and instead distributing WR, PLLC funds to 
themselves and refusing to make an equal distribution to Siddoway Co. 
66. Counterclaim Defendants' actions have damaged Mr. Siddoway and Siddoway Co. in 




(all Counterclaim Defendants) 
67. Mr. Siddoway and Siddoway Co. incorporate herein all preceding paragraphs of this 
Counter Claim. 
68. Under the terms of the Operating Agreement, all members of WR, PLLC are to 
receive distributions in proportion to their membership interest. 
69. From January 2014 until August 2015, all distributions were distributed to each 
member in proportion to their respective membership interest. 
70. On or about August 24, 2015, Counterclaim Defendants decided to deny Siddoway 
Co. of its right to a proportionate distribution of company funds. 
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71. From September!, 2015 to the present Counterclaim Defendants have surreptitiously 
and illegally caused WR, PLLC to distribute company funds in a manner inconsistent with the 
Operating Agreement, Idaho law, and the established course of dealing. In so doing, 
Counterclaim Defendants have unlawfully distributed to themselves, for their own use and 
enjoyment, company funds to which Siddoway Co. is legally entitled. 
72. Counterclaim Defendants are liable to Siddoway Co. for actual damages for their 
conversion of WR, PLLC funds that should have been distributed to Siddoway Co. 
73. Counterclaim Defendant's actions have damaged Mr. Siddoway and Siddoway Co., 




(all Counterclaim Defendants) 
74. Mr. Siddoway and Siddoway Co. incorporate herein all preceding paragraphs of this 
Counterclaim. 
75. Counterclaim Defendants, in breach of the Operating Agreement, have 
misappropriated funds of WR, PLLC for their own benefit and use. 
76. Neither Mr. Siddoway nor Siddoway Co. is in control of the financial affairs of WR, 
PLLC and Counterclaim Defendants have blocked access to the financial records of the 
company, therefore, Mr. Siddoway and Siddoway Co. cannot ascertain where and to whom 
money is flowing from revenue generated by WR, PLLC. 
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77. Mr. Siddoway and Siddoway Co., therefore, is entitled to a full accounting, from 
Counterclaim Defendants, of all WR, PLLC activities including, without limitation, a detailed 
accounting of all money paid by WR, PLLC, directly or indirectly, to its members. 
SEVENTH COUNTERCLAIM 
Breach of Contract - Reese Contract 
(Mr. Reese and Reese PC) 
78. Mr. Siddoway and Siddoway Co. incorporate herein all preceding paragraphs of this 
Counterclaim. 
79. Reese PC has breached the Reese Contract and the associated Promissory Note by 
failing to make the required payments to Siddoway Co. 
80. Mr. Reese has breached the terms of the Specific Guaranty by failing to make prompt 
and full payment under the terms of the Promissory Note once Reese PC failed to make such 
payments. 
81. Mr. Reese and Reese PC have breached the terms of the Reese Contract by failing to 
adhere to the mandatory arbitration clause of the Reese Contract and have, instead, instigated 
litigation in this court alleging certain controversies and claims arising out of the Reese 
Agreement. 
82. Mr. Siddoway and Siddoway Co. will seek, and this court should issue an order, 
compelling arbitration of all controversies and claims arising out of the Reese Contract and 
ordering Counterclaim Defendants to dismiss all such claims from their Complaint. 
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83. Mr. Reese's and Reese PC's actions have damaged Mr. Siddoway and Siddoway Co., 
in an amount to be established at arbitration, or if arbitration is not compelled, at trial, plus 
interest, costs and attorneys' fees as allowed by law or equity. 
EIGHTH COUNTERCLAIM 
Legal Fees 
(all Counterclaim Defendants) 
84. Mr. Siddoway and Siddoway Co. incorporate herein all preceding paragraph of this 
Counterclaim. 
85. Pursuant to the Operating Agreement, the Reese Contract, Idaho Code Ann.§ 12-120, 
and Idaho Code Ann.§ 12-121, Mr. Siddoway and Siddoway Co. are entitled to recover their 
attorney fees and costs of suit in an amount deemed reasonable by this court. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Mr. Siddoway and Siddoway Co. prays for relief as follows: 
1. Under the First Counterclaim, a judgment in favor of Mr. Siddoway or Siddoway Co. 
and against Counterclaim Defendants for breach of the Operating Agreement in an amount to be 
established at trial, plus interest, costs, and attorneys' fees as allowed by law or equity. 
2. Under the Second Counterclaim, a judgment in favor of Mr. Siddoway or Siddoway 
Co. and against Counterclaim Defendants for breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair 
dealing in an amount to be established at trial, plus interest, costs, and attorneys' fees as allowed 
I 
by law or equity. 
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3. Under the Third Counterclaim, a judgment in favor of Mr. Siddoway or Siddoway Co. 
and against Counterclaim Defendants for violation ofIDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-6-404 in an 
amount to be established at trial, plus interest, costs, and attorneys' fees as allowed by law or 
equity. 
4. Under the Fourth Counterclaim, a judgment in favor of Mr. Siddoway or Siddoway 
Co. and against Counterclaim Defendants for conversion in an amount to be established a trial, 
plus interest, costs, and attorneys' fees as allowed by law or equity. 
5. Under the Fifth Counterclaim, a full accounting, from Counterclaim Defendants, of all 
WR, PLLC activities including, without limitation, a detailed accounting of all money paid by 
WR, PLLC, directly or indirectly, to its members. 
6. Under the Seventh Counterclaim, an order compelling arbitration of all controversies 
and claims arising out of the Reese Contract. 
7. Under the Eight Counterclaim, a judgment in favor of Mr. Siddoway or Siddoway Co. 
and against Counterclaim Defendants in an amount to be established at trial, for Mr. Siddoway 
and Siddoway Co.' s reasonable attorneys' fees and costs, plus interest, associated with this 
matter. 
8. Any other legal or equitable relief that this court deems just. 
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Dated this 20th day of June, 2016. 
Bre 1, .... -u.uiPJs;?.._ __ _ 
HASTINGS LAW GROUP, LLC 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Pro Hae Vice 
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I certify that on the 20th day of June, 2016, I served a true and correct copy of the 
forgoing Answer and Counterclaim of Defendant Randy Siddoway and Siddoway & Company in 
Response to Plaintiffs Amended Complaint on the following parties by the means indicated: 
via email delivery to 
Vaughn Fisher 
FISHER RAINEY HUDSON 
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 630 
Boise, ID 83702 
Fax: (208) 297-2689 
Vaughn(d;FRHTrialLawyers.com 
Plaintiff's and Counter Claim 
Defendant's Counsel 
via email delivery to 
Jeanine Barkan 
Jcanine(d;Siddoway.com 
Defendant, pro se 
via email delivery to 
Dustin Siddoway 
Dustin(a!teamanchorpoint.com 
Defendant, pro se 
"'--=~-v a &-
HASTINGS LAW GROUP, LLC 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Pro Hae Vice 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISm~XWELL 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
WADSWORTH REESE, PLLC, an Idaho 
Professional Corporation; CLARK A. REESE 
CPA, P.C., an Idaho Professional Corporation; 
and WADSWORTH ACCOUNTING CPA, an 
Idaho Professional Corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SIDDOWAY & COMP ANY, PC, an Idaho 
professional corporation; RANDY 
SIDDOWAY, an individual; DUSTIN 
SIDDOWAY, an individual; and JEANINE 
BARKAN, an individual, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-OC-2015-21225 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
ON SIDDOWA Y'S MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
This case arises from an accounting firm's breakup. Defendants Randy Siddoway and his 
company Siddoway & Company, PC ("Siddoway PC")--which the Court together will call 
"Siddoway"- move for summary judgment against all but two of the claims asserted by 
Plaintiffs Wadsworth Reese, PLLC, Clark A. Reese CPA, P.C. ("Reese PC"), and Wadsworth 
Accounting CPA ("Wadsworth PC"). Siddoway contends the rest of Plaintiffs' claims are 
preempted by the Idaho Trade Secrets Act ("ITSA"), LC. §§ 48-801 to -807. Alternatively, 
Siddoway says three claims-those alleging civil conspiracies-are not cognizable under Idaho 
law. Siddoway's motion for partial summary was argued and taken under advisement on August 
11, 2016. For the reasons that follow, the Court cannot at this time determine that any of 
Plaintiffs' claims are preempted by ITSA, but the Court agrees with Siddoway's alternative 
argument for summary judgment against the conspiracy claims. 
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The accounting firm now called Wadsworth Reese was formed by accountants Clark 
Reese and Randy Siddoway in December 2013. (Am. Compl. ,r,r 13-14; Answer ,r,r 13-14;1 
Fisher Aff. filed Mar. 2, 2016, ,r 3 & Ex. A.) It first was called CRS Services, PLLC. (Am. 
Compl. ,r 13; Answer ,r 13.) About a month later, its name was changed to Siddoway, 
Wadsworth & Reese, PLLC, reflecting the addition of a third accountant, Frederick Wadsworth, 
to the venture. (Am. Compl. ,r 21; Answer ,r 21; Fisher Aff. filed Mar. 2, 2016, ,r 4 & Ex. B.) Its 
three members at that time were not the three accountants individually, but instead the 
professional corporations through which they had respectively been doing business as 
accountants. Those professional corporations-Siddoway PC, Reese PC, and Wadsworth PC-
entered into an operating agreement for Wadsworth Reese dated January 6, 2014. (Am. Compl. 
,r 20(a), (b); Answer ,r 20(a), (b).) The January 2014 operating agreement was intended to be 
temporary because the three accountants had not yet reached a final agreement as to all of the 
terms on which they were joining forces, such as the values to assign to their respective client 
bases. (Reese Aff. filed Mar. 2, 2016, ,r 5.) But no final agreement was ever reached. (Reese 
Aff. filed Mar. 2, 2016, ,r,r 7, 11-21.) The firm finally took on the Wadsworth Reese name in 
November 2015, nearly two years after the ''temporary" operating agreement was signed. 
(Fisher Aff. filed Mar. 2, 2016, ,r 5 & Ex. C.) It did so in the wake of Randy Siddoway's August 
2015 decision to cut ties and begin a new venture. (Reese Aff. filed Mar. 2, 2016, ,r 23.) 
This lawsuit arises from the parties' inability to reach an agreement as to the terms of 
Randy Siddoway's departure from Wadsworth Reese, as well as their disagreement as to whether 
1 
Citations to the "Answer" mean Siddoway's answer to Plaintiffs' amended complaint. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON SIDDOWA Y'S MOTION 
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2 
000216
-
e and Siddoway PC violated duties to Wadsworth Reese in the wake of that departure, most 
notably by allegedly funneling Wadsworth Reese's client list and related historical billing 
information to a newly formed competitor, AnchorPoint Accounting PLLC. AnchorPoint is an 
accounting firm in which Defendants Dustin Siddoway and Jeanine Barkan, who theretofore had 
been Wadsworth Reese employees, are involved. 
Plaintiffs filed suit on December 14, 2015. After some preliminary litigation, Plaintiffs 
filed an amended complaint on May 24, 2016. The amended complaint is their operative 
pleading. Its nine counts are as follows: (1) Count III, a request for a judicial order for 
Siddoway PC's dissociation from Wadsworth Reese; (2) Count IV, a claim against Siddoway for 
breach of fiduciary duty; (3) Count V, a claim against all defendants for civil conspiracy to 
commit breach of fiduciary duty; ( 4) Count VI, a claim for misappropriating trade secrets-
specifically, Wadsworth Reese's client list and related historical billing information-in 
violation of ITSA; (5) Count VII, a claim against all defendants for interference with prospective 
business advantage; (6) Count VIII, a claim against all defendants for civil conspiracy to commit 
interference with prospective economic advantage; (7) Count IX, a claim against all defendants 
for breach of confidence; (8) Count X, a claim against all defendants for civil conspiracy to 
commit breach of confidence; and (9) Count XIII, a request for a declaratory judgment that an 
agreement the Court has called "the Reese Agreement" in prior decisions is void. (Am. Compl. 
,i,i 88-143.) Counts I, II, XI, and XII, which were part of the original complaint, were 
intentionally omitted from the amended complaint. 
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On June 20, 2016, Siddoway filed an answer to Plaintiffs' amended complaint and a 
counterclaim against Reese PC, Wadsworth PC, Clark Reese, and Frederick Wadsworth.
2 
The 
counterclaim's eight counts are as follows: (1) a claim for breach of Wadsworth Reese's 
operating agreement; (2) a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing owed in connection with the operating agreement; (3) a claim that Wadsworth Reese's 
distributions have been unequal, in violation of I.C. § 30-6-404; (4) a claim for conversion; (5) a 
claim for an accounting of Wadsworth Reese's activities; (6) a claim for Wadsworth Reese's 
judicial dissolution; (7) a claim against Reese PC and Clark Reese for breach of the Reese 
Agreement; and (8) a request for legal fees. 
Dustin Siddoway and Jeanine Barkan, who are self-represented, answered Plaintiffs' 
original complaint but have not answered the amended complaint. 
On May 12, 2016, Siddoway moved for partial summary judgment. Through that 
motion, Siddoway seeks summary judgment against all of Plaintiffs' claims, with the exception 
of Counts VI and XIII-the ITSA claim and the declaratory-judgment claim. As already noted, 
that motion was argued and taken under advisement on August 11, 2016. It is ready for decision. 
II. 
LEGAL STANDARD 
Summary judgment is proper "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to 
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw." I.R.C.P. 56(a). If 
the movant is seeking summary judgment against a claim or defense asserted by the nonmovant, 
the movant carries its burden by showing that the evidence does not support an element of the 
2 
Unconventionally, Clark Reese and Frederick Wadsworth were named as counterdefendants 
despite not being among the named plaintiffs. 
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allenged claim or defense. E.g., McHugh v. Reid, 156 Idaho 229,303,324 P.3d 998, 1002 (Ct. 
App. 2014). The movant's showing can take either (or both) of two forms: (i) affirmative 
evidence disproving the element at issue; or (ii) a showing that the nonmovant is unable to offer 
admissible evidence proving that element. Id.; see also I.R.C.P. 56(c)(l). 
If the movant carries its burden, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to prove that a 
genuine factual dispute must be resolved before judgment can be awarded to the movant. E.g., 
Boise Mode, LLC v. Donahoe Pace & Partners Ltd., 154 Idaho 99,104,294 P.3d 1111, 1116 
(2013). To carry that ultimate burden, the nonmovant "may not rest upon mere allegations in the 
pleadings, but must set forth by affidavit specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial." 
Id. ( quotation marks omitted). The record must be construed in the light most favorable to the 
nonmovant, and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in the nonmovant's favor. Id. 
Nevertheless, "[a] mere scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt as to the facts is not sufficient" 
for the nonmovant to avoid summary judgment. AED, Inc. v. KDC Invs., LLC, 155 Idaho 159, 
163, 307 P.3d 176, 180 (2013). 
III. 
ANALYSIS 
A. Conspiracy claims 
In Counts IV, VII, and IX of their amended complaint, Plaintiffs assert tort claims for 
breach of fiduciary duty, interference with prospective economic advantage, and breach of 
confidence, respectively. The first of those three tort claims is asserted only against Siddoway, 
whereas the other two are asserted against all defendants. Each of the three tort claims is 
immediately followed in the amended complaint by a corresponding claim against all defendants 
for civil conspiracy to commit that tort. In other words, Counts V, VIII, and X are claims for 
civil conspiracy to commit breach of fiduciary duty, to commit interference with prospective 
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conomic advantage, and to commit breach of confidence, respectively. Siddoway seeks 
summary judgment against the three conspiracy claims, contending that Idaho law simply does 
not recognize claims for civil conspiracy, irrespective of whether Plaintiffs could prove that any 
conspiratorial agreement was made. 
As Siddoway argues, under Idaho law "civil conspiracy is neither a cause of action nor a 
theory ofliability." Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Assocs., LLP, 157 Idaho 106, 
123 n.4, 334 P.3d 780, 797 n.4 (2014). Thus, "if two or more persons or entities conspired to 
commit a tort, damages cannot be awarded for the conspiracy" and "can only be awarded for the 
tort that they conspired to commit." Id. Consequently, "[t]he existence of the conspiracy is only 
relevant insofar as it bears on the rules of evidence and the persons liable, including holding one 
conspirator liable for the conduct of the other." Id. Under this law, Plaintiffs' three conspiracy 
claims plainly are untenable as stand-alone claims.
3 
Siddoway therefore is entitled to summary 
judgment against Counts V, VIII, and X.
4 
Plaintiffs' factual allegations that the defendants conspired to commit torts (Am. Compl. 
,i,i 105, 106, 124, 125, 135, 136) do, however, have a role to play in this litigation. Under Idaho 
law as outlined in Saint Alphonsus, if Plaintiffs are able to prove both a tort and a conspiracy to 
commit it, a conspirator is charged with every other conspirator's tortious conduct, even if that 
conspirator's own personal conduct, considered alone, is not enough to commit the tort. The 
Court therefore considers the conspiracy allegations made in Counts V, VIII, and X to be offered 
3 
This conclusion is a legal one that does not depend on evidence and therefore could not 
possibly be affected by evidence developed in ongoing discovery. Consequently, to the extent 
Plaintiffs ask the Court to defer decision under I.R.C.P. 56(d), the Court declines to do so. 
4 
The conspiracy claims are no more tenable as to self-represented defendants Dustin Siddoway 
and Jeanine Barkan than they are as to Siddoway. Thus, despite that those defendants did not 
join in Siddoway's motion, the grant of summary judgment extends to them. 
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n support of the underlying tort claims to which they respectively relate, such that Count IV will 
be treated as a claim that Siddoway breached a fiduciary duty and conspired with the other 
defendants to do so, Count VII will be treated as a claim that each defendant interfered with a 
prospective economic advantage and conspired with the other defendants to do so, and Count IX 
will be treated as a claim that each defendant committed a breach of confidence and conspired 
with the other defendants to do so. Thus, if Plaintiffs prove both a tort and a conspiracy to 
commit it, each conspirator would be liable for the resulting tort damages. But if Plaintiffs prove 
only a tort and not a conspiracy to commit it, the only defendants liable for the resulting tort 
damages would be those that committed the tort themselves. 
B. ITSA preemption 
In Count VI of their amended complaint, Plaintiffs claim Defendants violated ITSA by 
misappropriating Wadsworth Reese's client list, along with related historical billing information, 
and using it in luring Wadsworth Reese clients to AnchorPoint. (Am. Compl. ,r,r 109-113.) The 
amended complaint includes eight other counts: Counts III through V, VII through X, and XIII. 
Of the eight non-ITSA counts, Siddoway contends seven-all but Count XIII-are preempted by 
ITSA. Because the Court has already entered summary judgment against Counts V, VIII, and X 
on another ground, only four claims-Counts III, IV, VII, and IX-must be tested against 
Siddoway's preemption argument. 
ITSA "displaces conflicting tort, restitutionary, and other law of this state providing civil 
liability remedies for misappropriation of a trade secret." LC. § 48-806(1) ( emphasis added). 
Count III is a claim for Siddoway PC's judicial dissociation as a Wadsworth Reese member. 
(Am. Compl. ,r,r 88-94.) That claim appears to be made under LC.§ 30-6-602(5), part of the 
Idaho Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, LC. §§ 30-6-101 to -1104. Section 30-6-602(5) 
provides in some circumstances for court-ordered expulsion oflimited liability company 
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An expulsion order has the effect of dissociating the member from the company, 
LC. § 30-6-602(1 ), which in turn has the effects for which LC. § 30-6-603 provides. Those 
effects are not "liability" effects; they reorient the relationship between the dissociated member 
and the company in light of the member's dissociation. See LC.§ 30-6-603(1). Thus, an order 
for Siddoway PC's expulsion as a Wadsworth Reese member simply would not be a "civil 
liability remed[y]," as is necessary to trigger ITSA preemption. LC.§ 48-806(1). Moreover, 
even if an expulsion order were a "liability" remedy, it would not be "conflicting" with ITSA, as 
is also necessary to trigger ITSA preemption. Id. ITSA does not purport to govern the 
relationship between a limited liability company and its members. The effect of an expulsion 
order is, as already noted, to reorient that relationship in light of the member's resulting 
dissociation from the company. LC.§§ 30-6-602(1), -603(1). That reorientation cannot 
reasonably be thought to conflict with ITSA. For these reasons, Siddoway's motion for 
summary judgment against Count III is denied. 
Counts IV, VII, and IX do, however, seek "civil liability remedies," namely awards of 
tort damages, and awards of tort damages might conflict with ITSA, depending on the basis for 
entering the awards. Consequently, a different analysis is necessary to assess whether those 
claims run afoul of ITSA's preemption provision. In that regard, it bears noting that, in addition 
to preempting "conflicting ... tort ... civil liability remedies for misappropriation of a trade 
secret," LC. § 48-806(1), ITSA does not preempt, and evidently deems non-conflicting, "[o]ther 
civil remedies that are not based upon misappropriation of a trade secret." LC. § 48-806(2)(b ). 
Like Plaintiffs' ITSA claim, Counts IV, VII, and IX are based, to varying degrees, on 
Siddoway's alleged misappropriation of Wadsworth Reese's client list and related historical 
billing information. (Am. Compl. ,r,r 58-61, 99, 119, 129.) It has not yet been determined, nor 
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can it be determined as a matter of law based on the present record, whether the client list and 
related historical billing information qualify as ''trade secrets" under ITSA. Indeed, no party is 
asking the Court to make that determination now. Plaintiffs say the client list and related 
historical billing information must be "trade secrets" for the damages awards sought in 
connection with Counts IV, VII, and IX in relation to their misappropriation to be preempted. 
Thus, they say a determination as to whether those claims are preempted by ITSA cannot be 
made until a later stage of litigation, when it can be determined whether the client list and related 
historical billing information are "trade secrets." Plaintiffs also say that, to whatever extent 
Counts IV, VII, and IX are based on alleged wrongdoing other than misappropriation of the 
client list and related historical billing information, they are beyond the ambit of ITSA's 
preemption provision, as to that extent they are not based on misappropriation of information at 
all. Siddoway conceded that point during the hearing. But Siddoway contends that whether the 
client list and related historical billing information are ''trade secrets" is irrelevant to whether 
ITSA preemption applies, as common law tort damages awards arising from misappropriation of 
information conflict with ITSA, whether or not the information amounts to a ''trade secret." 
Thus, Siddoway contends that now is an appropriate time for summary judgment to be entered 
against Counts IV, VII, and IX to the extent those claims are based on alleged misappropriation 
of information. 
Idaho's appellate courts have not had occasion to consider whether ITSA preempts 
common law tort claims that are based on misappropriation of information that fails to amount to 
a "trade secret" under ITSA. That precise question has, however, been considered in Idaho 
federal court. In Chatterbox, LLC v. Pulsar Ecoproducts, LLC, 2007 WL 1388183 (D. Idaho 
May 9, 2007), the court surveyed case law addressed to the same question, as it had arisen in 
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ther jurisdictions that, like Idaho, had adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act ("UTSA"), along 
with its preemption provision. The court discerned that the view for which Siddoway advocates 
here is the majority view of the intended operation ofUTSA's preemption provision. Id at *3. 
The court then took note of the Idaho legislature's goal of promoting uniformity in the law of 
trade secrets, as evidenced by the legislative statements of purpose associated with ITSA's 1981 
enactment and its 1990 amendment, which was occasioned by UTSA's amendment in 1985. Id 
Given that goal, the court considered it appropriate to adopt the majority view-the view that 
common law tort claims are preempted to the extent they are based on misappropriation of 
information even if the information is not a "trade secret." Id. That view continues to prevail in 
Idaho federal court, recently having been reaffirmed in New Phase Development LLC v. Cook, 
2015 WL 4528695, at *8-9 (D. Idaho July 27, 2015). 
It is hard to argue with the Chatterbox court's conclusion that the legislative goal of 
uniformity in the law of trade secrets is better served, given that different views have emerged in 
different jurisdictions, by adopting the majority view instead of the minority view. That 
approach brings UTSA jurisdictions closer to alignment than the converse approach. But the 
mere observation that adopting the majority view better promotes uniformity among jurisdictions 
is not reason enough to adopt it. The preemption provision's actual language must be carefully 
considered to discern whether it is susceptible to the majority-view interpretation. 
As already noted, ITSA preempts "conflicting tort, restitutionary, and other law of this 
state providing civil liability remedies for misappropriation of a trade secret." LC.§ 48-806(1) 
(emphasis added). Moreover, ITSA declines to preempt "[o]ther civil remedies that are not 
based upon misappropriation of a trade secret." I.C. § 48-806(2)(b) ( emphasis added). The 
majority view regards this statutory language as sufficient to displace common law tort remedies 
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or misappropriation of information that is not "a trade secret." Jurisdictions adopting the 
majority view may have an approach to statutory interpretation that is less deferential to the 
legislative body, or less constrained by plain statutory language, than the approach the Idaho 
Supreme Court requires. Under Idaho law, unambiguous statutes simply must be construed as 
they are written. E.g., Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg'! Med Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 894-96, 265 
P.3d 502, 507-09(2011). Idaho's courts do not have leeway to override unambiguous statutory 
language for policy reasons, such as to promote uniformity amongjurisdictions.
5 
In the Court's mind, the majority view reflects the "better" rule from a policy standpoint 
for reasons that need not be explained here ( and that go beyond the notion that adopting the 
majority view better promotes uniformity among jurisdictions). But the Court's view in that 
regard is unimportant, as the legislature has spoken clearly and unambiguously to the question at 
hand. The legislature provided for preemption only when civil liability remedies are sought "for 
misappropriation of a trade secret," LC. § 48-806(1 ), and it decided against preemption of other 
civil remedies "not based upon misappropriation of a trade secret." LC.§ 48-806(2)(b). This 
statutory language simply is not susceptible to an interpretation that common law tort damages 
remedies sought for misappropriation of information that is not a "trade secret" are preempted. 
Consequently, unless it is later determined that the client list and related historical billing 
information at issue here are "trade secrets," Siddoway cannot be granted summary judgment on 
the theory that Counts IV, VII, and IX are preempted. 
6 
5 
The Court is aware of no exception to that approach for Idaho statutes that are derived from 
uniform laws designed for adoption across the country. 
6 
On reply, Siddoway began arguing that Count IX, for breach of confidence, is untenable 
because Idaho recognizes no such cause of action. That may well be the case, but the Court will 
not decide that issue now, given that it was first raised on reply. 
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Accordingly, 
IT IS ORDERED that Siddoway's motion for partial summary judgment is granted in 
part and denied in part. The motion is granted in that summary judgment is entered in favor of 
all defendants (not just Siddoway) on Counts V, VIII, and X. The motion is otherwise denied. 
t~ 
Dated this~ day of August, 2016. 
&. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
WADSWORTH REESE, PLLC, an Idaho 
Professional Corporation; CLARK A. REESE 
CPA, P.C., an Idaho Professional 
Corporation; and WADSWORTH 




SIDDOWAY & COMPANY, PC, an Idaho 
Professional corporation; RANDY 
SIDDOWAY, an individual; DUSTIN 
SIDDOWAY, an individual and JEANINE 
BARKAN, an individual; 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 1521225 
ANSWER OF DEFENDANT 
JEANINE BARKAN TO PLAINTIFF'S 
AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Defendant, JEANINE BARKAN (hereinafter referred to as "defendant"), and for no 
other defendant, answer, admit, deny, affirmatively defend, and otherwise allege in response to 
the plaintiffs amended complaint for DISSOCIATION, DAMAGES AND DECLARATORY 
RELIEF (hereinafter referred to as "amended complaint") filed on or about May 24, 2016 herein 
as follows: 
ANSWER TO AMENDED COMPLAINT-1 
000228
- -
1. Defendant denies, unless specifically admitted, generally and specifically each 
and every allegation set forth in the amended complaint of plaintiffs, and without waiving the 
generality of such denial, specifically deny that plaintiffs are or have been owed any contractual, 
fiduciary, confidential or tort duties, or any amounts of money, including but not limited to 
anything of value to account for to plaintiff, as alleged or otherwise, from this answering 
defendant. 
2. Defendant answers and so generally and specifically deny each and every material 
allegation of the within the amended complaint unless otherwise specifically admitted. 
3. Defendant admits the allegations contained in paragraph 7, 52, 56, 63, 64. 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
4. The complaint, and each cause of action thereof, does not state facts sufficient to 
constitute a cause of action against this answering defendant. 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
5. Plaintiff by its conduct has waived any and all claims or remedies, if any, against 
this answering defendant. 
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
6. Plaintiff by its conduct is barred from asserting any and all claims for money, or 
otherwise, or remedies, if any, against these answering defendant as a result of accord and 
satisfaction. 
ANSWER TO AMENDED COMPLAINT-2 
000229
-
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
7. Plaintiff by its conduct is barred from asserting any and all claims for money, or 
otherwise, or remedies, if any, against these answering defendants as a result of a novation, 
express or implied. 
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
8. Plaintiff failed to exercise reasonable care for its own protection, rights, and 
interest, if any, at all relevant times, and in connection with the alleged transactions, and as a 
result of such negligence, caused, contributed to, or brought about its own damages, if any, and 
knew or should have known that no duty, fiduciary or otherwise, was owed to plaintiff at all 
relevant times. Accordingly, in the event any answering defendant is found to owe plaintiff any 
duty, sum of money, or any thing of value, each defendant's liability, if any, must be reduced as 
a result of such comparative negligence of plaintiff. 
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
9. Plaintiff by its conduct is barred from asserting any and all claims or remedies, if 
any, against this answering defendant as a result of failure to mitigate damages. 
SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
10. Plaintiff by its conduct is barred from asserting any and all claims for money, or 
otherwise, or remedies, if any, against this answering defendant as a result of laches, causing 
prejudice to defendant by plaintiff's unreasonable delay in asserting the claims as set forth in the 
complaint herein. 
ANSWER TO AMENDED COMPLAINT ~3 
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EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
11. Plaintiff by its conduct is barred from asserting any and all claims or remedies, if 
any, against this answering defendant as a result of applicable statutes of limitations. 
NINTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
12. Plaintiff lacks standing or capacity to sue generally, and to bring the instant 
action, by its failure to comply with applicable statutes, laws, or rules, respecting the alleged 
corporate status or interests, if any, of plaintiff. 
TENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
13. Plaintiff by its conduct is barred from asserting or enforcing any and all claims for 
money, or otherwise, or remedies, if any, against this answering defendant as a result of the 
applicable statute of frauds. 
ELEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
14. Plaintiff by its conduct, expressly, impliedly, or by ratification, is barred from 
asserting, enforcing any and all claims for money, or otherwise, or remedies, if any, against this 
answering defendant as a result of prior or subsequent modifications of material provisions of 
such writings or oral agreements, if any, in connection with the underlying transactions. 
TWELFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
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15. Plaintiff is barred from asserting, collecting, or enforcing any and all claims for 
money, or otherwise, or remedies, if any, against this answering defendant in connection with the 
purported transactions, as alleged in the instant complaint, as a result of plaintiff's unclean 
hands, including, but not limited to, sexual discrimination. 
THIRTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
16. Plaintiff is barred from asserting, collecting, or enforcing any and all claims for 
money, or otherwise, or remedies, if any, against this answering defendant in connection with the 
purported transactions, as alleged in the instant complaint, as a result of plaintiff's having acted 
in pari delicto with other defendants, assigns, agents, or other third parties to bring about all of 
the loss or injury, if any, complained of by plaintiff in its complaint on file herein. 
FOURTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
1 7. In the event that any answering defendant is found, in any manner, degree, or 
extent, to have owed plaintiff any duties, whether statutory, generally, or in equity, for which 
such defendant is further found liable, each answering defendant alleges that other persons 
and/or entities are primarily liable for any and all such claims, sums of monies, or duties, and 
that such other persons, entities, or parties should be made to pay any judgment rendered any 
answering defendant, in full, or in substantial part, under the principles of equitable 
indemnification. 
FIFTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
18. Each answering defendant alleges that each is entitled to a setoff and/or offset 
against any amounts established to be owed to plaintiff in connection with the transactions 
alleged in plaintiff's complaint. 
ANSWER TO AMENDED COMPLAINT-5 
000232
SIXTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Defendant is and was privileged and justified in any conduct alleged by and 
against Defendant in the complaint. 
WHEREFORE, these answering defendants pray for judgment as follows: 
1. That plaintiffs take nothing by the instant complaint and that the complaint be 
dismissed; 
2. For costs of suit incurred hereby; 
3. For reasonable attorney fees; 
4. For such other and further relief the Court may deem just and proper including 
Rule 11 sanctions. 
Date: August 19, 2016 
ANSWER TO AMENDED COMPLAINT-6 
000233
- -
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on August 19, 2016, I served a copy of Defendant Jeanine Barkan's 
Answer to Amended Complaint to be served on the following individuals in the manner indicated 
below: 
Dustin Siddoway 
10994 West Hiddenbrook 
Star, ID 83665 
Brett Hastings 
299 South Main Street, 13th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110 
Glen Godfrey, Jr. 
842 E. Winding Creek Drive 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Vaughn Fisher 
Fisher Rainey Hudson 
950 West Bannock St., Suite 630 
Boise, ID 83702 
( x) Via email 
(x) Via email 
(x) Via email 
(x) Via email 
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Email: God:freyLawPLLC@gmail.com 
Idaho Bar No. 1662 
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Brett W. Hastings 
HASTINGS LAW GROUP, LLC 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
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By AUSTIN LOWE 
DEPUTY 
Attorneys for Randy Siddoway and Siddoway & Company, PC 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
WADSWORTH REESE, PLLC, an Idaho 
professional corporation; CLARK A. REESE 
CPA, P .C., an Idaho professional corporation; 
and WADSWORTH ACCOUNTING CPA, 
and Idaho professional corporation, 
Respondents 
v. 
SIDDOWAY & COMP ANY, PC, an Idaho 
professional corporation; RANDY 
SIDDOWAY, an individual; DUSTIN 
SIDDOWAY; an individual; and JEANINE 
BARKAN, an individual, 
Appellants 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No.: CV OC 1521225 
Judge Jason D. Scott 
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TO THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS, RESPONDENT CLARK A. REESE, 
RESPONDENTS' ATTORNEY, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. Appellants Siddoway and Company, PC and Randy Siddoway ( collectively, 
"Siddoway") appeal against the above named Respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the 
Order On Siddoway's Second Motion to Reconsider and Reese's Motion to Stay Arbitration (the 
"Order"), entered in the above entitle action on the 9th day of August, 2016, the Honorable 
Judge Jason D. Scott presiding. 
2. Appellants appeal that portion of the Order denying Appellants Motion to Compel 
Arbitration and granting Respondents Motion to Stay Arbitration as it applies to Clark A. Reese 
personally. A copy of the Order being appealed is attached to this Notice as "Exhibit A". 
3. The Order is appealable, as a matter of right, under IDAHO APPELLATE RULE 11 ( a)(8) and 
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 7-919(a), together establishing appeal as a matter of right from an "order 
denying an application to compel arbitration" or an "order granting an application to stay 
arbitration .... " I.C. § 7-919(a). 
4. The issues Appellants intend to assert on this appeal include, but are not limited to, the 
following: 
a. The District Court incorrectly held that Clark Reese, personally, was not bound by 
the arbitration clause in the Reese Agreement. 
2 
Wadsworth et. al. v. Siddoway et. al. ,.... 
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b. The District Court incorrectly held that Siddoway presented no ~vidence that 
Clark Reese, personally, entered into an agreement to arbitrate. 
c. The District Court improperly stayed arbitration, as to Clark Reese personally, 
despite Clark Reese's failure to carry his burden of showing that the arbitration 
clause did not apply to him. 
d. The District court improperly shifted the burden to Siddoway to raise and then 
refute arguments as to why the arbitration clause in the Reese Agreement did not 
apply to Clark Reese, personally, despite Clark Reese having never raised such an 
argument 
5. There has been no order entered sealing all or any portion of record in this matter. 
6. Appellants request a reporter's transcript, in electronic form.at, of the follow: 
a. Oral argument held on April 26, 2016 pursuant to Siddoway's original Motion to 
Compel Arbitration. 
b. Oral argument held on July 19, 2016 pursuant to Respondent's Motion to Stay 
Arbitration and Appellant's objection thereto. 
7. Appellants request that the following documents be included in the clerk's record in 
addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.AR.: 
a. Siddoway's Motion to Compel Arbitration, filed on or about January 18, 2016 
b. Clark A. Reese CPA, P.C.'s Opposition to Motion to Compel Arbitration, filed on 
I 
or about March 2, 2016. 
Wadsworth et. al. v. Sid(ioway et. al. 
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c. Siddoway's Reply to Reese's Opposition to Motion to Compel Arbitration along 
with all exhibits thereto, filed on or about March 9, 2016. 
d. This Court's Memorandum Decision and Order, entered on May 10, 2016. 
e. Reese's Motion to Stay Arbitration, filed on or about June 20, 2016. 
f. Reese's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Stay Arbitration, filed on or about 
June 20, 2016. 
g. Siddoway's Motion to Reconsider, filed on or about July 25, 2016. 
h. Siddoway's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reconsider, filed on or about 
July 25, 2016. 
i. Reese's Memorandum in Opposition to Second Motion to Reconsider, filed on or 
about August 1, 2016. 
J. Siddoway's Reply to Plaintiff's Response to Siddoway's Second Motion to 
Reconsider along with all exhibits thereto, filed on or about August 3, 2016. 
8. Appellants request that the following documents, charts, or pictures offered or admitted 
as exhibits be copied and sent to the Supreme Court: 
a. All exhibits attached to Siddoway's Reply to Reese's Opposition to Motion to 
Compel Arbitration, filed on or about March 9, 2016. 
b. All exhibits attached to Siddoway's.Reply to Plaintiff's Response to Siddoway's 
Second Motion to Reconsider, filed on or about August 3, 2016. 
c. The Asset Sales Agreement with Specific Guaranty, executed January 28, 2015. 
Wadsworth et. al. v. Siddoway et. al. 
Notice of Appeal 
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d. The Promissory Note with Specific Guaranty, dated January 28, 2015. 
9. Appellants certify as follows: 
a. A copy of this Notice has been served on each reporter of whom a transcript has 
been requested as named below at the address set out below: 
i. Tucker and Associates, LLC-605 W. Fort Street, P.O. Box 1625, 
Boise, Idaho 83701, Tel: (208) 345-3704, Fax: (208) 345-3713. · 
b. The clerk of the district court has been paid the estimated fee for preparation of 
the reporter's transcript. 
c. The estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid. 
d. The appellate filing fee has been paid. 
e. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 
20, I.A.R 
Respectfully submitted this 19th day of September, 2016. 
Wadsworth et. al. v. Siddoway et. al. 
Notice of Appeal 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I ~ertifythat on the 19th day of September, 2016, I served a true and correct copy of the 
Notice of Appeal on the following parties by the method indicated: 
via email delivery 
and U.S. Mail to 
Vaughn Fisher 
FISHER RAINEY HUDSON 
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 630 
Boise, ID 83702 
Fax: (208) 297-2689 
Vaughn@FRHTrialLawyers.com 
Plaintiffs• Legal Counsel 
via email delivery 
and physical delivery to 
Dustin Siddoway 
Dustin@teamanchorpoint.com 
Defendant, pro se 
via fax delivery 
and U.S. Mail to 
Tucker and Associates, LLC 
Court Reporters 
605 West Fort Street 
Boise, ID 83701 
Fax: (208) 345-3713 
via email delivery and 
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CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By KRISTI OUMON 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
TIIE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
WADS WORTH REESE, PLLC, an Idaho 
Professional Corporation; CLARK A. REESE 
CPA P .C., an Idaho Professional Corporation; 
and WADSWORTH ACCOUNTING CPA, an 
Idaho Professional Corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
SIDDOWAY & COMP ANY, PC, an Idaho 
professional corporation; RANDY 
SIDDOWAY, an individual; DUSTIN 
SIDDOWAY, an individual and JEANINE 
BARKAN, an individual, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-OC-2015-21225 
ORDER ON SIDDOWA Y'S 
SECOND MOTION TO 
RECONSIDER AND ON REESE'S 
MOTION TO STAY 
ARBITRATION 
Plaintiff Clark A. Reese CPA, P .C. ("Reese PC") and Counter defendant Clark A. Reese 
("Clark Reese") (collectively, "Reese") move to stay an arbitration proceeding commenced 
against them by Defendants Siddoway & Company, PC ("Siddoway PC") and Randy Siddoway 
(collectively, "Siddoway"). That motion is set for an evidentiary hearing on August 11, 2016, 
under I.C. § 7-902(b), part of the Unifonn Arbitration Act as adopted in Idaho ("UAA"). The 
purpose of that hearing is detennining whether the agreement that contains the arbitration clause 
at issue-called ''the Reese Agreement" in this order-is valid or invalid. Until recently, the 
parties had presumed that the UAA applies here and that, under the UAA, the Reese 
Agreement's validity is a question for the Court, not an arbitrator. On those presumptions, if the 
Court concludes that the Reese Agreement is valid, its arbitration clause also is valid, meaning 
ORDER ON SIDDOWAY'S SECOND MOTION TO RECONSIDER • · 
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the arbitration proceeding can go forward, but if it is invalid, so too would be its arbitration 
clause, meaning the arbitration proceeding must be stayed. 
On July 21, 2016, however, Siddoway departed from those presumptions in a motion to 
reconsider the need for the evidentiary hearing. Siddoway argued that the evidentiary hearing is 
inappropriate because the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, applies here 
instead of the UAA, and under the FAA the agreement's validity is a question for an arbitrator, 
not the Court. See Buckeye Check Cashing. Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 449 (2006). That 
was the first occasion, during several months of litigating arbitrability issues in this case, that any 
party has contended the FAA applies instead of the UAA. 
The next day~ the Court issued an order denying Siddoway's motion to reconsider. The 
motion _was denied because Siddoway failed to show that the Reese Agreement involves 
interstate commerce-a necessary condition to FAA applicability. E.g., Allied-Bruce Terminix 
Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995). The Court noted, however, that if Siddoway came forward 
with evidence satisfying the "interstate commerce" requirement, the motion could be renewed. 
Siddoway filed a second motion to reconsider on July 25, 2016. This time, Siddoway 
presents evidence and argument sufficient to show that the Reese Agreement affects interstate 
commerce. In fact, Reese does not argue otherwise in Reese's expedited response to the motion, 
which was timely filed on August 1, 2016. 1 The "interstate commerce" requirement having been 
satisfied, further inquiry is necessary into the FAA's applicability here. 
1 The filing deadline was set in a procedural order entered on July 26, 2016. The same order 
provided that any reply memorandum by Siddoway was due by noon on August 3, 2016. 
Siddoway filed a reply memorandum on August 3 but missed the noon deadline by several hours. 
Siddoway's late reply memorandum will not be considered . 
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Siddoway argues that the FM, instead of the UAA, applies to the Reese Agreement 
because it lacks a choice-of-law clause in favor ofldaho law. That argument tracks the holding 
in Moore v. Omnicare, Inc., 141 Idaho 809, 118 P.3d 141 (2005), that the FAA, instead of the 
UAA, applies to arbitration agreements that involve interstate commerce unless the parties 
"expressly agreed that Idaho law will govern arbitration." Id at 815, 118 P.3d at 147. The 
agreement at issue in Moore included a conventional choice-of-law clause in favor ofldaho law, . 
as well ·as a clause calling for arbitration of disputes arising under that agreement. Id That was 
enough to trigger the UAA's application. Id.; see also Clearwater REI, LLC v. Boling, 155 
Idaho 954,958,318 P.3d 944, 948 (2014). Siddoway points out that the same cannot be said 
here-the Reese Agreement itselflacks a choice-of-law clause. Thus, in Siddoway's view, the 
conclusion that the FAA applies here is in keeping with Moore. 
Reese acknowledges that the Reese Agreement itselflacks a choice-of-law clause, but 
Reese points to a choice-of-law clause in favor ofldaho law in the Promissory Note attached to 
the Reese Agreement as Exhibit A. The Promissory Note's choice-of-law clause reads as 
follows: "This note shall take effect as a sealed instrument and shall be construed, governed and 
enforced in accordance with the laws of the State of Idaho." (Reese Agreement Ex. A.) Unlike 
the Reese Agreement itself, the Promissory Note lacks an arbitration clause. 
Some discussion of the Promissory Note's role in the transaction contemplated by the 
Reese Agreement, and of that transaction itself, is in order. The Reese Agreement provides for 
Reese PC to purchase from Siddoway PC-those two entities being the only parties to the Reese 
Agreement itselt=-the right to a one-third interest in Plaintiff Wadsworth Reese, PLLC (which 
went by another name at the time). (Reese Agreement§ 1.) The purchase price was $200,000 
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(Reese Agreement § 2), and it was to ''be paid as specified in the Promissory Note" attached to 
the Reese Agreement as Exhibit A. (Reese Agreement § 3.) The Promissory Note was to be 
executed at the same time as the Reese Agreement, at which point the sale would be closed. 
(Reese Agreement§ 4.) The execution of these documents and, thus, the closing occurred on 
January 28, 2015. (Reese Agreement at 5; Reese Agreement Ex. A at 2.) Also executed that day 
were two nearly identical guaranties, one appended to the Reese Agreement and one appended to 
the Promissory Note, in which Clark Reese personally guaranteed the payment obligations owed 
by Reese PC under the Promissory Note. (Reese Agreement at 5; Reese Agreement Ex. A at 2.) 
The guaranties do not include either an arbitration clause or a choice-of-law clause. (Id.) 
Reese says the Promissory Note's choice-of-law clause makes this case indistinguishable 
from Moore. To determine whether that is so, the Court finds it necessary to inventory the 
claims Siddoway asserts in the arbitration proceeding, talcing note of the nature of the claims and 
their respective targets. In the arbitration proceeding, Siddoway asserts two claims (leaving 
aside a third "claim" merely seeking an award of the attorney fees incurred in that proceeding): 
(1) a claim that Reese PC breached both the Reese Agreement itself and the Promissory Note by 
not making payments as they require; and (2) a claim that Clark Reese breached the guaranties 
by not making those payments himself after the Reese PC's payment default. (Fisher Aff. filed 
June 27, 2016, Ex. A 1163-68.) 
The Court first considers the FAA 's applicability to the latter claim. Again, the 
guaranties signed by Clark Reese do not contain an arbitration clause. Moreover, they do not 
somehow incorporate the Reese Agreement's arbitration clause. Clark Reese is not a party to the 
Reese Agreement itself; he is a party to only the guaranties. Arbitration is, of course, a matter of 
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agreement. No evidence has been presented that Clark Reese entered into any agreement to 
arbitrate. And no argument has been presented as to why Clark Reese should be deemed to have 
submitted to arbitration, despite not being a party to the Reese Agreement, which includes the 
arbitration clause at issue here. Thus, Siddoway presents no basis on which the claim against 
Clark Reese for breach of the guaranties can be determined to be arbitrable under either the FAA 
or the UAA. Clark Reese not having agreed to arbitrate, a stay of the arbitra?on proceeding is in 
; 
order as to the claim against him, without need for an evidentiary hearing to reach that 
' 
conclus!on. Consequently, Siddoway's second motion to reconsider is granted as to that claim; 
,, 
the evidentiary hearing is cancelled as to it. But Reese's motion to stay also is granted; the 
arbitration proceeding is stayed as to -that claim. 
That leaves for consideration Siddoway's claim against Reese PC for breach (i) of the 
Promissory Note ("Breach-of-Note Theory"}, and (ii) of the Reese Agreement ("Breach-of-
Agreement Theory"), section 3 of which requires that the purchase price "be paid as specified in 
: 
the Promissory Note." Siddoway contends, in other words, that Reese PC's alleged failure to 
make the payments required by the Promissory Note breaches not only the Promissory Note 
itself but also the Reese Agreement's section 3. Section 3's plain language supports that 
contention. Thus, Siddoway tenably pursues both theories, as opposed to pursuing only a theory 
that the Promissory Note itself was breached. 
To evaluate whether an evidentiary hearing is needed to determine if Siddoway's claim 
against Reese PC, with its two analytically distinct (yet highly similar) theories, is arbitrable, the 
Court returns to the subject of whether the FAA or the UAA applies. If the Reese Agreement 
itself included a choice-of-law clause in favor ofldaho law, the UAA would apply, under Moore, 
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to Siddoway's Breach-of-Agreement Theory. But it contains no such clause. And the 
Promissory Note's choice-of-law clause is limited by its own tenns to the Promissory Note, 
rendering incorrect Reese's view that that clause washes over the Reese Agreement itself. Thus, 
under Moore, because of the absence of a contractual choice of Idaho law, the FAA applies to 
Siddoway's Breach-of-Agreement Theory. The same logic yields the opposite conclusion, 
though, as to Siddoway's Breach-of-Note Theory. Because the Promissory Note contains a 
choice-of-law clause in favor ofldaho law, and because the Reese Agreement's arbitration · 
clause applies to the Breach-of-Note Theory,2 under Moore the UAA seemingly applies to the 
Breach-of-Note Theory. The split outcome suggests this mode of analysis is flawed, and indeed 
it is, as the Court will next explain. 
As Moore recognizes, ''the FAA applies in all cases involving arbitration in which the 
underlying transaction affects interstate commerce," 141 Idaho at 815, 118 P .3d at 14 7 ( emphasis 
added), which this transaction does. The UAA can displace the FAA in such cases, but 
displacement occurs only "wliere parties have expressly agreed that Idaho law will govern 
arbitration." Id The contracting parties may agree to displace the FAA because,just as they 
have freedom to agree to arbitration, in doing so they have freedom to specify the rules under 
which arbitration will be conducted. Id. (citing Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 
514 U.S. 52, 57-58 (1995)). To think that the contracting parties here intended the FAA to apply 
" to claims for breach of the Reese Agreement, but the UAA to apply to claims for breach of the 
Promissory Note, strains credulity. There is no true sign of that intent in either the Reese 
2 The arbitration clause applies to "any controversy or claims arising out of or relating to" the 
Reese Agreement. (Reese Agreement§ 13.) Because the Reese Agreement provides for the 
execution and performance of the Promissory Note (Reese Agreement §§ 3-4), Siddoway's claim 
for bre~ch of the Promissory Note "aris[ es] out of or relat[ es] to" the Reese Agreement. 
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Agreement or the Promissory Note; there is only the Promissory Note's choice-of-law clause, 
which makes no reference to the prospect of arbitration or the rules under which arbitration 
would be conducted. To read the Promissory Note's choice-of-law clause-which, again, has no 
analog in the Reese Agreement itselt=-as displacing the FAA would surely be to give it an 
unintended consequence. Having agreed to arbitrate disputes arising out of or relating to the 
Reese Agreement (Reese Agreement § 13), but having given no true sign of desiring to arbitrate 
under differing arbitration statutes depending on whether the claim to be arbitrated is made under 
the Reese Agreement itself or under the Promissory Note for which the Reese Agreement 
provides, the parties surely intended-to the extent they gave the matter any thought at all-the 
same legal structure to apply to any arbitration proceeding commenced under the Reese 
Agreement's arbitration clause. After all, the Reese Agreement is the main agreement between 
the parties. The Promissory Note is a mere creature of the Reese Agreement, needed to carry out 
I 
the transaction the Reese Agreement contemplated. The Court considers the Promissory Note's 
choice-of-law clause insufficient to show any intent on the part of the contracting parties to 
· displace the FAA. Consequently, the FAA applies here, and it applies to both the Breach-of-
Agreement Theory and the Breach-of-Note Theory. 
The next question is whether, under the FAA, the Reese Agreement's validity is a 
question for the Court or an arbitrator. As Siddoway argues, under the FAA, "a challenge to the 
validity of the contract as a whole, and not specifically to the arbitration clause, must go to the 
arbitrator." Buckeye, 546 U.S. at 449. The Supreme Court adopted that rule, knowing full well 
it "permits a court to enforce an arbitration agreement in a contract that the arbitrator later finds 
to be void," preferring that anomaly to the converse one that "permits a court to deny effect to an 
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arbitration provision in a contract that the court later finds to be perfectly enforceable," as would 
be the case if the task of determining the validity of the contract as a whole went to the court. Id 
The Supreme Court noted, however, that the questions-of-validity-go-to-the-arbitrator rule does 
not necessarily cover questions as to whether a contract "was ever concluded." Id at 444 n.1. It 
then listed three questions in that vein: (i) whether the contract was signed; (ii) whether the 
signer had authority to commit the entity for which he signed; and (iii) whether the signer had 
the mental capacity to contract.3 Id A few years later, though, the Supreme Court decided that 
questions as to whether a contract was ever concluded-i. e., questions of contract formation-go 
to the court. Granite Rock Co. v. Int'l Bhd a/Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287, 296 (2010). 
Reese PC contends its challenges the Reese Agreement are formation rather than validity 
challenges, bringing them __ within the Granite Rock rule and excluding them from the Buckeye 
rule. Its three challenges are as follows: (i) that the Reese Agreement is void because of the 
non-occurrence of a condition subsequent; (ii) that it is too indefinite to be enforced; and (iii) that 
it fails for lack of consideration. The Court will address them in tum. 
A condition subsequent is "a condition that, if performed or violated ... defeats the 
contract, or one that, if not met by one party, abrogates the other party's obligation to perform." 
Lakeland True Value Hardware, LLC v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 153 Idaho 716, 725, 291 P.3d 
399, 408 (2012). A contract that is conditioned to become void upon an event's occurrence or 
non-occurrence is considered to be subject to a condition subsequent Id The alleged condition 
3 Reese PC (i) concedes the Reese Agreement, the Promissory Note, and the guaranties were 
signed, (ii) does not contend its signatory-Clark Reese-was unauthorized to sign contracts on 
its behalf, and (iii) does not contend he lacked the mental capacity to contract. Its challenges to 
the Reese Agreement's validity therefore are not of the sort the Buckeye court expressly 
exempted from its questions-of-validity-go-to-the-arbitrator rule. 
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subsequent at issue here is part of Modification #1 to the Reese Agreement, 4 which provides for 
the Reese Agreement to be void if at least two of Wadsworth Reese, PLLC's members did not 
agree to a new operating agreement by February 15, 2015. The Reese Agreement was signed on 
January 28, 2015-more than two weeks before that deadline. Even assuming that the condition 
failed to occur and that its non-occurrence was not excused, the Reese Agreement was in effect 
until the February 15 deadline. Thus, Reese PC's "condition subsequent" argument is not one of 
contract fonnation. Indeed, "' [a] condition subsequent presumes a valid contract and refers to a 
future event, which divests a preexisting contractual liability."' Id (quoting 17 A C.J.S. 
Contracts§ 451 (2012)). Reese PC's "condition subsequent" challenge goes to the arbitrator, 
not the Court. 
Moving on to Reese PC's challenge to the Reese Agreement's definiteness, the Court 
notes that, to be enforceable, a contract must be "complete. definite, and certain in all its tenns, 
or contain provisions which are capable in themselves of being reduced to certainty." Gen. Auto 
Parts Co. v. Genuine Parts Co., 132 Idaho 849,857,979 P.2d 1207, 1215 (1999). Only 
' ··reasonable certainty•· is required in order for a contract to be given effect, meaning ~at the 
parties' obligations must be sufficiently identified so that "adequacy ofperfom1ance can be 
asce1iained/' Id However, a contract is unenforceable, as a mere "agreement to agree," if the 
parties leave a material tenn open to further negotiations. In re Univ. Place/Idaho Water Ctr. 
Project, 146 Idaho 527,533, 199 P.3d 102, 108 (2008). An agreement to agree is unenforceable 
because the ·'tenns are so indefinite that it fails to show a mutual intent to create an enforceable 
4 Siddoway contends Modification #1 does not actually modify the Reese Agreement but instead 
modifies Wadsworth Reece, PLLC's operating agreement. That contention is specious. 
Modification #1 's plain language makes perfectly clear that it modifies the Reese Agreement. 
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obligation ... Id. Whether Reese PC's definiteness challenge is a formation challenge subject to 
the Granite Rock rule, or instead a validity challenge subject to the Buckeye rule, is difficult to 
say. It is unlike any of the formation challenges the Buckeye court insulated from the Buckeye 
rule. 546 U.S. at 444 n.1. And it is not a challenge to the arbitration clause itself, which is 
"severable" from the balance of the Reese Agreement even if the Reese Agreement is 
unenforceable. See id. at 445 ("[A]s a matter of substantive federal arbitration law, an arbitration 
provision is severable from the remainder of the contract."). But it does address whether the 
provisions to which the parties agreed are legally sufficient to amount to a contract, which has 
the ring of a formation challenge. Thus, it may be an issue for the Court, not an arbitrator. 
Assuming that to be the case, an evidentiary hearing or trial, such as th.at scheduled for 
August 11, is not necessarily needed for the Court to resolve Reese PC's challenge to the Reese 
Agreement's definiteness. Proceedings of that sort are unnecessary if the challenge can be 
resolved as a matter oflaw in accordance with the summary-judgment standard. See, e.g., 
Guidotti v. Legal Helpers Debt Resolution, L.L.C., 716 F.3d 764, 776 (3d Cir. 2013). That is the 
case here, as the Reese Agreement's definiteness is assessed largely based on its text. 
While not a model of clarity in some respects, the Reese Agreement is basically 
understandable; and its terms are not so devoid of completeness or certainty as to fail for 
indefiniteness. The alleged indefiniteness centers on the assets Siddoway PC would contribute to 
Wadsworth Reese, PLLC, so as to align that entity's value with the $200,000 purchase price 
Reese PC agreed to pay under the Reese Agreement for the right to a one-third membership 
interest in it. But the Reese Agreement does not purport to require Siddoway PC to contribute 
assets to Wadsworth Reese; PPLC (though it does contemplate that such a contribution would 
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' 
occur). Instead, as Reece PC acknowledges, that subject was to be addressed in an anticipated 
' 
new operating agreement for Wadsworth Reese, PLLC, toward which the parties were separately 
negotiating. (Reese Aff. filed Mar. 2, 2016, ,r 13.) 
The Reese Agreement does not fail for indefiniteness simply because it deferred that 
subject matter to a separate agreement (the anticipated new operating agreement), especially 
because, through its Modification #1, the Reese Agreement provides for its own demise if the 
anticipated new operating agreement failed to materialize. In other words, the parties accounted 
in the Reese Agreement for the prospect that they would fail to reach agreement on other matters 
not covered by the Reese Agreement, and the way they accounted for that prospect was agreeing 
to the "condition subsequent" discussed above. An agreement cannot be said to be indefinite if it 
contemplates future negotiations addressed to an unresolved subject but provides a clear and 
definite consequence if negotiations are unsuccessful. Such an agreement, instead, has the 
"reasonable certainty" necessary to assess whether the parties have adequately performed their 
contractual obligations. Gen. Auto Parts, 132 Idaho at 857,979 P.2d at 1215. The Reese 
Agreement covers the ground it covers-that Reese PC would pay Siddoway PC $200,000 for 
the right to a one-third membership interest in Wadsworth Reese, PLLC-in sufficiently definite 
fashion to constitute a formed contract. That is so even though the parties knowingly left for 
other negotiations a subject-the assets Siddoway PC would contribute to Wadsworth Reese, 
PLLC-that is closely related to the transaction contemplated by the Reese Agreement. 
Finally, the Court turns to Reese PC's argument that the Reese Agreement fails for lack 
of consideration. To be enforceable, a contract must include an element of consideration, which 
is a bargained-for exchange between the contracting parties. Boise Towers Assocs., UC v. 
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Hogland, 147 Idaho 774, 780, 215 P.3d 494, 500 (2009). A contract is invalid from the 
beginning if it lacks consideration: meaning that no consideration ever existed to support the 
contract. World Wide Lease, Inc. v. Woodworth, 111 Idaho 880, 884-85, 728 P.2d 769, 773-74 
(Ct. App. 1986). But a failure of conside~ation, as distinguished from a lack of consideration, 
refers to a failure to perform under the contract. Id Reese PC's "consideration" challenge 
asserts a failure of consideration, not a lack of consideration.5 (Reese PC's Mem. Supp. Mot. 
Stay Arbitration 8.) Because it has to do with performance, not with formation, it is not a 
challenge to the Reese Agreement's formation. Accordingly, under the Buckeye rule, it goes to 
the arbitrator, not the Court. 
Consequently, the Court agrees with Siddoway that an evidentiary hearing is not needed 
to determine the arbitrability of Siddoway's claim against Reese PC for breach of the Reese 
Agreement the Promissory Note. Under the FAA, Reese PC's challenges to the Reese 
Agreement either go to the arbitrator or fail as a matter of law. 
5 To any extent Reese PC asserts a lack of consideration, that challenge might be a formation 
challenge that goes to the Court instead of a validity challenge that goes to an arbitrator, but the 
Court would resolve it against Reese PC as a matter of law under the summary-judgment 
standard. The Reese Agreement does not lack consideration. In the Reese Agreement, Reese PC 
agreed to pay Siddoway PC $200,000 in return for the right to a one-third membership interest in 
Wadsworth Reese, PLLC. The uncertainty about just what that interest was worth, if anything, 
does not mean it does not amount to lawful consideration given in return for the purchase price. 
See Weisel v. Beaver Springs Owners Ass'n. Inc., 152 Idaho 519,526,272 P.3d 491,498 (2012) 
("Consideration must have some value in the eyes of the law; but in the absence of fraud or 
overreaching, the promisor, if competent, can fix on ~ything not in itself unlawful as a 
consideration and put his own value on it, and whether it is equivalent to the benefit bargained 
for is a matter left to the determination of the parties.") (quotation marks omitted). 
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IT IS ORDERED that Siddoway's second motion to reconsider is granted. The 
I 
evidentiary hearing scheduled for August 11, 2016, on Reese's motion to stay arbitration is 
cancell~d (though other motions remain scheduled for hearing on that date). j 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Reese's motion to stay arbitration is anted in part 
I . 
and denied in part. The motion is granted as to Siddoway's claim in the arbitration proceeding 
against Clark Reese. The arbitration proceeding is stayed as to that claim. The I otion is denied 
as to Siddoway's claim in the arbitration proceeding against Reese PC. 
. ~ 
Dated this~ day of August, 2016. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA  
WADSWORTH REESE, PLLC, an Idaho 
Professional Corporation; CLARK A. REESE 
CPA, P.C., an Idaho Professional Corporation; 
and WADSWORTH ACCOUNTING CPA, an 
Idaho Professional Corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SIDDOWAY & COMPANY, PC, an Idaho 
professional corporation; RANDY 
SIDDOWAY, an individual; DUSTIN 
SIDDOWAY, an individual; and JEANINE 
BARKAN, an individual, 
Defendants. 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON SIDDOWAY’S MOTION 
FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION - 2 
This case arises from the breakup of Plaintiff Wadsworth Reese, PLLC, an accounting 
firm.  Defendants Randy Siddoway and his company Siddoway & Co., PC (“Siddoway PC”) 
(collectively “Siddoway”) claim a membership interest in Wadsworth Reese and fear that interest 
is losing value because of some of the ways Wadsworth Reese is being run by the other members 
(the other two plaintiffs in this action).  Because of that fear, Siddoway seeks a preliminary 
injunction ordering the following four forms of relief:  (1) that Plaintiffs be prohibited from 
using Wadsworth Reese’s funds to pay the legal expenses of Plaintiff Clark A. Reese CPA, P.C. 
(“Reese PC”) and Counterdefendant Clark A. Reese (collectively “Reese”); (2) that Reese (or 
Reese’s counsel) be ordered to repay Wadsworth Reese for all funds expended on Reese’s legal 
expenses; (3) that Wadsworth Reese be ordered to timely pay all of its legitimate operating 
expenses; and (4) that Plaintiffs be ordered not to divert Wadsworth Reese’s assets to other 
entities, including non-party Wadsworth Reese Real Estate, LLC.  They arranged for that motion 
to be argued on November 22, 2016. 
Plaintiffs contend the requested injunctive relief isn’t appropriate on the merits.  They 
also moved to vacate the November 22 hearing on jurisdictional grounds, arguing that the Court 
lacked jurisdiction to decide Siddoway’s motion for a preliminary injunction while a prior order 
entered in this action (one resolving Siddoway’s motion to compel arbitration) was on appeal to 
the Idaho Supreme Court. 
In open court on November 22, the Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion to vacate the 
preliminary-injunction hearing.  (Ct. Mins. Nov. 23, 2016.)  At that point, Siddoway agreed to 
withdraw the appeal so that the preliminary-injunction hearing could proceed as scheduled.  (Id.)  
The Court then allowed the hearing to proceed but told the parties it would not rule until after the 
appeal was dismissed, eliminating the jurisdictional concern.  The appeal was dismissed by 
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stipulation a few weeks later (on December 14, 2016), at which point Siddoway’s motion for a 
preliminary injunction officially was taken under advisement. 
For the reasons that follow, that motion is now granted in part and denied in part.  It is 
granted only as to the first form of relief described above. 
I.  
BACKGROUND 
The accounting firm now called Wadsworth Reese was formed by accountants Clark 
Reese and Randy Siddoway in December 2013.  (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 13-14; Answer ¶¶ 13-14;1 
Fisher Aff. filed Mar. 2, 2016, ¶ 3 & Ex. A.)  It first was called CRS Services, PLLC.  (Am. 
Compl. ¶ 13; Answer ¶ 13.)  About a month later, its name was changed to Siddoway, 
Wadsworth & Reese, PLLC, reflecting the addition of a third accountant, Frederick Wadsworth, 
to the venture.  (Am. Compl. ¶ 21; Answer ¶ 21; Fisher Aff. filed Mar. 2, 2016, ¶ 4 & Ex. B.)  Its 
three members at that time were not the three accountants individually, but instead the 
professional corporations through which they had respectively been doing business as 
accountants.  Those professional corporations—Siddoway PC, Reese PC, and Wadsworth 
Accounting CPA (“Wadsworth PC”)—entered into an operating agreement for Wadsworth 
Reese dated January 6, 2014.  (Am. Compl. ¶ 20(a), (b); Answer ¶ 20(a), (b).)  The January 2014 
operating agreement was intended to be temporary because the three accountants had not yet 
reached a final agreement as to all of the terms on which they were joining forces, such as the 
values to assign to their respective client bases.  (Reese Aff. filed Mar. 2, 2016, ¶ 5.)  But no 
final agreement was ever reached.  (Reese Aff. filed Mar. 2, 2016, ¶¶ 7, 11-21.)  The firm finally 
took on the Wadsworth Reese name in November 2015, nearly two years after the “temporary” 
                                                          
1 Citations to the “Answer” mean Siddoway’s answer to Plaintiffs’ amended complaint.  
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operating agreement was signed.  (Fisher Aff. filed Mar. 2, 2016, ¶ 5 & Ex. C.)  It did so in the 
wake of Randy Siddoway’s August 2015 decision to cut ties and begin a new venture.  (Reese 
Aff. filed Mar. 2, 2016, ¶ 23.) 
This action arises from the parties’ inability to reach an agreement as to the terms of 
Randy Siddoway’s departure from Wadsworth Reese, as well as their disagreement as to whether 
he and Siddoway PC violated duties to Wadsworth Reese in the wake of that departure, most 
notably by allegedly funneling Wadsworth Reese’s client list and related historical billing 
information to a newly formed competitor, AnchorPoint Accounting PLLC.  AnchorPoint is an 
accounting firm in which Defendants Dustin Siddoway and Jeanine Barkan, who theretofore had 
been Wadsworth Reese employees, are involved. 
Plaintiffs filed suit on December 14, 2015.  After some preliminary litigation, Plaintiffs 
filed an amended complaint on May 24, 2016.  The amended complaint is their operative 
pleading.  Its six remaining counts are as follows:  (1) Count III, a request for Siddoway PC’s 
expulsion as a Wadsworth Reese member; (2) Count IV, a claim against Siddoway for breach of 
fiduciary duty; (3) Count VI, a claim for misappropriating trade secrets—specifically, 
Wadsworth Reese’s client list and related historical billing information—in violation of the 
Idaho Trade Secrets Act, I.C. §§ 48-801 to -807; (4) Count VII, a claim against all defendants for 
interference with prospective business advantage; (5) Count IX, a claim against all defendants 
for breach of confidence; and (6) Count XIII, a request for a declaratory judgment that an 
agreement the Court calls “the Reese Agreement” is void.  (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 88-143.)2  That said, 
Plaintiffs have moved for leave to file a second amended complaint, in which they would, among 
                                                          
2 The amended complaint intentionally contained no Counts I, II, XI, or XII, and summary 
judgment has been entered against its Counts V, VIII and X. 
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other things, drop Counts IX and XIII and—important here—add a claim by Reese PC against 
Siddoway PC for unjust enrichment.  That motion is pending.   
On June 20, 2016, Siddoway filed an answer to Plaintiffs’ amended complaint and a 
counterclaim against Reese PC, Wadsworth PC, Clark Reese, and Frederick Wadsworth.3  The 
counterclaim’s eight counts are as follows:  (1) a claim for breach of Wadsworth Reese’s 
operating agreement; (2) a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing owed in connection with the operating agreement; (3) a claim that Wadsworth Reese’s 
distributions have been unequal, in violation of I.C. § 30-6-404; (4) a claim for conversion; (5) a 
claim for an accounting of Wadsworth Reese’s activities; (6) a claim for Wadsworth Reese’s 
judicial dissolution; (7) a claim against Reese for breach of the Reese Agreement; and (8) a 
request for legal fees. 
Siddoway filed the instant motion for a preliminary injunction on October 19, 2016.  For 
reasons already explained, it was argued on November 22, 2016, but not taken under advisement 





Whether to grant a preliminary injunction is a discretionary decision.  Brady v. City of 
Homedale, 130 Idaho 569, 572, 944 P.2d 704, 707 (1997); Harris v. Cassia County, 106 Idaho 
513, 517, 681 P.2d 988, 992 (1984).  The party seeking the preliminary injunction bears the 
burden of proving one is proper under I.R.C.P. 65(e).  Harris, 106 Idaho at 518, 681 P.2d at 993.  
                                                          
3 Unconventionally, Clark Reese and Frederick Wadsworth were named as counterdefendants 
despite not being among the named plaintiffs. 
000259
 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON SIDDOWAY’S MOTION 
FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION - 6 
When the injunctive relief sought is “mandatory”4 in nature—as are the second and third 
categories of injunctive relief Siddoway seeks here—it should be granted only “in extreme cases 
where the right is very clear and it appears that irreparable injury will flow from its refusal.”  Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
Under I.R.C.P. 65(e), a preliminary injunction may be granted for any of several reasons, 
three of which apply here according to Siddoway.  (Def.’s Mot. Prelim. Inj. 5.)  First, a 
preliminary injunction may be granted “[w]hen it appears by the complaint or affidavit that the 
commission or continuance of some act during the litigation would produce waste, or great or 
irreparable injury to the plaintiff.”  I.R.C.P. 65(e)(2).  Second, a preliminary injunction may be 
granted when it appears that a party is doing some act that violates the other party’s rights which 
“may make the requested judgment ineffectual.”  I.R.C.P. 65(e)(3).  Third, a preliminary 
injunction may be granted when it appears, by affidavit, that a party is about to dispose of its 
property “with the intent to defraud” the other party.  I.R.C.P. 65(e)(4). 




The Court begins with the third form of preliminary injunctive relief sought by 
Siddoway:  a mandatory injunction requiring Wadsworth Reese to pay its bills.  Siddoway has 
not shown how any failure of Wadsworth Reese to pay its bills impacts Siddoway or violates 
Siddoway’s rights, so as to even potentially give rise to the right to a preliminary injunction 
                                                          
4
 “Mandatory” injunctive relief is that which orders a party to do something, as contrasted with 
“prohibitory” injunctive relief, which orders a party not to do something.  See, e.g., 11A Charles 
A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2948.2 (3d ed.), Westlaw (database updated 
Apr. 2016) (“[T]he fact that defendant would be ordered to act in a particular way, rather than be 
enjoined from engaging in certain conduct may make a mandatory injunction more burdensome 
than a prohibitory one in some cases.  Thus, several courts have stated that the power to issue a 
mandatory preliminary injunction should be exercised sparingly.”). 
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under I.R.C.P. 65(e), nor has Siddoway shown that the Court either has authority to or should 
interject itself in the management of Wadsworth Reese to such a degree that the Court directs 
payment of operating expenses.  Thus, Siddoway has not shown that it has a “very clear” right to 
that form of relief. 
Turning to the fourth form of preliminary injunctive relief sought by Siddoway—an order 
prohibiting diversion of Wadsworth Reese’s assets to other entities, such as Wadsworth Reese 
Real Estate, LLC—the Court notes Siddoway’s concern that Wadsworth Reese’s other members 
will cause its assets to be conveyed to another entity (in which Siddoway has no interest), in 
return for little or nothing.  But Siddoway’s showing in that regard is just a suspicion.  Siddoway 
has not presented facts showing the suspicion to be well founded.  Thus, Siddoway has not 
identified a sound basis for awarding that form of relief. 
The second form of preliminary injunctive relief sought by Siddoway—a mandatory 
injunction requiring Reese (or Reese’s counsel) to repay Wadsworth Reese for legal expenses it 
paid on Reese’s behalf—is tantamount to a damages award on an unpleaded “derivative” claim.5  
If Siddoway wishes to contend that Wadsworth Reese is entitled to reimbursement for those 
                                                          
5
 Broadly speaking, actions by a member of a limited liability company against the company, its 
managers, or its other members come in two kinds:  (1) “direct” actions; or (2) “derivative” 
actions.  As to “direct” actions, the Idaho Uniform Limited Liability Company Act provides that 
“a member may maintain a direct action against another member, a manager, or the limited 
liability company to enforce the member’s rights and protect the member’s interests,” but the 
member “must plead and prove an actual or threatened injury that is not solely the result of an 
injury suffered or threatened to be suffered by the limited liability company.”  I.C. § 30-25-801.  
As to “derivative” actions, the Act provides that “[a] member may maintain a derivative action to 
enforce a right of a limited liability company,” but typically must “first make[ ] a demand on the 
other members in a member-managed limited liability company, or the managers of a manager-
managed limited liability company, requesting that they cause the company to bring an action to 
enforce the right” and then wait a reasonable time for the managers or other members to bring 
the action.  I.C. § 30-25-802(1).  Siddoway’s unpleaded reimbursement claim fits into the 
“derivative” category because it involves an assertion of Wadsworth Reese’s rights.  It doesn’t fit 
into the “direct” category because Siddoway is trying to protect its own interests by remedying 
alleged injuries to Wadsworth Reese. 
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expenses, Siddoway should seek permission to plead a derivative claim to that effect.  If 
Siddoway succeeds on that derivative claim, a damages award to Wadsworth Reese would 
follow.  The potential for that damages award is an adequate remedy.  Siddoway lacks a “very 
clear” right to a preliminary injunction that essentially orders payment of those damages before 
any claim for them has been pleaded or proved.  See, e.g., Charles A. Wright et al., Federal 
Practice and Procedure § 2948.1 (3d ed.), Westlaw (database updated Apr. 2016) (“[A] 
preliminary injunction usually will be denied if it appears that the applicant has an adequate 
alternate remedy in the form of money damages or other relief.”) (footnotes omitted).  Thus, 
Siddoway is not entitled to the second form of requested relief. 
That leaves the first form of preliminary injunctive relief sought by Siddoway:  an order 
prohibiting Wadsworth Reese from continuing to pay Reese’s separate legal expenses.  None of 
the claims pending at the moment appears to present much reason for concern that Reese will 
continue incurring separate and distinct legal expenses, as Reese has done in the course of 
litigating and arbitrating claims related to the Reese Agreement, which recently was declared 
void by an arbitrator.  (Fisher Aff. filed Dec. 19, 2016, Ex. A.)  The surviving claims asserted in 
Plaintiffs’ amended complaint are asserted by Plaintiffs as a group, not just by Reese, and 
Siddoway’s counterclaims are asserted against Plaintiffs as a group, except the seventh 
counterclaim, for breach of the Reese Agreement, which is asserted against only Reese.  
(Counterclaim filed June 20, 2016, ¶¶ 78-83.)  That counterclaim is essentially resolved, given 
the arbitration outcome.  Thus, if the claims to be litigated were to remain unchanged, 
Wadsworth Reese seemingly will not have occasion to continue paying legal expenses incurred 
by Reese, beyond the very same legal expenses that Wadsworth Reese will incur anyway to 
pursue the claims Plaintiffs brought and to defend against the counterclaims Plaintiffs face. 
000262
 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON SIDDOWAY’S MOTION 
FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION - 9 
But the claims to be litigated may well change.  In fact, Plaintiffs have moved for leave to 
file a second amended complaint, in which Reese PC would assert a claim for unjust enrichment 
against Siddoway PC.  Thus, there is real potential for Reese PC to continue incurring separate 
and distinct legal expenses, for which Wadsworth Reese would foot the bill if form holds. 
Plaintiffs did not identify a sound justification—a legitimate business reason—for 
Wadsworth Reese to cover Reese’s legal expenses in connection with litigation and arbitration of 
claims involving the Reese Agreement.  Perhaps there is one.  Indeed, in some circumstances, 
limited liability companies may advance legal expenses to their members and may indemnify 
them against liabilities related to their status as members.  I.C. § 30-25-408(b)-(c).  But, again, if 
there is such a reason, Plaintiffs have not identified it, and the Court will not attempt to posit any 
such reason on its own.  Siddoway has shown that Wadsworth Reese has been paying to litigate 
and arbitrate claims and issues to which it isn’t a party, benefiting Reese but harming Siddoway, 
to whatever extent Siddoway retains an interest in Wadsworth Reese.  Because Plaintiffs have 
not identified a legitimate business reason for doing so, Siddoway’s showing is enough to 
warrant preliminary injunctive relief under I.R.C.P. 65(e)(2) and (3). 
Consequently, unless and until Plaintiffs demonstrate that Wadsworth Reese has a 
legitimate business reason for covering Reese’s legal expenses with respect to claims and issues 
relating to the Reese Agreement (including, without limitation, Reese PC’s proposed claim for 
unjust enrichment), Wadsworth Reese is enjoined from doing so and Reese PC and Wadsworth 
PC are enjoined from causing Wadsworth Reese to do so. 
Finally, because of the nature of this preliminary injunctive relief, the Court exercises its 
discretion under I.R.C.P. 65(c) not to require Siddoway to post security.  This preliminary 
injunction therefore is effective upon entry. 
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Accordingly, 
 IT IS ORDERED that Siddoway’s motion for a preliminary injunction is granted in part 
and denied in part.  The motion is granted in the following respect:  Wadsworth Reese is 
enjoined from using its own funds to pay Reese’s legal expenses in connection with further 
litigation of claims or issues arising from the Reese Agreement (including Reese PC’s proposed 
claim for unjust enrichment against Siddoway PC).  Further, Reese PC and Wadsworth PC are 
enjoined from causing Wadsworth Reese to pay Reese’s legal expenses in violation of this order.  






   _____________________________ 
   Jason D. Scott 
      DISTRICT JUDGE 
  
Signed: 12/30/2016 02:02 PM
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Signed: 12/30/2016 03:01 PM
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WADSWORTH REESE, PLLC, an Idaho 
Professional Corporation; CLARK A. REESE 
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SIDDOWAY, an individual; and JEANINE 
BARKAN, an individual, 
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SIDDOWAY & COMPANY, PC, an Idaho 
professional corporation; RANDY 
SIDDOWAY, an individual, 
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vs. 
FREDERICK WADSWORTH, an individual; 
WADSWORTH ACCOUNTING CPA, an 
Idaho Professional Corporation; CLARK A. 
REESE, an individual; and CLARK A. 
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FILED By: _p~::::=---~---- Deputy C erk 
Fourth Jud icial rnst rict, A.da County 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
 
ORDER CONFIRMING ARBITRATION AWARD - 2 
This multi-faceted case arises from the breakup of Plaintiff Wadsworth Reese, PLLC, an 
accounting firm.  One of its facets is a counterclaim asserted by Defendants Randy Siddoway 
and Siddoway & Co., PC (collectively “Siddoway”) against Plaintiff Clark A. Reese CPA, P.C. 
(“Reese PC”) for breach of an agreement the Court calls “the Reese Agreement” and against 
Counterdefendant Clark A. Reese (individually, “Clark Reese,” and together with Reese PC, 
“Reese”) for breach of a guaranty appended to the Reese Agreement.  Siddoway also asserted 
those same claims in an arbitration proceeding.  Reese moved to stay the arbitration proceeding.  
The Court denied the motion as to Reese PC but granted it as to Clark Reese.  The arbitration 
proceeding went forward as to Siddoway’s claim against Reese PC for breach of the Reese 
Agreement.  The arbitrator ruled that the Reese Agreement is void for failure of a condition 
subsequent, preventing Siddoway from recovering from Reese PC on the claim for breach of the 
Reese Agreement. 
Reese and Siddoway filed cross-motions for confirmation of the arbitration award, but 
they had markedly different expectations for the confirmation process.  Reese saw the 
appropriate process as a straightforward one in which, after briefing and perhaps a motion 
hearing, the Court simply gave effect to the arbitration award by confirming the arbitrator’s 
ruling that the Reese Agreement is void and, on that basis, ordering dismissal of Siddoway’s 
counterclaim against Reese PC for breach of the Reese Agreement and against Clark Reese for 
breach of the guaranty appended to it.  Siddoway saw the appropriate process as a broader one, 
in which the Court both confirmed the arbitrator’s ruling that the Reese Agreement is void and 
holds an evidentiary hearing to determine the collateral consequences of that ruling. 
In a procedural order entered on January 3, 2017, the Court resolved that dispute in favor 
of Reese’s view.  The Court also repurposed an already-set status conference to discuss whether 
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the Court should simply enter Reese’s proposed order (or something like it) in resolution of the 
cross-motions to confirm the arbitration award.  Siddoway’s counsel thereafter informed the 
Clerk of Court, on behalf of both Siddoway and Reese that they didn’t consider the status 
conference necessary, as they agreed that, in light of the procedural order, a confirmation order 
akin to Reese’s proposed order could be entered.  The status conference therefore was vacated. 
The Court chooses, however, to enter this order instead of Reese’s proposed order.  The 
Court does so mainly to make explicit a concession the Court perceives to be implicit in 
Siddoway’s agreement to the form of Reese’s proposed order:  the arbitrator’s ruling that the 
Reese Agreement is void, though it occurred in arbitrating Siddoway’s claim against Reese PC 
for breach of the Reese Agreement, precludes Siddoway from relitigating that same issue in the 
context of Siddoway’s claim in this action against Clark Reese for breach of the guaranty 
appended to the Reese Agreement.  See, e.g., W. Indus. & Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. Kaldveer Assocs., 
Inc., 126 Idaho 541, 544, 887 P.2d 1048, 1051 (1994); Theis Research, Inc. v. Brown & Bain, 
400 F.3d 659, 666 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Theis submitted to the arbitrator the issue whether B & B’s 
alleged conflicts of interest rendered the Theis–B & B legal services agreement void ab initio.  
The arbitrator rendered a decision on this issue adverse to Theis.  The district court thus did not 
err when it determined that Theis was barred from relitigating the same issue as part of its federal 
court malpractice claims.”).  Given the preclusive effect of the arbitrator’s ruling on that issue, 
not only should Siddoway’s counterclaim against Reese PC for breach of the Reese Agreement 
be dismissed, but so should Siddoway’s counterclaim against Clark Reese for breach of the 
guaranty appended to it.  This is contemplated by Reese’s proposed order, the form of which 




ORDER CONFIRMING ARBITRATION AWARD - 4 
Accordingly, 
 IT IS ORDERED that the arbitrator’s ruling that the Reese Agreement is void for failure 
of a condition subsequent, and that therefore Siddoway recovers nothing on Siddoway’s 
arbitration claim against Reese PC for breach of the Reese Agreement, is confirmed. 
 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Siddoway’s seventh counterclaim in this action, which 
is asserted against Reese PC for breach of the Reese Agreement and against Clark Reese for 
breach of the guaranty appended to the Reese Agreement, is dismissed with prejudice. 
 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any fee-shifting or cost-shifting consequences of these 






   _____________________________ 
   Jason D. Scott 




Signed: 1/10/2017 04:53 PM
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Counterclaimants Randy Siddoway (“Randy”) and Siddoway & Company, PC 
(“Siddoway Co.”) complains of counterclaim defendants Clark A. Reese (“Reese”), and Clark 
A Reese CPA, P.C. (“Reese PC”), Frederick Wadsworth (“Wadsworth”), Wadsworth 
Accounting CPA, PLLC (“Wadsworth PLLC” and collectively “Counterclaim Defendants”), 
as follows: 
PARTIES, JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
1. Randy is a resident of Ada County, Idaho and the sole shareholder of Siddoway Co. 
2. Wadsworth Reese, PLLC, formerly known as Siddoway Wadsworth & Reese, PLLC, 
is an Idaho professional limited liability company in good standing with the Idaho Secretary of 
State (“SWR”). 
3. Siddoway Co. is an Idaho professional corporation in good standing with the Idaho 
Secretary of State and a member of SWR. 
4. Wadsworth is a resident of Canyon County Idaho and the sole member of Wadsworth 
PLLC. 
5. Wadsworth PLLC is an Idaho professional limited liability company in good standing 
with the Idaho Secretary of State and a member of SWR. 
6. Reese is a resident of Ada County, Idaho and the sole shareholder of Reese PC. 
7. Reese PC is an Idaho professional corporation in good standing with the Idaho 
Secretary of State and a member of SWR. 
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8. This court has jurisdiction over this case under IDAHO CONST. art. V, § 20 and IDAHO 
CODE ANN. § 7-705. 
9. Venue is proper in this court under IDAHO CODE ANN. § 5-404 because some or all 
Counterclaim Defendants reside in Ada County, Idaho. 
BACKGROUND 
The Reese Buy-In Agreement 
10. In December 2013, Reese was an employee of Siddoway Co. having been employed 
by Siddoway Co. for approximately 15 months. 
11. In and before December 2013, Reese had never before been an owner or partner in a 
CPA firm. 
12.  Reese had a desire to be a partner in a CPA firm. 
13. Starting on or about August 2013, Reese engaged in negotiations with Randy to buy 
the client base of Siddoway Co. 
14. On or about December 2013 Randy and Reese struck an agreement to form a new 
business entity that would operate as a CPA firm in the Boise area. 
15. Under the agreement, Reese would become a partner and part owner of the new CPA 
firm under certain conditions. 
16. In anticipation of becoming a partner and owner of the new CPA firm, on or about 
December 20, 2013, Reese formed Reese PC. 
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17. On the same day, December 20, 2013 Reese and Randy filed a Certificate of 
Organization with the Idaho Secretary of State forming CRS Services, PLLC, later known as 
Siddoway Wadsworth & Reese, PLLC, and now known as Wadsworth Reese, PLLC (“SWR”). 
18. On or about January 6, 2014, Wadsworth, through his entity Wadsworth PLLC, 
agreed to partner with Randy and Reese in SWR . 
19. As of December 2013, Randy had developed a substantial accounting practice having 
engaged in public accounting in the Boise area for nearly 20 years. 
20. Wadsworth had also practiced as a public accountant in the Boise area for a number 
of years. 
21. In entering into the SWR partnership, Randy, Wadsworth, and Reese each agreed that 
Wadsworth PLLC had a client base that Wadsworth could bring to SWR in an amount 
approximately ½ the size of the client base that Randy had developed and could bring to SWR. 
22. On and before December 2013, Reese had not developed a public accounting practice 
and had very little client base, if any, he could bring to SWR. 
23. As of December 2013, the client base that Siddoway Co. could bring to SWR 
produced annual collections of approximately $500,000. 
24. As of December 2013, the client base Wadsworth PLLC could bring to SWR 
produced annual collections of approximately $250,000.   
25. As of December 2013, the client base Reese could bring to SWR produced annual 
collection of no more than $9,050. 
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26. Accordingly, to become a partner and owner in SWR, Reese promised to pay 
Siddoway Co. $200,000, in exchange for a 1/3 membership interest in SWR.  (the “Practice 
Buy-In”). 
27. On January 1, 2014, SWR began servicing all of the clients previously serviced by 
Siddoway Co. and Wadsworth PLLC. 
28. On January 1, 2014, SWR began servicing additional clients which it had acquired 
from another accounting firm, Harding Co., PA. 
29. On January 6, 2014, Siddoway Co., Wadsworth PLLC, and Reese PC each executed 
the Operating Agreement of Siddoway Wadsworth & Reese, PLLC (the “Operating 
Agreement” previously filed with the court), with the intent that the agreement act as the sole 
source of agreement between the parties regarding their membership in SWR. 
30. The Operating Agreement was not intended to be temporary in nature. 
31. Prior to formation of SWR , Randy informed Reese and Wadsworth that it was his 
strong desire to phase out of compliance based public accounting and develop a business 
advisory practice of his own that would not offer tax preparation, bookkeeping, or audit services. 
32. Nevertheless, Randy was willing to work in SWR for a year or two before he began 
phasing out of compliance public accounting.  
Reese Disavows the Practice Buy-In 
33. Because Reese and Reese PC had not made any payments on the Practice Buy-In, 
Randy inquired about payment on or about May 2014. 
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34. To Randy’s great surprise, Reese disavowed the Practice Buy-In, falsely asserting 
that he had never promised to pay Randy or Siddoway Co. $200,000 to become a partner and 1/3 
Member of SWR. 
35. In response, Randy insisted that the Practice Buy-In agreement be promptly reduced 
to writing or that Reese PC immediately abandon its 1/3 membership interest in SWR to 
Siddoway Co. 
36. Accordingly, on January 28, 2015, Reese PC and Siddoway Co. executed an Asset 
Sales Agreement with an accompanying Specific Guarantee and Promissory Note 
memorializing, in writing, the Practice Buy-In agreement, including the promise to pay 
Siddoway Co. $200,000 (the “Reese Agreement” previously filed with the court). 
37. Mr. Reese, Reese PC, Randy, and Siddoway Co. all agreed that the Reese Agreement 
was effective as of January 1, 2014. 
38. Reese PC began making payments to Siddoway Co., and did so until October 1, 2015.  
39. On October 1, 2015, Reese PC failed to make the $2,500 payment to Siddoway Co., 
as required by the Reese Contract, and has failed to make any payment since September 1, 2015. 
The Force-Out of Siddoway Co. and Randy Siddoway 
40. Soon after the formation of SWR significant disagreements arose between 
Wadsworth and Reese, on the one hand, and Siddoway, on the other hand. 
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41. On or about July 2015, in an effort to resolve the ongoing disagreements regarding 
management and growth of SWR, Randy, Reese, and Wadsworth hired Shannon Vincent, a 
practice management consultant. 
42. The resulting negotiations yielded no significant relief of the disagreements between 
the members of SWR. 
43. During the months leading up to July 2015, Wadsworth and Reese had formed an 
alliance with each other and actively conspired to force Randy and Siddoway Co. out of SWR. 
44. During the months leading up to and after July 2015, Reese and Wadsworth began 
holding secretive, closed-door, meetings with each other at the exclusion of Randy. 
45. Many of these closed-door meetings occurred early in the morning prior to Randy or 
most other employees arriving at work. 
46. Beginning at least as early as July 2015, Wadsworth and Reese began intentionally 
deleting text messages and emails between themselves, Randy Siddoway, and Shannon Vincent. 
47. Upon information and belief, the intentionally deleted text messages and emails 
contain information regarding Wadsworth’s and Reese’s conspiracy to force Randy and 
Siddoway Co. out of SWR, or information that is otherwise detrimental to their claims in this 
matter. 
48. Due to the significant disagreement between them, on or about July 18, 2015, Randy 
suggested to Reese and Wadsworth that they buy-out his membership interest in SWR. 
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49. Following significant negotiation, on or about July 31, 2015, Randy, Reese, and 
Wadsworth each agreed to a buy-out arrangement that required, among other things, payment to 
Siddoway Co. of $150,000. 
50. The business terms of the proposed buy-out arrangement were reduced to a hand 
written document which was signed by Reese, Wadsworth, and Siddoway on July 31, 2015 (the 
“July L.O.I.” attached as Exhibit C). 
51. Randy voluntarily took on the task of having the July L.O.I. reduced to a more 
professional, typewritten document and retained counsel to assist him.  
52. Before the typewritten document could be executed Wadsworth and Reese announced 
that they would not sign it nor would they honor the terms of the July L.O.I. 
53.  On August 21, 2015, Randy met with Wadsworth and Reese in and effort, once 
again, to negotiate a mutually agreeable buy-out of Siddoway Co.’s membership interest in 
SWR. 
54. During the August 21, 2015 meeting Randy proposed a number of terms for a 
buy-out, including a phase out of his SWR duties, proposed sharing of receivables, payment of 
liabilities, and separation of office assets. 
55. Wadsworth and Reese rejected the buy-out/separation terms offered by Randy in the 
August 21, 2015 meeting. 
56. The following Monday, on August 24, 2015, Wadsworth and Reese sent an email to 
the entire SWR staff, asserting that Randy had resigned from his SWR duties. 
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57. On August 28, 2015, Siddoway promptly objected to the false assertions made by 
Wadsworth and Reese and affirmed his ongoing membership and rights as a member of SWR. 
58. Regardless, beginning at least as early as August 21, 2015, Wadsworth and Reese 
assumed all management control of SWR, and excluded Randy and Siddoway Co. from all 
Management meeting.  
59. From August 21, 2015 to the present, due to the assertions and actions of Wadsworth 
and Reese, Siddoway Co. has not been a Manager of SWR. 
60. From September 1, 2015 to the present, Wadsworth and Reese have paid themselves 
management fees, but have refused to paid management fees to Siddoway Co. 
61. On or about August 24, 2015, Wadsworth and Reese demanded that Randy and 
Siddoway Co. abandon the office used by Randy, or pay rent to SWR. 
62. On or about August 31, 2015, Wadsworth and Reese removed all cash from the SWR 
bank account and placed it in a different account to which Siddoway Co. has no access nor 
control. 
63. From September 1, 2015 to the present, Wadsworth and Reese have refused to 
distribute any money out of SWR to Siddoway Co. 
64. On or about April 15, 2016, Reese and Wadsworth issued a K-1 to Siddoway Co. 
assigning $40k of SWR profits to Siddoway Co. 
65. Reese and Wadsworth refused to distribute any money to Siddoway Co., thus leaving 
Randy with a large tax burden with no money to pay it. 
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66. From August 24, 2015 forward, Wadsworth and Reese have excluded Randy and 
Siddoway Co. from virtually all meetings of members of SWR. 
67. From August 2015 to September 2016, despite multiple demands from Siddoway Co., 
Wadsworth and Reese refused to share any financial information regarding SWR and its 
operations. 
The Force out of Dustin Siddoway 
68. On December 24, 2013, just prior to organizing SWR, Reese made an offer of 
employment to Dustin Siddoway, Randy Siddoway’s nephew. 
69. The offer made by Reese did not include a requirement that Dustin sign a 
non-compete, non-solicitation, or confidentiality agreement. 
70. Dustin had informed Randy and Reese that he would not sign a non-compete or 
non-solicitation agreement as he did not believe in such agreements. 
71. On or about January 20, 2014, SWR hired Dustin Siddoway to work for SWR as a 
certified public accountant. 
72. Dustin Siddoway was not required to sign a non-compete, non-solicitation, or 
confidentiality agreement as a term of his employment with SWR. 
73. On or about August 19, 2015, with full knowledge that Dustin Siddoway had not 
signed a non-compete, non-solicitation, or confidentiality agreement with SWR, in the midst of 
the upheaval with Randy, Wadsworth and Reese met alone with Dustin Siddoway and demanded 
that he sign a non-compete agreement with SWR. 
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74.  Wadsworth threatened Dustin that if Dustin did not sign a non-compete agreement he 
would no longer be on partner track. 
75. Wadsworth further threatened Dustin that if Dustin did not sign a non-compete 
agreement his interaction with clients would be restricted to make it harder for Dustin to develop 
strong relationships with clients. 
76. As a result of the ultimatum presented to him by Wadsworth and Reese, Dustin 
resigned from his employment with SWR on August 21, 2015. 
Randy’s Additional Attempt to Negotiate a Buy Out 
77. On or about September 5, 2015, Randy initiated an additional attempt to negotiate a 
separation of Siddoway Co. from SWR. 
78. During the September 5, 2015 negotiation, both parties were represented by legal 
counsel. 
79. After several hours the parties had agreed to the major terms of a buy-out agreement 
and agreed to have Randy’s counsel reduce the agreement to writing (the “September 
Agreement”). 
80. Two days later, on or about September 7, 2015, Wadsworth and Reese renounced the 
September Agreement and stated that they would not sign any document containing the 
previously agreed upon terms. 
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81. Shortly thereafter, due to the complete loss of trust in Wadsworth and Reese and their 
actions making it impossible for Randy to effectively work in the SWR offices, Randy began 
working from a separate office. 
82. Siddoway Co. remains a member of SWR. 
Dustin’s Attempts to Negotiate in Good Faith 
83. Upon resigning from SWR, Dustin decided to start his own CPA firm. 
84. On or about August 24, 2015, Dustin made offers of employment to SWR employees 
Emily Harris, Kalyn Harding, Debbie Mason, Glenda Nelson, and Rebecca Bishop. 
85. Dustin did not try to conceal the offers of employment from Wadsworth or Reese. 
86.  On August 24, 2015, Wadsworth and Reese knew that Dustin was starting a new 
CPA firm. 
87. On August 24, 2015, Wadsworth and Reese knew clients would be leaving SWR and 
transitioning to Dustin’s new CPA firm. 
88. On August 24, 2015, Wadsworth and Reese knew that Randy would be starting a new 
company offering business advisory services and not bookkeeping, audit, or tax preparation 
services. 
89. Between August 24th and September 7th, 2015, there were discussions between 
Dustin, Wadsworth, and Reese about sharing the SWR office space until January 1, 2017 with 
SWR and Dustin’s new CPA firm each servicing their separate clients during that period of time. 
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90. Between August 24th and September 7th, Reese requested that Dustin meet with him 
to go over a list of clients to identify those clients that would likely be moving on to Dustin’s 
new accounting firm. 
91. On or about August 28th, Randy forwarded a list of clients to Dustin for the purpose 
of identifying what clients would likely be moving on to Dustin’s new accounting firm.  
92. On September 7, 2015, the very day Wadsworth and Reese renounced the September 
Agreement with Randy, Dustin met privately with Reese in what Dustin believed to be a good 
faith meeting to discuss a professional and cordial separation from SWR. 
93. Unbeknownst to Dustin, Wadsworth and Reese had decided to secretly tape record 
the meeting for the purpose of soliciting information from Dustin that they could use in 
litigation. 
94. In the meeting, Dustin reminded Reese that he had no legal obligation not compete 
with SWR. 
95. Reese agreed. 
96.  Even though not obligated to do so, Dustin offered to compensate SWR if Reese and 
Wadsworth would cooperate in the timely delivery of client data for those clients who would be 
leaving SWR. 
97. Reese committed to provide the client data and represented to Dustin that Reese and 
Wadsworth were not “playing games.” 
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98. Reese stated that Reese and Wadsworth were not going to fight for client that SWR 
had no chance of keeping. 
99. On or about September 8, 2015 Dustin met privately with both Wadsworth and Reese 
to again discuss cooperative sharing of client data and a professional and cordial separation from 
SWR. 
100. Again, Wadsworth and Reese secretly recorded the conversation hoping to obtain 
information that they could use in litigation against Dustin, Jeannine Barkan, Randy, and 
Siddoway Co. 
101. Despite Reese’s representation to Dustin the previous day that Reese and 
Wadsworth would provide the client data and were not “playing games,” during the September 8, 
2015 meeting Wadsworth and Reese threatened litigation and stated that the leverage they had on 
Dustin was the client data. 
Improper Use of SWR Funds 
102. Rather than accept any of the offers made by Randy or Dustin, Wadsworth and 
Reese elected to initiate litigation and filed this action on or about December 16, 2015. 
103. Wadsworth and Reese instigated this litigation by suing Siddoway on various 
grounds incident to their relationship as Members of SWR, and a separate cause of action 
brought by Reese PC seeking rescission of the Reese Agreement, or in the alternative, seeking 
damages from Randy and Siddoway Co. for breach of the Reese Agreement. 
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104. The parties to the Reese Agreement are Randy Siddoway, Siddoway Co., Clark 
Reese, and Reese PC. 
105. SWR is not a party to the Reese Agreement. 
106. As early as January 2016, Randy and Siddoway Co. notified Wadsworth and Reese, 
through their counsel Vaughn Fisher (“Mr. Fisher”), that expenditure of SWR funds for Reese’s 
separate attorney fees and costs related to the dispute over the Reese Agreement inappropriate 
and should not take place. 
107. Over the next several months substantial litigation regarding the Reese Agreement 
proceeded through this court and in the arbitration subsequently ordered by this court. 
108. During that time, on several occasions, Randy and Siddoway Co., through legal 
counsel, reiterated their objection regarding Wadsworth and Reese expending or distributing 
SWR funds to pay Reese’s separate attorney fees and costs. 
109. Despite the notice and objections of Randy and Siddoway Co., Wadsworth and 
Reese expended or distributed over $100,000 of SWR funds to pay Reese’s separate attorney 
fees and costs. 
110. The improper acts of Wadsworth and Reese left Randy and Siddoway Co. no choice 
but to seek an injunction to stop the improper use or distribution of SWR funds. 
111. On December 30, 2016, this court issued an order enjoined SWR, Wadsworth, and 
Reese from diverting any further SWR funds for the purpose of paying Reese’s separate 
attorney’s fees and costs. 
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Reese Agreement Ruled Void 
112. The Reese Agreement contained an enforceable arbitration clause. 
113. Reese and Reese PC objected to resolving the disputes over the Reese Agreement 
through arbitration. 
114. Following months of hearings and briefings on the matter, this court granted Randy 
and Siddoway Co.’s motion to compel arbitration. 
115. On November 8, 2016 the Arbitrator ruled the Reese Agreement void. 
116. The Arbitration ruling was confirmed by this court on or about January 11, 2017.  
117. Accordingly, Reese and Reese PC assert that they are relieved of their obligation to 
pay Siddoway Co. $200,000 as agreed in the Practice Buy-In and the Reese Agreement. 
118. However, Reese and Reese PC refuse to voluntarily surrender to Siddoway Co. the 
1/3 membership in SWR, and associated benefits, it received from SWR pursuant to its, now 
void, membership interest in SWR. 
119. From January 1, 2014 to the present, Reese PC has improperly received at least 
$258,000 of management fees. 
120. Nearly all of the improper management fees received by Reese PC have been 
distributed out to Reese.  
FIRST COUNTERCLAIM 
Breach of Contract – Operating Agreement 
(All Counterclaim Defendants) 
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121. Randy and Siddoway Co. incorporate herein all preceding paragraphs of this 
Counter Claim. 
122. Counterclaim Defendants have breached the terms of the Operating Agreement by 
their actions, including but not limited to the following: 
a. Denying Siddoway Co. access to company information. 
b. Denying Siddoway Co. access to company assets. 
c. Denying Siddoway Co. the right to consent to or approve actions of the company. 
d. Denying Siddoway Co. the right to equal distributions of the company. 
e. Denying Siddoway Co. the right to vote on company matters and to otherwise 
participate in the management of the company. 
f. Improperly diverting funds of SWR for the payment of Reese’s separate 
attorney’s fees and costs. 
123. Counterclaim Defendant’s breach of the Operating Agreement have damaged Randy 
and Siddoway Co., in an amount to be established at trial, plus interest, costs and attorneys’ fees 
as allowed by law or equity. 
SECOND COUNTERCLAIM 
Breach of the Implied Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
(All Counterclaim Defendants) 
124. Randy and Siddoway Co. incorporate herein all preceding paragraphs of this 
Counter Claim. 
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125. Without limitation, the following actions of Counterclaim Defendants have breached 
the terms of the Operating Agreement and have nullified or significantly impaired Siddoway 
Co.’s rights and benefits under the Operating Agreement: 
a. Denying Siddoway Co. access to company information. 
b. Denying Siddoway Co. access to company assets. 
c. Denying Siddoway Co. the right to consent to or approve actions of the company. 
d. Denying Siddoway Co. the right to equal distributions of the company. 
e. Denying Siddoway Co. the right to vote on company matters and to otherwise 
participate in the management of the company. 
f. Improperly diverting funds of SWR for the payment of Reese’s separate 
attorney’s fees and costs. 
126. Counterclaim Defendants’ breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing has 
damaged Randy and Siddoway Co., in an amount to be established at trial, plus interest, costs 
and attorneys’ fees as allowed by law or equity. 
THIRD COUNTERCLAIM 
Violation of Idaho Code § 30-6-404 
(All Counterclaim Defendants) 
 
127. Randy and Siddoway Co. incorporate herein all preceding paragraphs of this 
Counterclaim. 
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128. Counterclaim Defendants’ have violated IDAHO CODE § 30-6-404 by failing to make 
distributions in equal shares among members and instead distributing SWR funds to themselves 
and refusing to make an equal distribution to Siddoway Co. 
129. Counterclaim Defendants have violated IDAHO CODE § 30-6-404 by illegally 
distributing to themselves hundreds of thousands of SWR dollars without an equal distribution to 
Siddoway Co. 
130. Counterclaim Defendants have violated IDAHO CODE § 30-6-404 by illegally 
distributing or allowing expenditure of over $100,000 of SWR funds for Reese’s and Reese PC’s 
separate attorney’s fees and costs. 
131. Counterclaim Defendants’ actions in violation of IDAHO CODE § 30-6-404  have 
damaged Randy and Siddoway Co. in an amount to be established at trial, plus interest, costs and 
attorneys’ fees as allowed by law or equity. 
FOURTH COUNTERCLAIM 
Conversion 
(All Counterclaim Defendants) 
132. Randy and Siddoway Co. incorporate herein all preceding paragraphs of this 
Counterclaim. 
133. From September1, 2015 to the present Counterclaim Defendants have 
surreptitiously and illegally distributed to themselves hundreds of thousands of SWR dollars 
without an equal distribution to Siddoway Co. 
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134. In so doing, Counterclaim Defendants have violated the terms of the Operating 
Agreement and Idaho law by converting to their own use and enjoyment funds to which 
Siddoway Co. is legally entitled. 
135. Counterclaim Defendants’ acts of conversion have damaged Randy and Siddoway 
Co., in an amount to be established at trial, plus interest, costs and attorneys’ fees as allowed by 
law or equity. 
SIXTH COUNTERCLAIM 
Breach of Fiduciary Duty of Care 
(All Counterclaim Defendants) 
 
136. Randy and Siddoway Co. incorporate herein all preceding paragraphs of this 
Counterclaim. 
137. As Managers of SWR, the Reese PC and Wadsworth PLLC, and their principals 
Reese and Wadsworth, owe a fiduciary duty of care to Siddoway Co. 
138. Counterclaim Defendants breached their duty of care by illegally distributing, or 
allowing expenditure of, over $100,000 of SWR funds for Reese’s and Reese PC’s separate 
attorney’s fees and costs. 
139. Counterclaim Defendants’ had a personal interest in the improper expenditure of 
funds, were not fully informed before approving the improper expenditures, and/or did not act in 
good faith in approving the improper expenditures. 
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140. Counterclaim Defendants breach of their duty of care has damaged Randy and 
Siddoway Co., in an amount to be established at trial, plus interest, costs and attorneys’ fees as 
allowed by law or equity. 
SEVENTH COUNTERCLAIM 
Accounting 
(All Counterclaim Defendants) 
 
141. Randy and Siddoway Co. incorporate herein all preceding paragraphs of this 
Counterclaim. 
142. Reese PC and Wadsworth PLLC are the Managers of SWR. 
143. Therefore, Counterclaim Defendants have a fiduciary duty to Siddoway Co., a 
Member of SWR. 
144. Due to the illegal acts of Counterclaim Defendants, neither Randy nor Siddoway Co. 
have control of or access to the financial information of SWR. 
145. Randy and Siddoway Co., therefore, are entitled to a full accounting, from 
Counterclaim Defendants, of all SWR activities including, without limitation 
a. a detailed accounting of all money paid by SWR, directly or indirectly, to its 
members; and 
b. a detailed accounting of all SWR funds expended or distributed to pay Reese’s 
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Willful Spoliation of Evidence 
(All Counterclaim Defendants) 
 
146. Randy and Siddoway Co. incorporate herein all preceding paragraphs of this 
Counterclaim. 
147. Counterclaim Defendants intentionally, and without justification, destroyed material 
evidence related to the controversies in this matter. 
148. The destruction of the material evidence occurred at a time when this action was 
pending or when this litigation was reasonably foreseeable. 
149. Counterclaim Defendant’s actions of intentional spoliation of evidence have 
damaged Randy and Siddoway Co., in an amount to be established at trial, plus interest, costs 
and attorneys’ fees as allowed by law or equity. 
NINTH COUNTERCLAIM 
Declaratory Relief 
(Reese and Reese PC) 
 
150. Randy and Siddoway Co. incorporate herein all preceding paragraphs of this 
Counterclaim. 
151. In an order issued on August 9, 2016, this Court held, under a summary judgment 
standard, that “the Reese Agreement is basically understandable. . . . [and] covers the ground it 
covers – that Reese PC would pay Siddoway PC $200,000 for the right to a one-third 
membership interest in Wadsworth Reese, PLLC.”  Siddoway’s Second Motion to Reconsider 
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and Reese’s Motion to Stay Arbitration, p 10 – 12, August 9, 2016 (the “Court Order,” of file 
with the Court).   
152. This Court further observed, in discussing the consideration Reese PC received 
through the Reese Agreement, that the “Reese Agreement does not lack consideration.  In the 
Reese Agreement, Reese PC agreed to pay Siddoway PC $200,000 in return for the right to a 
one-third membership interest in Wadsworth Reese, PLLC.”  Court Order, p 12 f 5. 
153. The Reese Agreement has been ruled void. 
154. Accordingly, Randy and Siddoway Co. request a declaration by this Court that 
Reese PC’s membership in SWR is, as a matter of law, void as of January 1, 2014. 
155. Randy and Siddoway Co. request a declaration that, because the Reese Agreement 
has been ruled void, as a matter of law Siddoway Co. must be deemed the holder of a 2/3 
membership interest in SWR, effective January 1, 2014. 
156. Randy and Siddoway Co. request a declaration that Reese and Reese PC must return 
to Siddoway Co. all of the valuable benefits it received, from January 1, 2014 through present, 
arising out of the voided 1/3 membership interest in SWR, the value of which will be established 
at trial. 
TENTH COUNTERCLAIM 
Unjust Enrichment – SWR Membership Interest and Benefits 
(Reese and Reese PC) 
 
157. Randy and Siddoway Co. incorporate herein all preceding paragraphs of this 
Counterclaim. 
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158. Randy and Siddoway Co. plead this Tenth Counterclaim in the alternative to the 
Ninth Counterclaim above. 
159. Randy and Siddoway Co. provided a benefit to Reese and Reese PC by facilitating 
Reese PC’s acquisition of a 1/3 membership interest in SWR through the Reese Agreement. 
160. The Reese Agreement required Reese and Reese PC to pay Siddoway Co. $200,000 
in exchange for Reese PC’s 1/3 membership interest in SWR. 
161. Reese and Reese PC accepted, and continues to accept, the valuable benefits of its 
1/3 membership interest in SWR.  
162. The Reese Agreement has been ruled void. 
163. Accordingly, Reese’s and Reese PC’s obligation to pay Siddoway Co. $200,000 has 
been eliminated. 
164. Under the circumstances, it would be unjust for Reese and Reese PC to retain its 1/3 
membership interest in SWR, and all the valuable benefits derived therefrom, without 
compensating Siddoway Co. for its value. 
165. Accordingly, Siddoway Co. is entitled to receive from Reese and Reese PC the 
value of Reese PC’s 1/3 membership interest in SWR. 
TENTH COUNTERCLAIM 
Legal Fees 
(All Counterclaim Defendants) 
 
166. Randy and Siddoway Co. incorporate herein all preceding paragraphs of this 
Counterclaim. 
24 
Wadsworth v. Siddoway 
Verified Amended Counterclaims of Randy Siddoway and Siddoway Co. 
 
000296
167. Pursuant to the Operating Agreement, the Federal Arbitration Act, IDAHO CODE 
ANN. § 12-120, and Idaho Code Ann. § 12-121, Randy and Siddoway Co. are entitled to recover 
their attorney fees and costs of suit in an amount deemed reasonable by this court. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Randy and Siddoway Co. prays for relief as follows: 
1. Under the First Counterclaim, a judgment in favor of Randy or Siddoway Co. and 
against Counterclaim Defendants for breach of the Operating Agreement in an amount to be 
established at trial, plus interest, costs, and attorneys’ fees as allowed by law or equity. 
2. Under the Second Counterclaim, a judgment in favor of Randy or Siddoway Co. and 
against Counterclaim Defendants for breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing in 
an amount to be established at trial, plus interest, costs, and attorneys’ fees as allowed by law or 
equity. 
3. Under the Third Counterclaim, a judgment in favor of Randy or Siddoway Co. and 
against Counterclaim Defendants for violation of IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-6-404 in an amount to 
be established at trial, plus interest, costs, and attorneys’ fees as allowed by law or equity. 
4. Under the Fourth Counterclaim, a judgment in favor of Randy or Siddoway Co. and 
against Counterclaim Defendants for conversion in an amount to be established a trial, plus 
interest, costs, and attorney’s fees as allowed by law or equity. 
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5. Under the Sixth Counterclaim, a judgment in favor of Randy or Siddoway Co. and 
against Counterclaim Defendants for breach of their duty of care in an amount to be established 
at trial, plus interest, costs, and attorney’s fees as allowed by law or equity. 
6. Under the Seventh Counterclaim, a full accounting, from Counterclaim Defendants, of 
all SWR activities including, without limitation, a detailed accounting of all money paid by 
SWR, directly or indirectly, to its members and a detailed accounting of all SWR funds 
expended for the separate attorney’s fees and costs of Reese and Reese PC. 
7. Under the Eighth Counterclaim, a judgment in favor of Randy or Siddoway Co. and 
against Counterclaim Defendants for intentional spoliation of evidence in an amount to be 
established at trial, plus interest, costs, and attorneys’ fees as allowed by law or equity. 
8. Under the Ninth Counterclaim, a declaration from this court that Reese PC’s 1/3 
membership interest in SWR is, as a matter of law, void as of January 1, 2014, that, as a matter 
of law, Siddoway Co. must be deemed the holder of a 2/3 membership interest in SWR, effective 
January 1, 2014, and that Reese and Reese PC must return to Siddoway Co. all of the valuable 
benefits it received, from January 1, 2014 through present, arising out of the voided 1/3 
membership interest in SWR. 
9. Under the Tenth Counterclaim, an in the alternative to the relief sought through the 
Ninth Counterclaim, a judgment in favor of Randy or Siddoway Co. and against Reese and 
Reese PC for the value of Reese PC’s 1/3 membership interest in SWR. 
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10. Under the Eleventh Counterclaim, a judgment in favor of Randy or Siddoway Co. and 
against Counterclaim Defendants for reasonable attorney’s fees and costs as allowed by law or 
equity.  
11. Any other legal or equitable relief that this court deems just. 




__/s/Brett W. Hastings_______________ 
Brett W. Hastings    
HASTINGS LAW GROUP, LLC 
Attorney for Randy Siddoway and  
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I, Randy Siddoway, declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Idaho 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
 I certify that on the 20th day of March, 2017, I served a true and correct copy of the 
forgoing Verified Amended Counterclaims of Defendant Randy Siddoway and Siddoway Co. on 
the following parties by the means indicated: 
via E-filing and    via E-filing and  
email delivery to    email delivery to 
Vaughn Fisher    James G. Reid 
FISHER RAINEY HUDSON   Jennifer Reid Mahoney  
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 630  KAUFMAN REID PLLC 
Boise, ID  83702    1211 W. Myrtle Street, Suite 350 
Fax: (208) 297-2689    Boise, Idaho  83702 
Vaughn@FRHTrialLawyers.com  Tel: (208) 342-4591 
Plaintiff’s and Counter Claim  Fax: (208) 342-4657 
Defendant’s Counsel    jreid@krlawboise.com 
      jmahoney@krlawboise.com 
      Attorneys for Defendants  
      Jeanine Barkan and Dustin Siddoway 
 
  
__/s/ Brett W. Hastings________________ 
Brett W. Hastings   
HASTINGS LAW GROUP, LLC 
Attorney for Randy Siddoway and   
Siddoway & Company, PC 
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Vaughn Fisher, ISB No. 7624 
Jennifer Hanway, ISB No. 9921 
Fisher Rainey Hudson 
950 West Bannock Street, Ste. 630 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 345-7000 




Attorneys for Plaintiff 
 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT  
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
 
  
 Counterclaim Defendants Clark A. Reese, Clark A. Reese CPA, P.C., Frederick 
Wadsworth, and Wadsworth Accounting CPA, PLLC (“Counterclaim Defendants”), by and 
through their attorneys of record, FISHER RAINEY HUDSON, Answer the Verified Amended 
Counterclaims of Randy Siddoway and Siddoway & Co., P.C. (“Amended Counterclaims”). The 
Counterclaim Defendants deny each and every allegation contained in in the Amended 
WADSWORTH REESE, PLLC, an Idaho 
Professional Corporation; CLARK A. REESE 
CPA, P.C., an Idaho Professional Corporation; 
and WADSWORTH ACCOUNTING CPA, an 





SIDDOWAY & COMPANY, PC, an Idaho 
professional corporation; RANDY 
SIDDOWAY, an individual; DUSTIN 
SIDDOWAY, an individual and JEANINE 




Case No. CV OC 1521225 
 
PLAINTIFFS’ ANSWER TO THE 
VERIFIED AMENDED 
COUNTERCLAIMS OF RANDY 




Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Nichole Snell, Deputy Clerk
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Counterclaims not herein specifically and expressly admitted.  Counterclaim Defendants reserve 
the right to amend this and any other answer or denial stated herein, once they have had an 
opportunity to complete discovery regarding the allegations contained in the Amended 
Counterclaims. 















14. Admit that Clark and Randy formed a new business entity. 
15. Deny. 
16. Admit that Clark formed Reese PC on or about December 20, 2013. 
17. Admit. 
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21. Admit that Frederick made the observation to Randy during conversations that his 
client base billings were roughly50% of the Siddoway billings. 




25. Admit.  
26. Deny. 
27. Deny to the extent that Wadsworth PLLC was not a member of SWR as of 
January 1, 2014.  
28. Admit. 
29. Admit the Operating Agreement was signed on January 6, 2014, and that such 
document speaks for itself. 
30. Deny. 
31. Admit that Randy had indicated a desire to develop a business advisory practice 
and phase out of compliance based public accounting. 
32. Deny in that Randy began his phase out during his time at SWR.  
33. Deny. 
34. Counterdefendants do not have sufficient knowledge to know Randy’s state of 
mind and therefore deny. 
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35. Admit that the Reese Agreement was signed in January 2015. Deny the remaining 
allegations. 
36. Admit that the Reese Agreement and accompanying documents were signed that 
day and that such documents speak for themselves. 
37. Admit that the Reese Agreement has an effective date of January 1, 2014, and that 
the document speaks for itself. 
38. Admit that Reese PC made payments from January to September 2015. 
39. Admit that Reese PC has made no further payments since September 2015. 
40. Deny, disagreements occurred between all partners, not just Wadsworth and 
Reese against Siddoway.  
41. Admit. 
42. Deny, an LOI was reached among the partners in July but not signed due to 
material changes required by Randy. 
43. Deny. 
44. Admit Reese and Wadsworth had meetings together to discuss buy-out options of 
Randy, deny the remaining allegations. 





49. Admit the July LOI was signed by Reese, Wadsworth, and Siddoway, deny it 
occurred on July 31, 2015. 
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50. Admit, except for the date the LOI was signed. 
51. Deny, all parties agreed that the firm would bear the cost of drafting and that Brett 
Hastings would draft the proposed documents. 
52. Deny. Before being presented with the typewritten document, Siddoway 
introduced new and additional terms which were not agreeable to Wadsworth and Reese.  
53. Admit that a meeting between Randy, Wadsworth, and Reese occurred on August 
21, 2015, deny the remaining allegations. 
54. Admit that Randy resigned during the August 21, 2015 meeting, and proposed 
terms of termination to Wadsworth and Reese, deny the remaining allegations. 
55. Deny. 
56. Deny to the extent it implies Reese sent the email, Wadsworth sent the email with 
the approval of Reese, admit the remaining. 
57. Admit Randy, through counsel, sent a letter which speaks for itself, deny the 
remaining allegations. 
58. Admit Wadsworth and Reese assumed managerial control upon Randy’s 
resignation from his management duties, deny the remaining allegations. 
59. Admit Randy has not acted as a manager of WR PLLC since August 21, 2015, 
deny the remaining allegations. 
60. Admit that Wadsworth and Reese have received management fees from WR 
PLLC for the work they have performed since September 1, 2015, and that Randy has not 
received a similar management fee since he has not worked for WR PLLC since August 21, 
2015.  Deny the remaining allegations. 
61. Admit that such actions occurred in writing on or after September 1, 2015. 
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62. Admit that such actions occurred and that the primary account was changed in 
late September 2015. 
63. Admit no distributions have been made to Siddoway Co. or any other member 
since September 1, 2015, deny the remaining allegations. 
64. Admit a K-1 was issued to Siddoway Co. and that such document speaks for 
itself, deny the remaining allegations. 
65. Admit no distribution was made to Siddoway Co. or any other member, 
Counterdefendants lack sufficient knowledge to admit the remaining allegations and therefore 
they are denied. 
66. Admit. 
67. Deny. 
68. Admit an offer was made to Dustin, deny the remaining allegations, including any 
allegation that the offer was made by Reese. 
69. Admit that Dustin did not sign a non-compete or non-solicitation agreement, deny 
the remaining allegations as Counterdefendants lack sufficient knowledge. 
70. Deny. 
71. Admit. 
72. Admit, Dustin did not sign any such agreements, deny that Wadsworth or Reese 
were aware. 
73. Admit that Dustin, Wadsworth, and Reese met on August 19, 2015, deny the 
remaining allegations. 
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74. Admit that Wadsworth explained to Dustin his options and requested that Dustin 
sign a non-compete, and explained to Dustin that if he did not sign then he would no longer be 
on a partner path, deny that it was a threat.  
75. Admit that Wadsworth explained that Dustin’s client interactions would be 
limited if he did not sign a non-compete, deny the remaining allegations.  
76. Admit that Dustin resigned from his employment at SWR, Counterdefendants are 









85. Deny, neither Wadsworth nor Reese knew that the offers of employment were 





90. Deny, Dustin requested to meet with Reese. 
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91. Admit Randy forwarded a list of WR PLLC clients to Dustin and Jeanine on 
August 24, 2015, deny the remaining allegations as Counterdefendants are without knowledge 
regarding the same. 
92. Admit Dustin and Reese met, deny the remaining allegations as 
Counterdefendants are without knowledge regarding the same. 




97. Admit that Wadsworth and Reese agreed to provide client data that was covered 
by Rule 403. 
98. Admit. 
99. Admit Dustin, Wadsworth, and Reese met, deny the remaining allegations as 
Counterdefendants are without knowledge regarding the same. 
100. Admit the meeting between Dustin, Wadsworth, and Reese was recorded, deny 
the remaining allegations. 
101. Admit that client data that was required to be provided pursuant to Rule 403 was 
provided. Deny to the extent it implies Dustin had a right to additional client information.  
102. Admit this action was initiated on December 16, 2015, deny the remaining 
allegations. 
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106. Admit. 
107. Admit that litigation occurred regarding the Reese Agreement both in the District 
Court and in the AAA. 
108. Admit. 
109. Deny. 
110. Counterdefendants are without information or knowledge regarding this allegation 








118. Admit that Reese and Reese PC refuse to voluntarily surrender its interest in WR 
PLLC, deny any allegation that Reese PC received such interest in any manner other than 
through the Operating Agreement of Siddoway Wadsworth and Reese. Any other allegations are 
also denied. 
119. Deny. 
120. Deny to the extent it implies that the wages paid to Reese for the work he has 
performed was improper, admit that wage payments have been distributed from Reese PC to 
Reese. 
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FIRST COUNTERCLAIM 
Breach of Contract – Operating Agreement 
(All Counterclaim Defendants) 
 
121. Counterdefendants likewise incorporate their responses to the preceding 
paragraphs. 
122. Deny, including all subparts. 
123. Deny. 
SECOND COUNTERCLAIM 
Breach of the Implied Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
(All Counterclaim Defendants) 
 
124. Counterdefendants likewise incorporate their responses to the preceding 
paragraphs. 
125. Deny, including all subparts. 
126. Deny. 
THIRD COUNTERCLAIM 
Violation of Idaho Code § 30-6-404 
(All Counterclaim Defendants) 
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FOURTH COUNTERCLAIM 
Conversion 
(All Counterclaim Defendants) 
 






Breach of Fiduciary Duty of Care 
(All Counterclaim Defendants) 
 








(All Counterclaim Defendants) 
 
141. Counterdefendants likewise incorporate their responses to the preceding 
paragraphs. 
142. Admit. 
143. Admit a fiduciary duty is owed to Siddoway Co. as a member of WR PLLC. 
144. Deny. 
145. Deny, including all subparts.  
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EIGHTH COUNTERCLAIM 
Willful Spoliation of Evidence 
(All Counterclaim Defendants) 
 







(Reese and Reese PC) 
 





154. Deny to the extent it does not appear to require a response, to the extent it does 
require a response it is denied. 
155. Deny to the extent it does not appear to require a response, to the extent it does 
require a response it is denied. 
156. Deny to the extent it does not appear to require a response, to the extent it does 
require a response it is denied. 
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TENTH COUNTERCLAIM 
Unjust Enrichment – SWR Membership Interest and Benefits 
(Reese and Reese PC) 
 
157. Counterdefendants likewise incorporate their responses to the preceding 
paragraphs. 
158. Deny to the extent it does not appear to require a response, to the extent it does 
require a response it is denied. 
159. Deny. 
160. Deny to the extent the Reese Agreement speaks for itself. 
161. Admit that Reese, through Reese PC, owns a 1/3 membership interest in WR PLLC, 





TENTH (Sic) COUNTERCLAIM 
Legal Fees 
(All Counterclaim Defendants) 
 
166. Counterdefendants likewise incorporate their responses to the preceding 
paragraphs. 
167. This does not appear to require a response, to the extent it does it is denied.   
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
First Affirmative Defense – The counterclaimants’ claims are barred in full or in part by 
contributory or comparative responsibility. 
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Second Affirmative Defense – The counterclaimants’ claims are barred in full or in part 
by estoppel. 
Third Affirmative Defense – The counterclaimants’ claims are barred in full or in part by 
failure of consideration. 
Fourth Affirmative Defense – The counterclaimants’ claims are barred in full or in part 
by fraud. 
Fifth Affirmative Defense – The counterclaimants’ claims are barred in full or in part by 
the statute of frauds. 
Sixth Affirmative Defense – The counterclaimants’ claims are barred in full or in part by 
waiver. 
WHEREFORE, Counterdefendants pray: 
a. That the counterclaims be dismissed in their entirety; 
b. That Defendants take nothing pursuant to their counterclaims; 
c. That Siddoway Co. be dissociated from Wadsworth Reese PLLC; 
d. That attorney fees and costs be awarded against Siddoway Co. and Randy; 
e. That this Court award all relief which is proper and appropriate. 
DATED this 10th day of April, 2017. 
FISHER RAINEY HUDSON 
/s/ Jennifer Hanway    
Jennifer Hanway 
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James G. Reid 
Jennifer Reid Mahoney 
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SIDDOWAY, an individual; and JEANINE 
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This action arises from the breakup of Wadsworth Reese, PLLC, an accounting firm. 
Wadsworth Reese and two of its members, Clark A. Reese CPA, P.C. ("Reese PC") and 
Wadsworth Accounting CPA ("Wadsworth PC"), are the plaintiffs. They've sued Wadsworth 
Reese's third member, Defendant Siddoway & Co, PC ("Siddoway PC"), and its principal, 
Randy Siddoway. They've also sued two of Wadsworth Reese's former employees, Defendants 
Dustin Siddoway and Jeanine Barkan. Siddoway PC and Randy Siddoway move for partial 
summary judgment, and Dustin Siddoway and Barkan each move for full summary judgment. 
Plaintiffs move to amend their complaint, proposing (among other things) to seek punitive 
damages. These motions were argued and taken under advisement on April 18, 2017. For the 
reasons that follow, the motions for summary judgment by Dustin Siddoway and Barkan are 
granted, the motion for summary judgment by Siddoway PC and Randy Siddoway is granted in 
part and denied in part, and Plaintiffs' motion to amend is granted in part and denied in part. 
I. 
BACKGROUND 
The accounting firm now called Wadsworth Reese was formed by accountants Clark 
Reese and Randy Siddoway in December 2013. (Am. Compl. ,i,i 13-14; Answer ,i,i 13-14;
1 
Fisher Aff. filed Mar. 2, 2016, ,i 3 & Ex. A.) It first was called CRS Services, PLLC. (Am. 
Compl. ,i 13; Answer ,i 13.) About a month later, its name was changed to Siddoway, 
Wadsworth & Reese, PLLC, reflecting the addition of a third accountant, Frederick Wadsworth, 
to the venture. (Am. Compl. ,i 21; Answer,121; Fisher Aff. filed Mar. 2, 2016, ,i 4 & Ex. B.) Its 
three members at that time were not the three accountants individually, but instead the 
1 Citations to the "Answer" mean the answer filed by Randy Siddoway and Siddoway PC to 
Plaintiffs' amended complaint. 
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professional corporations through which they had respectively been doing business as 
accountants. Those professional corporations-Siddoway PC, Reese PC, and Wadsworth PC-
entered into an operating agreement for Wadsworth Reese dated January 6, 2014. (Am. Comp!. 
,r 20(a), (b); Answer ,r 20(a), (b).) The operating agreement was intended to be temporary 
because the three accountants had not yet reached a final agreement as to all of the terms on 
which they were joining forces, such as the values to assign to their respective client bases. 
(Reese Aff. filed Mar. 2, 2016, ,r 5.) But no final agreement was ever reached. (Reese Aff. filed 
Mar. 2, 2016, ,r,r 7, 11-21.) The firm finally took on the Wadsworth Reese name in November 
2015, nearly two years after the "temporary" operating agreement was signed. (Fisher Aff. filed 
Mar. 2, 2016, ,r 5 & Ex. C.) It did so in the wake of Randy Siddoway's August 2015 decision to 
cut ties and begin a new venture. (Reese Aff. filed Mar. 2, 2016, ,r 23.) 
This action arises from the parties' inability to reach an agreement as to the terms of 
Randy Siddoway's departure from Wadsworth Reese, as well as their disagreement as to whether 
he and Siddoway PC violated duties to Wadsworth Reese in the wake of that departure, most 
notably by allegedly funneling a spreadsheet containing Wadsworth Reese's client list and 
related historical billing information to a newly formed competitor started by Dustin Siddoway, 
who is Randy Siddoway's nephew and who had been working for Wadsworth Reese but also cut 
ties when Randy Siddoway did. Also departing from Wadsworth Reese around that same time 
was Jeanine Barkan, who left to join Dustin Siddoway's new accounting firm. 
Plaintiffs filed suit on December 14, 2015. After some preliminary litigation, Plaintiffs 
filed an amended complaint on May 24, 2016. It is their operative pleading for the moment. Its 
six remaining counts are as follows: (]) Count III, a request for Siddoway PC's expulsion as a 
Wadsworth Reese member; (2) Count IV, a claim for breach of fiduciary duty; (3) Count VI, a 
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claim for misappropriating trade secrets-Wadsworth Reese's client list and related historical 
billing information-in violation of the Idaho Trade Secrets Act, I.C. §§ 48-801 to -807; (4) 
Count VII, a claim for interference with prospective economic advantage; (5) Count IX, a claim 
for breach of confidence; and (6) Count XIII, a request for a declaratory judgment that an 
agreement the Court calls "the Reese Agreement" is void. (Am. Comp!. ,i,i 88-143.)2 That said, 
Plaintiffs have moved for leave to file a second amended complaint, in which they would, most 
significantly, drop Counts IX and XIII, add a claim by Reese PC against Siddoway PC for unjust 
enrichment, and seek punitive damages in connection with Counts IV and VII. 
Defendants have moved for summary judgment against Counts IV, VI, and VII. As 
already noted, those motions were argued, as was Plaintiffs' motion to amend, on April 18, 2017. 
All of them are ready for decision 
II. 
LEGAL STANDARD 
A. Defendants' motions for summary judgment 
Summary judgment is proper "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to 
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw." I.R.C.P. 56(a). If 
the movant is seeking summary judgment against a claim or defense asserted by the nonmovant, 
the movant carries its burden by showing that the evidence does not support an element of the 
challenged claim or defense. E.g., McHugh v. Reid, 156 Idaho 229,303,324 P.3d 998, 1002 (Ct. 
App. 2014). The movant's showing can take either (or both) of two forms: (i) affirmative 
evidence disproving the element at issue; or (ii) a showing that the nonmovant is unable to offer 
admissible evidence proving that element. Id.; see also I.R.C.P. 56(c)(l). 
2 The amended complaint intentionally contained no Counts I, II, XI, or XII. Summary judgment 
previously was entered against its Counts V, VIII and X. 
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If the movant carries its burden, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to prove that a 
genuine factual dispute must be resolved before judgment can be awarded to the movant. E.g. , 
Boise Mode, LLC v. Donahoe Pace & Partners Ltd., 154 Idaho 99,104,294 P.3d 1111, 1116 
(2013). To carry that ultimate burden, the nonmovant "may not rest upon mere allegations in the 
pleadings, but must set forth by affidavit specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial." 
Id. (quotation marks omitted). The record must be construed in the light most favorable to the 
nonmovant, and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in the nonmovant's favor. Id. 
Nevertheless, "[a] mere scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt as to the facts is not sufficient" 
for the nonmovant to avoid summary judgment. AED, Inc. v. KDC lnvs., LLC, 155 Idaho 159, 
163,307 P.3d 176, 180 (2013). 
B. Plaintiffs' motion to amend 
I.R.C.P. 15(a)(2) governs pretrial motions for leave to amend pleadings. Under that rule, 
the trial court "should freely give leave when justice so requires." I.R.C.P. 15(a)(2). Whether 
that standard has been met is decided in the trial court's discretion. E.g., Maroun v. Wyreless 
Sys., Inc., 141 Idaho 604,612, 114 P.3d 974,982 (2005), abrogated on other grounds, 
Wandering Trails, LLC v. Big Bite Excavation, Inc., 156 Idaho 586,591,329 P.3d 368,373 
(2014). That said, leave to amend ordinarily should be granted unless (i) there is undue delay, 
bad faith, or a dilatory motive on the movant's part, (ii) the movant has repeatedly failed to cure 
deficiencies in its pleadings by amending them, (iii) the amendment would unduly prejudice the 
nonmovant, or (iv) the amendment would be futile. E.g., id. A proposed new claim is futile if 
the supporting factual allegations are insufficient to state a claim for relief. E.g., id. 
A much more demanding standard applies, however, when the proposed amendment is 
one seeking punitive damages. Advance judicial permission is needed to seek punitive damages. 
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LC. § 6-1604(2). That is because "[p ]unitive damages are not favored in the law and should be 
awarded in only the most unusual and compelling circumstances." Seiniger Law Office, P.A. v. 
N Pac. Ins. Co., 145 Idaho 241,249, 178 P.3d 606,614 (2008). Permission to seek punitive 
damages must, however, be granted if, "after weighing the evidence presented" at a pretrial 
hearing, the trial court concludes the claimant has "a reasonable likelihood of proving facts at 
trial sufficient to support an award of punitive damages."3 J.C.§ 6-1604(2). 
An award of punitive damages is appropriate upon proof at trial, by clear and convincing 
evidence, of "oppressive, fraudulent, malicious or outrageous conduct." I.C. § 6-1604(1 ). 
Evidence is clear and convincing if it establishes "that the thing to be proved is highly probable 
or reasonably certain." Doe v. Doe, 150 Idaho 46, 49,244 P.3d 190, 193 (2010). Conduct is 
oppressive, fraudulent, malicious, or outrageous if the actor "performed a bad act with a bad state 
of mind." Hall v. Farmers All. Mut. Ins. Co., 145 Idaho 313,319, 179 P.3d 276,282 (2008). 
Thus, to obtain permission to seek punitive damages, the claimant must show a reasonable 
likelihood of proving at trial, by clear and convincing evidence, the requisite intersection of a 
"bad act" and a "bad state of mind." E.g., id. The "bad act" requirement is met by evidence of 
"an extreme deviation from reasonable standards of conduct." Seiniger, 145 Idaho at 250, 178 
P.3d at 615 (internal quotation marks omitted). The "bad state of mind" requirement is met by 
evidence that the "bad act" was performed with "an understanding of or disregard for its likely 
consequences" and in "an extremely harmful state of mind, whether that be termed malice, 
3 Citing Bryant v. Colonial Surety Co., 2016 WL 707339, at *3 (D. Idaho Feb. 22, 2016), 
Plaintiffs contend section 6-1604(2) calls upon trial courts to employ the same approach they 
must employ in deciding Rule 50 motions for judgment as a matter of law. The Court disagrees 
with Bryant's conclusion in that regard. Section 6-1604(2) expressly requires trial courts to 
weigh the evidence. Rule 50, by contrast, forbids weighing the evidence. E.g., Reeves v. 
Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000). Consequently, the two modes of 
analysis are fundamentally different. 
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oppression, fraud or gross negligence; malice, oppression, wantonness; or simply deliberate or 
willful." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Additionally, it is important to recognize that "[b]efore a plaintiff can recover punitive 
damages, he or she must be entitled to legal or equitable relief." Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 
670, 675, 183 P .3d 758, 763 (2008). In other words, a request for punitive damages isn't a 
freestanding claim; instead, it is merely a request for a particular remedy-an award of punitive 
damages-upon proof of an underlying claim. Id.; Great Plains Equip., Inc. v. Nw. Pipeline 
Corp., 132 Idaho 754,771,979 P.2d 627,644 (1999) (affirming the denial of permission to seek 
punitive damages because the plaintiff "did not have viable underlying claims"). Consequently, 
to satisfy section 6-1604(2), the claimant must show a reasonable likelihood4 of proving at trial 
not only the "bad act" and "bad state of mind" that are essential to any award of punitive 
damages, but also an underlying claim. Whether the necessary showing has been made is 
decided in the trial court's discretion. Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Assocs., 
LLP, 148 Idaho 479,499,224 P.3d 1068, 1088 (2009). 
4 Idaho case law doesn't seem to explore the meaning of the phrase "reasonable likelihood," as 
used in section 6-1604(2). A plain English interpretation of that phrase, in the Court's mind, is a 
realistic chance-a chance too great to be discounted as simply unlikely, even if not great 
enough to be probable. That view is in line with judicial interpretations of that same phrase in 
other (admittedly unrelated) contexts. E.g., Guo v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 556,564 (3d Cir. 2004) 
("A 'reasonable likelihood' means merely showing a realistic chance that the petitioner can at a 
later time establish that asylum should be granted."); Alvarez v. Superior Court, 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
854, 863 n.4 (2007) ('"Reasonable likelihood' ... has been construed to mean something less 
than more probable than not, yet greater than something that is merely possible.") (internal 
quotation marks and brackets omitted). 
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A. Defendants' motions for summary judgment 
Three of the claims asserted in Plaintiffs' amended complaint are challenged on summary 
judgment: (1) Count VI, a claim for violation of the Idaho Trade Secrets Act; (2) Count IV, a 
claim for breach of fiduciary duty; and (3) Count VII, a claim for interference with prospective 
economic advantage. No other claims against Dustin Siddoway and Barkan remain at issue.5 
Thus, Dustin Siddoway and Barkan seek total extrication from this action. Siddoway PC and 
Randy Siddoway, by contrast, seek only partial summary judgment, as other claims involving 
them remain pending. The Court addresses these three claims in turn . 
.L Count VI: violation of the Idaho Trade Secrets Act 
Count VI of Plaintiffs' amended complaint is a claim that Defendants misappropriated a 
trade secret-a spreadsheet containing Wadsworth Reese's client list and related historical 
billing information (Am. Compl. ,r,r 110-11)6-in violation of the Idaho Trade Secrets Act. 
Defendants seek summary judgment against that claim on the theory that the spreadsheet fails to 
qualify as a "trade secret" under the Act. In the Court's view, Defendants are right. 
To prevail on a misappropriation claim under the Act, the plaintiff must make a threshold 
showing that the information at issue is in fact a "trade secret." Basic Am., Inc. v. Shati/a, 133 
Idaho 726, 734, 992 P.2d 175, 183 (1999). The Act defines a trade secret as: 
5 As already noted, Plaintiffs seek permission, through their motion to amend, to drop their claim 
for breach of confidence, which also is asserted against Dustin Siddoway and Barkan. 
6 Plaintiffs attempted to expand this claim on summary judgment, arguing that Defendants also 
misappropriated Plaintiffs' UltraTax information. (Mem. Opp'n Dustin Siddoway's & Jeanine 
Barkan's Mots. Summ. J. 2.) But Plaintiffs haven't moved to amend the claim to incorporate this 
new theory of liability. The Court won't consider it on summary judgment. 
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[l]nformation, including a ... compilation, ... that: 
(a) Derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not 
being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means 
by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and 
(b) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to 
maintain its secrecy. 
I.C. § 48-801(5). Defendants' arguments for summary judgment are predicated on subpart (b); 
they contend Wadsworth Reese failed to make reasonable efforts to keep secret the spreadsheet 
containing its client list and related historical billing information. Plaintiffs contend the 
opposite. The issue at hand is whether there is a genuine factual dispute on that point. 
According to the record, Wadsworth Reese did almost nothing to keep the spreadsheet 
secret, or to even convey to anyone that it was regarded as secret. The spreadsheet was kept on 
Wadsworth Reese's computer system, accessible by anyone who worked there. (See R. 
Siddoway Deel. filed Feb. 7, 2017, ,r,r 13-15, 27, 29.) Wadsworth Reese's computer system was 
password-protected. (Id. ,r 14; Wadsworth Deel. filed Apr. 4, 2017, ,r 11 .) And Wadsworth 
Reese conducted business in a building that was kept locked (Hanway Aff. filed Apr. 4, 2017, 
Ex.Bat 104:1-22, 106:23-107:16), at least outside of regular business hours. Other than that, 
Plaintiffs fail to identify any measures taken to convey to anyone that the spreadsheet was 
regarded as secret, or any measures taken to keep it secret. There is no evidence the spreadsheet 
was marked "confidential." Wadsworth Reese didn't require its members or employees to enter 
into confidentiality agreements, pertaining to either the spreadsheet in particular or its business 
information in general. (R. Siddoway Deel. filed Feb. 7, 2017, ,r 11; D. Siddoway Aff. filed Feb. 
7, 2017, ,r 3; Barkan Aff. filed Feb. 7, 2017, ,r 3.) Wadsworth Reese didn't tell its members or 
employees that the spreadsheet (or any of its other business information) was secret, nor did it 
take any other identifiable action to impress upon them the spreadsheet's confidential nature. (R. 
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Siddoway Deel. filed Feb. 7, 2017, ,r,r 6-9; D. Siddoway Aff. filed Feb. 7, 2017, ,r,r 4-6; Barkan 
Aff. filed Feb. 7, 2017, ,r,r 4-6.) Wadsworth Reese even provided a copy of the spreadsheet to 
Shannon Vincent, a business consultant, in January 2015, and there is no indication that, in doing 
so, it bound Vincent to any confidentiality obligation. (Hanway Aff. filed Apr. 4, 2017, Ex.Bat 
107:22-112:8; R. Siddoway Deel. filed Feb.7.2017, ,r 30.) 
Wadsworth Reese's failure to do anything to convey to anyone that the spreadsheet was 
considered secret is highly problematic for Plaintiffs, particularly when coupled with the 
spreadsheet's accessibility to anyone with a password to Wadsworth Reese's computer system. 
See, e.g., Welenco, Inc. v. Corbell, 126 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 1174-75 (E.D. Cal. 2015) (holding that 
a company's client list could qualify as a "trade secret" because the company told its employees 
the list is confidential, but that certain drawings failed to qualify as a "trade secret" because there 
was no evidence the company did anything to keep them secret or even bothered to tell the 
employee who prepared them that it considered them secret); Alagold Corp. v. Freeman, 20 F. 
Supp. 2d 1305, 1315 (M.D. Ala. 1998) ("At Alagold, employees who need to know secret 
information have free access to it, and none of the filing cabinets containing such information are 
locked. There is no evidence that Alagold's proprietary information was marked 'confidential' 
or that Alagold communicated to its employees that such proprietary information was to be kept 
confidential."); Buffets, Inc. v. Klinke, 73 F.3d 965,969 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that manuals 
failed to qualify as "trade secrets" because the employees to whom they were given weren't told 
they were secret and weren't asked to prevent others from obtaining them); Jackson v. Hammer, 
653 N.E.2d 809, 817 (Ill. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that the plaintiffs customer lists failed to 
qualify as "trade secrets" because they "were not kept under lock and key, defendants (plaintifrs 
competitor) knew many of plaintiffs customers, and the record contains no evidence that 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUM1v1ARY JUDGMENT 
AND ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO AMEND - I 0 
000327
plaintiff took steps to explain the secrecy or confidentiality of the lists to his employees"). 
Employees with access to information can't be expected to know it is secret unless they are told. 
And if they aren't told it is secret, they can't reasonably be expected to treat it as secret. The 
combination of not telling employees certain information is secret and giving them access to it is 
a decidedly unreasonable approach, as these cases illustrate, to maintaining secrecy. 
Plaintiffs try to explain away the near-total absence of confidentiality measures by saying 
that neither Wadsworth nor Reese ever had reason for concern that Wadsworth Reese's 
confidential information would be misappropriated. (Wadsworth Deel. filed Apr. 4, 2017, ,i 11; 
Reese Deel. filed Apr. 4, 2017, ,i 6.) While the perceived absence of any particular reason for 
such a concern may well be a consideration in determining whether the chosen secrecy measures 
were reasonable under the circumstances, it cannot render reasonable a near-total failure to do 
anything either to convey a desire for secrecy or to actually maintain secrecy. The Court 
recognizes that questions of reasonableness normally are put to a jury. But the Court is 
responsible for assessing whether a reasonable jury could find, based on the evidence presented 
on summary judgment, that the measures taken to keep the information at issue secret were 
reasonable under the circumstances. When no reasonable jury could so find, summary judgment 
is appropriate. See Gemisys Corp. v. Phoenix Am., Inc., 186 F.R.D. 551,558 (N.D. Cal. 1999) 
("[C]ourts routinely summarily adjudicate cases in which the plaintiff did not take steps to ensure 
the confidentiality of its material."). No reasonable jury could so find here, as Wadsworth Reese 
took essentially no secrecy measures. Accordingly, Defendants are granted summary judgment 
against Plaintiffs' misappropriation claim. 
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2. Count IV: breach of fiduciary duty 
In Count IV of its amended complaint, Plaintiffs claim that, as a member of Wadsworth 
Reese, Siddoway PC owed fiduciary duties to Wadsworth Reese and its other members, that it 
breached those duties by giving Dustin Siddoway the spreadsheet containing Wadsworth Reese 
client information and helping his new accounting firm lure clients away from Wadsworth 
Reese, and that the other defendants conspired in these breaches. (Am. Compl. ,r,r 95-108.)7 
In seeking summary judgment against this claim, Defendants dispute the notion that 
Siddoway PC owed fiduciary duties to Wadsworth Reese in the first place. But they are wrong 
about that. Wadsworth Reese is a limited liability company-an LLC. Unless its operating 
agreement expressly says otherwise, an LLC is member-managed. I.C. § 30-6-407(1). Members 
of member-managed LLCs owe duties of care and loyalty to the LLC and the other members, 
I.C. § 30-6-409(1), unlike members of manager-managed LLCs. I.C. § 30-6-409(7). Wadsworth 
Reese's operating agreement doesn't say it is manager-managed, so it is member-managed. The 
Court isn't persuaded by Defendants' argument that Wadsworth Reese transformed itself into a 
manager-managed LLC simply by excluding Siddoway PC from a management role. That 
argument is out of step with section 30-6-407(1). Consequently, for so long as it has been a 
Wadsworth Reese member, Siddoway PC has owed duties of care and loyalty to Wadsworth 
Reese and its other members. Although Wadsworth Reese's operating agreement validly limits 
the scope of the duty of loyalty by authorizing its members to compete with it, the operating 
agreement doesn't appear to authorize its members to funnel its business information to a 
7 This citation is to the paragraphs in both Count IV (the fiduciary-duty claim) and Count V (the 
claim for conspiracy to commit a breach of fiduciary duty). In a prior decision, the Court entered 
summary judgment against Count V because there is no stand-alone claim for conspiracy, but the 
Court held that Count V's conspiracy allegations would be considered part of Count IV. 
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competitor, as Siddoway PC did with the spreadsheet. 8 Thus, summary judgment can't be 
granted on the theory that no fiduciary duties were owed at all. 
Defendants also seek summary judgment against the fiduciary-duty claim on the theory 
that Plaintiffs can't prove a causal connection between any breach of fiduciary duty and any 
resulting damages, nor can they prove the amount of any resulting damages with reasonable 
certainty. Plaintiffs have offered evidence that Randy Siddoway provided the spreadsheet of 
Wadsworth Reese client information to Dustin Siddoway, that Randy Siddoway intended for 
Dustin Siddoway to use the spreadsheet to identify Wadsworth Reese clients that would be likely 
to transition to Dustin Siddoway's new accounting firm, that Dustin Siddoway actually solicited 
some Wadsworth Reese clients, and that some Wadsworth Reese clients left it for Dustin 
Siddoway's new accounting firm, causing Wadsworth Reese to lose the associated revenue. 
Plaintiffs' evidence of causation and damages is undeniably shaky. It is far from clear that the 
spreadsheet played a meaningful role in Dustin Siddoway's solicitation of Wadsworth Reese 
clients, many (if not most) of which undoubtedly could've been identified from other sources as 
targets for solicitation. Consequently, Plaintiffs might have significant difficulty convincing a 
jury that access to the spreadsheet actually drove the migration of clients from Wadsworth Reese 
to Dustin Siddoway's new accounting firm. That said, the Court considers the evidence barely 
strong enough to support an inference that access to the spreadsheet aided Dustin Siddoway's 
8 In fact, section 6.6A of the operating agreement, which authorizes Wadsworth Reese's 
members to compete with it, goes on to require its members to account to it for profit made 
through use of "Company Property"-a term sections 1.15 and 1.43 of the operating agreement, 
considered together, define broadly enough to encompass the spreadsheet. 
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solicitation efforts and resulted in some loss of revenue to Wadsworth Reese.9 Summary 
judgment therefore won't be granted on this ground either. 
Because neither of these arguments warrants the entry of summary judgment, and 
because Siddoway PC and Randy Siddoway make no more arguments for summary judgment 
against the fiduciary-duty claim, they are denied summary judgment as to that claim. 
Dustin Siddoway and Barkan, however, present another argument that remains to be 
considered. They say they aren't liable for any breach of fiduciary duty by Siddoway PC 
because there is no evidence that any such breach was an objective of a conspiracy between 
Siddoway PC (or its principal, Randy Siddoway) and either of them. "A civil conspiracy that 
gives rise to legal remedies exists only ifthere is an agreement between two or more to 
accomplish an unlawful objective or to accomplish a lawful objective in an unlawful manner." 
McPheters v. Maile, 138 Idaho 391,395, 64 P.3d 317,321 (2003). A conspiracy claim is based 
on "the civil wrong committed as the objective of the conspiracy, not the conspiracy itself." Id. 
To prevail on a conspiracy claim, a plaintiff must provide "specific evidence of a plan or 
agreement" among the defendants to commit the civil wrong. Wesco Autobody Supply, Inc. v. 
Ernest, 149 Idaho 881,899,243 P.3d 1069, 1087 (2010) (emphasis added). 
There is evidence that Randy Siddoway left Wadsworth Reese to collaborate with his 
nephew, Dustin Siddoway, in related business ventures-specifically, that Randy Siddoway 
would offer consulting services and Dustin Siddoway would offer traditional accounting 
services, acting through separate business entities that were given similar names and that would 
9 The Court isn't persuaded by the argument that Plaintiffs necessarily sustained no damages 
because their own expert witness says Wadsworth Reese's goodwill was zero both before and 
after Randy Siddoway provided the spreadsheet to Dustin Siddoway. The absence of goodwill 
doesn't disprove Plaintiffs' assertion that Wadsworth Revenue's revenue would've been higher 
had Randy Siddoway not provided the spreadsheet to Dustin Siddoway. 
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do business at the same location. There is also evidence that Randy Siddoway provided the 
spreadsheet to Dustin Siddoway for his use in identifying clients that might migrate from 
Wadsworth Reese to Dustin Siddoway's new accounting firm, which in tum might benefit Randy 
Siddoway's new consulting firm by creating an opportunity for cross-selling his consulting 
services. What's lacking, though, is "specific evidence" that either Dustin Siddoway or Barkan, 
who was hired by Dustin Siddoway's new accounting firm, arranged with Randy Siddoway or 
Siddoway PC for the spreadsheet to be provided to them. Dustin Siddoway and Barkan say 
Randy Siddoway sent the spreadsheet unsolicited. (Barkan Aff. filed Feb. 7, 20 I 7, 1 I 9; D. 
Siddoway Aff. filed Feb. 7, 2017, 18.) Randy Siddoway says the same thing. (R. Siddoway 
Deel. filed Feb. 7, 2017, 1127-28.) 
By requiring "specific evidence" of a conspiratorial agreement, the legal standard for 
conspiracy liability seemingly discourages inferring a conspiracy from evidence of actions that 
merely might be regarded as consistent with one. The evidence of coordination among 
Defendants in leaving Wadsworth Reese might have some slight tendency to suggest the 
existence of the conspiracy Plaintiffs claim existed. But that inference is not strong. It is 
weaker, in the Court's view, than the contrary inference that Randy Siddoway provided the 
spreadsheet of his own accord, particularly when one takes into account the absence of evidence 
suggesting the spreadsheet was critical to Dustin Siddoway's ability to develop a clientele for his 
new accounting firm. Regardless, there is simply no "specific evidence" of a conspiratorial 
agreement between Randy Siddoway or Siddoway PC, on one hand, and Dustin Siddoway or 
Barkan, on the other hand, for Siddoway PC to take some action-such as giving Dustin 
Siddoway or Barkan the spreadsheet-that would violate its fiduciary duties to Wadsworth 
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Reese and Wadsworth Reese's other members. For that reason, summary judgment is granted to 
Dustin Siddoway and to Barkan on Plaintiffs' fiduciary-duty claim. 
3. Count VII: interference with prospective economic advantage 
In Count VII of their amended complaint, Plaintiffs claim Defendants interfered with the 
prospective economic advantage associated with Wadsworth Reese's client relationships. (Am. 
Compl. ,i,i 114-27.)10 The means by which they allegedly did so was using the spreadsheet and 
other unspecified proprietary information to lure clients away from Wadsworth Reese and to 
Dustin Siddoway's new accounting firm. (Id. ,i 119.) The elements of this claim are: 
(1) the existence of a valid economic expectancy, (2) knowledge of the 
expectancy on the part of the interferer, (3) intentional interference inducing 
termination of the expectancy, (4) the interference was wrongful by some measure 
beyond the fact of the interference itself, and (5) resulting damage to the plaintiff 
whose expectancy has been disrupted. 
Wesco, 149 Idaho at 893, 243 P.3d at 1081. As to the claim's fourth element, interference is 
wrongful if either "( 1) the interferer had an improper motive to harm the plaintiff; or (2) the 
means used by the interferer to cause injury to the prospective advantage were wrongful by 
reason of a statute, regulation, recognized common law rule, or an established standard of a trade 
or profession." Syringa Networks, LLC v. Idaho Dep't of Admin., 155 Idaho 55, 64-65, 305 P.3d 
499, 508-09 (2013). Plaintiffs say the alleged interference was wrongful because it was 
accomplished by violating the Idaho Trade Secrets Act, by violating I.C. § 30-6-409, or by 
violating the common law. (Am. Compl. ,i 118.) 
Dustin Siddoway and Barkan are entitled to summary judgment against the interference 
claim for lack of evidence that their interference with the alleged prospective economic 
10 This citation is to the paragraphs in both Count VII (the interference claim) and Count VIII 
(the claim for conspiracy to commit interference). In a prior decision, the Court entered 
summary judgment against Count VIII because there is no stand-alone claim for conspiracy, but 
the Court held that Count VIII's conspiracy allegations would be considered part of Count VII. 
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advantage was "wrongful" under this legal standard. The evidence doesn't support an inference 
that either Dustin Siddoway or Barkan solicited Wadsworth Reese's clients with the aim of 
harming Plaintiffs, rather than with the aim of helping Dustin Siddoway's new accounting firm. 
That takes care of the first prong of the ''wrongfulness" test. As to the second prong, the Court is 
granting summary judgment against Plaintiffs' misappropriation claim under the Idaho Trade 
Secrets Act, so Plaintiffs can't establish that the alleged interference was "wrongful" on the 
ground that it violated the Act. The Court also is granting summary judgment to Dustin 
Siddoway and Barkan on Plaintiffs' fiduciary-duty claim, so Plaintiffs can't establish that the 
alleged interference was "wrongful" on the ground that it entailed a breach of any fiduciary 
duties owed under LC.§ 30-6-409 for which either Dustin Siddoway or Barkan are responsible. 
Finally, to the extent Plaintiffs pin their hopes on the notion that the alleged interference was 
"wrongful" because it entailed a violation of the common law, the particular common-law rule 
on which they rely isn't specified. That takes care of the second prong. Consequently, Plaintiffs 
are unable to establish "wrongful" interference by Dustin Siddoway or Barkan, entitling them to 
summary judgment. 
This reasoning doesn't apply, however, to Randy Siddoway and Siddoway PC, as the 
Court is denying summary judgment to them on Plaintiffs' fiduciary-duty claim. Thus, the 
alleged breach of fiduciary duty can serve as the "wrongful" act of interference needed to make 
out that element of the interference claim. See Wesco, 149 Idaho at 894, 243 P.3d at 1082. As a 
result, the Court must consider the other two arguments for summary judgment made by Randy 
Siddoway and Siddoway PC. 
The first of them is that Plaintiffs lack a valid economic expectancy in the continued 
patronage of Wadsworth Reese's clients. This argument is grounded in an opinion held by 
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Plaintiffs' own expert witness in business valuation. The expert witness's opinion is that 
Wadsworth Reese had no goodwill even before it splintered, as there were no covenants not to 
compete that would inhibit its members or employees from leaving the firm and taking the 
clients they serviced with them. (Mahoney Aff. filed Feb. 7, 2017, Ex. E.) The Court will 
assume for now that Plaintiffs' expert witness has made a sound business-valuation judgment in 
that regard. Even so, the absence of goodwill from a business-valuation standpoint doesn't 
negate the seemingly reasonable real-world expectation that Wadsworth Reese would receive 
repeat business from at least some of its clients. The Court is aware of no case law suggesting 
that a business lacks any valid expectancy of continuing relationships with its existing clients if it 
isn't in a position to bar its employees from servicing those clients on behalf of some other 
employer. The Court isn't persuaded by this argument. 
The second of them is the notion that, by their own admission, Plaintiffs haven't been 
damaged. This argument also derives from an opinion of Plaintiffs' expert witness in business 
valuation. The expert witness's opinion is that a one-third membership interest in Wadsworth 
Reese had the same worth-zero-both before and after it splintered. (Mahoney Aff. filed Feb. 
7, 2017, Ex. E.) Part of the basis for that opinion is the already-discussed opinion that 
Wadsworth Reese had no goodwill. Here as well, the Court will assume for now that Plaintiffs' 
expert witness has made a sound business-valuation judgment. Nevertheless, that a business 
lacks value from a business-valuation standpoint at two particular points in time doesn't prove it 
is incapable of earning profits between those two points in time or at subsequent times. 
Professional firms, it cannot be denied, sometimes generate profits and then pay them out to their 
owners, leaving their balance sheets no stronger than before, rather than putting them in the bank 
or using them to fund capital investments, as would improve their balance sheets. Randy 
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Siddoway and Siddoway PC may well be able to make hay with these expert opinions in front of 
the jury, but they do not, ipso facto, prove that Plaintiffs suffered no financial loss from a mass 
departure of clients. 
For these reasons, Plaintiffs' interference claim survives summary judgment as to Randy 
Siddoway and Siddoway PC. 
B. Plaintiffs' motion to amend 
Plaintiffs move to amend their complaint in four respects: (i) to seek punitive damages in 
connection with their claims for breach of fiduciary duty and for interference with prospective 
economic advantage; (ii) to add a claim for unjust enrichment in relation to the Reese 
Agreement, which an arbitrator has declared void; (iii) to consolidate, as a housekeeping 
measure, their conspiracy claims into the underlying tort claims to which the alleged conspiracies 
relate; and (iv) to drop their claims for breach of confidence and for a declaratory judgment that 
the Reese Agreement is void. Defendants don't object to the motion except insofar as Plaintiffs 
request permission under LC.§ 6-1604(2) to seek punitive damages. Given Defendants' 
position, the Court grants the motion, without further comment, to the extent Plaintiffs seek to 
add a claim for unjust enrichment and to drop their claims for breach of confidence and for a 
declaratory judgment that the Reese Agreement is void. 
Although Defendants don't oppose the proposed housekeeping amendment by which 
Plaintiffs would consolidate their conspiracy claims into the underlying tort claims to which the 
alleged conspiracies relate, the Court nevertheless denies the motion to the extent it pertains to 
Dustin Siddoway and Barkan, as summary judgment is being granted to them on the claims that 
they conspired to commit a breach of fiduciary duty and to interfere with prospective economic 
advantage. The proposed housekeeping amendment is unnecessary (or, in other words, futile) to 
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that extent. But to any extent the proposed housekeeping amendment pertains to Randy 
Siddoway and Siddoway PC, the motion is granted. 
That leaves for discussion the matter of punitive damages. Plaintiffs are denied 
permission to amend their complaint to seek punitive damages against Dustin Siddoway and 
Barkan. As already noted, "[b ]efore a plaintiff can recover punitive damages, he or she must be 
entitled to legal or equitable relief." Losser, 145 Idaho at 675, 183 P.3d at 763. Because 
Plaintiffs' claims against those defendants don't survive summary judgment, there is no basis to 
hold them to account for punitive damages. 
Plaintiffs also are denied permission to amend their complaint to seek punitive damages 
against Randy Siddoway and Siddoway PC. Plaintiffs propose to seek punitive damages against 
those defendants in connection with their claims for breach of fiduciary duty and for interference 
with prospective economic advantage. After weighing the evidence presented, the Court isn't 
persuaded that Plaintiffs have shown a reasonable likelihood of proving by clear and convincing 
evidence the requisite bad act and bad state of mind in connection with those claims. 
This action centers on the spreadsheet of Wadsworth Reese client information that Randy 
Siddoway admittedly provided to Dustin Siddoway's new accounting firm. His having done so 
is at least potentially actionable, as discussed above. But the spreadsheet wasn't the subject of 
any meaningful confidentiality protections, casting grave doubt on Plaintiffs' assertions about its 
intrinsic value for client-solicitation purposes. Its value for those purposes indeed seems 
dubious. The Court finds persuasive the evidence that the spreadsheet's key information-the 
list of clients themselves-could've largely been assembled, with reasonable effort, without 
access to the spreadsheet (or to any illicitly obtained information). The spreadsheet therefore 
may well have served as a convenient shortcut for Dustin Siddoway-a means of reducing the 
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effort involved in identifying clients to solicit. But there is little reason to think, based on the 
evidence presented, that access to the spreadsheet actually played an important role in getting 
Wadsworth Reese clients to migrate to Dustin Siddoway's new accounting firm. More 
importantly, there is little reason to think, based on the evidence presented, that when he 
provided the spreadsheet to Dustin Siddoway, Randy Siddoway expected it to enable Dustin 
Siddoway to lure more clients away from Wadsworth Reese than he would've been able to lure 
without access to the spreadsheet. The Court doesn't discount the possibility that Plaintiffs could 
recover some damages award in connection with their fiduciary-duty and interference claims at 
trial. The Court nevertheless concludes, in its discretion, that Plaintiffs haven't shown a 
reasonable likelihood of proving at trial, by clear and convincing evidence, the bad act and bad 
state of mind that are essential to an award of punitive damages. 
Accordingly, 
IT IS ORDERED that Dustin Siddoway's motion for summary judgment is granted. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Jeanine Barkan's motion for summary judgment is 
granted. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion for summary judgment filed by Randy 
Siddoway and Siddoway PC is granted in part and denied in part. Summary judgment is granted 
to them on Plaintiffs' misappropriation claim under the Idaho Trade Secrets Act. Otherwise, the 
motion is denied. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' motion to amend their complaint is granted 
in part and denied in part, as described above. Plaintiffs shall file an amended complaint 
consistent with this order within seven days of its entry. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, in accordance with the oral order made in open court 
on April 18, 2017, the mediation deadline set in the Amended Scheduling Order governing this 
action is extended so as to expire forty-two days after this order's entry. 
ro ft. u "'"00 .,.,,,, .. ., ,. 
Ja n D. Scott 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
 
WADSWORTH REESE, PLLC, an Idaho 
Professional Corporation; CLARK A. REESE 
CPA, P.C., an Idaho Professional Corporation;  
and WADSWORTH ACCOUNTING CPA, 
PLLC, an Idaho Professional Corporation, 
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vs. 
SIDDOWAY & COMPANY, PC, an Idaho 
professional corporation; RANDY 
SIDDOWAY, an individual; DUSTIN 
SIDDOWAY, an individual and JEANINE 
BARKAN, an individual; 
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SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT 
FOR DISSOCIATION, DAMAGES and 
DECLARATORY RELIEF  
 
PARTIES, JURISDICTION, VENUE 
1. Plaintiff Wadsworth Reese, PLLC (“WR PLLC”) is an Idaho Professional 
Corporation in good standing with the Idaho Secretary of State and is formerly known as 
Siddoway, Wadsworth & Reese, PLLC. 
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2. Plaintiff Clark A. Reese CPA, P.C. (“Reese PC”) is an Idaho Professional 
Corporation in good standing with the Idaho Secretary of State and is a member of WR PLLC. 
3. Plaintiff Wadsworth Accounting CPA, PLLC (“Wadsworth PLLC”) is an Idaho 
Professional Corporation in good standing with the Idaho Secretary of State and is a member of 
WR PLLC. 
4. Defendant Siddoway & Company, P.C. (“Siddoway Co.”) is an Idaho Professional 
Corporation in good standing with the Idaho Secretary of State and is a member of WR PLLC.  
5. Defendant Randy Siddoway (“Randy”) is an individual resident of the State of 
Idaho, residing in Ada County and, upon information and belief, the sole member of Siddoway 
Co. 
6. Defendant Dustin Siddoway (“Dustin”) is an individual resident of the State of 
Idaho and a former employee of WR PLLC. 
7. Defendant Jeanine Barkan (“Barkan”) is an individual resident of the State of Idaho 
and a former employee of WR PLLC. 
8. Plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to the WR PLLC Operating Agreement, the 
Idaho Uniform Limited Liability Company Act and other applicable law. 
9. Plaintiffs, including WR PLLC, are proper parties pursuant to I.C. §§30-6-902, 30-
6-903 and by the vote of Reese PC and Wadsworth PLLC.     
10. Siddoway Co. has renounced its duties to WR PLLC, has utilized WR PLLC 
property to its detriment, has solicited employees from WR PLLC and has helped Dustin acquire 
more than 283 former WR PLLC clients for his new accounting practice, for which reasons a 
demand under I. C. §30-6-902(1) would be futile. 
11. The amount in controversy is greater than the sum of $10,000.00. 
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12. Based upon the above allegations and pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-404, this claim 
satisfies the jurisdictional prerequisites of the District Court and venue is proper in this action. 
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 
13. On December 20, 2013, Clark Reese (“Clark”) and Randy filed a Certificate of 
Organization with the Idaho Secretary of State organizing WR PLLC (then known as CRS 
Services, PLLC) as a professional limited liability company. 
14. The Certificate of Organization listed Clark and Randy as either members or 
managers of WR PLLC. 
15. On January 1, 2014, WR PLLC entered into a Purchase Agreement with Non-
Competition Agreement with Harding & Co. P.A.  (“Harding Agreement”). 
16. Pursuant to the Harding Agreement, WR PLLC purchased the following assets 
from Harding & Co., P.A.: 
a. All of the equipment, computers, computer programs/software, client lists, 
furniture, marketing materials, signs, tools, client files, inventory, and fixtures, 
plus all other property used in conducting the Harding & Co., P.A. business. 
b.   All leasehold improvements and leasehold rights of Harding & Co., P.A. at 
the premises of 357 East Watertower Lane, Meridian, ID, 83642. 
c. All of Harding & Co., P.A.’s goodwill. 
d. The right to Harding & Co., P.A.’s telephone number(s) and listing in the 
telephone books. 
e. All clients, client lists, client files and information. 
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17. In return for the assets, WR PLLC agreed to pay to Harding Co., P.A. 60% of the 
average annual collections for services performed in 2014 and 2015, including amounts collected 
through April 30, 2016. 
18. The purchase price was to be paid pursuant to a promissory note over a five year 
period with interest accruing at 6%. 
19. Harding Co., PA and its owner, Kalyn Harding (“Kalyn”) agreed not to compete 
with WR PLLC and Kalyn and other former Harding Co., PA employees accepted positions with 
WR PLLC. 
20. On or about January 6, 2014, Reese PC, Wadsworth PLLC, and Siddoway Co. 
executed an Operating Agreement for WR PLLC: 
a. The January 6, 2014 Operating Agreement was the first governing document 
for WR PLLC other than the Certificate of Organization filed on December 20, 
2013. 
b. The January 6, 2014, Operating Agreement listed Reese PC, Wadsworth PLLC 
and Siddoway Co. as the members of WR PLLC. 
c. The January 6, 2014, Operating Agreement changed the name of WR PLLC 
from CRS Services, PLLC to Siddoway, Wadsworth & Reese, PLLC. 
d. The January 6, 2014, Operating Agreement listed each of the three members’ 
capital contribution to WR PLLC as $100. 
21. On January 14, 2014, WR PLLC filed an Amendment to Certificate of Organization 
with the Idaho Secretary of State changing the name of WR PLLC from CRS Services, PLLC to 
Siddoway, Wadsworth & Reese, PLLC. 
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22. On or about January 20, 2014, WR PLLC hired Dustin to work for it as a certified 
professional accountant.   
23. Dustin’s terms of employment were negotiated by Randy. 
24. Randy is Dustin’s uncle. 
25. The offer to employ Dustin with WR PLLC was made by Randy. 
26. Randy has never produced a signed, written contract between WR PLLC and Dustin 
covering the substance of Dustin’s employment with WR PLLC. 
27. Upon information and belief, Randy permitted Dustin to work for WR PLLC 
without having Dustin execute a written contract. 
28. Randy has never produced a signed, written contract restricting Dustin’s ability to 
compete with WR PLLC or otherwise exploit his exposure to WR PLLC clients, including those 
purchased from Harding & Co, P.A. 
29. Upon information and belief, Randy permitted Dustin to work for WR PLLC 
without having Dustin execute a written contract restricting Dustin’s ability to compete with WR 
PLLC for clients with whom he established a relationship while an employee of WR PLLC. 
30. On or about January 28, 2015, Reese PC and Siddoway Co. signed an Asset Sale 
Agreement (“Reese Agreement”). 
31. Pursuant to the Reese Agreement, Reese PC purportedly purchased from Siddoway 
& Co. the right to receive a one third interest and membership in WR PLLC (then known as 
Siddoway, Wadsworth & Reese, PLLC). 
32. The Reese Agreement purports to value the one third interest and membership at 
“one half the value of certain assets to be contributed.” 
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33. At the time Reese PC executed the Reese Agreement, Reese PC was already a 
member of WR PLLC. 
34. The Reese Agreement fails to list the “certain assets” to be contributed. 
35. The Reese Agreement fails to specify to where those certain assets will “be 
contributed.” 
36. As part of the execution of the Reese Agreement, it was decided amongst the 
members of Wadsworth Reese, PLLC and the parties to the Reese Agreement that the Reese 
Agreement would only be valid if the members of Wadsworth Reese reached an agreement by 
February 15, 2015, on the issues of partner compensation and contribution that would be 
incorporated into a new Operating Agreement. 
37. After the meeting on January 28, 2015, Frederick Wadsworth reduced the above 
agreement (reflected in paragraph 39) regarding the validity of the Reese Agreement to an email, 
which was titled Modification #1 that Clark Reese, Randy Siddoway, and Frederick Wadsworth 
signed. Modification #1 is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
38. Modification #1 to the Reese Agreement specifically states that, “The Clark buy-in 
document (Reese Agreement) will be void if fewer than two partners agree to sign the 
operating/member’s agreement by February 15, 2015.”  Modification #1 also contemplated various 
terms that still needed to be agreed to, including but not limited to a “non-transferrable clause” and 
a non-compete to protect Randy Siddoway. 
39. Around the time the Reese Agreement was executed, Clark Reese and Randy 
Siddoway agreed that Clark’s previous $5,500 loan to Randy could be used as credit for the 
$200,000 due under the Reese Agreement. 
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40. Through Reese PC, Clark Reese made two payments in January 2015, totaling 
$5,000 and began to make monthly payments of $2,500 in anticipation that the parties would reach 
a new Operating Agreement pursuant to Modification #1. 
41. From approximately January 2015, through the summer of 2015, and well beyond 
the February 15, 2015, deadlines, the members of Wadsworth Reese and the parties to the Reese 
Agreement negotiated in an attempt to reach a new Operating Agreement. 
42. However the parties were unsuccessful in reaching a new Operating Agreement. 
43. Nonetheless, in good faith Clark Reese, through Reese PC, continued to make 
payments to Siddoway Co. 
44. As of the filing of this action, Reese PC has paid $28,000 to Siddoway Co. pursuant 
to the Reese Agreement. 
45. On August 9, 2016, this Court ordered that claims related to the Reese Agreement 
be submitted to arbitration. 
46. On November 8, 2016, arbitrator Tony Park entered an Order re: Dispositive 
Motions finding the Reese Agreement void due to Modification #1. 
47. In July of 2015, Randy informed Clark and Frederick Wadsworth (“Frederick”) that 
he was done with public accounting in general and that he desired to leave WR PLLC. 
48. In July 2015, WR PLLC used a consultant to negotiate a buy-out for Siddoway 
Co.’s interest in WR PLLC. 
49. Subsequently the members of WR PLLC failed to reach an agreement on the value 
of Siddoway Co.’s interest in WR PLLC. 
50. On August 21, 2015, Randy informed Clark and Frederick that effective August 21, 
2015, he was resigning from his management duties with WR PLLC. 
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51. On August 21, 2015, Randy informed Clark and Frederick that on August 24, 2015, 
he would start taking clients from WR PLLC and servicing them in a new entity. 
52. Randy also informed Clark and Frederick that he was going to offer employment 
in his new entity to certain WR PLLC employees, including Dustin and Barkan. 
53. On August 21, 2015, Dustin gave notice of termination of his employment. 
54. On August 24, 2015, Barkan gave notice of termination of her employment 
effective immediately.  
55. After Dustin terminated his employment he was asked not to return to the premises. 
56. At some point between August 21 and August 24, Randy facilitated Dustin’s re-
entry to the premises and was seen sharing information from his computer with Dustin. 
57. On August 24, 2015, Dustin approached Kalyn Harding, Debbie Mason and Glenda 
Nelson, all of whom are former Harding employees, and offered them employment with his new 
tax accounting entity. 
58. On August 24, 2015, Barkan filed a Certificate of Organization with the Idaho 
Secretary of State organizing a limited liability company called AnchorPoint, LLC. 
59. Upon information and belief, Randy and-or Siddoway Co. was the principal owner 
of AnchorPoint, LLC. 
60. On August 24, 2015, Randy emailed a spreadsheet containing a WR PLLC client 
list to both Dustin and Barkan. 
61. Barkan, along with Randy, used the spreadsheet containing the WR PLLC client 




SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DISSOCIATION, DAMAGES and 
DECLARATORY RELIEF - 9 
 
62. Barkan, along with Randy, encoded the spreadsheet with information regarding 
which person (including Randy and the former Harding & Co. employees) would be best suited to 
solicit each WR PLLC client to transfer from WR PLLC to Dustin’s new accounting firm. 
63. Barkan forwarded the spreadsheet containing the WR PLLC clients to Dustin on 
August 28, 2015, for his use in soliciting WR PLLC clients.  
64. On August 26, 2015, Dustin filed Certificate of Organization with the Idaho 
Secretary of State organizing a professional limited liability company called AnchorPoint 
Accounting, PLLC. 
65. On August 26, 2015, Barkan filed a Certificate of Organization with the Idaho 
Secretary of State organizing a limited liability company called AnchorPoint Advisory, LLC. 
66. On September 17, 2015, Randy and Barkan filed an Amendment to Certificate of 
Organization with the Idaho Secretary of State changing the name of AnchorPoint, LLC to 
Siddoway Advisory Services, LLC. 
67. From August 21, 2015, forward, Randy assisted Dustin and AnchorPoint 
Accounting, PLLC in taking clients away from WR PLLC even though Siddoway Co. continues 
to be a member of WR PLLC. 
68. For example, Randy had a meeting scheduled with former WR PLLC client Don 
Cook on September 3, 2015. 
69. Upon information and belief, Randy and Don Cook’s associate attended the 
September 3, 2015, Don Cook meeting which took place at WR PLLC’s offices and was witnessed 
by a member of WR PLLC. 
70. Later on September 3, 2015, after Randy’s meeting with Don Cook’s associate, 
Don Cook caused a written notice to be delivered to WR PLLC by AnchorPoint Accounting, 
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PLLC, indicating that he needed his papers and electronic documents released to Dustin’s new 
accounting firm, AnchorPoint Accounting, PLLC. 
71. As another example, Randy had a meeting with former WR PLLC client Barry Van 
Beuren of Meridian Steel Erectors, Inc. on September 9, 2015. 
72. Upon information and belief, Dustin attended the September 9, 2015, Barry Van 
Beuren meeting. 
73. Later on September 9, 2015, after his meeting with Randy, Barry Van Beuren 
caused a written notice to be delivered to WR PLLC by AnchorPoint Accounting, PLLC indicating 
that he needed his papers and electronic documents, along with those of Meridian Steel Erectors, 
Inc., released to Dustin’s new accounting firm, AnchorPoint Accounting, PLLC. 
74. As another example, on or near October 19, 2015, Randy was contacted by Pro 
Tech Roofing, Inc. to address their end of the year accounting. 
75. Upon information and belief, Randy then had a discussion or meeting with Scott 
Lottman, Mark Rogers and-or Office Manager Denise Clark. 
76. On October 20, 2015, after speaking with Randy, Scott Lottman signed a written 
notice indicating that he needed his papers and electronic documents, along with those of Rogers 
& Lottman, LLC and Pro Tech Roofing, Inc., released to Dustin’s new accounting firm, 
AnchorPoint Accounting, PLLC.  The notice was delivered by AnchorPoint Accounting, PLLC. 
77. On October 20, 2015, after speaking with Randy, Mark Rogers signed a written 
notice indicating that he needed his papers and electronic documents, released to Dustin’s new 
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78.  As of the filing of this lawsuit, 283 individuals and companies have transitioned 
from WR PLLC to AnchorPoint Accounting, PLLC. 
79. Upon information and belief, Randy participated in transitioning a significant 
amount of the 283 transferees. 
80. Upon information and belief, Randy has been continuously contacting WR PLLC 
clients and asking them to transfer from WR PLLC to AnchorPoint Accounting, PLLC. 
81. For example, on October 1, 2015, Randy called Mike Teeter of MJT Construction 
in an effort to discuss tax accounting. 
82. Randy made this call despite his pronouncements that he is no longer in the business 
of tax accounting. 
83. From August 21, 2015, forward, Randy has assisted Dustin in convincing 
employees to leave WR PLLC even though Siddoway Co. continues to be a member of WR PLLC. 
84. For example, on August 25, 2015, Kalyn Harding, Debbie Mason and Glenda 
Nelson, all former WR PLLC employees, resigned their positions with WR PLLC and took jobs 
with AnchorPoint Accounting, PLLC. 
85. Upon information and belief, Randy helped Dustin to recruit WR PLLC employees 
for his new company even though Siddoway Co. continued to be a member of WR PLLC. 
86. At the time, Kalyn Harding accepted a position with AnchorPoint Accounting, 
PLLC, she was the subject of a non-compete clause in favor of WR PLLC which was contained in 
the Harding Agreement. 
87. A short time after accepting employment in violation of the non-compete 
agreement, Kalyn Harding renounced her employment with AnchorPoint Accounting, PLLC. 
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88. Nonetheless, Debbie Mason and Glenda Nelson were former employees of Harding 
& Co., P.A. with significant relationships with the clients that joined WR PLLC as a result of the 
Harding Agreement. 
89. Although WR PLLC continues to be liable to Kalyn Harding under the Harding 
Agreement, Randy and Dustin have utilized Debbie Mason and Glenda Nelson to encourage 
former Harding clients to leave WR PLLC for AnchorPoint Accounting, LLC.  
COUNT III 
Application for Judicial Order for Siddoway Co.’s Dissociation from WR PLLC 
90. The Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re-allege all previous paragraphs of this 
Complaint.  
91. Plaintiffs seek a judicial order dissociating Siddoway Co. from WR PLLC. 
92. Siddoway Co. engaged, or is engaging, in wrongful conduct that has adversely and 
materially affected, or will adversely and materially affect WR PLLC’s business activities. 
93. Siddoway Co. has willfully or persistently committed, or is willfully and 
persistently committing, a material breach of WR PLLC’s operating agreement and its duties or 
obligations under I.C. § 30-6-409. 
94. Siddoway Co. has engaged in, or is engaging in, conduct relating to the WR PLLC’s 
business activities which makes it not reasonably practicable to carry on business activities with 
Siddoway Co. 
95. WR PLLC has suffered damages as a result of the actions taken by Siddoway Co. 
and its principal, Randy, for which Siddoway Co. should dissociated from its membership interest 
in WR PLLC. 
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96. In the event that Siddoway Co. is found to be entitled to the value of Membership 
Interest in WR PLLC, as defined in the Operating Agreement, that value should be diminished by 
all damages suffered by WR PLLC as a result of the actions taken by Siddoway Co. and its 
principal, Randy. 
COUNT IV 
Breach of Fiduciary Duty 
(Siddoway Co. & Randy) 
 
97. The Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re-allege all previous paragraphs of this 
Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 
98. WR PLLC is an Idaho professional limited liability company organized pursuant to 
the Idaho Professional Limited Liability Company Act. 
99. At all times alleged herein, Siddoway Co. was a member and one-third owner of 
WR PLLC. 
100. As a member and one-third owner of WR PLLC, Siddoway Co. owed a fiduciary 
duty to WR PLLC and to the other two members and one-third owners: (1) Reese PC, and (2) 
Wadsworth PLLC. 
101. As set forth above, Siddoway Co. breached its fiduciary duty to (1) WR PLLC, (2) 
Reese PC, and (3) Wadsworth PLLC by the acts of misfeasance and malfeasance described herein. 
102. Randy is an officer and owner of Siddoway Co. 
103. Randy participated in and orchestrated Siddoway’s breach of fiduciary duty as set 
forth herein. 
104. As a proximate result of Siddoway Co.’s breach of fiduciary duty, (1) WR PLLC, 
(2) Reese PC, and (3) Wadsworth PLLC, have suffered damages for which they are entitled to 
recover in an amount to be proven at trial.   
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Civil Conspiracy to Commit Breach of Fiduciary Duty 
(Siddoway Co., Randy, Dustin & Barkan) 
 
105. The Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re-allege all previous paragraphs of this 
Complaint. 
106. By engaging in the foregoing conduct, including but not limited to Siddoway Co.’s, 
Randy, Dustin and Barkan’s secret play to steal WR PLLC’s client information list, selectively 
solicit key employees and provide other confidential information to a competing business while 
still associated with WR PLLC, and doing so with full knowledge of each other’s actions, 
Siddoway Co., Randy, Dustin and Barkan entered into an agreement to accomplish an unlawful 
purpose or to accomplish a lawful purpose by unlawful means.  
107. Siddoway Co., Randy, Dustin and Barkan have conspired to act in concert to 
facilitate a breach of fiduciary duty by Siddoway Co. and Randy. 
108. As a proximate result of Defendants’ civil conspiracy and the actual breach of 
fiduciary duty, (1) WR PLLC, (2) Reese PC, and (3) Wadsworth PLLC, have suffered damages 
for which they are entitled to recover in an amount to be proven at trial.   
COUNT VI 
Violation of the Idaho Trade Secret Act— 
I.C. §§ 48-801, 48-802, & 48-803 
(All Defendants) 
 
109. The Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re-allege all previous paragraphs of this 
Complaint. 
110. The August 24, 2015, spreadsheet containing the WR PLLC client list, along with 
sensitive and proprietary information regarding hours billed and fees charged to the customers by 
WR PLLC is a trade secret as defined by I.C. §48-801(5). 
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111. Randy’s mailing of the spreadsheet to Dustin and Barkan was a misappropriation 
of trade secrets as defined by I.C. §48-801(2).   
112. As of the filing of this complaint, 283 individuals and businesses have left WR 
PLLC for AnchorPoint Accounting, PLLC. 
113.  Plaintiffs have suffered and continue to suffer damages as a result of the 
Defendants’ misappropriation of trade secrets for which they are entitled to recover in an amount 
to be proven at trial. 
COUNT VII 
Interference with Prospective Business Advantage 
(All Defendants) 
 
114. The Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re-allege all previous paragraphs of this 
Complaint. 
115. WR PLLC enjoys an economic relationship and a valid economic expectancy with 
many customers with whom it has provided services to, and with whom it expects to contract in 
the future. 
116. All Defendants have knowledge of this relationship and economic expectancy, and 
of the economic benefit it brings to WR PLLC.  
117. Defendants have and continue to intentionally interfere with WR PLLC’s economic 
relationship with its clients by soliciting them to end their relationship with WR PLLC. 
118. Defendants’ acts of intentional interference are wrongful pursuant to the Idaho 
Trade Secrets Act I.C. §§ 48-801 et al., I.C. §30-6-409 and common law. 
119. In utilizing the spreadsheet and other proprietary information the Defendants used 
a wrongful means to cause injury to the Plaintiffs’ prospective business relationship with its clients. 
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120. The actions of Randy and Siddoway Co. were wrongful and improper in that 
Siddoway Co. is still a member of WR PLLC. 
121. As a result of Defendants’ intentional interference with the Plaintiffs’ prospective 
business relationships, Plaintiffs have suffered damages for which they are entitled to recover in 
an amount to be proven at trial. 
COUNT VIII 
Civil Conspiracy to Interfere with Prospective Economic Advantage 
(All Defendants) 
122. The Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re-allege all previous paragraphs of this 
Complaint. 
123. By engaging in the foregoing conduct, including but not limited to Siddoway Co.’s, 
Randy, Dustin and Barkan’s secret play to steal WR PLLC’s client information list, selectively 
solicit key employees and provide other confidential information to a competing business while 
still associated with WR PLLC, and doing so with full knowledge of each other’s actions, 
Siddoway Co., Randy, Dustin and Barkan entered into an agreement to accomplish an unlawful 
purpose or to accomplish a lawful purpose by unlawful means.  
124. The Defendants have conspired to act in concert thereby facilitating an intentional 
interference with prospective economic advantage. 
125. As a proximate result of Defendants’ civil conspiracy and the actual intentional 
interference with prospective economic advantage, (1) WR PLLC, (2) Reese PC, and (3) 
Wadsworth PLLC, have suffered damages for which they are entitled to recover in an amount to 
be proven at trial.   
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126. The Plaintiffs hereby incorporate and re-allege all previous paragraphs of this 
Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 
127. On January 28, 2015, Reese P.C. and Siddoway Co. entered into the Reese 
Agreement. 
128. Between January 2015 and September 2015 Reese P.C. paid $28,000 to Siddoway 
Co. for payments toward the Reese Agreement, including a $5500 loan that was made by Reese 
PC to Siddoway Co. in January 2014 which was reclassified by the parties as a payment toward 
the Reese Agreement. 
129. The Reese Agreement was declared void on November 8, 2016, for not satisfying 
the condition subsequent in Modification #1. 
130. It would be inequitable to permit Siddoway & Co. to retain the payments totaling 
$28,000 made by Reese P.C. pursuant to the now void Reese Agreement. 
131. Reese P.C. is entitled to Judgment in the amount of $28,000 plus interest 
 
COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES 
Therefore, pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(3), Plaintiffs are entitled to recover their 
attorney fees and costs of suit in an amount deemed reasonable by this Court.   
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendants as follows: 
1. For a Court Order dissociating Siddoway Co. from WR PLLC; 
2. An award of damages against the Defendants in an amount to be proven at trial; 
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3. A declaratory judgment finding the Reese Agreement void; 
4. An award of Plaintiff’s attorney fees and costs of suit incurred herein; 
5. An award of pre-judgment and post-judgment interest; and 
6. For such other and further relief as this Court deems just, equitable and proper. 
 
DATED this 25th day of May, 2017. 
FISHER RAINEY HUDSON 
 
/s/ Vaughn Fisher   
Vaughn Fisher 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 25 day of May, 2017, I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DISSOCIATION, DAMAGES and 
DECLARATORY RELIEF to be served upon the following individuals via iCourt: 
 
James G. Reid 
Jennifer Reid Mahoney 
Kaufman Reid PLLC 
1211 W. Myrtle St. Ste. 350 
Boise, ID 83702 
JMahoney@krlawboise.com 
 
Attorneys for Defendants Jeanine 
Barkan and Dustin Siddoway 
 
Brett Hastings 
299 South Main Street, 13th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110 
Brett@hastingslaw.us 
 
Glenn Godfrey, Jr.  
842 E. Winding Creek Drive 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
GodfreyLawPLLC@gmail.com 
Attorneys for Defendants Randy 
Siddoway and Siddoway & Company, 
P.C. 
 
   
/s/ Vaughn Fisher     
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA  
WADSWORTH REESE, PLLC, an Idaho 
Professional Corporation; CLARK A. REESE 
CPA, P.C., an Idaho Professional Corporation; 
and WADSWORTH ACCOUNTING CPA, an 
Idaho Professional Corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SIDDOWAY & COMPANY, PC, an Idaho 
professional corporation; RANDY 
SIDDOWAY, an individual; DUSTIN 
SIDDOWAY, an individual; and JEANINE 
BARKAN, an individual, 
Defendants. 
 
Case No. CV-OC-2015-21225 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO 
AMEND COMPLAINT AND ADD PARTY 
 
SIDDOWAY & COMPANY, PC, an Idaho 
professional corporation; RANDY 
SIDDOWAY, an individual, 
Counterclaimants, 
vs. 
FREDERICK WADSWORTH, an individual; 
WADSWORTH ACCOUNTING CPA, an 
Idaho Professional Corporation; CLARK A. 
REESE, an individual; and CLARK A. 








Signed: 8/21/2017 03:36 PM
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CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Cl'erk 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION 
TO AMEND COMPLAINT AND ADD PARTY - 2 
This action arises from the breakup of Wadsworth Reese, PLLC, an accounting firm.  
Wadsworth Reese and two of its members, Clark A. Reese CPA, P.C. (“Reese PC”) and 
Wadsworth Accounting CPA (“Wadsworth PC”), are the plaintiffs.  They’ve sued Wadsworth 
Reese’s third member, Defendant Siddoway & Co, PC (“Siddoway PC”), and its principal, 
Randy Siddoway.  Plaintiffs now move to amend their complaint to add new claims and clarify 
or expand existing claims.  A hearing on that motion was held on August 9, 2017.  As the 
hearing date approached, Plaintiffs partially withdrew the motion, and they narrowed it further 
during the hearing.  To the extent it wasn’t withdrawn, the motion was taken under advisement at 
the end of the hearing.  For the reasons that follow, it is now denied. 
I.  
BACKGROUND 
The accounting firm now called Wadsworth Reese was formed by accountants Clark 
Reese and Randy Siddoway in December 2013.  (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 13-14; Answer ¶¶ 13-14;1 
Fisher Aff. filed Mar. 2, 2016, ¶ 3 & Ex. A.)  It first was called CRS Services, PLLC.  (Am. 
Compl. ¶ 13; Answer ¶ 13.)  About a month later, its name was changed to Siddoway, 
Wadsworth & Reese, PLLC, reflecting the addition of a third accountant, Frederick Wadsworth, 
to the venture.  (Am. Compl. ¶ 21; Answer ¶ 21; Fisher Aff. filed Mar. 2, 2016, ¶ 4 & Ex. B.)  Its 
three members at that time were not the three accountants individually, but instead the 
professional corporations through which they had respectively been doing business as 
accountants.  Those professional corporations—Siddoway PC, Reese PC, and Wadsworth PC—
entered into an operating agreement for Wadsworth Reese dated January 6, 2014.  (Am. Compl. 
¶ 20(a), (b); Answer ¶ 20(a), (b).)  The operating agreement was intended to be temporary 
                                                          
1 Citations to the “Answer” mean the answer filed by Randy Siddoway and Siddoway PC to 
Plaintiffs’ amended complaint.  
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because the three accountants had not yet reached a final agreement as to all of the terms on 
which they were joining forces, such as the values to assign to their respective client bases.  
(Reese Aff. filed Mar. 2, 2016, ¶ 5.)  But no final agreement was ever reached.  (Reese Aff. filed 
Mar. 2, 2016, ¶¶ 7, 11-21.)  The firm finally took on the Wadsworth Reese name in November 
2015, nearly two years after the “temporary” operating agreement was signed.  (Fisher Aff. filed 
Mar. 2, 2016, ¶ 5 & Ex. C.)  It did so in the wake of Randy Siddoway’s August 2015 decision to 
cut ties and begin a new venture.  (Reese Aff. filed Mar. 2, 2016, ¶ 23.) 
This action arises from the parties’ inability to reach an agreement as to the terms of 
Randy Siddoway’s departure from Wadsworth Reese, as well as their disagreement as to whether 
he and Siddoway PC violated duties to Wadsworth Reese in the wake of that departure, most 
notably by allegedly funneling a spreadsheet containing Wadsworth Reese’s client list and 
related historical billing information to a newly formed competitor started by Defendant Dustin 
Siddoway, a nephew of Randy Siddoway who had been working for Wadsworth Reese but cut 
ties at about the same time.  Also departing from Wadsworth Reese around that same time was 
Defendant Jeanine Barkan, who left to join Dustin Siddoway’s new accounting firm. 
Plaintiffs filed suit on December 14, 2015.  Plaintiffs later obtained the Court’s 
permission to file an amended complaint on May 24, 2016, and a second amended complaint on 
May 25, 2017.  The second amended complaint is their operative pleading.  Shortly before its 
filing, the Court granted summary judgment to Dustin Siddoway and Jeanine Barkan.  Thus, the 
only unadjudicated claims asserted in the second amended complaint are against Siddoway PC 
and Randy Siddoway.  The extant claims are as follows:  (1) Count III, a request for Siddoway 
PC’s expulsion as a Wadsworth Reese member; (2) Count IV, a claim against Siddoway PC and 
Randy Siddoway for breach of fiduciary duty; (3) Count VII, a claim against Siddoway PC and 
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Randy Siddoway for interference with prospective economic advantage; and (4) Count IX, a 
claim against Siddoway PC for unjust enrichment in relation to the money it received from Clark 
Reese under a contract that was declared void in arbitration proceedings and has been called “the 
Reese Agreement” in prior decisions.2  (Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 90-104, 114-121, 126-131.) 
On June 15, 2017, about three weeks after filing their second amended complaint, 
Plaintiffs moved for leave to file a third amended complaint.  That motion, as initially crafted, 
had five objectives.  The first was simply to change the case caption by deleting Jeanine Barkan, 
with whom Plaintiffs by that time had reached a settlement, and to add as a new defendant 
Dustin Siddoway’s new accounting firm, AnchorPoint Accounting, PLLC.  (Mem. Supp. Mot. 
Amend Compl. 3.)  The second was to clarify or expand the scope of the fiduciary-duty claim.  
(Id. at 2-3.)  The third was to expand the scope of Count VI, a claim for misappropriation of 
trade secrets, against which summary judgment had already been entered.  (Id. at 3.)  The fourth 
was to add a claim against Dustin Siddoway and AnchorPoint for unjust enrichment.  (Id.)  
Finally, the fifth was to add a conversion claim against Siddoway PC, Randy Siddoway, Dustin 
Siddoway, and AnchorPoint.  (Id.)  On July 26, 2017, however, Plaintiffs expanded the scope of 
the motion with a sixth objective:  adding a claim against Siddoway PC and Randy Siddoway for 
breach of fiduciary duty or of Wadsworth Reese’s operating agreement based upon their alleged 
funneling of Wadsworth Reese information and opportunities to Randy Siddoway’s new venture, 
PoleStar Entrepreneurial Group LLC. 
On August 8, 2017, one day before the hearing on the motion, its scope changed again.  
This time, its scope was reduced.  That day, Plaintiffs filed a notice that the motion is withdrawn 
to the extent leave was sought to amend or assert claims against Dustin Siddoway and 
                                                          
2 The amended complaint intentionally contained no Counts I or II, and summary judgment 
previously was entered against Counts V, VI, and VIII. 
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AnchorPoint.  During the hearing, Plaintiffs further reduced the scope of the motion by stating 
that only the first, second, and third of the motion’s original objectives, plus its later-added sixth 
objective, were still being pursued, and then only against Siddoway PC and Randy Siddoway. 
The applicable deadline for motions to amend the pleadings was set in the Scheduling 
Order entered on June 1, 2016.  That deadline was 120 days after the date the Scheduling Order 
was entered, or September 29, 2016.  (Scheduling Order ¶ 4(A).)  The Court expressly declined 
to reset it when the trial date was continued from May 2017 to November 2017 in the Amended 
Scheduling Order entered on March 1, 2017.  (Am. Scheduling Order ¶ 4(A).)  Thus, Plaintiffs’ 
motion to amend was filed more than eight months after the deadline. 
In any event, as already noted, the motion was argued and taken under advisement on 





I.R.C.P. 15(a)(2) governs motions made before trial for leave to amend pleadings.  Under 
that rule, trial courts “should freely give leave when justice so requires.”  I.R.C.P. 15(a)(2).  
Whether that standard is met in a given instance is a matter of discretion.  E.g., Maroun v. 
Wyreless Sys., Inc., 141 Idaho 604, 612, 114 P.3d 974, 982 (2005), abrogated on other grounds, 
Wandering Trails, LLC v. Big Bite Excavation, Inc., 156 Idaho 586, 591, 329 P.3d 368, 373 
(2014).  Leave to amend should be granted, though, unless (i) there is undue delay, bad faith, or a 
dilatory motive on the movant’s part, (ii) the movant has repeatedly failed to cure deficiencies in 
its pleadings by amending them, (iii) the amendment would unduly prejudice the nonmovant, or 
(iv) the amendment would be futile.  E.g., id. 
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I.R.C.P. 15(a)(2) doesn’t operate by itself, however, when the movants have failed to 
meet the scheduling order’s deadline for pleadings amendments.  In that situation, it is 
supplemented by I.R.C.P. 16(a)(3), which requires the movants to show “good cause” for 
amending the scheduling order in order to allow an otherwise-untimely pleadings amendment.  
I.R.C.P. 16(a)(3); see also Silver Creek Computers, Inc. v. Petra, Inc., 136 Idaho 879, 882, 42 
P.3d 672, 675 (2002) (affirming the disallowance of a late amendment partly because the movant 
“did not contend that it had good cause for failing to file its motion within the time period set in 
the scheduling order”).  Whether “good cause” has been shown is a matter of discretion.  E.g., 
Camp v. E. Fork Ditch Co., Ltd., 137 Idaho 850, 859, 55 P.3d 304, 313 (2002).  Accordingly, if 
there is “good cause” for amending the scheduling order to permit an otherwise-untimely 
amendment, then the amendment should be allowed if it passes muster under I.R.C.P. 15(a)(2)’s 
liberal amendment standard. 




As the first objective of their motion to amend, Plaintiffs sought guidance on a 
housekeeping matter:  whether Dustin Siddoway and Jeanine Barkan should be eliminated from 
the case caption, given Plaintiffs’ settlements with those defendants.  Eliminating those 
defendants from the caption now would be inappropriate, as dismissal papers have yet to be 
submitted.  But after dismissal, eliminating them from the caption would be appropriate.  
Consequently, in an exercise of its discretion, the Court orders under I.R.C.P. 2(a)(2) that Dustin 
Siddoway and Jeanine Barkan shall not be included on the caption of any filing made after entry 
of orders for their dismissal as defendants. 
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The Court now turns to the motion’s substantive objectives.  Three remain in the wake of 
the motion’s partial withdrawal before and during the hearing. 
First, Plaintiffs seek to amend their already-dismissed claim for misappropriation of trade 
secrets to include allegations about the misappropriation of a different alleged trade secret than 
that identified in their second amended complaint:  Wadsworth Reese’s UltraTax data.  Plaintiffs 
say they learned of the alleged misappropriation of UltraTax data during Randy Siddoway’s 
deposition on March 3, 2017.  Although the deadline for motions to amend the pleadings had 
long since passed by that point, Plaintiffs didn’t promptly move to amend after discovering this 
evidence.  Instead, Plaintiffs attempted to expand the scope of their misappropriation claim in the 
briefing they filed in opposition to the defendants’ motions for summary judgment against that 
claim.  In that briefing, they behaved as if UltraTax data were part of the pleaded claim when 
that simply wasn’t the case; that Idaho is a “notice pleading” jurisdiction doesn’t let Plaintiffs 
make a placeholder misappropriation claim and then identify the allegedly misappropriated trade 
secrets later.  On May 18, 2017, the Court granted summary judgment against the 
misappropriation claim, specifically noting its unwillingness to consider an unpleaded claim for 
misappropriation of UltraTax data.  Even then, Plaintiffs waited another four weeks to file to file 
their motion to amend.  Thus, the motion wasn’t filed for more than three months after the 
deposition in which the supposed basis for the UltraTax misappropriation claim was discovered, 
and more than eight months after the deadline for motions to amend the pleadings. 
On the threshold question of whether there is “good cause” to amend the scheduling order 
to allow Plaintiffs to assert an UltraTax misappropriation claim long after the amendment 
deadline, the Court finds against Plaintiffs.  Plaintiffs lack good cause for the delay that followed 
the March 3 deposition, nor does good cause for relaxation of the amendment deadline arise from 
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their decision to defer key discovery that might lead to potential new claims until several months 
after the deadline for motions to amend the pleadings.  The motion therefore is denied to the 
extent Plaintiffs seek permission to make the UltraTax data part of their misappropriation claim. 
On fundamentally the same reasoning, the Court finds no “good cause” to amend the 
scheduling order to assert their proposed new claim for breach of fiduciary duty or of the 
Wadsworth Reese operating agreement.  That proposed new claim is based principally on the 
alleged funneling of UltraTax data (perhaps among other forms of Wadsworth Reese business 
information) to PoleStar.  Plaintiffs are free to decide if and when to conduct the various forms 
of discovery allowed by the rules of court, but part of what must be taken into account in making 
those decisions is the deadline for motions to amend the pleadings.  When key discovery is 
deferred until after the deadline, a possible consequence is failing identify potential new claims 
in time to satisfy the deadline.  Sometimes an amendment deadline should be extended to allow 
the assertion of new claims later in the course of litigation than was originally desired, but “good 
cause” for such an extension here is absent. 
Finally, the Court also finds no “good cause” to amend the scheduling order to allow 
Plaintiffs to re-plead their existing fiduciary-duty claim.  Plaintiffs now wish to allege, in support 
of that claim, that Siddoway PC and Randy Siddoway (1) provided AnchorPoint with 
Wadsworth Reese’s client list, client files, computers, and office equipment, (2) rented office 
space to AnchorPoint under an agreement that allowed for deferred lease payments, (3) assisted 
AnchorPoint in attracting Wadsworth Reese clients, and (4) assisted AnchorPoint in obtaining 
conventional bank financing.  Some, but not all, of these allegations are included in the second 
amended complaint.  Here, there is no good cause for waiting until late stages of the litigation to 
expand the alleged breaches of fiduciary duty.  The scope of the fiduciary-duty claim, for 
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purposes of trial, is established by the allegations in the second amended complaint.  Those 
allegations, the Court notes, aren’t limited to the “client list” issue that was the focal point of the 
Court’s decision on summary judgment. 
Accordingly, 





   _____________________________ 
   Jason D. Scott 
      DISTRICT JUDGE  
Signed: 8/21/2017 02:00 PM
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This action arises from the breakup of Wadsworth Reese, PLLC, an accounting firm.  
The plaintiffs are Wadsworth Reese itself and two of its three members, Clark A. Reese CPA, 
P.C. (“Reese PC”) and Wadsworth Accounting CPA (“Wadsworth PC”).  The principals of 
Reese PC and Wadsworth PC are Clark A. Reese and Frederick Wadsworth, respectively.  This 
decision calls Plaintiffs, Reese, and Wadsworth collectively “the Wadsworth Reese Parties.”  On 
a variety of theories, Plaintiffs have sued Wadsworth Reese’s third member and its principal, 
Signed: 9/18/2017 01:32 PM
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Siddoway & Company, PC (“Siddoway PC”) and Randy Siddoway.  This decision calls 
Siddoway PC and Siddoway collectively “the Siddoway Parties.”  On a variety of theories, the 
Siddoway Parties have countersued Plaintiffs and, unconventionally, asserted their counterclaims 
against non-plaintiffs Reese and Wadsworth. 
Plaintiffs move for summary judgment on two of their claims.  Through the same motion, 
the Wadsworth Reese Parties seek summary judgment against two of the Siddoway Parties’ 
counterclaims.  That motion was argued and taken under advisement on September 7, 2017.  For 
the reasons that follow, it is now granted in part and denied in part. 
I.  
BACKGROUND 
In December 2013, accountants Reese and Siddoway formed the accounting firm now 
called Wadsworth Reese.  (Fisher Aff. ¶ 3 & Ex. A, Mar. 2, 2016.)  At first it was called CRS 
Services, PLLC.  (Id.)  About a month later, though, its name was changed to Siddoway, 
Wadsworth & Reese, PLLC, reflecting the addition of a third accountant, Wadsworth, to the 
venture.  (Id. ¶ 4 & Ex. B.)  Its three members weren’t the three accountants individually, but 
instead the three professional corporations through which they respectively had been doing 
business as accountants. 
Wadsworth Reese and those three professional corporations—Siddoway PC, Reese PC, 
and Wadsworth PC—entered into an operating agreement for Wadsworth Reese dated January 6, 
2014.  (Hanway Aff. Ex. A, July 14, 2016.)  Its article V, in conjunction with its Exhibit A, 
grants each of them a one-third membership interest in Wadsworth Reese.  (Id.)  The operating 
agreement was intended to be temporary, as the three accountants hadn’t yet finally agreed on all 
the terms under which they were joining forces.  (Reese Aff. ¶ 5, Mar. 2, 2016.)  But no final 
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agreement was ever reached.  (Id. ¶¶ 7, 11-21.)  The firm finally took on the Wadsworth Reese 
name in November 2015, nearly two years after the “temporary” operating agreement was 
signed.  (Fisher Aff. ¶ 5 & Ex. C, Mar. 2, 2016.)  It did so in the wake of Randy Siddoway’s 
August 2015 decision to cut ties and begin a new venture.  (Reese Aff. ¶ 23, Mar. 2, 2016.) 
Returning for a moment to the initial joining of forces, though, the Court notes that the 
operating agreement wasn’t the parties’ only agreement on that subject.  On January 28, 2015, an 
agreement prior decisions call the “Reese Agreement” was signed and made effective retroactive 
to January 1, 2014 (Reese Aff. Ex. A, Mar. 2, 2016), a few days before the operating agreement 
was signed.  Presumably for that reason, the Reese Agreement reads as though Reese PC had no 
interest in Wadsworth Reese.  It provides that Reese PC must pay Siddoway PC $200,000 for 
“the right to receive” a one-third membership interest in Wadsworth Reese.  (Id. Ex. A, §§ 1-2.)  
That is the price for which Siddoway PC would “sell certain assets used in [its] accounting 
practice” to Reese PC, and then those assets would be jointly contributed by Siddoway PC and 
Reese PC to Wadsworth Reese in return for their respective one-third membership interests in 
Wadsworth Reese.  (Id. Ex. A, second Recitals clause.)  The agreed value of the assets to be 
contributed was twice the value of a one-third membership interest (id. Ex. A, § 1), so the 
contribution of them justified Siddoway PC and Reese PC each receiving a one-third 
membership interest in return.  The Reese Agreement eventually was declared void, however, in 
arbitration proceedings.  By then, Reese PC had paid only $28,000 of the $200,000 purchase 
price.  (Reese Aff. ¶ 3, July 11, 2017.) 
This action arises from the parties’ inability to reach an agreement as to the terms of 
Randy Siddoway’s August 2015 departure from Wadsworth Reese, as well as their disagreement 
as to whether he and Siddoway PC violated duties to Wadsworth Reese in the wake of that 
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departure, most notably by providing a spreadsheet containing Wadsworth Reese’s client list and 
related historical billing information to a newly formed competitor started by his nephew Dustin 
Siddoway, who had been working for Wadsworth Reese but cut ties at about the same time. 
Plaintiffs filed suit on December 14, 2015.  They later obtained the Court’s permission to 
file an amended complaint on May 24, 2016, and a second amended complaint on May 25, 2017.  
The second amended complaint is their operative pleading.  Through motion practice, Plaintiffs’ 
claims have been narrowed to these four:  (1) Count III, a request for Siddoway PC’s judicial 
dissociation as a Wadsworth Reese member; (2) Count IV, a claim against the Siddoway Parties 
for breach of fiduciary duty; (3) Count VII, a claim against the Siddoway Parties for interference 
with prospective economic advantage; and (4) Count IX, a claim against Siddoway PC for unjust 
enrichment, seeking return of the $28,000 received from Reese PC under the Reese Agreement.1  
(Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 90-104, 114-121, 126-131.) 
The Siddoway Parties are pursuing counterclaims.  In that regard, their operative pleading 
was filed on March 20, 2017.  In it, they assert nine counterclaims:  (1) their first counterclaim, 
for breach of the Wadsworth Reese operating agreement; (2) their second counterclaim, for 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing owed in connection with the 
operating agreement; (3) their third counterclaim, contending Wadsworth Reese’s distributions 
have been unequal in violation of I.C. § 30-6-404; (4) their fourth counterclaim, for conversion; 
(5) their sixth counterclaim, for breach of fiduciary duty; (6) their seventh counterclaim, for an 
accounting of Wadsworth Reese’s activities; (7) their eighth counterclaim, for spoliation of 
evidence; (8) their ninth counterclaim, for a declaratory judgment that Reese PC has no valid 
membership interest in Wadsworth Reese, that Siddoway PC holds a two-thirds membership 
                                                          
1 The second amended complaint intentionally contained no Count I or Count II, and summary 
judgment has already been entered against Counts V, VI, and VIII. 
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interest in Wadsworth Reese, and that Reese and Reese PC must pay over to Siddoway PC 
anything of value received in connection with membership in Wadsworth Reese; and (9) their 
tenth counterclaim, for unjust enrichment equal to the value of Reese PC’s one-third membership 
interest in Wadsworth Reese.2  (Verif. Am. Countercls. ¶¶ 121-165.)  The ninth and tenth 
counterclaims are asserted against only Reese and Reese PC, whereas the rest are asserted 
against all the Wadsworth Reese Parties.  (Id.) 
On June 27, 2017, Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on Counts III and IX of their 
second amended complaint, and the Wadsworth Reese Parties moved for summary judgment 
against the Siddoway Parties’ ninth and tenth counterclaims.  As already noted, the motion was 





Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to 
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  I.R.C.P. 56(a).  To 
carry its burden, the movant must cite to particular parts of the record for proof of the facts that 
are essential to the movant’s position.  I.R.C.P. 56(c)(1)(A).  If the movant does so, the burden 
shifts to the nonmovant to prove that a genuine factual dispute must be resolved before judgment 
can be awarded to the movant.  E.g., Boise Mode, LLC v. Donahoe Pace & Partners Ltd., 154 
Idaho 99, 104, 294 P.3d 1111, 1116 (2013).  To carry that ultimate burden, the nonmovant “may 
not rest upon mere allegations in the pleadings, but must set forth by affidavit specific facts 
showing there is a genuine issue for trial.”  Id. (quotation marks omitted).  The record must be 
                                                          
2
 No counterclaim is identified as the fifth counterclaim.  Additionally, there are two “tenth” 
counterclaims, but the second of them is disregarded, as it is a request for costs and attorney fees, 
not a true counterclaim. 
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construed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, and all reasonable inferences must be 
drawn in the nonmovant’s favor.  Id.  But when the trial court—not a jury—is the trier of fact, it 
“‘is entitled to arrive at the most probable inferences based upon the undisputed evidence 
properly before it and grant the summary judgment despite the possibility of conflicting 
inferences.’”  J.R. Simplot Co. v. Bosen, 144 Idaho 611, 615, 167 P.3d 748, 752 (2006) (quoting 
Shawver v. Huckleberry Estates, L.L.C., 140 Idaho 354, 360–61, 93 P.3d 685, 691–92 (2004)).  
In any event, “[a] mere scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt as to the facts is not sufficient” 
for the nonmovant to avoid summary judgment.  AED, Inc. v. KDC Invs., LLC, 155 Idaho 159, 
163, 307 P.3d 176, 180 (2013). 




A. Plaintiffs’ Count Three, for judicial dissociation 
On application of a limited liability company, a court may order a person dissociated as a 
member of the limited liability company if the person “[h]as engaged or is engaging in conduct 
relating to the company’s activities and affairs which makes it not reasonably practicable to carry 
on the activities and affairs with the person as a member.”  I.C. § 30-25-602(6)(C).  Wadsworth 
Reese has applied on that basis for Siddoway PC’s dissociation, citing (1) Siddoway’s departure 
from Wadsworth Reese two years ago, (2) Siddoway’s providing Wadsworth Reese business 
information after his departure to Dustin Siddoway’s competing new accounting firm, and (3) the 
longstanding and ongoing contentious litigation between the Siddoway Parties and the 
Wadsworth Reese Parties.  (Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 9, June 27, 2017.) 
Reasonable minds might disagree about which of these reasons for dissociation is most 
compelling.  But compelling, they all are.  Any one of them alone likely is enough to warrant 
dissociation.  Take the first reason for example.  Siddoway PC’s one-third membership interest 
000376
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 7 
in Wadsworth Reese resulted from an understanding that its principal, Siddoway, would provide 
professional accounting or accounting-related services to Wadsworth Reese clients, just as 
Wadsworth and Reese would do.  Siddoway soon decided to provide those services elsewhere.  
Once he left Wadsworth Reese, an ongoing business relationship between him and the two other 
accountants stopped making business sense.  It is flatly absurd for Siddoway to leave Wadsworth 
Reese yet still expect afterward to have a voice in how his former colleagues Wadsworth and 
Reese conduct business as Wadsworth Reese.  By leaving, he deprived Wadsworth Reese of the 
most obvious benefit of associating with him and his company:  his personal contribution to 
developing and servicing its clients.  This is not to suggest that he was wrong, or acted outside 
his rights, to leave.  It is simply to recognize the business reality of the situation, which is that it 
is impracticable for a departed provider of professional services to have an ongoing say in the 
way the remaining providers conduct their business.  Professional-services firms aren’t 
customarily vehicles for passive investments.  This one wasn’t envisioned that way either. 
In any event, together, the three reasons for dissociation identified by Wadsworth Reese 
most certainly do warrant dissociation.  The Siddoway Parties have no reasonable contrary 
argument.  Effective immediately, Siddoway PC is dissociated as a Wadsworth Reese member.  
Dissociation has the consequences for which I.C. § 30-25-603 provides, including Siddoway 
PC’s transition from member status to “transferee” status.  I.C. § 30-25-603(a)(3).  This ruling 
leaves to be determined whether a buyout of Siddoway PC’s interest in Wadsworth Reese is 
required as a result (and, if so, the buyout price). 
B. The Siddoway Parties’ ninth counterclaim, for declaratory judgment 
Through their ninth counterclaim, the Siddoway Parties seek a declaratory judgment that 
Reese PC has no valid membership interest in Wadsworth Reese, that Siddoway PC therefore 
holds a two-thirds membership interest in Wadsworth Reese, and that Reese and Reese PC must 
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pay over to Siddoway PC anything of value received in connection with membership in 
Wadsworth Reese.  The twin premises of this counterclaim are (1) that the Reese Agreement is 
the vehicle by which Reese PC obtained its membership interest in Wadsworth Reese, and (2) 
that Siddoway PC bestowed that membership interest on Reese PC.  Contending that these are 
false premises, the Wadsworth Reese Parties seek summary judgment against this counterclaim.  
(Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 6-8, June 27, 2017.) 
The Wadsworth Reese Parties are correct.  “If a limited liability company is to have more 
than one (1) member upon formation, those persons become members as agreed by the persons 
before the formation of the company.”  I.C. § 30-25-401(b).  There is no evidence of an 
agreement, before Wadsworth Reese’s formation, for Reese PC to be a member.  But “[a]fter 
formation of a limited liability company, a person becomes a member . . . [a]s provided in the 
operating agreement.”  I.C. § 30-25-401(c)(1).  The operating agreement’s article V, in 
conjunction with its Exhibit A, plainly grants Reese PC a one-third membership interest.  
(Hanway Aff. Ex. A, July 14, 2016.)  This is so even if Reese PC never made the $100 capital 
contribution the operating agreement’s Exhibit A requires, as its article VII makes plain that 
membership isn’t conditioned upon making that contribution (id. Ex. A, art. VII), and the law 
doesn’t require a capital contribution to achieve member status.  I.C. § 30-25-401(d)(2) (“A 
person may become a member without . . . “[m]aking or being obligated to make a contribution 
to the limited liability company.”).  The operating agreement, not the Reese Agreement, is the 
source of Reese PC’s membership interest. 
Prior decisions may suggest that, under the Reese Agreement, Reese PC agreed to 
purchase a one-third membership interest in Wadsworth Reese from Siddoway PC, but any such 
reading of the Reese Agreement would be mistaken.  The Reese Agreement required Reese PC 
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to pay Siddoway PC $200,000 for “the right to receive” a one-third membership interest in 
Wadsworth Reese (Reese Aff. Ex. A, §§ 1-2, Mar. 2, 2016), not for the membership interest 
itself.  This suggests the membership interest itself came from elsewhere.  The Reese Agreement 
makes clear where it came from.  In return for the $200,000 Reese PC agreed to pay for “the 
right to receive” its one-third membership interest, Siddoway PC would “sell certain assets used 
in [its] accounting practice” to Reese PC, and then Reese PC and Siddoway PC would jointly 
contribute those assets to Wadsworth Reese in return for their respective one-third membership 
interests.  (Id. Ex. A, second Recitals clause.)  Because those assets were agreed to be worth 
twice the value of a one-third membership interest in Wadsworth Reese (id. Ex. A, § 1), the 
contribution evidently justified Wadsworth Reese in granting one-third membership interests to 
both Reese PC and Siddoway PC.  Thus, just as the operating agreement suggests, Reese PC and 
Siddoway PC obtained their one-third membership interests in Wadsworth Reese from 
Wadsworth Reese. 
Consequently, that the Reese Agreement is void is no reason for divesting Reese PC’s 
one-third membership interest in Wadsworth Reese and transferring it to Siddoway PC.  The 
Siddoway Parties’ ninth counterclaim fails in its entirety as a result. 
C. The competing unjust-enrichment claims 
The Reese Agreement’s core is explained in the immediately preceding subsection of this 
decision.  The gist of it is that Reese PC was expected to bring less to Wadsworth Reese than 
Siddoway PC was expected to bring to Wadsworth Reese, so Reese PC had to pay Siddoway PC 
$200,000 in cash to justify equal membership interests.  The Reese Agreement was declared void 
in arbitration proceedings at a time when Reese PC had paid only $28,000 of that $200,000.  
(Reese Aff. ¶ 3, July 11, 2017.)  The Reese Agreement having been declared void, Reese PC 
claims, through Count IX of Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint, the right to get that money 
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back on an unjust-enrichment theory.  And, also on an unjust-enrichment theory, the Siddoway 
Parties claim, through their tenth counterclaim, the right to receive the value of Reese PC’s 
membership interest in Wadsworth Reese.  The Wadsworth Reese Parties seek summary 
judgment in their favor on these competing unjust-enrichment claims. 
“The elements of unjust enrichment are that (1) a benefit is conferred on the defendant by 
the plaintiff; (2) the defendant appreciates the benefit; and (3) it would be inequitable for the 
defendant to accept the benefit without payment of the value of the benefit.”  Teton Peaks Inv. 
Co., LLC v. Ohme, 146 Idaho 394, 398, 195 P.3d 1207, 1211 (2008).  The Court denies summary 
judgment on Count IX of Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint because, on this record, the 
Court cannot conclude as a matter of law that it is inequitable for Siddoway PC to keep some or 
all of the $28,000 Reese PC paid Siddoway PC under the Reese Agreement.  Requiring complete 
repayment seemingly would be equitable only if Siddoway PC contributed nothing of value to 
Wadsworth Reese, despite promising in the Reese Agreement to contribute sufficient assets to 
Wadsworth Reese to warrant a $200,000 investment by Reese PC in a one-third membership 
interest.  Requiring partial repayment seemingly would be equitable only if the value of assets 
contributed by Siddoway PC was more than nothing but less than three times $28,000 (or 
$84,000), as Reese PC obtained, in some sense, a one-third interest in the contributed assets.  
The Court cannot determine as a matter of law, at least not on this record, the extent and value of 
assets contributed by Siddoway PC to Wadsworth Reese. 
For similar reasons, the Court also denies summary judgment on the Siddoway Parties’ 
tenth counterclaim.  The Court cannot conclude as a matter of law, at least not on this record, 
that the extent and value of assets contributed by Siddoway PC to Wadsworth Reese wasn’t 
sufficiently large to have conferred a benefit greater than $28,000 on Reese PC.  If Siddoway PC 
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ultimately proves that it contributed assets worth more than three times $28,000 (or $84,000) to 
Wadsworth Reese, it might be entitled to some recovery on the tenth counterclaim.  That said, 
the measure of recovery sought in the pleadings—the value of Reese PC’s membership interest 
in Wadsworth Reese (Verif. Am. Countercls. ¶ 165)—isn’t awardable under any circumstances.  
That proposed measure of recovery stems from the false premise that Reese PC obtained its 
membership interest from Siddoway PC.  Moreover, that proposed measure of recovery fails to 
account for the fact that the value of Reese PC’s membership interest undoubtedly reflects by 
now, years after Wadsworth Reese’s formation, numerous factors other than the value of assets 
contributed by Siddoway PC to Wadsworth Reese, including Reese’s own efforts during the 
ensuing years at building his practice. 
Accordingly, 
 IT IS ORDERED that the motion for summary judgment is granted in part and denied in 
part.  Summary judgment is entered on Count III of Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint, 
insofar as Siddoway PC is judicially dissociated as a Wadsworth Reese member, effective 
immediately.  Additionally, summary judgment is entered against the Siddoway Parties’ ninth 




   _____________________________ 
   Jason D. Scott 
      DISTRICT JUDGE  
Signed: 9/18/2017 12:23 PM
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA  
WADSWORTH REESE, PLLC, an Idaho 
Professional Corporation; CLARK A. REESE 
CPA, P.C., an Idaho Professional Corporation; 
and WADSWORTH ACCOUNTING CPA, an 
Idaho Professional Corporation, 
Plaintiffs-Counterdefendants, 
vs. 
SIDDOWAY & COMPANY, PC, an Idaho 
professional corporation; and RANDY 
SIDDOWAY, an individual, 
Defendants-Counterclaimants. 
 
Case No. CV-OC-2015-21225 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
 
SIDDOWAY & COMPANY, PC, an Idaho 
professional corporation; RANDY 
SIDDOWAY, an individual, 
Counterclaimants, 
vs. 
FREDERICK WADSWORTH, an individual; 






This action arises from the breakup of what had been a three-member accounting firm.  
The plaintiffs are the accounting firm itself—Wadsworth Reese, PLLC—and its two remaining 
members, Clark A. Reese CPA, P.C. (“Reese PC”) and Wadsworth Accounting CPA 
(“Wadsworth PC”).  The principals of Reese PC and Wadsworth PC are Clark A. Reese and 
Frederick Wadsworth, respectively.  This decision calls Plaintiffs, Reese, and Wadsworth “the 




Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk -
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Siddoway & Company, PC (“Siddoway PC”) and its principal Randy Siddoway.  This decision 
calls them “the Siddoway Parties.”  In December 2015, Plaintiffs sued the Siddoway Parties on a 
variety of theories.  Likewise on a variety of theories, the Siddoway Parties countersued 
Plaintiffs and, unconventionally, also asserted their counterclaims against non-plaintiffs Reese 
and Wadsworth.  Reese and Wadsworth never objected that, as non-plaintiffs, they can’t be 
countersued, so the unconventionality is of no concern.  
This action has been litigated intensively.  A great deal of motion practice was followed 
by a five-day bench trial that took place from November 7–14, 2017.  At the end of the bench 
trial, the Court gave both sides a period of time to obtain a trial transcript and then file 
simultaneous proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, as well as a period of time to file 
simultaneous responses to one another’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.  The 
contemplated post-trial filings were all submitted by January 23, 2018, at which point the Court 
took the matter under advisement.  The Court now issues its findings of fact and conclusions of 
law.  Before setting them forth, though, the Court will catalog the various claims and 
counterclaims that survived for trial. 
Three of Plaintiffs’ claims survived to trial, not counting the claim for interference with 
prospective economic advantage that they abandoned at the outset of trial.  (Tr. 28:23–29:20.)  
Those three claims are:  (1) Count III, by which Plaintiffs have already obtained an order for 
Siddoway PC’s judicial dissociation as a Wadsworth Reese member, but which the parties 
agreed, during the pretrial conference, survived for trial insofar as there is a need to determine 
whether (and, if so, on what terms) a buyout of Siddoway PC’s lingering economic interest in 
Wadsworth Reese must occur; (2) Count IV, a claim against the Siddoway Parties for breach of 
fiduciary duty; and (3) Count IX, a claim against Siddoway PC for unjust enrichment, seeking 
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return of $28,000 Siddoway PC received from Reese PC under a contract that the Court has 
called “the Reese Agreement” in numerous pretrial decisions and that, during the course of this 
litigation, was declared void by an arbitrator.  (Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 90–104, 126–31.) 
Eight of the Siddoway Parties’ counterclaims survived for trial.  They are:  (1) their First 
Counterclaim, for breach of Wadsworth Reese’s operating agreement; (2) their Second 
Counterclaim, for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied by law into the 
operating agreement; (3) their Third Counterclaim, contending Wadsworth Reese made unequal 
distributions in violation of I.C. § 30-6-404; (4) their Fourth Counterclaim, for conversion; (5) 
their Sixth Counterclaim, for breach of fiduciary duty; (6) their Seventh Counterclaim, for an 
accounting of Wadsworth Reese’s activities; (7) their Eighth Counterclaim, for spoliation; and 
(8) their Tenth Counterclaim, for unjust enrichment equal to the value of Reese PC’s one-third 
membership interest in Wadsworth Reese.  (Verified Am. Countercls. ¶¶ 121–49, 157–65.)  The 
Tenth Counterclaim is asserted against only Reese and Reese PC, but the rest are asserted against 
all the Wadsworth Reese Parties.  (Id.) 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Reese, Wadsworth, and Siddoway are certified public accountants.  Each has his 
own professional corporation.  The Court calls the three professional corporations Reese PC, 
Wadsworth PC, and Siddoway PC, respectively. 
2. In mid-2012, Reese became an employee of Siddoway PC.  (Tr. 51:13–52:13.)  At 
that time, Wadsworth didn’t have a professional relationship with either Reese or Siddoway. 
3. In October 2013, Steve Harding, one of Siddoway’s former partners, passed away 
while still actively engaged in an accounting practice, leading Siddoway and the employees of 
Siddoway PC, including Reese, to help fill the void.  (Tr. 53:21–54:10, 976:8–22.)  Siddoway 
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had worked with Harding for about three years ending in 1999, (Tr. 340:6–13), and knew several 
of Harding’s larger clients, (Tr. 342:2–4). 
4. Around the same time, in November 2013, Siddoway and Reese began discussing 
becoming partners or co-owners of an accounting firm, on terms that involved Reese buying a 
one-half interest in Siddoway’s practice, as Siddoway had an established client base but Reese 
didn’t.  (Tr. 56:9–22, 342:10–23, 349:11–350:7, 491:16–22, 620:16–621:13, 1003:12–25.) 
5. On December 20, 2013, Reese and Siddoway formed CRS Services, PLLC.  
(Defs.’ Ex. 1017; Tr. 56:18–25.)  CRS Services now carries the name Wadsworth Reese.  The 
Court will simply call it Wadsworth Reese, though it had other names at different points in the 
past.  When it was formed, no agreement had been reached between Reese and Siddoway for the 
former to purchase a one-half interest in the latter’s client base; in fact, no such agreement was 
formalized until early 2015.  (Pls.’ Ex. 14.) 
6. In any event, in early 2014, shortly after its formation, Wadsworth Reese 
purchased the Harding client base.  (Tr. 55:5–7.)  The company had this opportunity because of 
the past relationship between Siddoway and Harding.  Nevertheless, Reese—and later 
Wadsworth—also were instrumental in integrating the Harding client base into the company.  
The joint efforts of the three accountants are responsible for the successful integration. 
7. Reese brought with him to Wadsworth Reese only two or three clients from his 
previous employment and five or six clients he developed while employed by Siddoway PC.  
(Tr. 150:8–22.)   
8. Siddoway, by contrast, brought hundreds of clients into Wadsworth Reese, 
numbering around 450.  (Tr. 150:23–151:6, 478:3–8.)  He recommended and introduced Reese 
to many of these clients, (Tr. 404:3–405:17, 409:11–15, 412:8–12), giving Reese the opportunity 
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to service many of them, (Tr. 167:23–168:15), as well as the opportunity to benefit from the 
resulting revenue to Wadsworth Reese, (Tr. 166:8–12). 
9. Wadsworth joined the company in January 2014.  (Tr. 57:1–24, 819:22–24.) 
10. Siddoway, Reese, and Wadsworth signed Wadsworth Reese’s operating 
agreement on January 6, 2014.  (Pls.’ Ex. 13.)  It recites that each of their companies gave a 
capital contribution of $100 and received a one-third membership interest in Wadsworth Reese.  
(Id. Ex. A.)  It doesn’t include a non-competition clause.  To the contrary, it broadly allows the 
company’s members to compete with the company: 
A Member, shall be entitled to enter into transactions that may be 
considered to be competitive with, or a business opportunity that may be 
beneficial to, the Company; it being expressly understood that some of the 
Members may enter into transactions that are similar to the transactions into 
which the Company may enter.  Notwithstanding the foregoing, Members shall 
account to the Company, and hold as trustee for it, any Property, profit or benefit 
derived by the Member, without the consent of the other Members, in the conduct 
and winding up of Company business or from a use or appropriation by the 
Member of Company Property, including information developed exclusively for 
the Company and opportunities expressly offered to the Company. 
(Id. § 6.6(A).)  The operating agreement might have done so allow Siddoway to start his own 
separate business advisory practice.  (Tr. 294:2–14, 401:22–402:8, 730:1–731:12.)  More likely, 
however, is that none of Wadsworth Reese’s members even read this provision before signing 
the operating agreement.  (Tr. 731:13–15, 1021:14–1023:12.)  The operating agreement was 
prepared by an administrative employee, Jeanine Barkan.  (Tr. 1021:14–1023:12.)  There is no 
evidence that Barkan had any expertise in such matters.  In some places, the operating agreement 
includes specific information that relates to a different company, (Pls.’ Ex. 13 §§ 1.11, 1.23, 2.6), 
supporting an inference that Barkan simply obtained an operating agreement from a client file 
and inexpertly adapted it for use by the company. 
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11. Siddoway’s nephew Dustin Siddoway joined Wadsworth Reese as an accountant 
in January 2014.  (Tr. 87:5–7, 88:13–15, 560:8–10.) 
12. During 2014, Reese met with Siddoway from time to time to continue discussing 
a purchase of a one-half interest in Siddoway’s client base.  (Tr. 67:22–68:10.)  Finally, on 
January 28, 2015, Reese and Siddoway signed an agreement (“the Reese Agreement”), under 
which Reese PC promised to pay Siddoway PC $200,000 for “the right to receive” a one-third 
interest in Wadsworth Reese.  (Pls.’ Ex. 14 §§ 1, 2.)  The $200,000 price was to be paid in 
monthly payments over a period of four years.  (Id. Ex. A.)  It was arrived at by multiplying the 
annual revenue generated by Siddoway PC’s client base by eighty percent, the product being the 
deemed value of the client base, and then halving the product, as Reese PC was acquiring only a 
one-half interest in the client base.  (Tr. 144:10–145:17, 261:11–14.)  Unlike the operating 
agreement, the Reese Agreement contains a non-competition clause barring the Siddoway 
Parties, for two years, from competing with Wadsworth Reese.  (Pls.’ Ex. 14 § 9.)  The same day 
the Reese Agreement was signed, Modification #1 to the Reese Agreement also was signed.  (Id. 
at Modification #1.)  It contemplated Wadsworth Reese’s three members agreeing to amend its 
operating agreement to finally settle the terms under which they would do business together, and 
if they didn’t do so by February 15, 2015, the Reese Agreement would be void.  (Id.)   
13. As permitted by the Reese Agreement, Reese PC reclassified a previous loan to 
Siddoway PC as a down payment on the $200,000 it owed under the Reese Agreement.  (Tr. 
71:19–73:14; Pls.’ Ex. 24.)  Reese PC also began to make payments pursuant to the Reese 
Agreement, even though the parties had not reached agreement on amendments to the operating 
agreement.  (Pls.’ Ex. 58, at 1–2.)  Although the drop-dead date of February 15, 2015, came and 
went without any such agreement being reached, (see Tr. 78:12–19, 420:2–5), Reese PC kept 
000388
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - 7 
making monthly payments until September 1, 2015, (Pls.’ Ex. 58).  In all, Reese PC paid 
$28,000 to Siddoway PC under the Reese Agreement.  (Id.)  Reese PC made the payments on the 
belief that it was buying a one-half interest in Siddoway PC’s client base.  (Tr. 194:24–25.)  No 
agreement to amend the operating agreement was ever reached.  (Tr. 76:8–11, 424:23–25.)  As a 
result, the Reese Agreement ultimately was found to be void during arbitration.  (Tr. 287:3–10.) 
14. Siddoway’s relations with Reese and Wadsworth broke down, causing the parties 
to begin discussing Reese PC and Wadsworth PC buying Siddoway PC out of Wadsworth Reese 
instead of amending the operating agreement.  (Tr. 78:20–79:22.) 
15. On July 17, 2015, the three accountants signed a letter of intent for that buyout.  
(Pls.’ Ex. 25.) 
16. After signing the letter of intent, the three accountants continued for a time 
working toward a formal buyout agreement, including by discussing that subject during a 
meeting held on July 20, 2015. 
17. In an e-mail sent to Reese later that day, Wadsworth said, “After the meeting 
today, why am I willing to move forward with anything besides forcing Randy out of SWR and 
letting the chips fall?”  (Pls.’ Ex. 27, at 3.)  A little less than an hour later, in a text message to 
Wadsworth, Reese said, “What time are you in the office tomorrow?  Let’s chat for a few 
minutes.  Tons of thoughts going through my brain.”  (Pls.’ Ex. 52, at 2.)  Wadsworth responded, 
“Me too, I’ve deleted two texts and five emails.  Should be in around six.”  (Id.)  Wadsworth 
testified at trial that what he had deleted that day were draft text messages or e-mails that he 
decided against sending because they were emotionally charged, (Tr. 778:5–25), as opposed to 
text messages or e-mails that had actually been sent or received by anyone, (Tr. 825:14–25).  The 
Court finds Wadsworth’s testimony in that regard to be credible and notes the absence of any 
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concrete contradictory evidence.  The Court therefore finds that Wadsworth didn’t delete any 
text messages or e-mails that had actually been sent or received by anyone. 
18. The three accountants continued working toward a formal buyout agreement until 
approximately August 11, 2015, when Wadsworth told Siddoway he would not consider 
anything except a signed offer.  (See Pls.’ Exs. 29–30.) 
19. On August 21, 2015, Siddoway announced he was parting ways with Wadsworth 
Reese.  (Tr. 93:7–22, 95:12–18, 833:5–10.)  This departure was volitional on his part; he wasn’t 
somehow forced out of Wadsworth Reese.  After his departure, Siddoway performed a small 
amount of compliance accounting services for Wadsworth Reese clients, but all payments went 
to Wadsworth Reese.  (Tr. 480:17–481:8.) 
20. The day he announced his departure, Siddoway downloaded Wadsworth Reese’s 
UltraTax files.  (Tr. 123:6–126:2, 369:10–14, 479:17–20, 1036:17–25; Pls.’ Ex. 60.)  They 
contained Wadsworth Reese’s client’s names, addresses, social security numbers, prior tax 
information, and depreciation schedules, as well as work-in-progress and notes of the servicing 
accountant.  (Tr. 294:24–296:11.) 
21. Soon after Siddoway’s departure, Dustin Siddoway, Barkan, and several other 
Wadsworth Reese employees also left Wadsworth Reese.  (Tr. 95:19–25, 103:7–10.) 
22. On August 24, 2015, Siddoway sent a list of Wadsworth Reese’s clients, 
including historical billing data, to Dustin Siddoway.  (Tr. 121:17–122:8; Pls.’ Exs. 1, 8.) 
23. On August 25, 2015, Wadsworth sent an e-mail to Barkan and Dustin Siddoway, 
instructing them to vacate Wadsworth Reese’s premises and not take with them any 
“[Wadsworth Reese] computer equipment, records or files.”  (Pls.’ Ex. 12.)  Wadsworth and 
Reese apparently later gave permission for some office equipment to be taken.  (Tr. 290:22–25.)  
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On September 7, 2015, Siddoway, Barkan, and Dustin Siddoway removed computers, furniture, 
and other office items from Wadsworth Reese for their new offices.  (Tr. 109:13–16, 283:15–17, 
373:9–14, 515:22–25.) 
24. On August 26, 2015, Dustin Siddoway formed AnchorPoint Accounting PLLC.  
(Pls.’ Ex. 37.)  Two days earlier, Barkan had formed the similarly named AnchorPoint LLC, a 
company that she and Siddoway owned and that they soon decided to rename PoleStar 
Entrepreneurial Group.  (Pls.’ Exs. 35, 129; Tr. 369:2–6, 476:3–20.)  Though the initial adoption 
of similar names evidently was coincidental rather than coordinated, (Tr. 475:4–476:20), 
Siddoway admittedly hoped the two firms would have overlapping clientele, with PoleStar 
providing business advisory services that would be complementary to the traditional compliance 
accounting services provided by Dustin Siddoway’s AnchorPoint firm.  (Tr. 527:24–528:5.) 
25. Siddoway leased computers to Dustin Siddoway but allowed four or five months 
to go by without requiring any lease payments.  (Tr. 376:7–24.)  He also leased office space to 
Dustin Siddoway, again allowing several months to go by without requiring payment.  (Tr. 
608:15–19, 610:15–22; Pls.’ Exs. 110, 126.) 
26. On September 7, 2015, Dustin Siddoway met twice with Reese, with Wadsworth 
taking part in the second meeting, to resolve difficulties arising from the company’s breakup. 
(Tr. 112:14–119:7, 613:12–614:25; Pls.’ Exs. 114–17.)  As part of the negotiations, Dustin 
Siddoway sought Wadsworth Reese’s tax data for certain clients.  (Pls.’ Ex. 116, at 25:4–12; 
Pls.’ Ex. 117, at 38:16–42:13.)  Ultimately, though, Dustin Siddoway didn’t purchase the tax 
data.  (See Tr. 121:8–16, 617:24–618:24.) 
27. Siddoway’s departure from Wadsworth Reese, coupled with his nephew Dustin 
Siddoway’s similarly timed departure, set the stage for a mass migration of clients from 
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Wadsworth Reese to Dustin Siddoway’s new firm.  Indeed, hundreds of Wadsworth Reese 
clients took their business to Dustin Siddoway’s new firm.  (Pls.’ Ex. 44; Tr. 653:17–655:3.)  
Dustin Siddoway would obtain executed release forms from transitioning clients, send the 
release forms to Siddoway, and then receive from Siddoway the UltraTax data that Siddoway 
had downloaded upon announcing his departure from Wadsworth Reese.  (Tr. 369:18–370:12, 
618:25–619:7.)  That said, though Siddoway helped Dustin Siddoway in this way, he never 
received compensation from Dustin Siddoway in connection with clients migrating from 
Wadsworth Reese to Dustin Siddoway’s new firm.  (Tr. 365:5–9, 617:14–23.) 
28. At some point in the fall of 2015, Siddoway contacted John Harry, a then-current 
client of Wadsworth Reese, and informed him that Dustin Siddoway was “a very competent 
accountant and would handle everything to [Harry’s] satisfaction.”  (Tr. 435:15–18.)  Harry hired 
Dustin Siddoway as his accountant, even though he wasn’t sure if Dustin Siddoway had done 
any accounting work for him while at Wadsworth Reese.  (Tr. 437:13–24, 439:6–7.) 
29. In October 2015, Reese and Wadsworth voted to have Wadsworth Reese pay the 
expenses incurred in the impending litigation against Siddoway, including as to disputes between 
Reese PC and Siddoway PC arising under the Reese Agreement (which, by that point, had yet to 
be declared void in arbitration).  (Tr. 128:4–129:23, 775:23–777:7; Pls.’ Ex. 74.)  Among the 
purposes of filing suit was to disassociate Siddoway PC from Wadsworth Reese and to resolve 
the dispute over membership interests, as Siddoway PC was claiming to own both its own 
membership interest and Reese PC’s membership interest in Wadsworth Reese.  (Tr. 128:15–
129:23, 775:10–22.)  On September 18, 2017, Plaintiffs obtained an order for Siddoway PC’s 
dissociation.  In any event, Wadsworth Reese has been paying the expenses associated with this 
action and the related arbitration proceeding, (Tr. 917:20–25, 960:21–961:24), presumably 
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complying, though, with a preliminary injunction entered on December 30, 2016, that barred it 
from paying any further expenses associated with litigation or arbitration concerning the Reese 
Agreement until the propriety of its doing so could be finally determined. 
30. Wadsworth Reese has always compensated its members for their service to the 
company paying them monthly management fees.  (Tr. 62:11–20, 351:12–16, 838:3–20.)  The 
original level was $7500 per month.  (Tr. 813:20–815:3.)  Payments to Siddoway PC stopped 
after August 2015, which is when Siddoway PC stopped rendering any substantial services to 
Wadsworth Reese.  (Tr. 278:18–279:8, 942:12–943:7.) 
31. In January 2017, Reese PC and Wadsworth PC voted, over Siddoway PC’s 
objection, to increase their management fees by $2000 a month to $9500.  (Tr. 63:17–64:17, 
889:5–890:3.)  The increase was adopted because Reese PC and Wadsworth PC believed that the 
effort they were expending on the company’s behalf justified larger fees, as well as because the 
company appeared to be in a position to afford the increase.  (Tr. 63:17–64:17.)  It lasted for only 
about six months, though, when it was rescinded, partly as a concession to Siddoway PC and 
partly out of cash-flow concerns.  (Tr. 64:18–65:13.) 
32. Wadsworth Reese has almost no history of making distributions to its members.  
In 2014, it made a distribution of $225 to all three members.  (Pls.’ Ex. 95, at 2.) That’s the only 
distribution it has ever made, though in 2015 it paid $6000 to each member, initially listed on its 
books as a distribution but later correctly recharacterized as a loan repayment.  (Pls.’ Ex. 95, at 4; 
Defs.’ Ex. 1015, at 2; Tr. 911:18–913:9.)   
33. In 2016, Wadsworth Reese collected $123,396.94 in payments from former 
Siddoway PC clients.  (Tr. 936:19–938:22; Pls.’ Ex. 102, at 30.)  Some of the payments were for 
work done in 2014 or 2015, not just in 2016.  (Tr. 938:18–22.) 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The Court now proceeds with its conclusions of law on Plaintiffs’ three remaining claims 
and the Siddoway Parties’ eight remaining counterclaims.  Each claim and counterclaim is 
addressed in turn, starting with the claims and then turning to the counterclaims. 
Plaintiffs’ Count III:  judicial dissociation 
1. On summary judgment, Plaintiffs asked the Court, in conjunction with Count III 
of their second amended complaint, to dissociate Siddoway PC from membership in Wadsworth 
Reese.  In a decision issued on September 18, 2017, the Court granted that relief, exercising its 
statutory authority to order dissociation when a limited liability company member “[h]as 
engaged or is engaging in conduct relating to the company’s activities and affairs which makes it 
not reasonably practicable to carry on the activities and affairs with the person as a member.”  
I.C. § 30-25-602(6)(C).1  (Mem. Decision & Order Pls.’ Mot. Summ. J. 6–7.)  As that decision 
notes, (id. at 7), the order of dissociation has the consequences for which I.C. § 30-25-603 
provides, including Siddoway PC’s transition from member status to “transferee” status. 
I.C. § 30-25-603(a)(3).  The statutory consequences of dissociation do not include an obligatory 
buyout of the former member’s lingering “transferee” interest.  I.C. § 30-25-603 cmt. to 
subsection (a)(3) (noting that “dissociation does not result in a distribution” by statute).  But 
dissociation can result in an obligatory buyout if the company’s operating agreement so provides.  
Id. (“[T]he operating agreement has the power to provide for the buyout of a person’s 
                                                          
1 This statute is part of the 2015 version of the Idaho Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, 
I.C. §§ 30-25-101 to -806.  With exceptions not relevant here, it governs all limited liability 
companies on and after July 1, 2017.  I.C. § 30-25-110(b).  The Court therefore applies it to 
Plaintiffs’ dissociation claim, not the predecessor version that had been codified as Chapter 6 of 
Title 30 before its 2015 repeal and that was in effect at the time of Wadsworth Reese’s 
formation.  This aligns the Court with Plaintiffs’ position that the 2015 version of the act applies 
for this purpose.  (Pls.’ Proposed Findings Fact & Conclusions Law 10.)  The Siddoway Parties 
haven’t directly taken any position on which version applies for this purpose. 
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transferable interest in connection with the person’s dissociation.”).  Thus, what is left for trial, 
as the Court previously suggested, (Mem. Decision & Order Pls.’ Mot. Summ. J. 7), is whether, 
under Wadsworth Reese’s operating agreement, Siddoway PC’s lingering “transferee” interest in 
Wadsworth Reese must be bought out (and, if so, at what price). 
2. Article XI of Wadsworth Reese’s operating agreement contemplates the prospect 
of a member’s dissociation.  (Pls.’ Ex. 13 art. XI.)  Its section 11.1 lists a variety of 
circumstances in which dissociation could occur.  (Pls.’ Ex. 13 § 11.1.)  But none of them is 
judicial dissociation under I.C. § 30-25-602(6).  (See id.)  Its section 11.2 provides for 
dissociation to have certain consequences, including an obligatory buyout of the dissociated 
member’s lingering interest in certain situations.  (Id. § 11.2.)  But none of those situations is a 
judicial dissociation under I.C. § 30-25-602(6) that doesn’t cause Wadsworth Reese to dissolve.  
(See id.)  There is no evidence that Siddoway PC’s judicial dissociation either did cause or 
should have caused Wadsworth Reese to dissolve.  So nothing in Article XI requires a buyout of 
Siddoway PC’s lingering interest in Wadsworth Reese, nor does anything in it apply to 
Siddoway PC’s judicial dissociation at all. 
3. No other provision of the operating agreement requires a buyout either. 
4. As already noted, a statutory effect of Siddoway PC’s judicial dissociation is that 
it became a “transferee.”  I.C. § 30-25-603(3).  More precisely, although Siddoway PC lost its 
member status upon dissociation, it continued to own an interest in Wadsworth Reese “solely as 
a transferee.”  Id.  A transferee’s statutory rights, including the right to participate in distributions 
by the company, are set forth in I.C. § 30-25-502.  The operating agreement’s provisions 
pertaining to transferees, (see Pls.’ Ex. 13 § 12.1), largely dovetail with that statute, though the 
operating agreement uses the label “Assignee” instead, (id. § 1.4).  Since the date of the 
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dissociation order, Siddoway PC has occupied transferee/Assignee status and has had the 
associated statutory and contractual rights.  The Court has no power to end this status by 
ordering a buyout or setting a buyout price.2  Accordingly, no further relief is granted in 
connection with Plaintiffs’ dissociation claim than was granted on summary judgment. 
Plaintiffs’ Count IV:  breach of fiduciary duty 
5. In Count IV of their second amended complaint, Plaintiffs claim Siddoway PC 
breached fiduciary duties owed in its capacity as a member of Wadsworth Reese, and they claim 
Siddoway shares responsibility for the breaching conduct.  (Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 97–104.)  
The parties have briefed this claim as though the 2015 version of the Idaho Uniform Limited 
Liability Company Act applies to it, (Pls.’ Proposed Findings Fact & Conclusions Law 11 n.12; 
Siddoway’s Proposed Findings Fact & Conclusions Law 13), not the substantively similar 
predecessor version that was repealed that year.  The Court therefore assumes, without deciding, 
that the 2015 version of the act applies for this purpose. 
6. A member of a member-managed limited liability company owes a fiduciary duty 
of loyalty to the company and its other members,3 barring it from competing with the company 
or acting for someone else with an adverse interest to the company.  I.C. § 30-25-409(a)–(b).  
This duty may, however, be curtailed in the company’s operating agreement, so long as the 
curtailment isn’t “manifestly unreasonable.”  I.C. § 30-25-105(d)(3). 
7. Whether a term curtailing the duty of loyalty is manifestly unreasonable is a 
question of law, to be decided as of the time the term originated, taking into account only the 
                                                          
2 The Court is well aware that this leaves the parties in an unhappy marriage of sorts.  Perhaps 
they can put an end to it by agreement.  (Hope springs eternal.)  If not, perhaps the operating 
agreement can be amended to require a buyout, on fair terms, as a result of the dissociation. 
3 Wadsworth Reese is a member-managed limited liability company, as nothing in the operating 
agreement vests managers with management powers.  See I.C. § 30-25-407(a). 
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then-existing circumstances.  I.C. § 30-25-105(e).  The term may be invalidated only if it is 
“readily apparent” that the term’s objective is unreasonable or that the term is an unreasonable 
way of achieving its objective.  I.C. § 30-25-105(e)(2). 
8. The following provision of Wadsworth Reese’s operating agreement curtails the 
duty of loyalty: 
A Member, shall be entitled to enter into transactions that may be 
considered to be competitive with, or a business opportunity that may be 
beneficial to, the Company; it being expressly understood that some of the 
Members may enter into transactions that are similar to the transactions into 
which the Company may enter.  Notwithstanding the foregoing, Members shall 
account to the Company, and hold as trustee for it, any Property, profit or benefit 
derived by the Member, without the consent of the other Members, in the conduct 
and winding up of Company business or from a use or appropriation by the 
Member of Company Property, including information developed exclusively for 
the Company and opportunities expressly offered to the Company. 
(Pls.’ Ex. 13 § 6.6(A).) 
9. In all likelihood, none of Wadsworth Reese’s members even read this provision 
before signing the operating agreement.  (Tr. 731:13–15, 1021:14–1023:12.)  This presents 
problems in discerning the provision’s objective, so as to decide whether it is manifestly 
unreasonable.  To the extent anyone actually read this provision before signing the operating 
agreement, its objective might have been to let the Siddoway Parties start a business advisory 
practice.  (Tr. 294:2–14, 401:22–402:8, 730:1–731:12.)  It is not readily apparent that the 
objective of allowing the Siddoway Parties to compete through a business advisory practice is 
unreasonable, especially given the provision’s restriction on making use of Wadsworth Reese 
property in doing so.  Further, it is not readily apparent that the provision is an unreasonable 
means of achieving that objective.  Thus, to the extent the provision was intended to allow the 
Siddoway Parties to pursue a competing business advisory practice, it is not manifestly 
unreasonable.  They therefore were within their rights to create and operate AnchorPoint LLC 
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(later renamed PoleStar) to provide business advisory services, even though Siddoway had 
provided business advisory services at Wadsworth Reese before cutting ties in August 2015. 
10. To the extent the provision has no identifiable objective because no one even read 
it before signing the operating agreement, it isn’t manifestly unreasonable on its face, as it 
permits competition as a general matter but renders economically infeasible certain particularly 
problematic forms of competition:  competing for business that the company already has or that 
has already been offered to the company, or competing through use of the company’s property.  
It does so by requiring the member to account to the company for any resulting benefit.   
11. The Siddoway Parties solicited at least one client, John Harry, on behalf of 
Siddoway’s nephew Dustin Siddoway.  This wasn’t a breach of the curtailed duty of loyalty.  
Instead, it was competition allowed by the operating agreement. 
12. To the extent the Siddoway Parties provided a company client list, UltraTax data, 
or other company data to Dustin Siddoway, this wasn’t a breach of the curtailed duty of loyalty 
either, but it triggered an obligation under the operating agreement to account to Wadsworth 
Reese for any benefit Siddoway PC received as a result.  There was no evidence, however, that 
the Siddoway Parties obtained any such benefit.  Any benefit was enjoyed by Dustin Siddoway. 
13. The Siddoway Parties benefited on some level from Dustin Siddoway’s being in 
business, in that they leased computer equipment and office space to him.  (Tr. 376:7–24, 
608:15–19, 610:15–22; Pls.’ Exs. 110, 126.)  That said, it hasn’t been shown that he couldn’t 
have performed his lease obligations without access to the Wadsworth Reese information the 
Siddoway Parties had provided to him.  This possible benefit—Dustin Siddoway’s lease 
payments—is too indirect and attenuated to show damages with reasonable certainty.  
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14. The Siddoway Parties also could’ve benefited indirectly from providing 
Wadsworth Reese information to Dustin Siddoway to the extent he used that information to land 
clients and then cross-sold them on the Siddoway Parties’ business advisory services.  There was 
evidence that the Siddoway Parties intended for PoleStar and Dustin Siddoway’s company to 
provide complementary services to the same clients.  (Tr. 527:24–528:5.)  But Plaintiffs failed to 
prove that Dustin Siddoway’s access to Wadsworth Reese information actually generated these 
cross-selling opportunities and actually resulted in benefits to the Siddoway Parties. 
15. The only direct benefit the Siddoway Parties may have obtained from using 
Wadsworth Reese property appears to involve office equipment taken from the company.  There 
was evidence that the Siddoway Parties took office equipment and furniture, (Tr. 109:13–16, 
283:15–17, 373:9–14, 515:22–25), which they evidently used at PoleStar.  Wadsworth and Reese 
gave permission for some office equipment to be taken, although they claimed more was taken 
than allowed.  (Tr. 290:22–25.)  Regardless, Plaintiffs did not specify which items were removed 
without permission, what the value of those items was, and whether the Siddoway Parties or 
instead Dustin Siddoway ended up with it.  Plaintiffs simply did not carry their burden to 
establish that the Siddoway Parties removed company property without permission and used it 
for their benefit, causing some sort of damages to Plaintiffs. 
16. Because Plaintiffs failed to establish any actual benefit to the Siddoway Parties 
from use of Wadsworth Reese property, their claim for breach of fiduciary duty fails. 
Plaintiffs’ Count IX:  unjust enrichment 
17. After the Reese Agreement was declared void in arbitration, Reese PC asserted, in 
Count IX of Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint, a claim for unjust enrichment, seeking return 
of what it paid to Siddoway PC under the Reese Agreement.  (Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 126–31.)  
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“The elements of unjust enrichment are that (1) a benefit is conferred on the defendant by the 
plaintiff; (2) the defendant appreciates the benefit; and (3) it would be inequitable for the 
defendant to accept the benefit without payment of the value of the benefit.”  Countrywide Home 
Loans, Inc. v. Sheets, 160 Idaho 268, 272, 371 P.3d 322, 326 (2016) (quoting Teton Peaks Inv. 
Co., LLC v. Ohme, 146 Idaho 394, 398, 195 P.3d 1207, 1211 (2008)).  Indisputably, Reese PC 
conferred a $28,000 benefit on Siddoway PC under the Reese Agreement.  (Pls.’ Ex. 58.)  
Siddoway PC appreciated this benefit by accepting the money.  Thus, the first two elements of 
the claim are satisfied.  Just the third is in dispute.  To determine whether Reese PC has proved it 
would be inequitable for Siddoway PC to retain the $28,000 benefit, the Court must consider 
what the evidence shows about what Siddoway PC gave, and Reese PC received, in return for it. 
18. The Reese Agreement required Reese PC to pay Siddoway PC $200,000 for “the 
right to receive” a one-third membership interest in Wadsworth Reese.  (Pls.’ Ex. 14 §§ 1–2.)  
That is the price for which Siddoway PC would “sell certain assets used in [its] accounting 
practice” to Reese PC, and then those assets would be jointly contributed to Wadsworth Reese by 
Reese PC and Siddoway PC in return for one-third membership interests.  (Id., second Recitals 
clause.)  The assets to be contributed weren’t specified in the Reese Agreement, but the evidence 
shows that the reason for this arrangement was that Reese PC was expected to bring almost no 
client relationships to Wadsworth Reese, whereas Siddoway PC was expected to bring a great 
deal of them, so Reese PC had to pay Siddoway PC cash to justify being an equal member. 
19. After the Reese Agreement was signed but before it was declared void in 
arbitration, Siddoway PC in fact transitioned numerous client relationships to Wadsworth Reese.  
(Tr. 150:23–151:6, 404:3–405:17.)  Reese became the accountant serving many of these 
established Siddoway PC clients, (Tr. 167:23–168:15), courtesy of Siddoway’s efforts at making 
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introductions and vouching for Reese’s skill, (Tr. 405:1–17).  The evidence doesn’t show the 
extent to which Wadsworth Reese generated revenue through Reese’s work for these clients, but 
it does show that in 2016 alone (after the Siddoway Parties had cut ties with Wadsworth Reese in 
August 2015), Wadsworth Reese was paid $123,396.94 for work—by whomever performed and 
whenever performed—done for these clients.  (Tr. 936:19–938:22; Pls.’ Ex. 102, at 30.)  This 
revenue presumably helped make it possible for Wadsworth Reese to pay $7500 monthly 
management fees to both Reese PC and Wadsworth PC, and whatever role Reese himself played 
in serving these clients presumably furnished part of the business justification for paying sizeable 
monthly management fees to Reese PC.  The Court cannot discern from the evidence the full 
measure of the extent to which Reese PC benefited from Siddoway PC’s efforts to transition its 
client relationships to Wadsworth Reese, but Reese PC undeniably benefited to some degree 
from those efforts.  Reese PC has failed to prove that that benefit’s value is less than the $28,000 
benefit it conferred upon Siddoway PC by making payments under the Reese Agreement.  
Consequently, Reese PC failed to prove the third element of its claim for unjust enrichment.4 
The Siddoway Parties’ First Counterclaim:  breach of operating agreement 
20. In pleading their First Counterclaim, for breach of the express terms of 
Wadsworth Reese’s operating agreement, the Siddoway Parties alleged that Siddoway PC was 
denied (i) “access to company information,” (ii) “access to company assets,” (iii) “the right to 
consent to or approve actions of the company,” (iv) “the right to equal distributions of the 
company,” and (v) “the right to vote on company matters and to otherwise participate in the 
                                                          
4 This is so even assuming for the sake of argument that a one-third membership interest in 
Wadsworth Reese is worthless, as the Wadsworth Reese Parties contend, because the absence of 
non-competition agreements means the company has no goodwill value.  That a one-third 
membership interest in the company isn’t worth anything doesn’t mean a member obtains no 
benefit from its association with the company during any period of time the company is 
generating enough revenue to pay its members for their efforts on the company’s behalf. 
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management of the company,” as well as (vi) that the Wadsworth Reese Parties are guilty of 
“[i]mproperly diverting funds of [Wadsworth Reese] for the payment of Reese’s separate 
attorney’s fees and costs.”  (Verified Am. Countercls. ¶ 122.)  But they ultimately pursued the 
claim less broadly than they pleaded it.  At the end of trial, the Court directed each side to file 
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law and allowed each side a response to the other’s 
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.  (Tr. 1136:2–1137:13.)  These post-trial filings 
took the place of closing arguments, which the parties agreed not to present.  (Tr. 926:14–25.)  In 
Siddoway PC’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, this claim gets just two brief 
mentions—one near the beginning describing the claim, and another near the end arguing it.  
(Siddoway’s Proposed Findings Fact & Conclusion Law 2, 18.)  The only argument made is that 
the operating agreement was breached by Wadsworth Reese’s payment of unequal distributions 
and that a distribution to Siddoway PC of $104,441.13 is a necessary equalizer.  (Id. at 18.)  
Hence, the Siddoway Parties abandoned the other pleaded aspects of the claim.  By not 
identifying in their proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law the factual and legal 
grounds for awarding relief in connection with the other pleaded aspects of the claim, the 
Siddoway Parties have waived any right they might otherwise have had to any such relief.  See 
Adams v. Adams, 89 Idaho 84, 90–91, 403 P.2d 593, 597 (1965) (“Defendant made no request 
for a specific finding of fact in this regard and hence a specific finding thereon was waived.”); 
Petty v. Petty, 70 Idaho 473, 479, 223 P.2d 158, 161 (1950) (“The record discloses that 
appellants tendered proposed findings of fact to the trial court and did not therein ask for a 
finding on their plea in abatement.  Their failure to ask for such finding constitutes a waiver of 
the error, if any, on the part of the trial court.”).  Indeed, on appeal, a claim of error may not be 
predicated on the absence of a finding that was never requested in the trial court.  I.R.C.P. 52(c) 
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(“No party may assign as error the lack of findings unless the party raised the issue to the trial 
court by an appropriate motion.”); Bedke v. Pickett Ranch & Sheep Co., 143 Idaho 36, 41, 137 
P.3d 423, 428 (2006) (applying this rule by holding that “[b]ecause Pickett Ranch did not raise to 
the district court the alleged lack of findings regarding Bedke’s maintenance practices, it cannot 
assign the lack of findings on that issue as error on appeal”).  The Court cannot reasonably be 
expected to address, and declines to address, the Siddoway Parties’ claim more broadly than they 
address it in their proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.  Thus, the Court will 
consider the claim only to the extent it is based on alleged unequal distributions.5 
21. “The elements for a claim for breach of contract are:  (a) the existence of 
the contract, (b) the breach of the contract, (c) the breach caused damages, and (d) the amount of 
those damages.”  Path to Health, LLP v. Long, 161 Idaho 50, 57, 383 P.3d 1220, 1227 (2016) 
(quoting Mosell Equities, LLC v. Berryhill & Co., 154 Idaho 269, 278, 297 P.3d 232, 241 
(2013)).  Wadsworth Reese’s operating agreement is a contract among itself, Siddoway PC, 
Reese PC, and Wadsworth PC, satisfying the first element.  The other elements are disputed. 
22. Under the operating agreement, Siddoway PC had an express contractual right to 
participate equally in distributions by Wadsworth Reese.  (Pls.’ Ex. 13 §§ 1.5, 8.5 & Ex. A.)  The 
operating agreement defines the term “Distribution” as a “transfer of Property to a Member on 
account of a Membership Interest.”  (Id. § 1.19.) 
23. The Siddoway Parties’ claim is based on two kinds of distributions allegedly 
made by Wadsworth Reese to or for the benefit of Reese PC or Wadsworth PC, without 
equivalent distributions to Siddoway PC:  (i) payments made to the Wadsworth Reese Parties’ 
                                                          
5 If the Siddoway Parties want the Court to address the pleaded-but-not-argued aspects of their 
claim, they will need to file a timely motion to alter or amend the judgment, explaining the 
evidentiary and legal justification for a ruling in their favor. 
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counsel for services rendered in connection with this litigation and the related arbitration 
proceeding concerning the Reese Agreement, to the extent those services purportedly benefited 
Reese PC or Wadsworth PC but not Wadsworth Reese itself; and (ii) the $2000 increase in 
monthly management fees paid to Reese PC and Wadsworth PC during the first six months of 
2017, shortly after the Court issued a preliminary injunction against Wadsworth Reese’s 
continued payment of the expenses incurred in litigating and arbitrating disputes over the Reese 
Agreement.  (Siddoway’s Proposed Findings Fact & Conclusions Law 18.)  For reasons 
explained in the next two paragraphs, neither of these two kinds of alleged distributions meets 
the operating agreement’s definition of the term “Distribution.” 
24. Transfers of the first kind—payments to the Wadsworth Reese Parties’ legal 
counsel for services rendered—aren’t transfers “to a Member,” as the definition requires.  (Pls.’ 
Ex. 13 § 1.19)  Instead, they are transfers to a non-member third party:  the Wadsworth Reese 
Parties’ legal counsel.  Moreover, they aren’t transfers “on account of a Membership Interest,” as 
the definition also requires.  (Id.)  The payments to the Wadsworth Reese Parties’ counsel 
weren’t made on account of Reese PC or Wadsworth PC owning membership interests.  Instead, 
they were made on account of a perceived need to address and resolve disputes among the 
parties, including the dispute in which Siddoway PC claimed that, in the event of the Reese 
Agreement’s failure, the operating agreement’s allocation of a one-third membership interest to 
Reese PC is ineffectual and Siddoway PC owns that membership interest, plus its own one-third 
membership interest.  For these two independent reasons, the payments to the Wadsworth Reese 
Parties’ legal counsel aren’t “Distributions,” as that term is defined in the operating agreement.  
As such, the operating agreement doesn’t entitle Siddoway PC to proportionate payments.  The 
absence of proportionate payments isn’t a breach of the operating agreement’s express terms. 
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25. Transfers of the second kind, though made “to a Member,” also weren’t made “on 
account of a Membership Interest.”  Wadsworth Reese had always compensated its members for 
their service to the company—not simply for owning a membership interest—through monthly 
management fees.  (Tr. 62:11–20, 351:12–16, 838:3–20.)  That’s why Wadsworth Reese stopped 
paying management fees to Siddoway PC once it stopped rendering substantial service to the 
company in August 2015, (Tr. 278:18–279:8, 942:12–943:7), though it still owned a membership 
interest.  At the beginning of 2017, the monthly fees paid to Reese PC and Wadsworth PC were 
increased by $2000 each, in accordance with a vote of the members, because the effort they were 
expending on the company’s behalf was thought to warrant the increase and the company was 
thought to be in a position to afford the increase.  (Tr. 63:17–64:17.)  The increase was ended, 
and the original compensation level was restored, after six months, partly as a concession to the 
Siddoway Parties and partly because of cash-flow concerns.  (Tr. 64:18–65:13.)  The Siddoway 
Parties failed to prove that the short-lived $2000 increase amounts to unreasonable compensation 
for services rendered by Reese PC and Wadsworth PC to the company.  The Siddoway Parties 
also failed to prove that the $2000 increase’s temporal connection to the preliminary injunction is 
more than coincidental; the evidence doesn’t support an inference that the increase was designed 
to flout the injunction by giving company money to Reese PC or Wadsworth PC to pay over to 
the Wadsworth Reese Parties’ legal counsel for services for which the company had been 
enjoined from paying itself.  In sum, payments of the $2000 increase aren’t “Distributions” under 
the operating agreement because they reflect compensation to Reese PC and Wadsworth PC for 
services rendered to the company, not transfers made on account of their merely owning a 
membership interest.  As such, the operating agreement doesn’t entitle Siddoway PC to 
proportionate payments and wasn’t breached because of the absence of them. 
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26. For these reasons, the Siddoway Parties failed to prove their claim for breach of 
the operating agreement’s express terms. 
The Siddoway Parties’ Second Counterclaim:  breach of implied covenant 
27. In pleading their Second Counterclaim, for breach of the Wadsworth Reese 
operating agreement’s implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the Siddoway Parties 
alleged that Siddoway PC was denied (i) “access to company information,” (ii) “access to 
company assets,” (iii) “the right to consent to or approve actions of the company,” (iv) “the right 
to equal distributions of the company,” and (v) “the right to vote on company matters and to 
otherwise participate in the management of the company,” as well as (vi) that the Wadsworth 
Reese Parties are guilty of “[i]mproperly diverting funds of [Wadsworth Reese] for the payment 
of Reese’s separate attorney’s fees and costs.”  (Verified Am. Countercls. ¶ 125.)  As with their 
First Counterclaim, though, they ultimately pursued this claim less broadly than they pleaded it.  
In their proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, the implied-covenant claim gets just 
one brief mention.  That mention is near the end, where the Siddoway Parties argue only that the 
implied covenant was breached by Wadsworth Reese’s payment of unequal distributions and that 
a distribution to Siddoway PC of $104,441.13 is a necessary equalizer.  (Siddoway’s Proposed 
Findings Fact & Conclusions Law 18.)  As held in Conclusion of Law 20, supra, each side had 
to identify—in its proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law—the factual and legal 
grounds for the relief it seeks on the claims tried, or else be deemed to have waived the right to 
any relief to which it might otherwise have been entitled.  The Court therefore will not address 
the Siddoway Parties’ implied-covenant claim in any broader way than they addressed it in their 
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.  This means the sole issue is whether the 
implied covenant was breached through payment of unequal distributions. 
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28. “In every contract there is an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 
which requires the parties to perform, in good faith, the obligations required by their agreement.”  
Silicon Int’l Ore, LLC v. Monsanto Co., 155 Idaho 538, 552, 314 P.3d 593, 607 (2013) (emphasis 
and quotation marks omitted).  This implied covenant “does not create independent obligations,” 
but “merely applies to contractual obligations” expressed in the contract.  Id.  It is breached 
“when either party violates, nullifies or significantly impairs any benefit of the contract.”  Drug 
Testing Compliance Grp., LLC v. DOT Compliance Serv., 161 Idaho 93, 103, 383 P.3d 1263, 
1273 (2016).  Such a breach “is a breach of contract.”  Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. 
MRI Assocs., LLP, 157 Idaho 106, 120, 334 P.3d 780, 794 (2014).  But it “does not result in a 
cause of action separate from the breach of contract claims, nor does it result in separate contract 
damages unless such damages specifically relate to the breach of the good faith covenant.”  Id. 
29. As the Court already noted in addressing the Siddoway Parties’ claim for breach 
of the operating agreement’s express terms, Siddoway PC had an express contractual right to 
participate equally in distributions by Wadsworth Reese.  (Pls.’ Ex. 13 §§ 1.5, 8.5 & Ex. A.)  In 
that context, the Court holds above that there was no breach of the operating agreement’s express 
terms because the payments the Siddoway Parties say were distributions to Reese PC and 
Wadsworth PC aren’t actually “Distributions,” as that term is defined in the operating agreement.  
The Siddoway Parties’ implied-covenant claim apparently is that those same payments are 
disguised distributions, even if not “Distributions” with a capital D.  Thus, the Siddoway Parties 
seemingly contend that Siddoway PC’s express contractual right to equal distributions was 
nullified or impaired through Wadsworth Reese’s making of payments to or for the benefit of 
Reese PC and Wadsworth PC that were distributions in substance even if not “Distributions” 
with a capital D, skirting the express contractual obligation to pay equal distributions to 
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Siddoway PC.  This is a tenable implied-covenant theory, should the evidence support the factual 
premise that the payments at issue are disguised distributions. 
30. The same two kinds of payments by Wadsworth Reese are at issue here as were at 
issue in connection with the Siddoway Parties’ claim for breach of the operating agreement’s 
express terms.  They are described in Conclusion of Law 23, supra.  For reasons explained in the 
next two paragraphs, neither kind has been proved to be a disguised distribution. 
31. First, as discussed in Conclusion of Law 24, supra, the payments to the 
Wadsworth Reese Parties’ legal counsel were made for the legitimate business purpose of 
addressing disputes among the parties.  Most notably, these disputes were over the validity of the 
Reese Agreement and ownership of the company in the event of its unenforceability.  The 
company needed to resolve these disputes in order to stabilize itself and continue as a going 
concern.  Though the company wasn’t neutral, the side it took in arbitration and litigation—that 
the Reese Agreement is void, and that Reese PC owns a one-third membership interest in the 
company despite the Reese Agreement’s unenforceability—won out.  Thus, the company can’t 
be accused of having funded an effort by two members to tilt at windmills to its own financial 
detriment and that of the third member.  That the positions the company took were vindicated 
demonstrates its good faith.  More to the point, the Court cannot conclude that the company’s 
payments to the Wadsworth Reese Parties’ legal counsel violated, nullified, or significantly 
impaired any benefit of Siddoway PC under the operating agreement.  Those payments simply 
aren’t disguised distributions or an attempt by the company to provide distribution-type benefits 
to Reese PC and Wadsworth PC but not to Siddoway PC. 
32. Second, as discussed in Conclusion of Law 25, supra, the short-lived $2000 
increase in monthly management fees paid to Reese PC and Wadsworth PC reflected nothing 
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other than compensation for services rendered to Wadsworth Reese.  The increased 
compensation level was set by a majority of the members.  Its purpose was simply 
compensatory, not to skirt Siddoway PC’s right to participate equally in distributions.  Indeed, at 
the time of the increase, Siddoway PC wasn’t rendering any substantial services to the company 
and therefore had no reasonable expectation of similar compensation, nor did it have any 
reasonable expectation that the monthly management fee would perpetually remain at the 
original $7500 level, never to be increased.  The Court cannot conclude that the $2000 increase 
violated, nullified, or significantly impaired any benefit granted to Siddoway PC by the operating 
agreement.  The payments of the $2000 increase simply aren’t disguised distributions or an 
attempt by the company to provide distribution-type benefits to Reese PC and Wadsworth PC but 
not to Siddoway PC. 
33. For these reasons, the Siddoway Parties’ implied-covenant claim fails. 
The Siddoway Parties’ Third Counterclaim:  unequal distributions 
34. The Siddoway Parties’ Third Counterclaim is that Wadsworth Reese has made 
unequal distributions in violation of I.C. § 30-6-404.  (Verified Am. Countercls. ¶¶ 127–31.)  
That statute was part of the predecessor version of the Idaho Uniform Limited Liability 
Company Act, repealed in 2015.  As mentioned in footnote 1, supra, the 2015 version of the 
act—the current version—governs all limited liability companies, with exceptions not relevant 
here, on and after July 1, 2017.  I.C. § 30-25-110(b).  The 2015 version includes a provision,  
I.C. § 30-25-404, that is similar to repealed section 30-6-404.  The Siddoway Parties rely on it, 
not on repealed section 30-6-404, in their proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.  
(Siddoway’s Proposed Findings Fact & Conclusions Law 2, 17–18.)  The Wadsworth Reese 
Parties also rely on the 2015 version of the act in their opposing argument.  (Pls.’ Proposed 
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Findings Fact & Conclusions Law 13.)  The Court therefore assumes, without deciding, that the 
2015 version—which isn’t materially different from the predecessor version—governs for this 
purpose.  Thus, the claim is treated as made under section 30-25-404.  With exceptions not 
relevant here, section 30-25-404 mandates that “[a]ny distributions made by a limited liability 
company before its dissolution and winding up must be in equal shares among members and 
persons dissociated as members.”  I.C. § 30-25-404(a).  The claim is based on the same two 
kinds of alleged distributions described in Conclusion of Law 23, supra.  (See Siddoway’s 
Proposed Findings Fact & Conclusions Law 17–18.) 
35. The act defines “distribution” as “a transfer of money or other property from a 
limited liability company to a person on account of a transferable interest or in the person’s 
capacity as a member.”  I.C. § 30-25-102(3).  But it excludes from this definition “amounts 
constituting reasonable compensation for present or past service.”  I.C. § 30-25-102(3)(B). 
36. Payments by Wadsworth Reese to the Wadsworth Reese Parties’ legal counsel for 
services rendered aren’t transfers “to a person on account of a transferable interest or in the 
person’s capacity as a member.”  I.C. § 30-25-102(3).  A “transferable interest” is “the right, as 
initially owned by a person in the person’s capacity as a member, to receive distributions from a 
limited liability company, whether or not the person remains a member or continues to own any 
part of the right.”  I.C. § 30-25-102(11).  As explained in Conclusions of Law 24 and 31, supra, 
the evidence supports the conclusion that the payments to the Wadsworth Reese Parties’ counsel 
weren’t made because Reese PC or Wadsworth PC own membership interests or have the right 
to receive distributions from the company.  Instead, they were made because of the company’s 
own perceived need to address and resolve disputes between the parties, including a dispute in 
which Siddoway PC claimed that the operating agreement’s allocation of a one-third 
000410
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - 29 
membership interest to Reese PC is ineffectual—and that Siddoway PC owns that membership 
interest, plus its own one-third membership interest—in the event of the Reese Agreement’s 
failure.  Because the payments aren’t “distributions” under the act, the act doesn’t entitle 
Siddoway PC to proportionate payments.6 
37. During the first six months of 2017, Wadsworth Reese paid $9500 monthly 
management fees to Reese PC and Wadsworth PC, not the $7500 monthly management fees it 
had paid them before then and has paid them since then.  The Siddoway Parties challenge all 
payments of the $2000 increase as unequal distributions.  But “amounts constituting reasonable 
compensation for present or past service” are not “distributions.”  I.C. § 30-25-102(3)(B).  As 
explained in Conclusions of Law 25 and 32, supra, the evidence supports the conclusion that the 
$2000 increase wasn’t unreasonable and was intended as compensation for service to the 
company.  Similarly, payments of the $2000 increase weren’t “on account of a transferable 
interest or in the person’s capacity as a member,” I.C. § 30-25-102(3), as they must have been to 
constitute “distributions” in the first place.  Reese PC and Wadsworth PC weren’t paid these 
amounts simply because they owned membership interests; instead, they were paid them 
because, unlike Siddoway PC, they were actively engaged in trying to further the company’s 
business and this was the company’s way of compensating them for doing so. 
38. For these reasons, the Siddoway Parties’ claim for unequal distributions fails. 
                                                          
6 Before trial, the Siddoway Parties asked for an injunction ordering that Wadsworth Reese be 
reimbursed for these payments.  In declining to issue that injunction, the Court characterized the 
Siddoway Parties’ reimbursement request as an unpleaded “derivative” claim, and observed that 
“[i]f Siddoway wishes to contend that Wadsworth Reese is entitled to reimbursement for those 
expenses, Siddoway should seek permission to plead a derivative claim to that effect.”  (Mem. 
Dec. & Order Siddoway’s Mot. Prelim. Inj. 7–8.)  The Siddoway Parties didn’t pursue that angle.  
Thus, the Court has no occasion to consider whether these payments injured the company and 
therefore might be recouped on a derivative theory.  All the Court can consider is whether they 
amount to “distributions,” injuring Siddoway PC by virtue of its non-participation in them.  
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The Siddoway Parties’ Fourth Counterclaim:  conversion 
39. The Siddoway Parties’ Fourth Counterclaim, for conversion, rests mainly on the 
already-discussed notion that Wadsworth Reese’s payments of attorney fees incurred in litigating 
and arbitrating disputes over the Reese Agreement are disguised distributions to Reese PC.  
Because those payments weren’t paired with equivalent distributions to Siddoway PC, the 
Siddoway Parties say they amount to conversion.  (Verified Am. Countercls. ¶ 133; Siddoway’s 
Proposed Findings Fact & Conclusions Law 18.)  The conversion claim may also rest partly on 
the already-discussed notion that Wadsworth Reese improperly increased Reese PC’s and 
Wadsworth PC’s monthly management fees, without providing an equivalent benefit to 
Siddoway PC, in the wake of a preliminary injunction barring its continued payment of the 
expenses incurred in litigating and arbitrating disputes over the Reese Agreement.  (Siddoway’s 
Proposed Findings Fact & Conclusions Law 18.) 
40. “A claim of conversion requires proof of three elements: ‘(1) that the charged 
party wrongfully gained dominion of property; (2) that property is owned or possessed by 
plaintiff at the time of possession; and (3) the property in question is personal property.’”  Sallaz 
v. Rice, 161 Idaho 223, 226, 384 P.3d 987, 990 (2016) (quoting Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 
826, 846, 243 P.3d 642, 662 (2010)). 
41. That said, “conversion for misappropriation of money does not lie unless it can be 
described or identified as a specific chattel.”  Warm Springs Props., Inc. v. Andora Villa, Inc., 96 
Idaho 270, 272, 526 P.2d 1106, 1108 (1974).  That sums of money were paid by or to the persons 
accused of conversion isn’t enough to make them a specific chattel for this purpose.  See Taylor, 
149 Idaho at 846, 243 P.3d at 662; see also 18 Am. Jur. 2d Conversion § 7, Westlaw (database 
updated Feb. 2018) (“[M]oney can be the subject of conversion but only when it is in the form of 
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specific chattel, such as old coins, or when the money is delivered to another party for 
safekeeping, the keeper claims no title, and the money is required and intended to be segregated, 
either substantially in the form in which it was received or as an intact fund.”). 
42. As already noted, the Siddoway Parties’ claim is that Wadsworth Reese paid sums 
of money to or for the benefit of two of its members, Reese PC and Wadsworth PC, without 
providing equivalent benefits to its third member, Siddoway PC.  Under Taylor, these sums of 
money don’t constitute a specific chattel and therefore aren’t a proper subject of a conversion 
claim.  The Siddoway Parties’ conversion claim fails for this reason. 
The Siddoway Parties’ Sixth Counterclaim:  breach of fiduciary duty 
43. In their Sixth Counterclaim, the Siddoway Parties claim the Wadsworth Reese 
Parties breached a fiduciary duty of care by causing Wadsworth Reese to fund the litigation and 
arbitration over the Reese Agreement.  (Verified Am. Countercls. ¶ 138.)  The Wadsworth Reese 
Parties analyze this claim under the 2015 version of the Idaho Uniform Limited Liability 
Company Act.  (Pls.’ Proposed Findings Fact & Conclusions Law 15.)  It isn’t clear whether the 
Siddoway Parties share the view that the 2015 version of the act applies for this purpose.  The 
Court declines to decide whether and to what extent the 2015 version of the act, or instead the 
predecessor version, applies for this purpose.  That question can be elided because the outcome 
is the same under either version. 
44. Under the 2015 version of the act, Reese PC and Wadsworth PC, as members of 
the member-managed Wadsworth Reese, owed a duty of care to the company and Siddoway PC, 
requiring them to “refrain from engaging in grossly negligent or reckless conduct, willful or 
intentional misconduct, or knowing violation of the law.”  I.C. § 30-25-409(c).  As held in 
Conclusions of Law 24, 31, and 36, supra, Wadsworth Reese had legitimate business reasons for 
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funding the litigation and arbitration over the Reese Agreement.  Consequently, by causing 
Wadsworth Reese to do so, Reese PC and Wadsworth PC did not engage in grossly negligent or 
reckless conduct, willful or intentional misconduct, or any knowing violation of law.  Thus, to 
the extent the 2015 version of the act applies here, the Siddoway Parties failed to prove any 
breach of the duty of care. 
45. Under the predecessor version of the act, Reese PC and Wadsworth PC, as 
members of the member-managed Wadsworth Reese, owed a duty of care to the company and 
Siddoway PC, requiring them “to act with the care that a person in a like position would 
reasonably exercise under similar circumstances and in a manner the member reasonably 
believes to be in the best interests of the company.”  I.C. § 30-6-409(3).  This duty is subject to 
the “business judgment rule.”  Id. 
46. In the context of corporations, “the ‘business judgment rule’ immunizes the good 
faith acts of directors when the directors are acting within the powers of the corporation and 
within the exercise of their honest business judgment.  The burden of proving bad faith rests on 
the [claimant].”  Steelman v. Mallory, 110 Idaho 510, 513, 716 P.2d 1282, 1285 (1986) (internal 
citations omitted).  “[U]nder the law of many jurisdictions, the business judgment rule applies 
similarly across the range of business organizations.”  I.C. § 30-6-409 cmt.  Thus, the Court will 
apply it in like fashion to the members of a member-managed limited liability company. 
47. Both Wadsworth PC and Reese PC voted for Wadsworth Reese to fund the 
litigation and arbitration over the Reese Agreement.  (Tr. 128:4–129:23.)  Wadsworth PC wasn’t 
a party to the Reese Agreement and had no direct personal interest in the litigation and 
arbitration over it.  Its vote therefore wasn’t a product of self-interest.  There is no reason to think 
that vote was cast in bad faith.  And, as already noted, funding the litigation and arbitration over 
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the Reese Agreement served Wadsworth Reese’s legitimate business purposes.  For these 
reasons, Wadsworth PC’s vote is protected by the “business judgment rule.”  The claim against it 
and its principal Wadsworth fails. 
48. Because the litigation and arbitration over the Reese Agreement directly impacted 
the interests of Reese PC and its principal Reese, Reese PC’s vote involved its self-interest.  The 
Court therefore assumes, without deciding, that Reese PC isn’t eligible to invoke the “business 
judgment rule” in protection of its vote.  Regardless, Reese PC had a reasonable basis to believe 
that Wadsworth Reese’s best interests were furthered by funding the litigation and arbitration 
over the Reese Agreement, so as to settle whether the Reese Agreement was enforceable and, if 
not, whether Reese PC was divested of ownership in Wadsworth Reese, as Siddoway PC 
contended, (Tr. 128:4–129:23).  Without settling these questions, Reese PC had little or no 
incentive to continue its association with Wadsworth Reese, and the end of that association likely 
would have imperiled the company’s survival.  Because it was reasonable for Reese PC to vote 
to cause Wadsworth Reese to fund the litigation and arbitration over the Reese Agreement, under 
section 30-6-409(3) its vote wasn’t a breach of fiduciary duty.  The claim against it and Reese 
fails as well. 
The Siddoway Parties’ Seventh Counterclaim:  accounting 
49. The Siddoway Parties’ Seventh Counterclaim seeks an accounting.  (Verified Am. 
Countercls. ¶¶ 142–45.)  Nowhere in their proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, 
however, is that claim even mentioned—not even in its listing of the claims and counterclaims 
that were tried.  (Siddoway’s Proposed Findings Fact & Conclusions Law 2.)  And even though 
the Wadsworth Reese Parties made an argument against the accounting claim in their proposed 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, (Pls.’ Proposed Findings Fact & Conclusions Law 16), 
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the Siddoway Parties still said nothing about it in their response.  The Siddoway Parties therefore 
abandoned the accounting claim.  As held in Conclusion of Law 20, supra, each side had to 
identify—in its proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law—the factual and legal grounds 
for the relief it seeks on the claims tried, or else be deemed to have waived the right to any relief 
to which it might otherwise have been entitled.  The Court will not hypothesize the factual and 
legal basis for the accounting claim.  It therefore fails. 
The Siddoway Parties’ Eighth Counterclaim:  spoliation of evidence 
50. The Court finds above that Wadsworth deleted draft text messages and e-mails on 
July 20, 2015, in the midst of the parties’ negotiations for Wadsworth and Reese or their 
companies to buy out Siddoway PC’s interest in Wadsworth Reese.  His actions in that regard 
are the sole basis for the Siddoway Parties’ Eighth Counterclaim, for spoliation.  (Verified Am. 
Countercls. ¶¶ 146–49.)  “[T]he doctrine of spoliation provides that when a party with a duty to 
preserve evidence intentionally destroys it, an inference arises that the destroyed evidence was 
unfavorable to that party.”  Bromley v. Garey, 132 Idaho 807, 812, 979 P.2d 1165, 1170 (1999) 
(citing Stuart v. State, 127 Idaho 806, 907 P.2d 783 (1995)).  Such a duty derives from a party’s 
having had “some notice that the documents were potentially relevant to litigation before they 
were destroyed.”  Performance Chevrolet, Inc. v. Mkt. Scan Info. Sys., Inc., 2006 WL 1042359, 
at *1 (D. Idaho Apr. 18, 2006) (citing United States v. Kitsap Physicians Serv., 314 F.3d 995, 
1001 (9th Cir.2002)).  The relief the Siddoway Parties seek on their spoliation claim is an 
inference that the deleted items reflect Wadsworth’s and Reese’s “planning of nefarious acts,” 
namely forcing Siddoway PC out of Wadsworth Reese.  (Siddoway’s Proposed Findings Fact & 
Conclusions Law 12–13.) 
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51. Merely negligent destruction of evidence doesn’t amount to spoliation; bad faith 
is required.  Courtney v. Big O Tires, Inc., 139 Idaho 821, 824, 87 P.3d 930, 933 (2003).  For bad 
faith to be found, “the circumstances must indicate that the evidence was lost or destroyed 
because the party responsible for such loss or destruction did not want the evidence available for 
use by an adverse party in pending or reasonably foreseeable litigation.”  Id. (emphasis added).  
Reasonably foreseeable litigation must be distinguished from litigation that is merely possible.  
When litigation is “merely possible” but not “reasonably foreseeable,” a majority of courts hold 
that destruction of potentially relevant evidence doesn’t amount to spoliation.  Performance 
Chevrolet, 2006 WL 1042359, at *1 (citing James T. Killelea, Spoliation of Evidence, 70 
Brooklyn L. Rev. 1045, 1050 (2005)). 
52. Litigation wasn’t reasonably foreseeable when Wadsworth deleted the draft text 
messages and e-mails.  Only three days earlier, the parties had signed a letter of intent for 
Wadsworth and Reese or their respective companies to buy out Siddoway PC’s interest in 
Wadsworth Reese.  (Pls.’ Ex. 25.)  Wadsworth did send Reese an e-mail that day, after a 
disappointing meeting about the prospective buyout, in which he mused, “After the meeting 
today, why am I willing to move forward with anything besides forcing Randy out of SWR and 
letting the chips fall?”  (Pls.’ Ex. 27, at 3.)  But the parties’ buyout negotiations continued for a 
few more weeks, (see Pls.’ Exs. 29–30), and there is no good reason to think Wadsworth’s 
engagement in them was a sham that concealed a plan to force Siddoway PC out of Wadsworth 
Reese, leading to litigation between the parties.  That this litigation wasn’t reasonably 
foreseeable when Wadsworth deleted the draft text messages and e-mails, some five months 
before this action was filed, is one reason the Siddoway Parties’ spoliation claim fails. 
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53. Another reason is the absence of evidence that Wadsworth acted in bad faith.  Bad 
faith, as already noted, is essential to a spoliation claim.  Wadsworth deleted draft text messages 
and e-mails that he prepared but never sent, (Tr. 778:1–780:2), coming to view them as a 
hyperemotional reaction to the difficulties in finalizing buyout negotiations, (Tr. 778:13–17).  
There was no evidence that his aim, in deleting his own draft communications, was to avoid 
giving litigation ammunition to the Siddoway Parties.  Instead, he deleted them simply because 
he no longer wished to send them.  Deletion in that circumstance is normal human behavior and 
not the slightest bit suggestive of scheming for an undeserved litigation advantage. 
54. “The application of the spoliation doctrine is within the discretion of the trial 
court.”  Ada Cty. Highway Dist. v. Total Success Invs., LLC, 145 Idaho 360, 368, 179 P.3d 323, 
331 (2008).  Unconvinced that the Siddoway Parties have shown either that litigation was 
reasonably foreseeable when Wadsworth deleted his own draft text messages and e-mails or that 
he deleted them in bad faith, the Court exercises its discretion to reject the Siddoway Parties’ 
spoliation claim.  Thus, the Court declines to infer that the content of the deleted items would’ve 
been favorable in some way to the Siddoway Parties in this litigation. 
The Siddoway Parties’ Tenth Counterclaim:  unjust enrichment 
55. The Reese Agreement required Reese PC to pay Siddoway PC $200,000 for “the 
right to receive” a one-third membership interest in Wadsworth Reese.  (Pls.’ Ex. 14 §§ 1–2.)  
That is the price for which Siddoway PC would “sell certain assets used in [its] accounting 
practice” to Reese PC, and then those assets would be jointly contributed to Wadsworth Reese by 
Reese PC and Siddoway PC in return for one-third membership interests in Wadsworth Reese.  
(Id., second Recitals clause.)  The Reese Agreement didn’t specify the assets to be contributed, 
but the evidence shows that the reason for this arrangement was that Reese PC was expected to 
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bring almost no client relationships to Wadsworth Reese, whereas Siddoway PC was expected to 
bring a great deal of them, so Reese PC had to pay Siddoway PC cash to justify being an equal 
member.  The $200,000 price was derived first by taking 80% of the past annual collections 
generated by Siddoway PC’s client base—the resulting figure being the deemed value of the 
client base—and then by taking half of the resulting figure, as Reese PC was essentially buying 
half the client base, not all of it.  (Tr. 137:13–139:16.)  
56. After the Reese Agreement was declared void in arbitration, the Siddoway Parties 
asserted their Tenth Counterclaim, through which they claim Reese PC has been unjustly 
enriched by the value of its one-third membership interest in Wadsworth Reese, which they say 
Reese PC obtained by virtue of the Reese Agreement.  (Verif. Am. Countercls. ¶¶ 157–65.)  
Before trial, the Court rejected the premise that Reese PC obtained its interest in Wadsworth 
Reese under the Reese Agreement.  (Mem. Decision & Order Pls.’ Mot. Summ. J. 11.)  For that 
reason, the Court ruled that the value of Reese PC’s membership interest couldn’t possibly be the 
right way to measure any unjust enrichment.  (Id.)  The Court said it was receptive, though, to 
measuring unjust enrichment by the degree (if any) to which Reese PC’s benefit from Siddoway 
PC’s contributions to Wadsworth Reese exceeds the $28,000 Reese PC paid to Siddoway PC 
under the Reese Agreement.  (Id. at 10–11.) 
57. As already noted, “[t]he elements of unjust enrichment are that (1) a benefit is 
conferred on the defendant by the plaintiff; (2) the defendant appreciates the benefit; and (3) it 
would be inequitable for the defendant to accept the benefit without payment of the value of the 
benefit.”  Countrywide Home Loans, 160 Idaho at 272, 371 P.3d at 326 (quoting Teton Peaks, 
146 Idaho at 398, 195 P.3d at 1211).  As held in Conclusion of Law 19, supra, Siddoway PC 
conferred a benefit on Reese PC by transitioning its established client relationships to 
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Wadsworth Reese in general and to Reese in particular as the servicing accountant.  This benefit 
was appreciated by Reese PC; it expanded Reese’s ability to serve clients on Wadsworth Reese’s 
behalf, furnishing part of the justification for Wadsworth Reese’s payment of $7500 monthly 
management fees to Reese PC.  Thus, the first two elements of the Siddoway Parties’ claim for 
unjust enrichment are satisfied.  Just the third element is in dispute.  The Court therefore must 
consider what the evidence shows about the degree to which Reese PC benefited from Siddoway 
PC’s contribution of its established client relationships to Wadsworth Reese, so as to compare 
that benefit with the $28,000 Reese PC paid to Siddoway PC under the Reese Agreement. 
58. The Siddoway Parties argue that the evidence shows they contributed client 
relationships worth $184,577.44 to Wadsworth Reese.  (Siddoway’s Proposed Findings Fact & 
Conclusions Law 16–17.)  The $184,577.44 figure has three components:  (i) $98,717.60, 
calculated by taking 80% of the $123,397 (rounded to the nearest dollar) in 2016 collections 
achieved by Wadsworth Reese from the Siddoway PC client base; (ii) $33,020.40, calculated by 
taking 80% of the $224,670.50 in 2016 collections achieved by Wadsworth Reese from the 
Harding clients and then subtracting from the resulting figure the debt still owed on the Harding 
note; and (iii) $52,837.44, calculated by taking 80% of the $198,140.39 in 2016 collections 
achieved by Wadsworth Reese from clients originated by Wadsworth Reese accountants (as 
opposed to having been brought into the company at its inception, or having been purchased by 
the company from some other accounting firm) and dividing the resulting figure by three.7  (Id.; 
Pls.’ Ex. 102, at 30.)  As the final step in their calculation, the Siddoway Parties offset against 
the $184,577.44 figure the $28,000 paid by Reese PC to Siddoway PC under the Reese 
                                                          
7 The reason for division by three isn’t explained, but presumably it lies in Wadsworth Reese 
having had three members. 
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Agreement, leaving $156,577.44 as the amount by which they say Reese PC has been unjustly 
enriched.  (Siddoway’s Proposed Findings Fact & Conclusions Law 17.) 
59. The Siddoway Parties’ rationale for including the second and third components in 
their unjust-enrichment calculation isn’t clear.  Under the Reese Agreement, Reese PC agreed to 
pay Siddoway PC $200,000 for what amounted to a one-half interest in Siddoway PC’s client 
base (the contribution of which to Wadsworth Reese would justify Reese PC’s one-third 
membership interest).  Siddoway PC’s client base didn’t include the Harding clients.  Instead, in 
early 2014, Wadsworth Reese (then known by a different name) bought the Harding clients.  
(Pls.’ Ex. 15.)  Because Wadsworth Reese bought the Harding clients, it’s simply not accurate 
for the Siddoway Parties to say that they conferred on Reese PC, under the Reese Agreement or 
otherwise, the benefit associated with the Harding clients.  Similarly, the clients originated by 
Wadsworth Reese accountants aren’t part of what Reese PC agreed to buy from Siddoway PC 
under the Reese Agreement.  The evidence doesn’t support the conclusion that the benefit 
associated with these clients somehow was conferred on Reese PC by the Siddoway Parties.  
Accordingly, the Siddoway Parties aren’t entitled to any compensation in respect of the second 
and third components of their calculation.  That leaves the first component. 
60. The total amount Wadsworth Reese collected from former Siddoway PC clients in 
2016 was $123,397 (rounded to the nearest dollar).  (Tr. 936:19–938:22; Pls.’ Ex. 102, at 30.)  
This total includes payments for services rendered by Wadsworth Reese not only in 2016 but 
also in 2014 and 2015, (Tr. 938:18–22), but the record doesn’t show the degree to which it is 
attributable to services rendered before the Siddoway Parties cut ties with Wadsworth Reese in 
August 2015, or instead to services rendered after the cutting of ties.  In any event, Siddoway PC 
contends Reese PC derived a benefit equal to 80% of $123,397, or $98,717.60, from this 
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revenue.  (Siddoway’s Proposed Findings Fact & Conclusions Law 16.)  It isn’t clear what the 
80% factor deducts for, but it is clear that it comes from the formula to which Reese PC and 
Siddoway PC agreed in setting the $200,000 price under the Reese Agreement for Reese PC to 
purchase a one-half interest in Siddoway PC’s established client base.  (Tr. 137:13–139:16.)  
That formula also contained a second adjustment, by which the result after application of the 
80% factor was reduced by another 50%, given that Reese PC was buying only a one-half 
interest in Siddoway PC’s established client base.  (Id.)  For reasons they don’t explain, the 
Siddoway Parties don’t apply this 50% factor here.  Perhaps that’s because, by 2016, they had 
cut ties with Wadsworth Reese and were no longer benefiting from the revenue Wadsworth 
Reese generated by serving the Siddoway PC client base, to whatever extent those clients 
remained with Wadsworth Reese.  But Reese PC undeniably shared the benefit of that revenue 
equally with Wadsworth PC—both received identical monthly management fees, and neither 
received any profit distributions—so Reese PC garnered no more than half the benefit.  
Consequently, the Siddoway Parties’ $98,717.60 figure would have to be reduced by 50% to 
account for Wadsworth PC’s share of the benefit.  This leaves $49,358.80—only $21,358.50 
more than the $28,000 Reese PC paid to Siddoway PC under the Reese Agreement. 
61. The question becomes whether the Siddoway Parties have proved that it would be 
unjust for Reese PC to retain the excess benefit of $21,358.50 (or whatever other amount the 
excess benefit might be calculated as) it arguably received under the Reese Agreement over and 
above the $28,000 it paid to Siddoway PC.  The Court concludes they failed to so prove.  The 
Siddoway Parties cut ties with Wadsworth Reese fairly early in the course of transitioning the 
Siddoway PC client base to Wadsworth Reese in general, and partly to Reese as the servicing 
accountant in particular.  The cutting of ties so early in the transition period wasn’t contemplated 
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by the Reese Agreement, and it created great potential for client flight.  A large share of the 
Siddoway PC client base—hundreds of clients, (Pls.’ Ex. 44; Tr. 653:17–655:3)—promptly left 
Wadsworth Reese for Dustin Siddoway’s new accounting firm.  The cutting of ties, which the 
Court finds above was volitional on the part of the Siddoway Parties and not the product of any 
effort by Wadsworth Reese’s other members to force Siddoway PC out of the company, would 
have largely deprived Reese PC of the benefit of the bargain represented by the Reese 
Agreement, had it been enforceable in the first place.  That Wadsworth Reese was able to hang 
onto some fraction of the Siddoway PC client base, no thanks to the Siddoway Parties, doesn’t 
make it unjust for Reese PC not to further compensate Siddoway PC for those clients.  Indeed, 
the Court can’t even discern from the record the extent to which Wadsworth Reese actually hung 
onto the Siddoway PC client base, as the 2016 revenue figure upon which the Siddoway Parties’ 
unjust-enrichment calculation is based apparently includes some amount of revenue for services 
performed before the August 2015 cutting of ties.  (Tr. 938:18–22.) 
62. The Court also considered significant, for this purpose, the respective 
contributions of effort made by Reese PC and Siddoway PC during the approximately twenty 
months they were actively engaged together in pursuing Wadsworth Reese’s business.  During 
that period, Reese PC and Siddoway PC received the same compensation from Wadsworth 
Reese:  $7500 monthly management fees and little else.  It seems reasonably clear from the 
evidence that Reese (and thus Reese PC) was actively engaged throughout that period in 
servicing Wadsworth Reese clients, leading directly to the generation of revenue that contributed 
to the company’s ability to pay the monthly management fees.  Whether the same is true of 
Siddoway (and thus Siddoway PC) was never as clear to the Court.  Consequently, at the end of 
the trial, the Court was left with the impression that, though Siddoway PC brought more clients 
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into the venture, Reese PC likely performed much more of the work necessary to service them, 
(Defs.’ Ex. 1010; Pls.’ Ex. 49; Tr. 66:10–67:1, 189:20–192:4, 266:1–9), militating against the 
conclusion that Reese PC has been unjustly enriched. 
63. In sum, the Siddoway Parties haven’t shown that it is unjust, under the 
circumstances, for the Court to leave the parties where it found them:  Reese PC having paid 
only part of the agreed price for Siddoway PC’s unenforceable—and only partly performed—
obligation to transition its client base to Wadsworth Reese. 
Accordingly, 
 IT IS ORDERED that no relief is awarded to any party as a result of the trial proceedings.  
Judgment will be entered in a separate document.  
 
 
   _____________________________ 
   Jason D. Scott 
      DISTRICT JUDGE  
Signed: 3/16/2018 11:08 AM
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
 I hereby certify that on _____________________, I served a true and correct copy of the 




FISHER RAINEY HUDSON 
950 W Bannock St, Ste 630 
Boise, ID 83702 
VIA EMAIL: vaughn@frhtriallawyers.com 
                       jennifer@frhtriallawyers.com 
 
Bret Hastings 
Hastings Law, Group LLC 
299 S Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
VIA EMAIL: Brett@HastingsLaw.us 
 
Glenn Godfrey, Jr.  
842 W. Winding Creek Drive  
Eagle, ID 83616  




 CHRISTOPHER D. RICH 








Signed: 3/16/2018 11:36 AM
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JUDGMENT - 1 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA  
WADSWORTH REESE, PLLC, an Idaho 
Professional Corporation; CLARK A. REESE 
CPA, P.C., an Idaho Professional Corporation; 
and WADSWORTH ACCOUNTING CPA, an 
Idaho Professional Corporation, 
Plaintiffs-Counterdefendants, 
vs. 
SIDDOWAY & COMPANY, PC, an Idaho 
professional corporation; and RANDY 
SIDDOWAY, an individual, 
Defendants-Counterclaimants. 
 
Case No. CV-OC-2015-21225 
JUDGMENT 
 
SIDDOWAY & COMPANY, PC, an Idaho 
professional corporation; RANDY 
SIDDOWAY, an individual, 
Counterclaimants, 
vs. 
FREDERICK WADSWORTH, an individual; 






JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
Effective September 18, 2017, Defendant Siddoway & Company, PC is dissociated as a 
member of Plaintiff Wadsworth Reese, PLLC.  Since that date, with respect to its ownership 
interest in Wadsworth Reese, PLLC, Siddoway & Company, PC has been a “transferee” as 
defined in I.C. § 30-25-102(a)(12) and an “Assignee” as defined in section 1.4(a) of Wadsworth 




Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk -
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JUDGMENT - 2 
No further relief is awarded to any party.  
 
 
   _____________________________ 
   Jason D. Scott 
      DISTRICT JUDGE  
Signed: 3/16/2018 11:08 AM
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
 I hereby certify that on _____________________, I served a true and correct copy of the 




FISHER RAINEY HUDSON 
950 W Bannock St, Ste 630 
Boise, ID 83702 
VIA EMAIL: vaughn@frhtriallawyers.com 
                       jennifer@frhtriallawyers.com 
 
Bret Hastings 
Hastings Law, Group LLC 
299 S Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
VIA EMAIL: Brett@HastingsLaw.us 
 
Glenn Godfrey, Jr.  
842 W. Winding Creek Drive  
Eagle, ID 83616  




 CHRISTOPHER D. RICH 








Signed: 3/16/2018 11:37 AM
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Brett W. Hastings [Utah Bar No. 15442] 
HASTINGS LAW GROUP, LLC 
299 South Main Street, 13th Flor 
Salt Lake City, Utah  84110 
Email:  Brett@HastingsLaw.us 
Telephone:  (801) 721-8066 
Attorney, pro hac vice, for Appellants  
 
 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
 
 
WADSWORTH REESE, PLLC,  an Idaho 
professional corporation; CLARK A. REESE 
CPA, P.C., an Idaho professional corporation; 
and WADSWORTH ACCOUNTING CPA, 
PLLC and Idaho professional limited liability 
company, 
     Plaintiffs/Respondents 
v. 
 
SIDDOWAY & COMPANY, PC, an Idaho 
professional corporation; RANDY 
SIDDOWAY, an individual; DUSTIN 
SIDDOWAY; an individual; and JEANINE 
BARKAN, an individual, 
     Defendants/Appellants 
 
 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
 
Civil No.: CV OC 1521225 
 
Judge Jason D. Scott  
 
CLARK A. REESE, an individual, CLARK A. 
REESE CPA, P.C., an Idaho professional 
corporation; FREDERICK WADSWORTH, an 
individual, and WADSWORTH 
ACCOUNTING CPA, PLLC an Idaho 
professional limited liability company, 










Glenn W. Godfrey, Jr. [Idaho Bar No. 1662] 
GODFREY LAW, PLLC 
842 E. Winding Creek Drive 
Eagle, Idaho  83616 
Telephone: (208) 392-1551 
Email: GodfreyLawPLLC@gmail.com 
Local Counsel for Appellants 
Electronically Filed
5/29/2018 12:49 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Austen Joseph, Deputy Clerk
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TO: RESPONDENTS WADSWORTH REESE, PLLC, CLARK A. REESE CPA, P.C., 
CLARK A REESE, WADSWORTH ACCOUNTING CPA, PLLC, AND FREDERICK 
WADSWORTH (“RESPONDENTS”), AND RESPONDENTS’ ATTORNEYS, 
FISHER RAINEY HUDSON, 950 W. BANNOCK STREET, SUITE 630, BOISE, ID  
83702, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT.   
  
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
 
1. Appellants Siddoway & Company, PC (“Siddoway PC”) and Randy Siddoway 
(“Randy” and collectively, “Appellants”), appeal against the above-named Respondents to the 
Idaho Supreme Court from final judgment entered in the above-entitled action on May 16, 2018, 
and the Order Denying Attorney’s Fees entered on April 16, 2018, the Honorable Judge Jason D. 
Scott presiding. 
2. That Appellants have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgments 
or orders described in paragraph 1 are appealable orders under Idaho Appellate Rule 11(a). 
3. The issues Appellant intends to appeal includes, without limitation, the following: 
a) Did the trial court commit reversible error in denying Siddoway’s unjust 
enrichment claim against Reese as follows: 
i) Incorrectly calculating the value of the benefit bestowed on Clark A. 
Reese CPA, P.C. (“Reese PC”) and Clark A. Reese (“Reese” and 
collectively, the “Reese Parties”) by Siddoway PC/Randy. 
ii) Failing to properly consider and value the benefits bestowed upon the 
Reese Parties by Appellants through the Reese Agreement. 
iii) Failing to properly consider and apply the law of the case established in 
the trial court’s interlocutory rulings regarding the Reese Agreement, as 
such rulings apply to Appellant’s unjust enrichment claims. 
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iv) Failing to award Appellant’s any relief under their unjust enrichment 
claims even though the trial court calculated a benefit bestowed by 
Appellants on the Reese Parties of at least $21,358.50, for which the 
Reese Parties have not paid. 
 
b) Did the trial court commit reversible error in ruling that Respondents had a 
legitimate business purpose for using thousands of dollars of Wadsworth Reese 
funds to pay for the Reese Parties’ legal fees related to disputes with Appellants to 
which Wadsworth Reese was not a party? 
c)  Did the trial court commit reversible error by ruling that all of the legal fees of 
the three separate Respondents in this matter were properly borne by only one of 
the Respondents, namely Wadsworth Reese. 
d) Did the trial court commit reversible error by denying Appellants request for legal 
fees related to the arbitration hearings regarding the Reese Agreement? 
e) Did the trial court commit reversible error by holding that payment of legal fees 
for the benefit of Reese PC and Wadsworth PC did not constitute disproportionate 
distributions from Wadsworth Reese? 
f) Did the trial court commit reversible error by denying Appellant’s motion to 
amend its Counterclaims to bring a derivative action on behalf of Wadsworth 
Reese? 
4. No order has been entered in this matter sealing all or any portion of the record. 
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5. Appellant requests that a transcript of the trial proceedings of November 7, 2017 
through November 14, 2017 be included in this appeal, which transcript was previously obtained 
by Appellants and Respondents from court reporter Dianne E. Cromwell following trial. 
 
6. For purposes of this appeal, Appellants request only those records and documents 
automatically included under Idaho Appellate Rules 28 including, without limitation, all 
interlocutory orders, judgments, or decrees of the trial court. 
7. Regarding this appeal, Appellant certifies as follows: 
a) Although Appellant has requested a trial transcript, the transcript was previously 
obtained from the court reporter following trial by both Appellants and 
Respondents and, therefore, no further request is necessary.  Nevertheless, a copy 
of this notice of appeal has been or will be served on the trial court reporter. 
b) If any estimated fee is required by the clerk of the district court for the preparation 
of the trial transcript requested in ¶ 5, such fee has been paid. 
c) The estimated fee for preparation of the clerk’s record has been paid.  
d) The appellant filing fee has been paid. 
e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to 
Idaho Appellate Rules 20. 
Respectfully submitted this 29th day of May, 2018. 
/s/Brett W. Hastings_____________ 
      Brett W. Hastings 
HASTINGS LAW GROUP, LLC 
Attorney, pro hac vice, for Randy Siddoway and 




Wadsworth v. Siddoway 
Notice of Appeal 
000432
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
 I certify that on this 29th day of May, 2018, I served a true and correct copy of the 
forgoing Notice of Appeal on the following parties by the means indicated: 
via E-filing and E-mail     
FISHER RAINEY HUDSON     
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 630   
Boise, ID  83702     
Fax: (208) 297-2689     
Vaughn@FRHTrialLawyers.com   
Attorney for Respondents 
 
via E-mail 
Dianne E. Cromwell 
dcromwell@cableone.net 
Court Reporter    
     
/s/ Brett W. Hastings_______________ 
Brett W. Hastings   
HASTINGS LAW GROUP, LLC 
Attorney for Randy Siddoway and Siddoway Co., 
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Stephen W. Kenyon 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
451 W State Street 
Boise, Idaho 83720 
NO._ ----AM. -- -:.:"'iio---
-P.M.~ 
SEP 2 6 2018 
CHRISTOPHER 
By KELLE ~G:N'CeH, Clerk 
DEPlfTY R 
In re: Wadsworth Reese v. Siddoway & Company, Docket No. 
CVOC-15-21225 
Notice is hereby given that on Wednesday, September 26, 2018, I 
lodged a transcript of 1139 pages in length for the above-referenced 
appeal with the district court clerk of Ada County in the Fourth Judicial 
District. 
The following files were lodged: 
Proceeding 11/07/2017, Proceeding 11/08/2017, Proceeding 
11/09/2017, Proceeding 11/13/2017 and Proceeding 11/14/2017 
David Cromwell 
Tucker & Associates 
cc: sctfilings@idcourts.net 
PDF format of completed files emailed to Supreme Court 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
WADSWORTH REESE, PLLC, an Idaho 
professional corporation; CLARK A. REESE Supreme Court Case No. 46126 
CPA, P.C., an Idaho professional corporation; 
and WADSWORTH ACCOUNTING CPA, an CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
Idaho professional corporation, 
Plaintiffs-Counterdefendants- Respondents, 
vs. 
SIDDOWAY & COMPANY, PC, an Idaho 
professional corporation; RANDY 
SIDDOWAY, an individual, 
Defendants-Counterclaimants- Appellants. 
SIDDOWAY & COMPANY, PC, an Idaho 
professional corporation; RANDY 
SIDDOWAY, an individual, 
Counterclaimants-Appellants, 
vs. 
FREDERICK WADSWORTH, an individual; 
and CLARK A. REESE, an individual, 
Counterdefendants-Respondents. 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify: 
That the attached list of exhibits is a true and accurate copy of the exhibits being 
forwarded to the Supreme Court on Appeal. It should be noted, however, that Plaintiff's Exhibit 
No. 58 cannot be located; and that the following exhibits are copy protected and will be retained 
at the District Court clerk's office and will be made available for viewing upon request. 
I. Plaintiff's Exhibit 114-Audio Recording Dustin and Clark meeting #1. 
2. Plaintiff's Exhibit 115 -Audio Recording Dustin, Clark and Frederick meeting #2. 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 
Court this 26th day of September, 2018. 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
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SIDDOWAY & COMPANY, et al 
Defendants Attorneys 
BY NO. DESCRIPTION STATUS 
PLAINTIFF 1 E-mail from Randy to Jeanine and Dustin re: ADMIT 
Client Profit 11/7/17 
PLAINTIFF 3 E-mail from Randy to Dustin re: Operating ADMIT 
Agreement - AnchorPoint 11/9/17 
PLAINTIFF 4 E-mail from Randy to Dustin re: Quickbooks ADMIT 
Payroll Service Key 11/9/17 
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11/7/17 
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11/7/17 
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SIDDOWAY & COMPANY, et al 
Defendants Attorneys 
PLAINTIFF 25 LOI signed by Randy, Clark and Frederick ADMIT 
11/7/17 
PLAINTIFF 27 E-mail chain between Clark, Frederick and ADMIT 
Shannon 11/7/17 
PLAINTIFF 29 Additional clarification re: 3 Option offer ADMIT 
11/13/17 
PLAINTIFF 30 E-mail chain between R/C/F re: Buy-Out ADMIT 
11/13/17 
PLAINTFF 32 Frederick's handwritten notes re Randy ADMIT 
resignation 11/13/17 
PLAINTIFF 33 E-mail from Frederick to Clark and Randy re ADMIT 
notes from last Friday 11/7/17 
PLAINTIFF 34 E-mail from Clark to Jeanine re: status ADMIT 
11/7/17 
PLAINTIFF 35 Certificate of Organization - AnchorPoint ADMIT 
LLC 11/14/17 
PLAINTIFF 37 Certificate of Organization - AnchorPoint ADMIT 
Accounting PLLC 11/9/17 
PLAINTIFF 39 Text to Jennifer, Frederick and Clark about ADMIT 
Dustin in Randy's office 11/7/17 
PLAINTIFF 40 User activity for Randy Siddoway ADMIT 
11/7/17 
PLAINTIFF 41 Letter from Rick Tuha to Brett Hastings ADMIT 
11n111 
PLAINTIFF 42 SWR Letter to Randy re copy of Quickbooks ADMIT 
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SIDDOWAY & COMPANY, et al 
Defendants Attorneys 
PLAINTIFF 44 Client Releases AnchorPoint ADMIT 
11/7/17 
PLAINTIFF 49 Spreadsheet with Clark's proposed changes ADMIT 
to Randy's distribution 11/7/17 
PLAINTIFF 52 Texts between Clark, Federick- redacted ADMIT 
11/7/17 
PLAINTIFF 54 Texts between Frederick and Clark ADMIT 
11/13/17 
PLAINTIFF 58 Checks from Clark Reese CPA, P.C. to ADMIT 
Siddoway & Co. 11/7/17 
PLAINTIFF 60 User Activity for Jeanine Barkan ADMIT 
11/7/17 
PLAINTIFF 64 E-mail from Randy to Clark and Frederick ADMIT 
regarding Options 11/13/17 
PLAINTIFF 74 E-mail between CR/FW re: legal fees ADMIT 
11/14/17 
PLAINTIFF 79 Practice Report - 2014 billings through ADMIT 
8/31/15 with chart 11/13/17 
PLAINTIFF 93 UltraTax 2014 - User activity for select clients ADMIT 
11/13/17 
PLAINTIFF 95 WR PLLC Balance Sheets-2014-2017 ADMIT 
11/13/17 
PLAINTIFF 96 WR PLLC AR Ledger for select clients ADMIT 
11/13/17 
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SIDDOWAY & COMPANY, et al 
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PLAINTIFF 102 Practice Report - 2016 Collections by Office ADMIT 
11/14/17 
PLAINTIFF 104 Texts from Dustin Siddoway (produced ADMIT 
10/18/17) 11/8/17 
PLAINTIFF 105 Texts from Jeanine Barkan (produced 10/6/17) ADMIT 
11/8/17 
PLAINTIFF 106 E•mail to RS re transfer records and client ADMIT 
release 11/9/17 
PLAINTIFF 107 Randy calendar August/Sept. 2015 ADMIT 
11/9/17 
PLAINTIFF 108 Mountain West Bank short form credit ADMIT 
authorization - redacted 11/8/17 
PLAINTIFF 109 Jan•Dec 2015 AR aging provided to MWB for ADMIT 
AnchorPoint Accounting loan 11/9/17 
PLAINTIFF 110 Sub•Lease Agreement ADMIT 
11/9/17 
PLAINTIFF 112 Email from Jeanine to Dustin re Client Profit ADMIT 
081115 (2)(autosaved) with attachment 11/7/17 
PLAINTIFF 113 Letter from AnchorPoint Strategic CPAs to ADMIT 
Bravson Buckner 11/9/17 
PLAINTIFF 114 Audio Recording - Dustin and Clark meeting ADMIT 
#1 11/7/17 
PLAINTIFF 115 Audio Recording - Dustin, Clark and Frederick ADMIT 
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SIDDOWAY & COMPANY, et al 
Defendants Attorneys 
PLAINTIFF 116 Transcript of Audio Recording - Dustin ADMIT 
and Clark meeting #1 11/7/17 
PLAINTIFF 117 Transcript of Audio Recording - Dustin, ADMIT 
Clark and Frederick meeting #2 11/7/17 
PLAINTIFF 118 Expert witness report and valuation of ADMIT 
Peter Butler 11/9/17 
PLAINTIFF 127 QuickBooks printout identifying debits and ADMIT 
credits between AnchorPoint Accounting 11/9/17 
and Polestar 
PLAINTIFF 128 Letter from Brett Hastings to Rick Tuha ADMIT 
11/9/17 
PLAINTIFF 129 Polestar and AnchorPoint company ADMIT 
Logos and Imagery 11/9/17 
PLAINTIFF 131 E-mail from D. Siddoway to R. Siddoway ADMIT 
dtd 8/27/15 11/8/17 
PLAINTIFF 132 WR PLLC Annual Revenue Comparison REFERENCE 
DEFENDANT 1001 Minutes of SWR partner meetings drafted ADMIT 
by Wadsworth 11/13/17 
DEFENDANT 1004 3 Option offer to resolve partnership ADMIT 
differences 11/13/17 
DEFENDANT 1007 Offer of employment from Reese to Dustin ADMIT 
11/7/17 
DEFENDANT 1009 Letter from Hastings Law, LLC to Rick ADMIT 
Tuha refuting Randy resigned 11/7/17 
DEFENDANT 1010 E-mail from Randy to Reese, Wadsworth ADMIT 
and others containing client list and 11/7/17 
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SIDDOWAY & COMPANY, et al 
Defendants Attorneys 
DEFENDANT 1013 E-mail from Reese to SWR client ADMIT 
alleging Randy's resignation from SWR 11/7/17 
DEFENDANT 1015 Balance sheet of SWR dtd 9/1/2015 ADMIT 
11/09/17 
DEFENDANT 1016 Balance sheet of SWR dtd 9/18/17 ADMIT 
11/13/17 
DEFENDANT 1017 Certificate of Organization for CRS ADMIT 
Services, Inc. 11/7/17 
DEFENDANT 1019 FRH billing statements ADMIT 
11/13/17 
DEFENDANT 1020 Wadsworth Reese, PLLC, Client Profit ADMIT 
Report 11/8/17 
DEFENDANT 1029 Wadsworth Reese, PLLC Transactions ADMIT 
by Account report as of August 31, 2015 11/13/17 
DEFENDANT 1034 Wadsworth Reese, PLLC Transactions ADMIT 
by Account report Oct. 2016 - Sept. 11/13/17 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
WADSWORTH REESE, PLLC, an Idaho 
professional corporation; CLARK A. REESE Supreme Court Case No. 46126 
CPA, P.C., an Idaho professional corporation; 
and WADSWORTH ACCOUNTING CPA, an CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Idaho professional corporation, 
Plaintiffs-Counterdefendants- Respondents, 
vs. 
SIDDOWAY & COMPANY, PC, an Idaho 
professional corporation; RANDY 
SIDDOWAY, an individual, 
Def endants-Counterclaimants- Appellants. 
SID DO WAY & COMPANY, PC, an Idaho 
professional corporation; RANDY 
SIDDOWAY, an individual, 
Counterclaimants-Appellants, 
vs. 
FREDERICK WADSWORTH, an individual; 
and CLARK A. REESE, an individual, 
Counterdefendants-Respondents. 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have 
personally served or mailed, by either United States Mail or Interdepartmental Mail, one copy of 
the following: 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
WADSWORTH REESE, PLLC, an Idaho 
professional corporation; CLARK A. REESE Supreme Court Case No. 46126 
CPA, P.C., an Idaho professional corporation; 
and WADSWORTH ACCOUNTING CPA, an CERTIFICATE TO RECORD 
Idaho professional corporation, 
Plaintiffs-Counterdefendants- Respondents, 
vs. 
SIDDOWAY & COMPANY, PC, an Idaho 
professional corporation; RANDY 
SIDDOWAY, an individual, 
Defendants-Counterclaimants- Appellants. 
SIDDOWAY & COMPANY, PC, an Idaho 
professional corporation; RANDY 
SIDDOWAY, an individual, 
Counterclaimants-Appellants, 
vs. 
FREDERICK WADSWORTH, an individual; 
and CLARK A. REESE, an individual, 
Counterdefendants-Respondents. 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing record in 
the above-entitled cause was compiled under my direction and is a true and correct record of the 
pleadings and documents that are automatically required under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules, 
as well as those requested by Counsel. 
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD 
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I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court on the 
29th day of May, 2018. 
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